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2ABSTRACT
In the decade of the 1990s international criminal justice and the international 
tribunals that enforce it emerged in international society as a major dimension of 
international relations. This has led to a widely held belief — further strengthened by the 
establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court — that genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes will now consistently be punished by a legal sanction 
that was previously lacking. The literature in the field has overwhelmingly fostered this 
impression. But international criminal tribunals are created by sovereign states. Despite 
the rhetoric that drove this surge in the 1990s, because international justice is part of 
international relations, it is subject to the strategic imperatives of states, civil society and 
other actors, and these frequently clash. Thus it is argued that international justice can be 
most accurately explicated from the perspective not solely of legal rules of international 
humanitarian law, but from that of the theories and practice of international relations. The 
Nuremberg trials generated precedents in international law that have given impetus to the 
movement for individual criminal accountability. But to stress this fact alone is a 
selective reading of history, for the trials were essentially a case far more of justice as 
strategy than justice as policy. The nature of the international society means that the 
relationship between justice and the order that sustains that society is largely, though not 
completely, one of tension and contradiction. This thesis examines these tensions and 
contradictions and how they are resolved. It shows that the (anarchical) international 
society, and not the much talked about “international community” is the dominant 
context of how international justice actually works. The ad hoc tribunals do not represent 
the enthronement of justice as policy, but rather are political responses to crimes in 
selected, narrow geographies in which the society of states chose not to exercise political 
options that would have led to preventive action. The International Criminal Court does 
not represent “the end of history” in international justice. Efforts by liberal 
internationalism to universalize international justice through universal jurisdiction have 
been largely unsuccessful. So have the attempted prosecutions of persons who are seen 
as guardians of particular national, regional or international orders. And efforts to give 
the jurisdiction of the ICC primacy over that of sovereign states and limit the scope of 
action of some great powers have been robustly resisted. These cases demonstrate that, 
for as long as states remain the predominant organizing unit of international society, these 
tensions will remain. The international justice we see is conditional -- one that is 
selective, inconsistent, and either serves strategic ends or is only a product of political 
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4Preface
This thesis attempts to examine the concept and phenomenon of international 
criminal justice from a political and strategic perspective. It analyzes the place of legal 
justice for violations of international humanitarian law by war crimes tribunals in 
international relations, the rise of these kinds of courts and their limits in a world of 
states, and the tensions between the political responses to international justice and the 
aspirations of “legalism” to neutrality, consistency and universality.
The working hypothesis of this inquiry is that the relationship between 
international justice and sovereign states, portrayed through the perspective of “order”, is 
a complex one, and that the assertion that globalization or cosmopolitanism has become 
the defining character of international justice is overstated and overrated. I attempt to 
demonstrate this hypothesis from a conceptual perspective (positing that the 
“international society” perspective of the “English School” of International Relations, not 
the “international community” approach, is still the dominant influence in international 
justice), a case study of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and a concluding 
examination of the International Criminal Court.
The thesis has its origins in my association with international justice as a legal and 
policy adviser in the ICTR for five years, my career in the United Nations in general over 
the past 13 years, and a long-held desire to reflect in-depth on a topic of international law 
and politics and attempt to make a contribution to knowledge on the subject matter 
through a PhD thesis.
Not surprisingly, researching and writing this thesis has been a most fulfilling task 
despite the “distraction” of having to work full time on a day job while doing this. And it
5has been possible only because of the support of individuals whom I acknowledge here 
with heartfelt gratitude. I was fortunate to have been supervised by Dr. Peter Wilson, 
Senior Lecturer in the IR Department at LSE. He introduced me to the English School 
and the influential work of Hedley Bull, and that introduction helped sharpen the line of 
inquiry I followed in this thesis -  one that I believe is more original and provocative than 
the lines of “conventional wisdom” I might otherwise have followed. Of course I take 
full responsibility for any shortcomings. I am grateful to Dr. Wilson for his guidance.
I am also grateful to Professor William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Saltaire), 
former Director of the Doctoral Program in IR, whose decision to admit me to the 
program gave me such a great opportunity to explore new ideas. Angeline Djampou, 
Chief Librarian at the ICTR, gave me wonderful support through the online research 
assistance she so consistently provided. This thesis would have been so much poorer 
without her help.
The love and companionship of my wife Maryanne made this work possible, and I 
cannot measure that gift. She provided the supportive environment without which this 
would have been a much harder task. My children Tobenna, Sochi, Yagazie and Chidera, 
who initially wondered why Daddy was “always writing” but later got used to it all, also 
deserve my thanks and gratitude for their family time that this project severely ate into. I 
hope that as they grow older and read this work, they will understand.
I am eternally thankful to my parents Isaac (now deceased) and Vidah Moghalu 
for their love and nurturing, encouraging my aspiration to undertake a task such as this in 
my education. My father is not alive to hold this in his hands, but the seed he planted 
bore fruit.




Introduction: War Crimes Justice in International Relations
In the spring of 2005, as countries seeking permanent seats in an enlarged United 
Nations Security Council crisscrossed the globe lobbying for their favored outcome in the 
context of proposals to reform the organization,1 Japan’s bid for a permanent seat ran into 
a significant obstacle. Twenty-two million private Chinese citizens, with apparently tacit 
approval of their government, signed a petition seeking to have the Chinese government 
use its veto power in the Council to block Japan’s bid for admission to the most elite club 
in world politics, one entrusted with the responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The campaign was soon followed by angry 
demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities including Chengdu, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou in which Japanese shops were vandalized and its embassy pelted with stones 
and eggs.2 China’s angst was fed by simmering tensions over war crimes committed by 
Japanese forces in China during World War II, for which Japan had declined to apologize 
and stood accused of historical revisionism.
As tensions rose in East Asia, some commentators argued that Japan, which has 
long sought increased political clout to match its economic one, had to come to terms 
with its past in the region if it wanted the region’s cooperation in its quest for a 
permanent seat at the Security Council. A newspaper editorial in the Gulf state of the 
United Arab Emirates put the demand starkly:
Having mastered economics and technology, Japan is still having trouble with history.
Admittedly, it is in a neighborhood where history is held hostage to the present. The
9North Koreans treat it as party propaganda, while the Chinese are extremely selective 
about what they teach schoolchildren.
The trouble for Japan is that its inability to come up with a history syllabus that 
acknowledges the brutality it inflicted on its neighbors during the Second World War is 
tarnishing its future prospects. The latest attempt to rewrite its history textbooks brought 
a chorus of condemnation from both China and South Korea. That’s bad enough but this 
is a pivotal year for Tokyo as it tries to press its case for a permanent United Nations 
Security Council seat. Its prospects of sitting at the highest table in world diplomacy are 
lessened by its constant refusal to teach its young about dark deeds that occurred 
generations ago. For Japan to secure its future, it must come to terms with its history.3
Others argued that enlarging the Security Council without Japan (other states such 
as Germany, India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt have sought permanent 
membership on the strength of a case for a broad-based decision making body) would 
“make nonsense of the whole exercise” and that Japan’s membership was necessary to 
check China’s rising influence in the region.4 If anyone needed any demonstration of 
how war crimes -  and questions of justice for them -  affect world order, this was it. A 
reform proposal for a modification of the architecture of multilateral diplomacy in the 
21st century had run into unresolved tensions with roots in violations of international 
humanitarian law committed early in the 20th.
This thesis seeks to establish the political nature of legal justice for violations of 
international humanitarian law by analyzing why and how such justice is affected by 
political considerations. To that end I will undertake a novel application of an existing 
theoretical perspective in international relations to international justice for war crimes.
There are few ideals that capture the popular imagination as the concept of justice. 
That crimes or violations of the rights of individuals and groups should be punished or 
otherwise rectified, and that wrongdoers get their just desserts. That is why trials for 
mass atrocities such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are such 
flashpoints in national and international society. These crimes are often committed by 
powerful political leaders and armed forces and target groups of people by reason of their 
ethnic, political or religious affiliation, or in the case of war crimes, target military 
personnel and civilians in ways not permitted by the laws and customs of war. 
Collectively, these crimes, whether committed in times of war or peace, constitute 
violations of international humanitarian law.
International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law has for several centuries referred to a set of standards to 
be observed by parties in armed conflict, and so has historically been largely applicable 
to soldiers. It was aimed at humanizing war -  an oxymoron5 -- by protecting wounded 
and sick soldiers and prisoners of war, and delineating what methods and means may or 
may not be used in combat.6 Following U.S. President Abraham Lincoln’s promulgation 
of the “Lieber Code” (Instructions for the Government o f the United States Armies in 
Field) that codified the customary law of war on land during the American Civil War, 
these humanitarian standards were codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1929 and 
1949, and the two sets of treaties signed at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, widely known 
as the Hague Conventions. The Geneva Conventions aim to provide legal protection for
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victims of war, while the Hague Conventions regulate how and with what means war can 
be legitimately fought.
The instruments of international humanitarian law were initially applicable only 
in international armed conflicts, and then only to soldiers and not civilians. But through 
the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 they were respectively extended to civilians 
and the non-international conflicts that have constituted the bulk of contemporary wars. 
Within the wider framework of the protection of human rights, international humanitarian 
law has also become increasingly applicable in times of “peace” in which there may be 
no easily definable conflict between two or more parties. Thus genocide and crimes 
against humanity do not require a war in order to be committed; they can be perpetrated 
against civilians in peacetime for purely political or at least non-military reasons. The 
nature of acts that constitute violations of international humanitarian law remains in 
constant evolution. With the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court, 
the ambit of these crimes has expanded to include attacks against United Nations 
peacekeepers. In the war against terrorism, the status of captured terrorists under the 
Geneva Conventions has become a matter of legal and policy debate7.
International humanitarian law has long been part of mankind’s recorded history, 
but beqdme codified only as from the 19 century. As Yves Beigbeder has observed, 
moral, philosophical and religious considerations led to the setting of unilateral and 
bilateral agreements seeking to contain and limit the cruelty of war8. In The Art o f War, 
the acclaimed Chinese classic on war and military strategy written by Sun Tzu in 500 BC, 
Tzu laid down the limits of what was permissible in war: the need to avoid excessive 
violence and a ban on the complete destruction of enemies9. In India, the Hindu code of
Manu, developed around 200 BC, contained references to, and prohibitions of war crimes 
such as the killing of an enemy with a concealed weapon, attacking a combatant who has 
surrendered, and attacking a wounded or fleeing enemy.10 These standards were
i t .
progressively adopted in Europe between the fourth and 15 centuries A.D., including the 
issuance by the Swedish King Gustave II Adolphus of the Articles o f War decree in 1621 
in which rape in war was to be met with capital punishment. Although violations of 
international humanitarian law are punishable under international law -  and in some 
cases in national jurisdictions -  there have been very few instances of enforcement of 
these prohibitions despite the historically loud abhorrence of such crimes expressed by 
political and military leaders. This is a central challenge that international humanitarian 
law continues to face, for reasons that are precisely the subject of this inquiry.
Justice — Some Definitions
The popular fixation with the idea of justice actually springs from a certain 
duality in human nature. There is a strong instinct towards injustice because unjust acts 
frequently procure some advantage for the person who is unjust. But the evil that the 
victim of injustice suffers far outweighs the temporary benefits injustice confers on the 
person who commits it, and the instinct to be unjust has come to be checked by law and 
by moral precepts11. There is thus a certain tendency to see war crimes trials, somewhat 
romantically, as mechanisms for neutral, impartial justice meted out to the really nasty 
fellows who commit egregious violations of human rights -  “ethnic cleansing”, raping 
and pillaging war victims, and so on. That is undoubtedly the case. But it is an 
incomplete picture. This is so because war crimes justice is framed and carried on in a
political context of sovereign states. War crimes tribunals are created by political bodies 
and processes, be they decisions of the United Nations Security Council in the case of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
agreements between sovereign states and international organizations such as the U.N. in 
the case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, domestic war crimes tribunals such as the 
Iraq Special Tribunal, or a multilateral treaty in the case of the permanent International 
Criminal Court. The political and strategic considerations of states are thus frequently 
factored into decisions and negotiations on the formation of international criminal 
tribunals.
There are several kinds of “justice” in international affairs. I use the term not in 
the general sense in which it is conflated with morality, but rather in a number of related 
senses. The first is justice as equality of rights and privileges, “equality in the 
distribution or in the application of rights as between the strong and the weak, the large 
and the small, the rich and the poor, the black and the white, the nuclear and the non­
nuclear, or the victors and the vanquished”12. The second is justice in the specific context 
of the equality of such rights and privileges before the law, referred to as formal justice13.
This study, then, explores the term in an institutional legal sense, one in which 
duly constituted courts mete out retribution and restitution for actions defined and 
accepted as crimes in international humanitarian law. One author has termed this 
“legalism”14. My main object of examination is international criminal justice, but 
national legal processes that have — or claim — jurisdiction to hand down justice for 
international crimes will be reviewed where appropriate. Just as national jurisdictions 
may in some instances assert a role for themselves in international criminal justice, the
14
distinction between the international and the strictly national has been further blurred by 
a sharp rise in civil wars within states in which international humanitarian law issues are 
directly relevant, as opposed to conflicts between sovereign states that characterized war 
prior to the second half of the 20th century. Indeed, “war” and “war crimes” are very 
limited concepts that are part of a wider spectrum of international humanitarian law that 
juridical interventions may seek to address. I nevertheless use the phrases “war crimes”, 
“war crimes tribunals” and “war crimes justice” in a general sense for simplicity, without 
prejudice to the specific discussions of war crimes in their technical sense.
In discussing war crimes justice and tribunals, another distinction is necessary for 
the sake of clarity. That distinction, aptly captured by Hedley Bull, is one between what 
he calls “international or interstate justice”, “individual or human justice” and 
“cosmopolitan or world justice”. International justice deals with the rights and duties of 
sovereign states in international relations on the basis of sovereign equality; individual 
justice encompasses the rights and duties of individuals as subjects, not just objects, of 
international law; and cosmopolitan justice embodies a radical transnational extension of 
individual justice. Regarding the third leg of this conceptual tripod, Bull expounds:
These are ideas which seek to spell out what is right or good for the world as a whole, for 
an imagined civitas maxima or cosmopolitan society to which all individuals belong and 
to which their interests should be subordinate. This notion of justice as the promotion of 
the world common good is different from that of the assertion of the rights and duties of 
individual human beings all over the globe for it posits the idea that these individuals 
form or should form a society or community whose common interests or common good 
must qualify or even determine what their individual rights and duties are, just as the 
rights and duties of individuals within the state have in the past been qualified or
15
determined by notions such as the good of the state, the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number of citizens, or the general will. . .15
These distinctions generate certain tensions, with each form of justice seeking dominance 
through various agencies, be it governments, transnational civil society, or other actors.
Inherent Tensions
This central purpose of this work, then, is to explore the tensions between 
political and strategic responses to violations of international humanitarian law, on the 
one hand, and legalist responses, on the other. The sponsors of judicial interventions 
often present war crimes tribunals as designed to build or maintain international peace by 
bringing justice to bear on situations where its absence is a major cause of conflict. In 
this sense law is brought into the service of what is essentially a political goal. A 
description of war crimes justice as “political justice” is thus a very apt one16. It has been 
defined as “the use of legal institutions and processes to create, sustain and a legitimate a 
particular order...”17 But the assumed logic inherent in formal justice (that no one or 
interest above the law, and that justice is completely neutral) frequently clashes with 
political considerations that are not so pure; and tensions develop between justice and 
these other interests. Judicial approaches to conflict resolution can also be either a fig 
leaf for political inaction, or part of a larger strategy that is not always altruistic, with 
“justice” serving as a means to that end.
The above-mentioned tensions operate at three levels. The first tension is the 
internal and external selectivity of international criminal justice. Internal selectivity 
applies to the definition of what is a crime in international humanitarian law. Genocide,
16
crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war are all grave 
crimes. But what about high-altitude “precision” bombing that produces immense 
collateral damage during warfare, or the targeting of electrical grids or other objects or 
spaces used by civilians? As well, the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
1 ftin international humanitarian law remains hazy . This internal selectivity is one of the 
more endogenous characteristics of international criminal law. These contradictions exist 
because, for example, the states most likely to engage in high-altitude bombing are the 
powerful states in the international society, which have the technology to fight air wars 
that expose their soldiers to an absolute minimum of risk. The external selectivity is that 
which delimits where and to whom accountability for violations of international 
humanitarian law can apply. Thus there are international criminal tribunals for Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia, but not for Liberia, Sri Lanka or Indonesia, among the many 
conflicts in which mass atrocities have been committed.
The second level of tension is the occasional clash between cosmopolitan 
conceptions of justice and domestic order in its most basic form -- stability. This tension 
is real because, although justice is a constitutive principle of order, it does not follow that 
the two are never in tension. That tension is at its most glaring in the context of 
transitional justice in domestic societies emerging from conflicts. Here there are 
situations when insisting on legal justice for violations of international humanitarian law 
may threaten or hamper societal stability, as was the case in South Africa’s transition out 
of Apartheid. This tension is discussed in Chapter 4.
A third level of tension is one between cosmopolitan notions of international 
justice and that of international order, defined by Hedley Bull as “a pattern of activity that
sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international 
society”19. This tension is largely due to the sovereignty that asserts the primacy of states 
within their territories except when they give it up of their own volition, for example in a 
bilateral or multilateral treaty. This tension is best reflected in the controversy over 
“universal jurisdiction” -- justice sans frontiers for mass atrocities -  by national or 
international courts. I treat this tension in Chapter 5.
A related goal of the study is to ascertain the sociological impact of judicial 
intervention as a tool of conflict resolution. How effective are criminal trials for mass 
atrocities? Do trials -  as often argued by their proponents -  contribute to healing the 
wounds of fractured societies, or do they in fact work against this goal? Is deterring 
impunity enough, or must we go further to achieve reconciliation in the sense of 
forgiveness? This aspect of the inquiry is also linked to the order/justice tension in so far 
as some policy approaches to conflict resolution recommend not trials (seen from this 
perspective as potentially disruptive of order), but pardons or other forms of non-legal or 
quasi-judicial processes that favor the primacy of political approaches. In so doing, the 
goal is to preserve a strategic balance of power between the state and the rights of the 
individual. From the perspective of order, that balance requires that while the rights of 
individuals are certainly to be respected, to accord individual rights supremacy over the 
collective interests of the state may create disruptions that are harmful to the interests of 
both the state and the individual.
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Theoretical Traditions in International Relations: The Link to International War 
Crimes Justice
Examining international criminal law and justice and the tribunals that are created 
to enforce these concepts from the perspective of international relations and theories 
about them might seem odd to those who believe that these tribunals are purely legal 
institutions. The question arises: is it necessary to write about war crimes justice and 
tribunals against the background of international relations theory? Can the story of war 
crimes tribunals not be told directly as one of legal institutions in international law? 
Doubtless it can, and has. But as noted earlier, the political/strategic contexts (and the 
tensions that flow from them) are real. Undertaking such an inquiry is thus appropriate 
and desirable, because international law (including international humanitarian law) does 
not exist in isolation of other aspects of international relations. International law 
facilitates, and is partly a creation of, international relations -  although the latter is a 
much more recent term. International relations in turn rest partially on international law 
as a major plank of its constitutional structure20. As Kenneth Abbott has persuasively 
argued, “[International Relations] helps us describe legal institutions richly, incorporating 
the political factors that shape the law; the interests, power, and governance structures of 
states and other actors; the information, ideas, and understandings on which they operate; 
[and] the institutions within which they interact.”21
The discussion would not seem so odd to an international relations scholar,
although very few such scholars have in fact entered into such a conversation on the
00subject, and this inquiry will be one of the very few book-length works to do so .
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Moreover, the few attempts that have been made in academic journals in recent years 
have tended to hitch the nature of international criminal justice either to the liberal 
agenda or to the realist paradigm23, with no middle ground in between.
That gap exists perhaps because after the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, there were no international tribunals for war crimes until the 1990s. The hunt for 
Nazi war criminals continued for several decades after World War II, but it was 
undertaken by national jurisdictions. International humanitarian law was thus left to the 
province of idealistic lawyers who kept alive the hope for the creation of a standing 
international penal tribunal to adjudicate genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, the jurisdiction of which would override that of states. It is increasingly 
understood by several international lawyers and international relations scholars that this 
gap ought to be closed, or at least bridged, in order to attain a fuller understanding of the 
phenomenon that is international criminal justice24.
The point having been made, I hasten to add that theories of international relations 
are sophisticated and complex. To combine them with an examination of international 
criminal law and institutions is even harder, as one must choose, within the constraints of 
space and priorities, between extended theoretical explications and the establishment of 
empirical knowledge about how politics and strategy affects the actual operation of these 
processes and institutions. The aim of this work is thus not to do justice to theories of 
international relations, but only to utilize them as an introductory context for situating 
war crimes tribunals as political and legal institutions. As such, while attempting to 
position the subject against a theoretical backdrop, empirical analysis of the politics of 
international criminal justice, not grand theory, is my objective.
In that context it is important to review briefly the most relevant theories of 
international relations that explain policy and strategy towards war crimes justice. There 
are several distinct theoretical traditions that could form a basis for understanding and 
interpreting the politics of justice for violations of international humanitarian law. These 
include realism, liberalism and the rationalist-pluralism of the “English School” of 
international relations. Terry Nardin and David Mapel discuss the first two and several 
others in their joint work on theories of international relations 25. But they do not discuss 
the third, which is my preferred approach for reasons I will explain below. These 
traditions, in particular realism and liberalism, have several offshoots or successor 
theories such as neo-realism (as distinguished from classical realism), neo-liberalism, the 
declaratory tradition, and social constructivism.
Classical Realism
Classical realism’s most dominant characteristic is its skepticism about the role of 
morality in foreign policy: states must act of necessity to survive, protect their interest, 
and expand their power in a hostile environment. From this perspective, international 
criminal justice is not a preferred approach from the standpoint of a classical realist 
paradigm, for realists favor political and military solutions to the kinds of problems that 
international criminal tribunals address. To the extent that realist states enter into treaties, 
they do so not by reason of any attachment to legalism or international cooperation for its 
own sake, but rather from self-interest. Generally speaking, realists tend to have a more 
bilateral than multilateral approach to international relations, although it has been argued 
that this logic is not borne out by the proliferation of multilateral institutions promoted by
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the United States after World War II . To this it can be said in response that a major 
factor in attitudes to multilateralism is the domestic political leaning of the government of 
a strong state such as the United States, as well as the unique context of post World War
II.
Classical realism holds that not only is the international realm anarchical, but 
states that act on the basis of morality or good faith endanger their very survival. 
Necessity thus precludes being swayed by moral arguments in world politics, even as 
realists recognize the need to acknowledge morality as a factor in the domestic sphere. 
The Florentine political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli remains the archetypical advocate 
of classic realism. He was a strong proponent of territorial expansion and pre-emptive 
war to thwart perceived security threats, so much so that the Romans have been 
described, in Machiavellian logic, as having “conquered the world out of self defense”27. 
But degrees of difference exist in realism. The Greek historian Thucydides exhibited a 
more sophisticated kind of realism that acknowledged the role and place of ethics in 
international politics, and the tension between the later and realism. Thucydides’ History, 
an account of the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta, dealt with this tension. 
In that account, the commencement by Sparta of a war with Athens in breach of a treaty 
because the former was threatened by the latter’s imperial expansion, the dialogues that 
accompanied the ebb and flow of war, and the subsequent massacres of the citizens of the 
island of Melos by Athenian forces after the failed Melian Dialogue, go to establish that 
in international politics, there can be no justice between states of unequal power28.
Other classical realists include Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza, and Jean- 
Jacques Rosseau. Hobbes, who founded the “social contract” school of the realist
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tradition, believed that man existed in “a state of nature” characterized by war, and that 
this state of affairs led to the formation of society as an organizing unit. Spinoza’s 
thought did not acknowledge any notions of international justice, though he recognized 
the value of alliances and treaties. He believed, however, that treaties were instruments 
of convenience from which a party could opt out if circumstances changed. Significantly 
for the purposes of this discussion, he believed that a state’s obligations were solely 
towards its subjects, and abiding with treaties and international agreements that were 
unfavorable from that perspective was a violation of this trust. Latter day realists such as 
Hans Morgenthau also subscribe to this view of the linear relationship between a state, its 
citizens and international obligations. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, there are 
parallels between contemporary interpretations of international law and international 
justice by some states, such as the United States, and Spinoza’s political philosophy.
Rosseau subscribed to a somewhat milder version of realism than Hobbes and 
Spinoza. Of relevance to our subject, he believed that justice inhered only in the “general 
will”, and as such is what a political community wills for itself. In Rosseau’s framework, 
this political community did not extend into the international realm. He opposed the 
view, popular in his day and now, that inter-state trade and interdependence were 
disincentives to conflict, arguing that state interests were more fundamental than 
commerce.29 Rosseau believed that only a European federation with enforcement powers 
could prevent and end the state of war he believed Europe to be experiencing in his day, 
but was skeptical that this would ever happen because states guarded their sovereignty 
jealously.30
Classical realism has been criticized for its exaggeration of the concept of 
anarchy. Its critics would have it that anarchy is the exception, not the norm in world 
politics. These critics point to the great volume of cooperation that occurs in 
international affairs and note that interdependence is a stabilizing influence. Neo-realists 
are skeptical about the impact of institutions or “regimes” on state behavior, and assert 
that the nature of cooperation, when it does occur, is shaped by the distribution of power. 
Realists rest their case on a cynical view of human nature that necessitates eschewing 
faith in morality. They do not attach great importance to human rights as a component of 
foreign policy, and on the occasions they may do so, it could only be as a means to an 
end and not as an end in itself. Clearly, war crimes tribunals sometimes perform this 
function for realists.
The Liberal Tradition
Liberalism is directly opposed to realism. Where realism is cynical, liberalism is 
predicated on ideals and a moral view of world politics. This tradition has its roots in the 
existential and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724 -  1804). Kant believed that 
all action must be guided by an understanding of reality that is a priori, which is to say, 
innate, and prior to experience. This moral philosophy led Kant to postulate the 
“categorical imperative” that requires us to treat our fellow human beings as having 
intrinsic value.31 This, to Kant, was what reason demanded.
Kant’s philosophy, as applied to international relations was a “cosmopolitan 
doctrine that treats all human beings, by virtue of their shared rationality, as citizens of a 
single moral order”.32 Three guiding concepts emerge from Kant’s “Metaphysical
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Elements of Justice” in his Metaphysics o f Morals and Perpetual Peace. First, he 
believed that the state is a moral person. Secondly, he argued for the original and 
common ownership of the earth and its resources by all its inhabitants. Thirdly, he 
postulated an imperative to achieve perpetual peace based on the abolition of standing 
armies, democratically elected governments, and the non-interference by force by states 
in each other’s constitution or government33.
Liberalism, then, is Kant’s philosophical legacy. It is wedded to the notion of 
individual liberty, its protection and expansion. The states that were built on respect for 
these individual liberties, or claim to be so, and have democratic governments, are 
referred to in this work as “liberal states”. Historical experience in international politics 
has not been kind to the liberal tradition, though the tradition has gained adherence in the 
domestic sphere in the Western world and other places. In other words, liberalism has 
done far better in domestic contexts than it has internationally. According to Stanley 
Hoffman, “international affairs have been the nemesis of liberalism”.34 Many of the 
cynicisms of the realists -  the urge for survival and power, and savage wars — have 
remained a conspicuous patch on the canvass of international relations. Building on 
Kant’s philosophy, liberals cling to their faith that reason and the more benign side of 
human nature will triumph over the statecraft of expediency. They are enthusiastic 
supporters of the promise of international law and institutions, and champion 
cosmopolitan human interests rather than narrow national interest. Realists respond that 
we are doomed to the limitations of the darker sides of our human natures.
Neo-liberals do not deny the anarchical nature of the international realm, the self 
interest that drives states, and the role of power. But they believe that international
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institutions influence state action, and that the cooperative forum they provide is superior 
to what states, acting alone, can achieve.35 Participation in international institutions is 
not, however, a liberal preserve. Realists also advocate participation actively in such 
institutions, but more selectively and not as an article of faith but rather by reason of 
rational calculations of self interest.
An important variant of liberalism, one that has contributed significantly to the 
tensions between order and the cosmopolitan view of international criminal justice in a 
world of sovereign states, is what has been described as the “declaratory tradition” of 
international law. Espoused by progressive academic international lawyers such as 
Richard Falk and international relations scholars such as Dorothy Jones, this tradition 
asserts what law ought to be, predicating such assertions on legally non-binding 
declarations of states and the writings of progressive publicists in international law36. It is 
a quintessentially Kantian tradition because it does not ask the question: what is 
international law? Rather its point of departure is: what ought the law of nations to be? 
What would be a just law of nations?37 Several states ask these questions in the conduct 
of their international relations or make statements that emphasize them. But the 
declarations of states, while sometimes genuine, are more often window-dressing. It 
cannot be taken for granted that such declarations are backed up by any intent to fulfill 
them. The implications of the declaratory tradition -  and the tensions it creates -  will be 
examined in Chapter 5 where I discuss the concept of “universal jurisdiction”. In a 
contradiction that will be examined in Chapter 2, these declarations have nevertheless 
raised thresholds of internal and interstate behavior.
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The English School
In what is really the first attempt I know of to situate war crimes trials and 
tribunals in international relations theory, Gary Jonathan Bass has adopted the liberal 
paradigm in his study of such tribunals, arguing that the chief impetus for their creation 
is the urge to export to the international plane the liberal ideals of liberal states, in 
particular due process and the rule of law, or what he terms “due process across 
borders”38. In this work I set out to establish that, appearances notwithstanding, 
liberalism is not the dominant motivation for the establishment or support of international 
war crimes tribunals by states, liberal or illiberal. I will offer an alternative conceptual 
framework for what I believe would be a more accurate understanding of international 
criminal justice and its institutions. That paradigm is that of an anarchical international 
society advanced by the English School of international relations, rather than an 
“international community” that is presupposed in the liberal ethical tradition or the 
cosmopolitan worldview.
But first, what are the English School and the international society? The two 
terms constitute a phenomenological and historical perspective of international relations 
that runs through the writings of a distinct group of scholars of international relations that 
originally came together as the British Committee for the Theory of International Politics, 
founded in 1958 with a grant from the Ford Foundation. The Committee was a group of 
scholars with close professional and personal ties that included Herbert Butterfield, 
Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Alan James, Martin Wight, C.A.W. Manning, and R.J. 
Vincent among others. They are known mostly for their rationalist, or Grotian approach 
to international relations39. Bull, the intellectual leading light of the English School in his
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lifetime -  and, I would argue, even in death -  posited that the international order 
comprises a society of states that has established institutions of cooperation as a result of 
shared values but remains anarchical because there is no overall sovereign and states 
remain primarily self-interested40. It is this divergence of interest, the unpredictability of 
actors in the international realm that stems from primordial self-interest that is defined as 
“anarchy”. This anarchy co-exists uncomfortably with the notions of cooperation in the 
international society. I will discuss the nature of the international society and critical 
perspectives on Bull in Chapter 3.
I adopt the international society approach of the English School to this study of 
international war crimes justice for three main reasons. First, it embodies a pluralist 
approach to the study of world politics. To adopt Robert H. Jackson’s definition of 
pluralism, the term means that “human conduct, taken as a whole, discloses divergent and 
even contradictory ideas, values, and beliefs which must be recognized by our theories, 
and assimilated by them, if they are to be faithful to reality.”41 The international society 
approach is sensitive to the voices of disparate political and legal theorists such as Hugo 
Grotius (rationalist), Machiavelli (realist) and Kant (cosmopolitan/revolutionary)42. As 
will become clearer in the chapters that follow, elements of all three voices will be heard 
in the politics of international justice for war crimes. Thus I recognize the influence of 
liberal assumptions, for example in demanding political action -- humanitarian 
intervention or legal accountability for violations of international humanitarian law, for 
example — but question the assertion that those assumptions are a dominant factor when 
states actually create international criminal tribunals43.
Second, for this reason, I posit that the international society approach is the most 
accurate prism from which to examine the phenomenon that is international criminal 
justice. It is a detached scholarly perspective that is not laden with a social or political 
agenda, such as the activist agendas of liberalism, the arguably static or inordinately self­
engrossed world view of realism, or the radical cosmopolitanism of critical theory. There 
is a linkage between the two reasons above and my personal professional experience in 
international war crimes justice. As a practitioner for several years, I was motivated by a 
cause -  that of justice. With the current benefit of a more distanced view of international 
criminal tribunals and an intellectual encounter with Bull’s The Anarchical Society, I see 
more clearly patterns that I saw then, but did not adequately analyze because I was 
attached to the perspective of cosmopolitan international justice that was inherent in my 
work at the time. This being an intellectual inquiry, I have chosen, while still basically 
sympathetic to the role of international criminal accountability even with its many 
imperfections, to follow the “evidence” to its logical conclusions.
The third reason for the choice of international society theory is that Bull’s 
Anarchical Society engages directly with the relationship between Order and Justice, 
which is an important theme of this work. While Bull has had his share of criticism 
regarding what has been described as the insufficient sophistication of his thinking in this 
area, I posit in the more detailed discussion of international society that he is not as far 
off the mark as some of his critics would have us believe44.
In the context of the international society approach I also examine, mostly 
implicitly but sometimes explicitly, norms in their sociological, positivist meaning as 
how people (or states) usually behave, and norms in the moral sense as ethical standards
of human or state activity. Jackson notes this distinction but errs, in my view, when he 
refers to the latter sense of norms as “moral and legal”45. For, as I demonstrate in 
Chapters 3 and 5, law and morality is not always the same thing in international relations. 
It is precisely for this reason that there exists in the field of international law^positive law 
(“hard law”) that is legally binding because it has been made by a body with the requisite 
authority, and progressivist attempts to expand morality or ethics into the status of law 
(declaratory law) that is in reality “soft law”46. Resolutions of the United Nations 
Security Council, or treaties entered into by states on the basis of mutual consent, are 
examples of the former, while General Assembly resolutions and declarations are 
examples of the latter.
Bass sets out five propositions to support his thesis of liberalism as a driving force 
in the creation of war crimes tribunals. First, it is only liberal states that support war 
crimes tribunals. Second, even liberal states will be reticent to press for war crimes 
tribunals if that course of action increases the risk to their own soldiers. Third, liberal 
states are more likely to be outraged by war crimes against their own citizens than by war 
crimes against foreigners. Fourth, such states are heavily influenced in their support for 
war crimes tribunals by domestic opinion. And fifth, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) pressure groups frequently shame liberal states into action.
It is already apparent from a number of contradictions in Bass’s five points that 
the motivations of liberal states, acting in international affairs on the question of war 
crimes justice is not all that liberal. First, it is not the case that it is only liberal states that 
create war crimes tribunals or that even that where illiberal states support such trials, they 
are necessarily show trials, and that the motives of liberal states are purer. As is well
known, Russia supported and participated in the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, when it was not a “liberal” state and indeed was itself implicated in 
violations of international humanitarian law47. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
the leader of a liberal state, argued strongly (together with Joseph Stalin) in favor of 
summary justice at Nuremberg. And, as I argue in Chapter 2, the motives of the Allied 
Powers at Nuremberg were not altruistic. Moreover, Ethiopia, the “liberal” credentials of 
which are debatable, has conducted national trials for genocide and crimes against 
humanity since 1994, with its former head of state Mengistu Haile Mariam (who is in 
exile in Zimbabwe) and several of the defendants tried in absentia -  just as France had 
argued that the German Kaiser Wilhelm II be tried in absentia after World War I.48 The 
fact is that states, liberal or illiberal, can support international war crimes tribunals for 
any number of reasons, most of them more of political expediency than long-term policy.
Second, it has been the case that Western liberal states have supported war crimes 
trials precisely as an alternative to putting their soldiers at risk through military 
intervention. This is the “send in the lawyers” syndrome. It was the case in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, and arguably, will be in Sudan. Thus, as one scholar has noted, “some political 
interest remarkably short of liberal benevolence is an indispensable element in creating 
international criminal trials”49.
Third, in citing the propensity of liberal states to be more interested in war crimes 
trials for offenses against their own soldiers rather than foreigners, Bass is in fact 
pointing to a realist, or at least international society tendency rather than a true solidarist 
legalism50. Fourth, if liberal states are moved to push for war crimes trials by domestic 
legal opinion, then the (realist) arguments of Spinoza and Rosseau about the interest of
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the domestic political community being paramount is actually brought into play, and so 
the motivation, again, is not that liberal-internationalist at all. The same could be said of 
pressure from NGOs as a motivating factor. It is clear, then, that “in terms of sheer 
causality, liberalism hardly works wonders”51 in this sphere of international relations. It 
has further been observed, critiquing Bass, that “if liberalism is just a predisposition 
...and it is crucially in the conjunction of that predisposition and a realist interest that 
makes the creation of international criminal justice likely, then Bass seems to have 
heaped up so many qualifications on his hypothesis that it no longer stands”52
Bass agrees that liberal states also commit atrocities, not at home but abroad, and 
that this hypocrisy does pose a considerable moral dilemma53. While he treats this matter 
as a footnote, the exclusion of the crimes of powerful states from the sphere of 
international justice is actually one of its central features. It is not just an unfortunate 
sideshow to liberalism’s claim to export its values abroad. Thus it is not the exception; it 
is the rule. If this is the case, it follows that the liberal paradigm is not the best one into 
which to fit war crimes tribunals. The better perspective from which to examine war 
crimes justice is that of a pluralist international society in which the self-interest of states, 
the frequent use of international criminal tribunals to construct particular kinds of order 
in international relations, and some liberal ethics, combine.
If liberalism was the dominant factor in the establishment in the establishment of 
war crimes tribunals, there would have been many more such tribunals, established 
systematically and as a matter of course, to address the numerous conflicts for which the 
option of war crimes trials has been foregone by the great powers.
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W ar Crimes Justice as Hegemony
Some other scholars have similarly noted that liberalism is not the dominating 
factor in the creation and work of such tribunals, but have ascribed the motivations of 
states in this context to realism. Thus the position has been advanced that “although 
liberal humanitarian ideas have created the demand for political action, the process of 
dealing with brutality in war has been dominated by realpolitik -- that is, the furthering 
the interests of the most powerful states”54. Realism may be too extreme an ethic with 
which to define the creation of war crimes tribunals, although some elements of it 
undoubtedly play a role. Realism — at least in its classical sense -- encompasses the use 
of violence where necessary. Moreover, hardcore realists do not believe that 
international war crimes tribunals established by international institutions are relevant, 
necessary or desirable as part of conflict resolution. The international society approach 
that mediates the extreme self interest of states with the element of cooperation that 
attempts to manage anarchy through consciously designed institutions, producing an 
ever-present tension, is more apposite. This is so despite constructivism -  a variant of 
liberalism that posits that anarchy in the international society is not immutable and that 
states can construct regimes that are less self-interested than realism’s constant harping 
on material power55. Constructivism is, in my view, a possible alternative to English 
School theory in explaining international criminal tribunals -  and indeed the possibilities 
for much of international relations in general. But it does not accurately explain the 
international society, including the application of international criminal justice, as it 
currently operates. It only holds out the promise of what could be — what can be 
constructed but in point of fact has not.
As a result of its nature, be it interpreted from the realist, liberal or international 
society perspective, international criminal justice is also hegemonic. Adam Watson, one 
of the founding members of the English School, has defined hegemony as “the material 
condition that enables one great power, or a group of powers, or the great powers in a 
system acting collectively, to bring such great pressures and inducements to bear that 
most other states lose some of their freedom of action de facto, though not de jure56. 
Watson notes the two senses in which hegemony tend to be used in international 
relations. In the first, it refers to power relations and distribution — military, 
technological, financial. In the second it is “the dominance of a particular idea or set of 
assumptions, such as economic liberalism and globalization”. While Watson aligns his 
definition of hegemony to the first sense of the word, I would apply it to international 
criminal justice in both its senses, with the second even more directly applicable to war 
crimes tribunals -  seen as the latter are as “liberalism”. In fact, the first serves as the 
path-breaker for the second, for it is as a result of the military, technological and financial 
prowess of the great powers that their ideas and assumptions -  including ideas about 
justice -- have become global. Importantly, Watson also notes that the concept of a 
hegemonic system is not restricted to governments, but as well to the activities of 
transnational civil society. This was clearly the case in the formation of the International 
Criminal Court, in which Western dominated “global” civil society, with their agendas 
set far more in New York than in Bamako or Brasilia, played an influential role in the 
emergence of a standing international court to judge war crimes57. All of this is not to 
say that international criminal justice is good or bad, only that for a more complete 
understanding it is necessary to go beyond epiphenomena to examine its underlying
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currents. It is only when we understand its nature and the context in which it operates 
that we can make a more informed judgment about its benefits and drawbacks.
Because the politics around international criminal tribunals are often expressed in 
the form of ideas, this process has resulted in such institutions being at the forefront of 
what has been described as “norm entrepreneurship”. In this sense international criminal 
tribunals or domestic tribunals articulate and enforce certain norms of state conduct and 
pressure states into adopting those norms in order to be seen as law-abiding members of 
international society58. This is one role that international criminal tribunals play in the 
construction of international and domestic order.
But there are others who see this phenomenon as “facade legitimation”59, with 
norms providing “the kinder, gentler face of naked power considerations in the pursuit of 
state interests”60. Thus it is that one man’s norm entrepreneur may be another’s hegemon, 
for where the norms in question are not applied equally across the board, but rather 
selectively, it is a selective norm and may be seen as a form of ideological hegemony. In 
this sense, legalism as a response to mass atrocity is a Western ideal that those countries 
have sought to impose on countries of other political or historical cultures. It advances 
the power and influence of the states that project the norms and are keen to universalize 
them while retaining the freedom to deviate from the same norms for self-serving 
reasons. It does not matter that the norm may be objectively defensible or even desirable. 
One example is the Japanese reaction to the Tokyo war crimes trials as Western racism 
and imperialism (notwithstanding the fact -- conveniently forgotten at the time -- that 
Japan was a militarily expansionist state that attacked the United States and dragged it 
into World War II). Allied troops did not face trials for war crimes, which were
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undoubtedly committed in the Allied bombings of cities with numerous civilian 
casualties. What right, then, an appraisal of norm entrepreneurship might ask, do 
powerful states have to impose their concept of war crimes trials on, say, African or 
Asian societies that may have other historically preferred notions of justice, or none at all 
in the case of war crimes?
The United Nations diplomat Shashi Tharoor has given an apt example of the 
hegemony of thought that is found in international criminal trials:
When the United Nations helped reconstruct East Timor from the devastation that 
accompanied the Indonesian withdrawal, we had to rebuild an entire society, and that 
meant, in some cases, creating institutions that had never existed before. One of them 
was a judicial system of international standards, which in practice meant Western 
standards, complete with the adversarial system of justice in which a prosecutor and 
defence attorney attempt to demolish each other’s arguments in the pursuit of truth. The 
UN experts had to train the Timorese in this system. But they discovered that there was 
one flaw. In Timorese culture, the expected practice for the accused was to confess his 
crimes and justice to be meted out compassionately. In order to promote the culture of 
the not guilty plea required by the Western court systems, the UN experts had to train the 
Timorese to lie. Their mental processes — their imagination -  had now been truly 
globalized.61
These, then, are the political and strategic issues this inquiry will examine. It will 
seek to establish that significant shifts in favor of human rights in international law 
notwithstanding, the perspective of a pluralist international society remains on the whole 
the more relevant in the activities of international criminal tribunals. The strategic
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interests of states remain the most important factor in international relations, trumping 
justice or using it where necessary. While the normative shift has been created by a 
metamorphorsis of the concept of sovereignty and the rise of the rights and duties of 
individuals in international law independent of the policy and strategy of states, it is 
tempered by the continuing influence of power and selectivity in the timing and scope of 
international judicial intervention.
This dissertation has four parts. The first is contextual and historical. In this 
chapter I have situated international criminal justice in international relations theory, 
examined and critiqued the (mostly implicit) dominant theoretical framework of much 
scholarship in international criminal justice -  that of liberal internationalism -  and 
indicated clearly the theoretical framework that is the dissertation’s point of departure: 
the international society as expounded by the English School. In the second chapter of 
the first part of the dissertation I examine the Nuremberg trials as a watershed in 
establishing international criminal justice as a practical possibility in the 20th century and 
the historical context for the subject.
In Part II I look at the conceptual framework, with illustrations of the dilemma 
posed by the interplay of political and strategic factors with those of legalistic responses 
to violations of international humanitarian law. I examine the nature of the international 
society in greater detail and relate that nature to how it defines and affects justice for 
violations of international humanitarian law. I then examine the tensions that 
demonstrate the strength of the international society approach to this kind of justice at a 
conceptual level, chiefly the tension between justice and order (or more popularly 
described as that between “peace” (in this sense stability) and justice, and the doctrine of
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universal jurisdiction. Against this background, Part III (the empirical part) explores the 
quest for justice and accountability in response to the genocide and other violations of 
international humanitarian law in Rwanda in 1994 as the case study of this dissertation. 
There is no existing work of scholarship that has studied in dissertation or book-length 
detail the tension between order and the quest for justice in the work of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. As such the major empirical case study is one of pristine 
originality. Part IV looks to the contemporary and future evolution of justice for war 
crimes by examining the interplay of the clashing concepts of order and a cosmopolitan 
international community in the establishment of the International Criminal Court.
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You ’11 get a fair trial... and then I ’m gonna hang you 
Sheriff Dad Longworth to Marlon Brando in the movie One-Eyed Jacks (1961)
In the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the wars that accompanied the disintegration of the Former 
Yugoslavia and the civil war in Rwanda led to the establishment of ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals to try individuals for violations of international humanitarian law for 
the first time since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II. The Security 
Council of the United Nations established these Tribunals as part of its peace- 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and these courts are subsidiary 
organs of the Security Council. That this is a major development in international relations 
is self-evident. That these tribunals are also inherently interventionist, intruding as they 
do on sovereignty, is obvious. International criminal justice is now a dimension in world 
politics in its own right, and judicial intervention has been established as one policy and 
strategic option for “the international community” in resolving conflicts. The work of the 
two United Nations-created ad hoc international tribunals provided the momentum for the 
eventual establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court.
The idea that states acting collectively can establish courts to adjudicate genocide 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law has not happened in a 
vacuum. It has developed in the context of world politics. In that world the main players 
-  sovereign states -  are not disinterested parties. The realization of that idea is in fact a
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product of world politics, inasmuch as such courts and tribunals have been established 
either by coalitions of governments victorious in war, as in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, or through the instrument of the United Nations as a universal international 
organization. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at 
The Hague, Netherlands, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) at 
Arusha, Tanzania and the Special Court for Sierra Leone are examples of the latter 
approach.
Certainly, increasingly influential non-state actors in contemporary international 
relations such as non-governmental organizations and the media have played a significant 
role in these processes, chiefly through direct pressure on governments to “do something” 
in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, or indirect pressure 
through the mobilization of public opinion. But good intentions alone would not have 
created the instruments of intervention. It took political will and decisions by states as 
the dominant actors in world politics.
That states play such a critical role in international justice is not to say that there 
are no contradictions between the nature of world politics -  and the interests of states 
therein -  and the avowedly objective aims of international justice. And yet we live with 
the reality that, through the vehicle of human rights and international and national 
criminal tribunals, individuals have become important subjects of international law 
alongside sovereign states. The relationship between individual or human justice and 
rights, and that between justice and law, serve as an important context for peace and 
security: many of the order-disrupting conflicts that judicial intervention seeks to address 
spring from violations of human rights.
The two realities of order and justice, their common origins in states as the main 
organizing units of international relations, and the tension between the two concepts, 
present an important contradiction. Like much else in life, between black and white there 
are shades of grey. To understand the contradiction it is essential to understand the 
historical context of the development of international justice in the 20th century.
The history of the 20th century has been one of an active effort to make individual 
justice an active element in international politics. The rights and duties of individuals in 
armed conflict, negotiated and then codified at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899, out 
of which emerged, among three conventions, the Hague Convention with Respect to the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, was the main catalyst for this development.1 The 
motivation for the meeting was not as lofty as its title: it was, as one commentator has put 
it, “a disarmament conference initiated by the Tsar of Russia who found himself in a 
financially unbearable arms race” and had delegates from 26 self-styled “civilized 
states”.2 Neither did the conference presage to a casual observer that it would spawn an 
effective body of law in the absence of an enforcement mechanism. The Conference and 
the Convention were essentially aspiratory, and the delegates, who were predominantly 
representatives of sovereign states, expected that it would be incorporated into national 
laws. A follow-up Second Hague Conference was held in 1907 and updated the texts of 
the original conference, even if not with significant differences. There was no intention 
amongst participants to make radical changes to the international legal order, and indeed 
the German Kaiser Wilhelm II is reported to have privately made clear his reluctance in 
participating in the Second Hague Conference, noting that he would in practice not abide 
by its resolutions and remained confident in his “God and sharp sword”. Nonetheless
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two important principles emerged from The Hague Peace Conference: First, that 
individuals have rights that deserve protection even in times of war, a principle necessary 
to protect prisoners and civilian populations in wartime and limit the scope of action of 
occupying powers. Second, certain international laws and customs were inviolable and 
could not be changed even by treaty.4 Moreover, the Hague Convention was 
significantly relied upon for the prosecution of German war criminals at the Nuremberg 
trials.
Not even the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, however, were the first attempts at 
international justice for war crimes. Several attempts had been made, without success, 
even in the 20th century5. Indeed, the trial of Peter Hagenbach, governor of the Austrian 
town of Breisach in 1474 (pre-dating even the system of sovereign states that was 
symbolized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648) is indicative of the long history of this 
idea. Hagenbach was put on trial, following a popular revolt, for what today would 
qualify as war crimes and crimes against humanity. More than five centuries ago, in 
what is considered the first war crimes trial in recorded western history, the prosecutor 
indicted the accused as having “trampled under foot the laws of God and man.”6 Von 
Hagenbach, who acted on the instructions of his master, Charles of Burgundy, in seeking 
to subjugate Breisach, was accused of engaging with his henchmen in acts of extreme 
brutality: murder, rape and pillage among others. “No conceivable evil”, wrote a 
contemporary historian, “was beyond him”7. The accused’s defense of superior orders 
did not avail him, and a court of 28 judges found von Hagenbach guilty and sentenced 
him to death.
But it was certainly the precedent of the Nuremberg trials that captured the 
world’s imagination and established international criminal justice as policy and strategy. 
As is well-known, Adolf Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933 provided the vehicle 
for his pursuit of expansionist dreams, inspired by theories of racial superiority, which 
culminated in World War II. Beginning inside Germany and continuing outward through 
aggression and conquest in Europe, it is estimated that 30 million people were killed 
during the 12 years of Hitler’s dictatorship -on the battlefields of his wars, in forced labor 
camps, and in gas chambers.8
Violations of the human rights of minorities and crimes against humanity were 
transparently part of the official policies of Hitler’s Nazi government. Widespread 
outrage at the atrocities of the Nazi regime among Allied nations that united to repel the 
aggression by Hitler and other Axis powers led to a determination to punish the Nazi 
leaders at the end of the war. Thus was the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 
Nuremberg established in 1945 to try the political leadership and officer corps of the 
German Government and military High Command.9 The four Allied Powers appointed 
the Tribunal’s judges, one from each country (with each backed up by an alternate).The 
United States appointed Francis Biddle, a former Attorney-General of the country whom 
President Harry Truman had dismissed in an act of political vengeance but now wanted 
to placate10. France appointed Henri Donnediue de Vabres, a scholar of international law 
and a former law professor at the University of Paris who was one of the early visionaries 
of a permanent international criminal court. The Soviet Union’s Nuremberg judge was 
Ion Nikitchenko, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Supreme Court and one-time lecturer in 
criminal law at the Academy of Military Jurisprudence in Moscow. And the British judge
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was Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, a law lord on the appeals bench in the House of Lords, who 
was later elected president of the IMT thanks to American-led internal intrigues (the 
American chief prosecutor had not wanted Biddle, who nursed ambitions for the 
presidency of the Tribunal, in the position, arguing that it would make the United States 
too dominant in the proceedings1').
Nuremberg was a prosecutor’s court, in the sense that the prosecution was far 
more dominant than the judges in the proceedings. The prosecution was composed of 
four national teams from the four victorious Allied Powers. United States Supreme Court 
Justice Robert Jackson, a respected lawyer who had become a lawyer without going to 
law school, was appointed chief American prosecutor by President Truman. Sir Hartley 
Shawcross, the British Attorney-General, headed the British prosecution team, although 
he did not effectively vacate his duties in London and so his deputy, Sir David Maxwell- 
Fyfe was the de facto leader of the British prosecution. Roman Rudenko, the Procurator 
of Ukraine was the Soviet prosecutor, and Francois de Menthon was the French 
prosecutor.
The road from Nazi crimes to their punishment was by no means a 
straightforward one. In between, a gamut of first instincts, approaches and positions were 
evident. There was sheer laziness, bureaucratic incompetence, a fear of venturing into 
unknown territory, conflicting legal approaches amongst the Allies and, most 
prominently, Winston Churchill’s (and, by extension, his Government’s) advocacy for
17summary executions of Nazi leaders as retribution. Josef Stalin, while in favor of 
summary executions in off-the-cuff remarks to fellow Allied leaders, officially supported 
a trial of Nazi leaders. In the words of the historians Ann Tusa and John Tusa, “Stalin
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wanted Nazi leaders put to death, but only after a trial”.13 The strong instinct for rough 
justice was predicated on a belief that the guilt of Nazi leaders and the scope of their 
crimes were so obvious as to be undeserving of an effort to discharge the burden of proof. 
For the proponents of summary executions, the St. James Declaration of 1942 that 
announced the intention of the Allies to bring to justice the direct perpetrators and 
political authors of Nazi atrocities were all but forgotten.14
In the United States, a similar policy battle raged between Henry Morgenthau, the 
influential Secretary of the Treasury who favored summary executions and the 
destruction of Germany’s industrial economy, and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War 
who argued for a war crimes trial, reflecting America’s internal value of due process. 
The resolution of that in-fighting by President Roosevelt in Stimson’s favor, after 
Morgenthau’s draconian proposals became public and generated a furious public 
reaction, was the deciding factor that provided the impetus and blueprint for a trial 
designed to provide basic safeguards of due process to the Nazi leadership.15 The IMT 
tried 22 members of the Nazi leadership in a 315-day trial that opened on 20 November 
1945.16
1 7The defendants were :
• Martin Bormann, the powerful Nazi party apparatchik who was Hitler’s 
private secretary. Borman was present at Hitler’s suicide and signed the 
Fuhrer’s last will and testament. Although indicted, he was not present at 
the trial and was tried in absentia.
Karl Donitz, Supreme Commander of the German Navy from 1943 to 
1945. He was named Hitler’s successor in the latter’s will, and, following 
Hitler’s death, led the rump Nazi government in the last days of the war. 
Hans Frank, Governor-General of Poland during World War II, known as 
“the butcher of Krakow”.
Wilhelm Frick, the former Minister of the Interior who promulgated the 
discriminatory, anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws that deprived German Jews 
of their citizenship, forbade them to own property, and outlawed 
intermarriage and sexual relations between Jews and Gentiles.
Hans Fritzsche, radio journalist and Nazi propagandist.
Walther Funk, financial journalist, Hitler’s economic adviser and president 
of the Reichsbank.
Herman Goring, commander-in-chief of the German Air Force, originally 
designated by Hitler as his successor, but dismissed by the Fiihrer for 
treachery when he attempted to take over the leadership in April 1945. 
Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s former private secretary, was arrested in Britain 
when he made an unauthorized flight to Scotland with the hope of meeting 
the Duke of Hamilton and convincing the British Government of Hitler’s 
bona fides.
Alfred Jodi, Major-General and Chief of the German Armed Forces 
Operations Staff. Jodi signed Germany’s unconditional surrender to the 
Allied Powers on 7 May 1945.
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• Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Austrian lawyer and head of the feared Gestapo, 
administered the gas chambers and the extermination program.
• Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal and Chief of Staff of the High Command 
of the Armed Forces.
• Constantin von Neurath, Hitler’s first Foreign Minister.
• Franz von Papen, Hitler’s predecessor as Chancellor of Germany who 
later became Hitler’s Ambassador to Austria and Turkey.
• Reich Raeder, Grand Admiral and commander-in-chief of the Navy who 
resigned in 1943.
• Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany from 1938 to 
1945; negotiated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union that 
facilitated Hitler’s invasion of Poland.
• Alfred Rosenberg, Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories from 1941 
to 1945; Nazi philosopher.
• Fritz Sauckel -  Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization.
• Hjalmar Schcht, banker and three-time president of the Reichsbank.
• Baldur von Schirach, Governor of Vienna.
• Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian lawyer, Reich Commissioner in the 
Netherlands.
• Albert Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production.
• Julius Streicher, Nazi propagandist and wealthy newspaper proprietor.
The defendants were charged with crimes against peace (conspiracy to wage
aggressive war and waging aggressive war), crimes against humanity (which included the
persecution and mass extermination of Jews and other ethnic minorities and civilians in 
other countries), and war crimes (violations of the laws and customs of war). Eighteen of 
them were convicted on various counts on their indictments and given sentences ranging 
from 10 years imprisonment to death by hanging18. Defendants Frank, Frick, Goering, 
Jodi, Kaltenbrunner, Keitel, Rosenberg, Sauckel, Seyss-Inquart, Streicher and von 
Ribbentrop were sentenced to hang. Funk, Hess, and Raeder were sentenced to life in 
prison, while Doenitz was sentenced to 10 years in prison, Speer was sentenced to 20 
years, von Neurath to 15, and von Schirach to 20 years. Three defendants ( Fritzsche, 
Schacht, and von Papen) were acquitted. In a major blow to the whole effort to bring the 
Nazi leadership to justice (especially as Hitler, Heinrich Himmler and Bormann were 
already dead) Goering committed suicide with a cyanide pill before his execution by 
hanging. Based on a modified version of the Nuremberg Charter (Control Council Law 
No. 10) 12 other war crimes trials were subsequently held under the prosecutorial 
direction of the American lawyer Telford Taylor.
Nuremberg’s Progeny
The Nuremberg trials and the international tribunals for Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia have often been erroneously and simplistically viewed as if they are one 
straight line in a continuum. The reality is much more nuanced. While the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials were the first modem international criminal tribunals, there are 
important differences between them and the United Nations tribunals that illustrate 
attempts -- not altogether successful, as will be seen — to reduce the influence of 
subjective political interests in international criminal justice.
First, the very nature of the two sets of tribunals is different: the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals were established by victorious powers of World War II. The Rwanda 
and Yugoslavia tribunals, by contrast, are the first international criminal tribunals to be 
established by the international community independently of the victorious powers of a 
conflict. The United Nations tribunals were created by an international organization 
reflecting a wide political cross-section of the international community. The ICTY was 
established in 1993, while the Balkan conflict was still raging, and there was ultimately 
no clear “victor” since it was stopped by later intervention by the forces of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The intervention, however, was targeted at the 
Serbs who initiated the military conflict and had enjoyed the upper hand until the NATO 
action. This has induced a sense of “victor’s justice” at the hand of a Tribunal that Serbs 
view as an instrument of Western policy. Notwithstanding that all sides in that conflict -  
the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims -  have been prosecuted by the Hague
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Tribunal, this feeling is essentially accurate. But it is the price of a failed Serbian policy 
of militarily-enforced ethnic cleansing. In Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
was the ultimate victor, having ousted the previous government in a military conflict and 
formed a new government for Rwanda. Although the ICTR was established by the 
United Nations, there was a clear victor in this war. Whether or not this amount’s to 
victor’s justice will be examined in later chapters of this work.
It is necessary to qualify the contrast between the vehicles through which the 
United Nations ad hoc tribunals and those at Nuremberg and Tokyo were established. To 
be sure, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were creatures of victorious powers in war, 
separating victory and defeat in war as the raison d’etre of war crimes tribunals in the
first half of the 20th century, from subsequent developments as represented by The Hague 
and Arusha tribunals. To that extent, Nuremberg and Tokyo were the justice of the victor 
(Hermann Goering, upon receiving a copy of his indictment by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
wrote on it: “The victor will always be the judge and the vanquished the accused”19). But 
to that two things may be noted. One is that it does not necessarily diminish the gravity 
of the crimes committed by the Nazi German and the Japanese governments and their 
military forces. The distinction is perhaps simply a reflection of the evolution of the 
international society and the use that has been made of the United Nations, as opposed to 
its predecessor the League of Nations. It is noteworthy in this context that the United 
Nations General Assembly unanimously affirmed the Nuremberg Principles and 
Judgment in 1946.
As the Nuremberg judgment argued:
The making of the [Nuremberg] Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the 
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered, and the undoubted right of 
these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world. 
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the 
view of the Tribunal, ...it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; 
and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law ... for it is not to be doubted that any 
nation has the right to set up special courts to administer law. With regard to the constitution of 
the court, all that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the facts and the 
law.20
It was of course perfectly legitimate, in the historical context of the time, where a 
state has waged aggressive war and lost, for the prerogatives of victory to go to the victor. 
This is all the more so where international order is undermined in such a fundamental
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manner as by Hitler’s Third Reich. It was justified, and indeed remarkable in the context 
of the time, that the victorious powers embraced justice as a strategy. That strategy, in 
this case, was to ensure, through accountability and the stigmatization that accompanied 
the historical documentation of Nazi crimes, the permanent defenestration of Nazi 
ideology and leadership — that Germany would never again threaten international order 
after provoking two world wars within a quarter-century. The path to future cooperation 
between Germany and the Allied Powers was to be paved by severing the delinquent 
state’s troubled past from its postwar future.
The American chief prosecutor Robert Jackson foresaw that the Tribunal’s 
credibility would be attacked with the tag of “victor’s justice”. His famous response 
during his opening address at the trial showed a keen appreciation of the judgment of 
history: “That four great nations flushed with victory and stung by injury, stay the hand 
of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is 
one of the most significant tributes that Power ever paid to Reason” . The influence of 
liberal views in some states that were part of the Allied Powers ultimately ensured a form 
of justice that the Nazi Government, had its military aggressions been successful, would 
hardly have afforded its enemies.
The other qualification to the difference between the Nuremberg process and the 
UN Tribunals is that of just who comprises the “international community” that the UN 
represents, and how representative we can consider the UN Security Council that set up 
The Hague and Arusha Tribunals. The question of whether there is, in fact an 
international community will be considered in the next chapter. But I will use the term 
here simply for purposes of argument. While the international community in the context
of a universal organization like the United Nations can be said to consist of its 191 
member states, the term is somewhat fictional in this context because the major decisions 
are made by a far smaller group of states. These are the heavy lifters, states that have 
capacity or other strategic advantage -- economic, military, diplomatic, geographic or 
demographic — to influence policy and turn agreed policies into reality on the ground. 
This reality flows from the fact that the Security Council, which established the UN 
Tribunals in the 1990s in the exercise of the organization’s peace enforcement powers, is 
based practically on the same power quartet that created the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
Together with China, these states are veto-wielding permanent members of the 15- 
member Security Council. Their legitimacy as being representative of a broad-based 
international community in a world with new and rising economic and demographic 
powers is increasingly questionable .
The prosecutors at Nuremberg were appointed by, and represented, their states, 
and the prosecutors of the ICTY and the ICTR are appointed by the Security Council of 
the United Nations. While the latter are, on the face of things, more independent than 
their predecessors at Nuremberg and are not outwardly beholden to national agendas, 
they are nonetheless subject to the political oversight of a political master -- the Security 
Council, to which they must submit periodic progress reports. The point, then, is that the 
first difference between the Nuremberg Tribunal and the UN Tribunals may be one more 
of form than substance.
Other contrasts are more substantive. The second, of key importance for the 
evolution of international law and relations, is that the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
prosecutions were for crimes committed in classic international wars between states. In a
fundamental contribution to the development of international humanitarian law, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is the first international criminal tribunal to 
adjudicate violations of humanitarian law committed in non-intemational armed conflict.
. This is a major advance because it strengthens the norm of individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but 
also because, in practice, most conflicts in the past 15 years, especially in Africa have 
been civil wars. This advance, from a point where international humanitarian law applied 
strictly to international wars, to that of an application of its standards to an internal 
conflict by a duly instituted international criminal tribunal, creates room for normative 
change within the international system, even if order and justice clash in the process -  as 
they frequently have.
Third, while the Nuremberg Charter went beyond individual criminal 
responsibility to label certain organizations of the then German state “criminal
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organizations” , the UN Tribunals have limited themselves to the individual culpability 
or innocence of accused persons24. This appears odd when juxtaposed with Jackson’s 
emphasis on individual responsibility in the Nuremberg trial, stating, as he did, that “The 
very idea that states commit crimes is fiction. Crimes are always committed only by 
persons”25.One can only surmise that this contradiction owes itself to larger strategy of 
stigmatizing the Nazi political and military leadership beyond the courtroom, but utilizing 
the weight of judicial judgments to achieve that objective. A contemporary parallel, even 
if not in all respects, is the banning of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, the United States-led occupying power in Iraq following the 
military defeat of Hussein’s armed forces and the fall of his government in 2003.
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Fourth, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals had the power to hand out, and did 
mete out, the death penalty. Life imprisonment, however, was the maximum penalty 
provided in the statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY. This reflects a movement away from 
the death penalty in the evolution of international human rights standards established by 
the United Nations. Nuremberg prosecutor Jackson had strong personal misgivings about 
the death penalty in the American legal system, but swallowed his reservations in the 
context of a call to a historic duty and the larger purpose of the war crimes trial. Latin 
American states at the United Nations also opposed its inclusion in the Nuremberg
9 f%Charter to no avail.
Fifth, the Nuremberg Tribunal had no appellate jurisdictions, while the UN 
Tribunals have appeals chambers. Although Nuremberg convicts could appeal, and did, 
to the Allied Control Council for clemency, that Council was a political and 
administrative authority and had no powers to review the legal basis of IMT decisions. It 
was thus not an appellate jurisdiction in any real sense. More than anything else, this 
fact weakens the Nuremberg Tribunal’s assertions of a superior justice that “stayed the 
hand of vengeance”. That the judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal were not subject to 
the review of an appellate chamber was a poor standard of justice. It points to the role of 
the trials as a means for ensuring that the Nazi leaders had little chance of escaping their 
likely fate at the hands of the law, or postponing that outcome through appeal processes.
Finally, the two sets of international tribunals have different sets of material 
jurisdictions. The Nuremberg Tribunal’s competence covered crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The Rwanda Tribunal’s remit extends to genocide, 
crimes against humanity and serious violations of Article 3 Common to the. Geneva
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Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, adopted in 1949, and Additional Protocol 
II Thereto of 1977, while the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s mandate includes genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and grave breaches of the laws and customs of war. Thus, the Rwanda 
Tribunal is one preoccupied with genocide, and relies far more on codified international 
humanitarian law than was the case at Nuremberg.
Nuremberg’s Legacy
Notwithstanding the victor’s justice it was, the Nuremberg Charter and the trials 
based on it have left an important legacy in international law and world politics. That 
legacy is decidedly mixed. Nevertheless, by demonstrating the moral and legal limits 
that there must be in the conduct of states, it was part of an important shift away from an 
international system to an international society that occurred in the first part of the 20th 
century and laid the foundation for advocacy for a further movement towards a 
cosmopolitan world society, distinctions that will be discussed in the next chapter.
Genocide.
A major legacy of Nuremberg was the codification of the crime of genocide that 
followed in its wake. While the extermination of the Jews and other minorities in the 
course of Hitler’s wars of aggression (tried at Nuremberg as crimes against humanity) 
was undoubtedly genocidal, and the word genocide was used in the course of the trials, 
Nuremberg did not have a mandate to try the Nazi leaders for genocide because the term, 
coined by the Polish international lawyer Raphael Lemkin, was not technically a legal 
crime at the time. That offense was only legally codified as a crime in international law
by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1948 (hereinafter the Genocide Convention). This is an 
important distinction, for the Genocide Convention opened up a markedly wider front in 
the quest for international justice. This legacy was extended through the attempts to 
develop international law by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. 
Although these efforts have tended to outpace positive international law and the actual 
practice of states in some instances, they have led inexorably to the establishment of a 
permanent International Criminal Court.
Crimes Against Humanity.
Similarly, the establishment of a rubric called “crimes against humanity” in 
international law ranks as one Nuremberg’s greatest achievements. Although that genre 
was defined in the context of the war for which the Nazi leaders were on trial, it has 
survived as a distinct category of crimes, whether committed in war or peace. When this 
is combined with the manner in which the nature of conflicts have changed in the past 50 
years -  becoming far more “internal” than international, although with undoubtedly 
international ramifications -  the implication of this innovation becomes clear. It has 
become the legal Achilles heel of dictators, at least in theory if not always in practice. 
What “maximum rulers” and “Big Men” despots do within their borders has become fair 
game for external interest and even inquiry. But meddlesomeness has rarely led to 




Perhaps the most important legacy of Nuremberg was the expansion in judicial practice 
of the principle of individual criminal responsibility for violations of international 
humanitarian law. The Nuremberg tribunal rejected the argument that international law at 
the time governed the actions of sovereign states only and provided no punishment for 
individuals. It rejected as well an extension of this argument, namely that where an act is 
done by a state, those who did it are not personally responsible, but are protected by the 
state’s sovereignty. The defense of superior orders, so frequently invoked as moral and 
legal justification of conduct that violates the laws of war and mass atrocities in times of 
war and peace, was also expressly curtailed. Predictably, many defendants at Nuremberg 
relied on that defense, but it did not avail them. Today, the Statutes of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals and the ICC make clear that superior orders provide no 
exemption from the culpability that flows from individual responsibility, but may only be 
an extenuating factor in punishment.
Command responsibility.
It is only a short step away from the principle of individual criminal responsibility 
to that of command responsibility, or the responsibility of military or political superiors 
for the acts of their subordinates when the superior knew, or should have known, that 
such persons were committing genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Again,
the Nuremberg trials paved the way to the firm establishment of this principle in positive 
law.
But the principle of command responsibility automatically calls into question that
of sovereign immunity. If a sovereign has command responsibility for the acts of his
subordinates is he or she then immune from the legal consequences of those acts? It is
here that the normative impact of the Nuremberg trials confronts the nature of
international order in terms so stark that it remains extremely controversial. Nuremberg’s
legacy is that heads of state and government can be tried for genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes in certain circumstances for acts performed while in office.
The Nuremberg Charter proclaims: “The official position of defendants, whether as
Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
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considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. The Statutes of 
the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC have similarly done away with substantive immunity for 
these crimes. But this should not be confused as being the general position in 
international law. The denial of that immunity is limited to cases where the victor or 
victors in a war become an occupying power, assume sovereignty over the vanquished, 
and try the leaders of the defeated party under special laws such as the Nuremberg 
Charter and Tokyo Charters. Sovereign immunity is also clearly suspended where an 
international tribunal with competent jurisdiction is established by the United Nations 
Security Council (e.g. the ICTY and the ICTR), or where an international criminal 
tribunal with competent jurisdiction is established by treaty, e.g. the ICC. Outside these 
circumstances, the substantive immunity of heads of state and government and other high 
officials of state (such as Ministers of Foreign Affairs) remain solid in customary
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international law. Efforts to prosecute sovereigns outside these confines have been 
fraught with controversy and, so far, unsuccessful.
The rise and decline o f  international law and tribunals.
In another important legacy, the Nuremberg trials established the contemporary 
superiority of international law over domestic laws in legal responses to mass atrocities. 
This legacy was to be established in the “primacy” of the jurisdictions of the two 
international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, in the former even more 
so.27 Why was this so? First, in the era in which the Nuremberg trials took place, wars 
were almost always waged across national frontiers. Jurists and politicians therefore 
believed that judging violations of international humanitarian law would best be 
undertaken through a “law of nations” rather than domestic criminal law.
Second, the Nuremberg trials were framed by prosecutors such as Jackson as a 
contest between good and pure evil, with the law of the Nuremberg Charter having risen 
to the gallant defense of “civilization” or “civilized nations”. This (in the case of 
Nuremberg, self-interested) defense of the greater whole, which today is captured by the 
more politically correct phrase “humanity” was also more naturally handled through 
international law as a vehicle for the establishment of a post-World War II order.
International law’s supremacy in this arena, however, has come under threat. 
This new reality arises because the nature of conflict, as noted a moment ago, has 
changed dramatically in the past half-century, with civil wars within states replacing wars 
between states as the main source of carnage. With this has come a slow but sure re­
thinking, on the basis of assertions of national sovereignty, of the balance of jurisdictions 
between international and municipal laws. Thus, some states have incorporated 
international law into nationally legislated laws or expanded their criminal law to 
accommodate such concepts. To illustrate: even in the context of the permanent 
International Criminal Court, that Court’s jurisdiction was made complementary to 
national jurisdiction, reversing the Nuremberg trend adopted in the creation of the ICTY 
and the ICTR whereby national jurisdictions were really seen in practice as poor cousins 
to international justice. Moreover, constrained by their nature as ad hoc tribunals and 
faced with the imperative of completing their work by the end of this decade, the 
international tribunals at Arusha and The Hague have begun looking to national courts 
for help with easing the burden of heavy caseloads.
International tribunals as a favored institutional means for rendering justice for 
international crimes have also suffered a certain decline, with the trend now more in 
favor of hybrid courts that combine national and international jurisdiction and judges, 
such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia.
Ex post facto law.
The issue of retroactive or ex post facto law is an important characteristic of Nuremberg 
that goes to the heart of the nature of the IMT and has cast a pall over its legitimacy ever 
since. The legal principle nulla poena sine lege (no punishment of a crime without pre­
existing law on which punishment is based) has been a cardinal rule of criminal law in 
many countries for several centuries. It is now explicitly acknowledged in the statutes of
the international war crimes tribunals. But the Nuremberg trials violated this 
fundamental legal norm when they included “crimes against peace” (planning and 
waging aggressive war) as one of the crimes for which the Nazis were put on trial. Not 
prepared to allow the Allied Powers a monopoly to claims of defending civilization, the 
Nazi defendants challenged the very legitimacy of the IMT by arguing that retroactive 
punishment was anathema to the law of all civilized nations. Aggressive war was not a 
crime in positive international law at the time Hitler embarked on his irredentist military 
campaigns, at least not as defined in any statute. Nowhere had a penalty for waging such 
a war been stipulated, and there was no court created to try and punish offenders.
Even as they planned the Nuremberg trials, its architects, including Robert 
Jackson, had foreseen this conundrum. Yes, the Nazis committed despicable acts that 
infringed morality at its most basic, but had they broken any laws in invading their 
European neighbors? Germany was one of 63 signatory nations to the General Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War, referred to as the Kellog-Briand Pact or the Pact of Paris, of 
1928, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy. It was a signatory to the 
Hague Rules of Land Warfare of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1929. Jackson 
constructed his response to these predictable arguments on the premise that the 
establishment of a court with punishment procedures (the IMT) filled in the previously 
blank space of enforcement of these treaties: “Let’s not be derailed by legal hair- 
splitters”, he argued. “Aren’t murder, torture, and enslavement crimes recognized by all 
civilized people? What we propose is to punish acts which have been regarded as
9 0criminal since the time of Cain and have been so written in every civilized code”.
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The judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal dismissed the ex post facto defense with 
an elegant, stretched disquisition that was based more on international morality than 
interpretations of positive international law. The Tribunal first sought to establish that 
the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, while a principle of justice, was not a limitation on 
the sovereignty of the Allied Powers.30 It could not therefore become a valid excuse for 
violating treaties. “To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties 
and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue, for 
in such circumstances the attacker must know that what he is doing is wrong, and so far 
from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go 
unpunished”.31
The IMT then analyzed the legal effect of the Kellog-Briand Pact. In rejecting the 
Nazi defense that the pact lacked the force of positive law, the Tribunal recalled the 
preamble to the Pact and its first two provisions, in which the signatories, including the 
Axis Powers Germany, Italy and Japan had pronounced themselves:
“Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare 
Of mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank 
Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should 
be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations 
existing between their peoples should be perpetuated.. .all 
changes in their relations should be sought only by pacific 
means.. .thus uniting civilized nations of the world 
in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy...
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Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in 
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse 
to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce 
it as an instrument of national policy in their relations to one 
another.
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement 
or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of 
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall 
never be sought except by pacific means”.
The Tribunal was of the opinion that “the solemn renunciation of war as an 
instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is 
illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with its 
inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime by doing so”. It likened the 
Kellog-Briand Pact to the Hague Convention of 1907 that prohibited certain methods of 
warfare (inhumane treatment of prisoners, the use of poisoned weapons, and so on) 
without designating them criminal or stipulating sanctions, or establishing a court to try 
the offenders.
This comparison to the Hague Convention was convenient, but is inapposite. As 
the IMT itself noted, the acts condemned in the Hague Convention had been prohibited 
under customary international law long before the Convention. The same cannot be said 
of planning and waging war, which was, and still is, one of the common currencies of 
international relations. Therein lies the essential difference between the Hague 
Convention and the Pact of Paris. In any event, there was a clear understanding during
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the negotiation of the Hague Convention that national courts would enforce its principles, 
or at least bear them in mind when trying war criminals. There was nothing of the sort as 
a background to the Kellog-Briand Pact. From the standpoint of objective legal analysis, 
the Nuremberg judges’ attempts to establish a historical linkage between the Pact of Paris 
and a number of draft international treaties which preceded it and explicitly declared 
aggressive war an international crime is unpersuasive. Why did none of those hortatory 
declarations see the juridical light of day in the sense of ratification? States were, in the 
end, not prepared to criminalize war in itself. They balked.
It is quite arguable that the atrocities perpetuated by the Nazis could have been 
effectively tried and punished under the rubric of war crimes (violations of the laws and 
customs of war) and crimes against humanity. Fifty years after Nuremberg, Drexel 
Strecher, one of its surviving American prosecutors, presented an important insight into 
Jackson’s frame of mind on the question of aggressive war: it was, to Jackson, the 
linchpin of the case against the Germans, for it was the conspiracy to wage the war 
(another controversial charge) and the waging of it that propelled all the other crimes.33
The Nuremberg tribunal either believed it was interpreting the Kellog-Briand Pact 
to establish the missing link of its signatories’ intentions, as it asserted, or else -- and this 
is more likely -  imposed a stretched interpretation in order to achieve the political 
objectives of the Nuremberg Charter. “In interpreting the words of the Pact, it must be 
remembered that international law is not the product of an international legislature, and 
that such international agreements as the Pact have to deal with general principles of law, 
and not with administrative matters of procedure”, the Tribunal ruled. “This law is not 
static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world”.
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Meanwhile, evidence that the world had not changed very much at all lay in the 
more realistic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations adopted in 1945/ That 
document remained true to the aspiration to a world free of war in its preamble: “We, the 
peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow ...” But it avoided 
the mistakes of the League of Nations -  and that of the Kellog-Briand Pact -  when it 
recognized that the use of force is a hardy constant in international relations but sought to 
stipulate the circumstances in which it is lawful or unlawful. This debate continues today 
in the United Nations and has been thrown into sharper focus by the war in Iraq in 2003.
The Nuremberg judgment, insofar as it relates to aggressive war, can now be seen 
as an attempt to turn a policy or aspiratory declaration into the force of law, because the 
Allied Powers could. The question, then, is: If the Nuremberg Charter was retroactive 
law, was it by that reason injustice, or was it a bad law that made real justice possible? 
This is an important query, for it goes to the heart of the debate about the nature of war 
crimes justice. The Nazi defense of the ex post facto nature of the Nuremberg Charter 
was in itself an exercise in hypocrisy, for Nazi rule and its persecution of minorities was 
based squarely on a subversion of that very principle. An international meeting of 
criminologists hosted in Germany in 1935 provided stark indications of the Nazi agenda.
Addressing delegates in a speech titled “The Idea of Justice in German Penal 
Reform”, Franz Guertner, the Reich minister of justice informed his learned audience that 
Germany would no longer rely on the principle of nulla poena sine lege. Rather, it would 
now adopt the exactly opposite one of nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without 
punishment). “Everyone who commits an act deserving of punishment shall receive due
punishment regardless of the incompleteness of the law...National Socialism imposes a 
new and high task on criminal law, namely the realization of true justice”.34 Guemer 
explained, in his logic, that the advantage of this new approach was to free judges from 
the constraints of gaps in the law, whereby they could adjudicate only that which the 
legislature had defined as law.35 The whole point, he stated, was to bridge the divide 
between morality and legality and so achieve “true justice”. From this synthesis, criminal
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law would now benefit from “the valuable forces of ethics”. This discussion was taking 
place in the same period that the obnoxious Nuremberg laws were being formulated in 
the German Ministry of the Interior.
Thus it was that at Nuremberg the Nazi leaders got a taste of their own medicine -  
retroactive, instant-brew justice. This fact has been overlooked in many assessments of 
the trials. It is trite wisdom that two wrongs do not make a right, and it is helpful to bear 
in mind this whole aspect of the Nuremberg trials as we review its legacy and competing 
claims to the defense of civilization as a tool in the service of agendas that are essentially 
political. But the scope of Nazi crimes called for an equally decisive response, as 
Jackson made clear in his moving opening statement at the trial.
Coupled with the issue of victor’s justice noted earlier, the whole framework of 
the Nuremberg trials, including ex post facto law, was established to exclude the crimes 
of the Allied Powers. Allied lawyers, including Jackson and Maxwell-Fyfe, anticipated 
the so-called “tu quoque”, the “so-did-you” defense.37 Both sides had committed war 
crimes during the war — in the case of the Allies most famously the bombing of Dresden 
and other cities that claimed hundreds of thousands of civilian lives. Jackson’s position 
was that it simply had to be an invalid defense — and so, indeed, it was in the Nuremberg
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Charter. He argued that the scale of Nazi crimes, committed in the course of wars started 
by Hitler, utterly dwarfed the crimes committed by Allied forces. Here the legacy of 
Nuremberg has been one of subsequent attempts to create a more equitable framework in 
the establishment of contemporary international criminal tribunals. As we shall see in 
later chapters, the problem has not gone away.
Anglo-Saxon Common Law.
The Nuremberg trials also established a legacy in which the adversarial, Anglo-Saxon 
common law trial system became the dominant procedure in trials proceedings in the UN 
-  sponsored ad hoc war crimes tribunals, over the continental European system that is 
sometimes referred to as “inquisitorial”38; There were political motives at play in this 
process, but let us first examine the “technical” ones. Both systems have their merits and 
demerits. The adversarial system tends to drag out trials because of direct examinations 
and cross-examinations of accused persons and witnesses, and would include an initial 
plea of “guilty” or “not guilty” by the defendant, but is seen as affording the accused a 
trail with full respect for his or her rights. The Nuremberg trial, however, was 
remarkable for its relative brevity -  eight months for the trial 22 defendants for crimes 
committed in more than ten countries over several years, with a four-nation prosecution 
team.
The civil law system, on the other hand, is a heavily investigative process in 
which the judges are dominant, and lawyers -  certainly defense lawyers, at any rate -  and 
the accused have less scope for action. A criminal case that advances to the point of a 
docket has, in all probability, a high level of the burden of proof already discharged
through the investigative process. It has already been noted that the Nuremberg trial was 
a “prosecutor’s court”, and it is clear that Jackson and his fellow Anglo-Saxon lawyers 
wanted to shape the nature of the proceedings at Nuremberg to a far greater extent than 
the civil law system would have allowed. Logically, then, the judges at Nuremberg were 
not the dominant force at the trial. Historical accounts of the IMT bear out this 
proposition, for they are unquestionably dominated by accounts of the courtroom heroics 
and oratorical flair of the Anglo-Saxon prosecutors Jackson, Shawcross, Maxwell-Fyfe, 
and their colleagues. Moreover, the balance of military roles among the four Allies in 
ending the war fell heavily in favor of the United States, with the roles of the French and 
Russian forces considered relatively less decisive. And American forces had captured 
most of the high-profile Nazi defendants. The cards were stacked in Jackson’s favor.
As Joseph Persico recounts of the negotiations among the four Powers at a 
meeting to set the framework of the trial held in London in late June 1945, with the 
common law lawyers led by Jackson and Maxwell-Fyfe, and the continental lawyers led 
by the Soviet union’s Nikitchenko and the French delegation:
To the continental Europeans it seemed that the Anglo-Saxons 
were trying to ram an alien court system down their throats.
Nikitchenko listened as Jackson and Maxwell-Fyfe explained 
adversarial law, with its opposing attorneys, direct examination, 
and cross-examination, before a judge who acted as an umpire.
That was not how it was done in his country, he said. The French 
agreed. Their judges did not demean themselves by prying 
battling lawyers apart like a referee in a prize fight. Judges took 
evidence from witnesses, from the accused, from the police,
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from the victims, sifted it, weighed it, and arrived at their decisions.
Lawyers were merely to help the accused prepare a defence.
They had little role in the court itself. Lawyers are not so 
important, Nikitchenko concluded in a lecturing tone; judges 
are important. And this matter of pleading guilty or not 
guilty: Were they really going to allow a man like Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner, responsible for the Gestapo and the concentration 
Camps, to stand up in a court of law and declare himself Not 
Guilty?39
Moreover, there were almost certainly other political reasons, inspired by a 
mixture of national pride and strategic goals that contributed to the ultimately successful 
American and British effort to ensure the dominance of their national legal cultures at the 
Nuremberg trials. It would best facilitate the historical defeat of the Nazi ideology in 
Germany, backed up as the prosecution case was by damningly incriminating documents. 
Jackson fully appreciated the historical significance of the Nuremberg trials. And it 
should not be surprising that he sought to put a distinctly American stamp on the 
proceedings in light of the disturbing tensions that were already developing between the 
West and the Soviet Union despite their “shotgun marriage” at Nuremberg.40
Nuremberg’s Legacy in Historical Context
Nuremberg’s legacy is interwoven into a number of important historical 
developments. First, the Nuremberg trials were perhaps the most important post-war 
factor that shaped a democratic and prosperous Germany (West Germany) that became a 
key member of the Western alliance during the Cold War that divide Germany between
East and West. By demonstrating so vividly the crimes committed by the Nazi Party, the 
trials effectively banished Nazi ideology from the domestic political sphere. The deep 
introspection it generated in subsequent years — not very apparent during the trials 
themselves or even shortly afterwards -  helped make room for real democracy. Hitler 
and the Nazi era became a badge of shame to be lived down. Across the Atlantic, 
Stimson was proved right and Morgenthau wrong. Prophecies by Nazi defendants at the 
trial that they would go down in history as martyrs for the German nation -- Goering in 
his typical vainglory predicted that statues would be erected in his image years after the 
trials — have remained a chimera. While this advantage from Nuremberg’s legacy has 
accrued far more to Germany -- and Japan, courtesy of the Tokyo Tribunal — than in any 
other theater of conflict in contemporary times, even in its limited impact it has had 
important implications for world politics and economics.
Second, the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court, the 
hope of which Nuremberg so ardently inspired in human rights campaigners, is one of the 
most important legacies of the Nuremberg trials. To be sure, the ICC as it exists today is 
not quite what was sketched out in the visions of its prophets — the Court came along half 
a century late as a result of the Cold War; even some liberal democracies were opposed to 
its creation; it’s jurisdiction is secondary to national prosecutions; and its future prospects 
and impact are decidedly debatable.
Third, at a more philosophical level, Nuremberg, romanticized as it has been in 
the mainstream liberal tradition, did not achieve its ultimate and unrealistic goal of 
deterring aggression with the specter of accountability. Between 1945 and 1992, just 
before the United Nations established its first ad hoc international tribunal the following
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year, there were 24 wars between nations, at a cost of over six million lives.41 Another 93 
civil wars took an additional 15 million lives.42 Millions more have died in the past 
decade, from Liberia to Sri Lanka, from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to Colombia 
and Sudan. No one can wish wars or evil away. Perspectives of international relations 
that reflect an international society propose only how wars can be made fewer and farther 
between.
The Nuremberg prosecution of “crimes against peace” thus seems likely to remain 
frozen in mists of history. It is apparent from even the most cursory look at 
contemporary events in a world now fundamentally altered by the “war against terrorism” 
and what Samuel Huntington famously called the “clash of civilizations”, the meaning of 
“aggression” depends on who is defining it. It does not look very much different from 
the dilemma that beset the members of the League of Nations when they were faced with 
drafts of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1923 and the Geneva Protocol a year later.
Nevertheless, aspects of Nuremberg’s legacy became firmly established by the 
judgments handed down by the international tribunals established as a response to two 
contemporary tragedies -  the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 
1990s. The Dusko Tadic trial at the ICTY in 1994 became the first time an individual was 
judged and convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity on the basis of 
individual criminal responsibility by an international tribunal since Nuremberg. But, if 
Nuremberg’s standards of political consequence were to be strictly applied, Tadic, being 
a lowly camp guard, would not have merited the judicial attention of a major 
international war crimes tribunal. The avowed goal of these institutions is to make 
examples of the powerful by bringing them to accountability. The Tadic trial
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nevertheless served to reawaken the legacy of Nuremberg, and led the Hague Tribunal to 
more significant quests that resulted in the historic indictment in 1999 of Slobodan 
Milosevic, the first sitting head of state to be indicted by an international criminal 
tribunal.
As it relates to the ultimate crime of genocide, however, the nature of events in 
Rwanda in 1994, the uncontested fact and gravity of the worst genocide since the 
Holocaust, lent the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda the opportunity to 
become the first such tribunal to apply Nuremberg’s legacy at a consistent level of 
political consequence -  trying the ringleaders of a genocide.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to point up the mixed legacy of the Nuremberg trials. The 
trial of the major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, warts and all, remains the defining 
war crimes trial of the 20th century. This is as much for what it teaches us about justice 
as policy as for the lessons it provides — for those willing to see beyond its halo — about 
the political and strategic context of war crimes justice. The legacy mentioned above is 
one that combines in itself the romantic view of international justice and more cynical 
motivations. What I have done is to show how that legacy has constituted an advance 
from where we were in the years before international criminal justice became a major 
dimension of international law and politics. When the legalist picture is mixed up with 
the “real world” of politics that provides a more complete context for assessing war 
crimes justice, a much more complex reality emerges. And it is to the factors that shape
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that more complete reality -  the nature of the international society -  that we shall now
turn.
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Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him.
And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother?
And he said, I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?
The Holy Bible, Genesis 4: 9 
In Chapter 1 I took an introductory look at some ethical traditions in international 
relations, making the point that the English School theory of international society, not the 
liberal legalism to which several writers explicitly or implicitly attribute the development 
of international criminal tribunals in the 20th century, offers a better explanation of the 
nature of that activity in international relations. Chapter 2 took a backward look at 
Nuremberg as a historical example of justice as political strategy.
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the nature of the international society 
has impacted on the development of international criminal justice at a broad conceptual 
level in a contemporary context. It will situate the discussion in the context of the nature 
of international law in general and justice in international relations, and demonstrate that 
sovereignty, inequality and the role of power inherent in the international realm renders 
war crimes justice necessarily political — frequently deployed unevenly and unequally, 
and in the service of political and strategic ends. At the same time the international 
society has come to closer agreement on certain values that are solidarist, but those 
values have lived more in declarations than in the actions of states, which contributes to 
the uneven quality of war crimes justice. Against this background the tensions between
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the aspirations of cosmopolitan world justice and the current international and domestic 
orders will fall into view, to be elaborated upon in later chapters.
A Society of States
Hedley Bull, mainly through The Anarchical Society , has done much to 
illuminate the nature of social order in world politics and the conceptual tensions between 
order and justice. He argued that we live in a world made up of a society of states (the 
international society) in which this group of states sees themselves as bound by a 
common set of rules in relation to one another because they recognize their common 
interests and values and participate in common institutions.1 This “society” is an advance 
on the international system. According to Bull, while there may be commercial, military 
or even diplomatic contact in an international system, it is the element of being bound 
together by a common set of rules, and sharing in the working of common institutions, 
that distinguishes the international society from an international system. These closer ties 
have fostered not only greater efficiencies, but the development of improved, shared 
moral standards of conduct as well. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, 
and, more concretely, the formation of the League of Nations in 1919, facilitated the shift 
from an international system to an international society. That the League was an effort to 
make that transition is captured in the statement by Raymond Fosdick, Under Secretary- 
General of the organization: “The world has had far too little practice in international 
activity. To be sure we’ve had the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures and the International Sugar Commission...but we never had a
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systematic international approach to problems where everybody has everything to gain 
and nothing to lose”.2
The Hague conference got somewhat ahead of itself when it claimed in its 
preamble a non-existent solidarity as the basis for inter-state relations, and as reflecting 
the actual state of international relations at the time. “Recognizing the solidarity uniting 
the members of the society of civilized nations” read the Convention -- a fiction that, as 
an international historian noted, “managed to ignore the recently fought Russo-Japanese 
War, the ongoing Anglo-German armaments race...and the determination of the United 
States to stay an ocean away from the bloodletting that so frequently masked the 
solidarity ‘uniting’ the civilized nations of Europe”.4
An international system can exist without the element of society5. But even the 
international society that is an improvement on the international system is inherently 
anarchical because of the sovereignty and contending interests of its members. In the 
“elegant paradox” of Bull’s phrase “anarchical society” we find that “society” implies a 
rule-governed environment, and yet we also have “anarchy”, which means that an 
element of chaos, a frequent or occasional unpredictability and untrustworthiness of some 
of that society’s members, is present.6 Questions have thus been raised about the 
“thickness” of the shared values of the international society, with some analysts using this 
as a basis for advocating a shift to a cosmopolitan “world society”.7
By way of analogy, then, the international society is like a social or professional 
club. Members associate with each other within it, in accordance with mutually agreed 
rules. Membership of the club confers shared benefits on its members. But shared 
benefits do not always equate to shared values, though membership rules stipulate values
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that , members profess to share. But the members of the club must go home after their 
interactions within the society. And, in this case, “home” is the sovereign states with 
geographical boundaries to which members belong as a constitutive element of the 
international society. This is what makes an international society different from an 
“international community”, which is much spoken of, but remains, in reality, an 
aspiration.
In a real community the members live with one another in a shared space, the 
rules are far more internalized, applicable by virtue of collective sanction. In such a 
community, even where there are individual “homes”, untoward events in one’s 
neighbor’s house or malfeasance by members are automatically subject to intervention by 
other members because the raison d’etre of the community is the abnegation of individual 
interest that accompanies it. Members subject the right to regulate their individual affairs 
to a higher collective or individual power, without exception.
With characteristic clarity, Bull clarifies three traditions of thought in world 
politics: “the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state 
of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a 
potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which
Q
views international politics as taking place within an international society.”
The question of whether or not we live in a tightly knit international community, 
or in a looser international society despite the phenomenon of globalization, is the key to 
understanding the real nature of justice for war crimes. On the answer to that question 
depends whether or not armed humanitarian intervention takes place to stop genocide and 
ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan or wherever else such atrocities may
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erupt tomorrow. Or whether states essentially balk at the prospect of muscular action and 
instead attempt to bury such crimes in a torrent of (verbal) moral indignation and -  in the 
rare event -  establish accountability after it is all over. The answer explains the real 
motives of judicial intervention through war crimes tribunals. And it determines the 
framework for such intervention and how consistently, occasionally or evenhandedly war 
crimes are punished. In sum, it holds the key to understanding the politics of 
accountability for war crimes. “International society” is thus the essential conceptual 
framework for this study.
In taking this position I am fully aware of the popularity, perhaps even political 
correctness, of the term “international community”. In one sense, community and society 
are not at all in opposition, community being an advanced evolution of society. But to 
the extent that cosmopolitan notions of war crimes justice are supposedly based, in the 
liberal or cosmopolitan worldview, on an international community, the empirical 
evidence of international life points towards a different reality. It is either, then, that the 
terms “international community” and “international society” are frequently used 
interchangeably, with the former depicting the latter (and vice versa), or community is 
used in the knowledge that it is an aspiration rather than the prevailing reality, or, in an 
extreme but not exceptional case, the phrase “international community” is used as an 
expedient term or a subterfuge.
Even staunch advocates of the concept of international community such as United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan have admitted that “the idea of the international 
community is under perfectly legitimate attack because of its own frequent failings”9. 
But what does the phrase mean precisely? Edward Kwakwa in a fine essay advocating
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the concept has admitted that it is now used with “reckless abandon”10.There are, as 
Kwakwa and others acknowledge, contending definitions of international community. In 
its restricted sense in which it is used by diplomats, the International Court of Justice11 
and treaties such as the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties12, for example, it 
means what in classical international law was known as the “comity of nations”, defined 
by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as “an association of nations for their mutual benefit, 
the mutual recognition by nations of the laws and customs of others”. In a much wider 
and contemporary sense it is an all-inclusive tent under which states, international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations and even individuals huddle.
At another end of the spectrum of interpretations of international community, it is 
a language of inclusion and exclusion all at once, describing not just those who belong in 
it, but those who do not, and against whom this community is ranged13. These are the 
terrorist groups such as A1 Qaeda that pose existential threats. Or they could include 
outlaw states, “rogue states” or “axis of evil” -- “bomb them”!14 Key actors in this group 
of non-members of the international community are prime candidates for war crimes 
trials. Closely related to this interpretation of international community is yet another that 
props up the concept of sovereign equality of states, but in fact glosses over the reality 
that that “community” is divisible into a few states that maintain the international order 
globally or regionally (the heavy lifters), the weaker states (jocosely dubbed the “axis of 
weasel”) and the outlaw states noted above.
Then there is the hegemony-defined “international community” in which the 
narrow interests of one or more powerful states are defined in universal terms — a 
common feature of the history of Western civilization stretching back to the Roman
empire15. Thus it is that European colonialism has been explained away as having been 
motivated by, among other things, “the spread of liberal ideas”, with colonial 
administrators benignly seeking “to enlarge the circle of national justice to the necessities 
of the empire we have obtained”16. Colonialism, of course, was a cardinal means of the 
expansion of Western-dominated international society for thoroughly self-interested 
reasons, mainly economic, and not infrequently accompanied by mass atrocities against 
the colonized peoples. The Belgian King Leopold, who ruled Belgian Congo (today’s 
Democratic Republic of Congo) in the late 19th century as his private rubber plantation, 
ordered the massacres of nearly 10 million Congolese to quell resistance to forced labor 
in the colony -  undoubtedly the first genocide in the Central Africa, pre-dating the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda by a century. Similarly, thousands of Namibia’s Hererro ethnic 
group was massacred by colonial German forces in the early 20th century. Martti 
Koskenniemi recounts how, following the 1885 Berlin West Africa Conference that 
carved up much of the continent among the European powers, the prestigious Institute de 
droit International echoed praise for King Leopold by one of its members: “It is without 
doubt thanks to the generosity and the political genius of King Leopold that the Congo 
State will have a regime in full conformity with the requirements of European culture”17.
Elements of community exist in the international realm, but they can be seen more 
in their “soft” or “thin” dimensions -  humanitarian responses to earthquakes such as the 
tsunami that hit the Asian countries of Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka and affected the 
African countries of Somalia and Kenya on the Indian Ocean in December 2004, and 
other acts of social solidarity that are more or less symbolic -  than “hard” or “thick”. The 
latter kind of community would be achieved at real material costs such a truly effective
mobilization of resources to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic ravaging Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe, or total cancellations of the debts of 
poor countries to western creditors. In the area of war crimes justice, the thinness of 
community was demonstrated by the establishment of a standing International Criminal 
Court that is essentially predicated on the Westphalian model of state sovereignty, with 
the Court’s jurisdiction essentially complementing, not supplanting, that of states, and 
subject to the influence of the United Nations Security Council in important ways 
(Chapter 9). When all the contrasting interpretations of international community are 
averaged, the result looks very much like an international society.
With this contrast between the international community and the international 
society touched upon, we can now return to Hedley Bull’s analysis of that society. 
Having asserted the international society as the current basis of international relations, 
Bull then defines international order -  the central perspective from which he views 
international relations in the classical tradition, as “a pattern of disposition or activity that 
sustains the goals of that society: the preservation of the international society itself, the 
external sovereignty of individual states that comprise this society, and the goal of peace 
in the sense not of “Universal and permanent peace, such as has been the dream of 
irenists or theorists of peace, and stands in contrast to actual historical experience”.18
Rather, Bull defines the peace that the international society seeks in the context of 
order as “the absence of war among member states of international society as the normal 
condition of their relationship, to be breached only in special circumstances and 
according to principles that are generally accepted”.19 The unnerving manner in which 
breakdowns of order occur in parts of the world, with or without warning, and the
strivings of diplomats and international lawyers to restore order (“peace processes” that 
sometimes include provisions for legal accountability) demonstrates Bull’s thesis. 
Christopher Hill has aptly reflected that “the descent of Yugoslavia into savagery was an 
existential shock to the post-modem societies of western Europe”20. The eruption of civil 
wars in the West African nations of Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire -- both previously 
renowned for their idyllic reputations as placid spots in a volatile region -  provides 
further empirical evidence of the accuracy of Bull’s thesis. The nuclear arms race in 
which certain states are suspected of aspiring to (or to already possess) nuclear status 
clandestinely is a sobering indicator that we live in an international society. And “the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 ended the fear-free lives of prosperous westerners”21. In 
the debate about terrorism, it is often forgotten that 9/11 was a crime against humanity, a 
violation of international humanitarian law. Kant’s perpetual peace is nowhere in sight.
This, then, is a pluralist view of international relations, and contrasts with the 
“solidarist” view of the peace movement. It has been criticized by various scholars as 
being too narrow a perspective because it divorces the international society from the 
human beings that inhabit its constituent states and conduct interstate relations22. 
Inherently, as well, this world view of international relations plays down the influence of 
morality in world politics.23 And yet yery neat divisions between the international 
society perspective and the solidarist one do not make as much sense as might have been 
the case when The Anarchical Society appeared in 1977. Clearly, elements of solidarism 
or the world society are now part of international relations, even if “Cosmopolitan 
networks between individuals and private associations may not live up to expectations of 
fostering the unity of mankind often placed upon them...” and “complicate life for
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official foreign policy through creating other levels of agency”24. Thus even within the 
“international society” intellectual tradition, there is a group of scholars with a more 
solidarist bent who stress the importance of individuals rather than states in international 
society25. The pluralist essence of international society, however, remains dominant as 
the explanatory factor of world politics.
Since justice, in the sense of justice for individuals as bearers of rights and duties, 
is the main subject of this work, it is pertinent to examine Bull’s analysis of the tension 
between order and justice in world politics, and how the evolution of the international 
society since Bull’s death confirms or disproves his position.
Legal justice for war crimes dispensed by truly international war crimes tribunals, 
in the sense in which we know it today, was a distant vision in Bull’s lifetime during the 
Cold War. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were the major point of reference for 
international war crimes trials. It is not that the rights of individuals have ever been 
extinguished, except perhaps in the communist states, but they had, as Bull puts it, “gone
•y/:
underground”. If the preservation of the sovereignty of states (including authority over 
their territories and citizens) is one of the main functions of order, it follows that a high 
profile for individual rights and duties is, in a sense, inherently subversive of sovereignty. 
This is because, first, it limits the power of the state directly, and second, it opens up the 
possibility of external entities sitting in judgment -  moral, political, or legal -  over the 
actions of sovereign states vis-a-vis their citizens. Bull posits that questions of the rights 
and duties of individuals, if answered in a certain way, can lead to disorder in
international relations. One scholar has described this perspective with the term the
0 0“primacy of order”. Bull argued that order was functionally prior to all other goals in
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international relations, including justice, but wisely refrained from passing a value 
judgment on the merits of the two and accepted that the outcome of the order-versus- 
justice clash will vary according to the “merits” of each particular case.28 One would say 
that it will vary not according to the merits, but according to the political interests at play 
at a given time.
Bull recognized the powerful force that international human rights represented 
even in the Cold War, but argued that the architecture of international order is hostile to 
demands for human justice. That is why the enforcement of international human rights — 
even in the area of international criminal law which is one of the areas where 
international law has established itself as enforceable -- is essentially selective. Although 
Bull’s view is correct, there are two inherent qualifications: The first is that, as Bull 
himself accepted, international society is in historical evolution. While the limitations of 
that society (namely, its essentially anarchical nature, functional priority of order over 
other values such as justice, and the kind of “peace” that is possible within it) have been 
borne out by historical experience, there thus exists a possibility of adaptations in world 
politics that accommodate the demands of justice, even if selectively, without 
fundamentally undermining the primacy of order. Bull unwittingly provides support for 
this interpretation of the rise of international criminal justice when he states:
It is clear that demands for preservation of order and for the promotion of just change in world 
politics are not mutually exclusive, and there is sometimes scope for reconciling one with the 
other. Any regime that provides order in world politics will need to appease demands for just 
change, at least to some degree, if it is to endure; and thus an enlightened pursuit of the goal of 
order will take account also of the demand for justice. Likewise the demand for just change will
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need to take account of the goal of order; for it is only if the changes that are effected can be
29incorporated in some regime that provides order, that they can be made secure.
Bull had in mind here mainly other dimensions of justice in international affairs, such as 
decolonization and the end of the Apartheid system in South Africa. But I interpret the 
analysis as applicable as well to legal justice for violations of international humanitarian 
law since this has become an aspect of international relations that is just as important as 
other manifestations of justice in international affairs today. Moreover, Bull himself 
addressed the question of international criminal justice to enforce human rights standards 
in The Anarchical Society.
The second qualification to the primary of order position is that it assumes 
another extreme position, that of an individual justice reflecting a cosmopolitan 
community of mankind and unregulated by power and order, as the basis of its assertion 
of the priority of order. There is no persuasive evidence that such a trend, despite having 
powerful advocates, is winning the day in international affairs. “The growth of the 
discourse of rights over the last fifty years”, Chris Brown has written, “has been one of 
the most striking changes in both the theory and practice of international relations”30. 
Indeed, I have previously asserted that war crimes justice developed in the 1990s into a 
third dimension of international politics after diplomacy and the use of force31. Despite 
these significant shifts, it is now clear that the system of war crimes justice that has 
emerged is one that still remains subservient to order and is easily controlled by states as 
the main actors in international society. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate this 
proposition very clearly.
What Bull did not foresee is the extent to which a sea change has taken place in 
international society to adapt the idea of international justice without, in my view,
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threatening interpretations of order that are based on realpolitik in any fundamental 
manner. A sense of movement towards universalism that has ultimately been far more 
apparent than real, has been created. The clash of forces has been a strong one, and both 
sides have won and lost important battles. Although Bull did not foresee the degree of 
change in the form of the international society, this evolution owes itself to trends that 
became dominant after his death, the specific nature of which he could not have foreseen.
The first reason for the conceptual shift towards international criminal justice that 
has been based not on victory in war, as efforts prior to the Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
Tribunals were, can be described in terms of the duality of human nature -  the ability to 
be selfish and at the same time to aspire to higher standards. There has always existed a 
clash between the order-centered view of state interest and a human yearning to higher 
standards beyond those that merely serve the interests of states. This duality has given 
heightened prominence to the role of morality in international affairs generally, and 
specifically in the foreign policies of several states in international affairs. Some of these 
states are liberal democracies that have sought to transplant their internal political and 
legal values of accountability and due process to the resolution of problems in the 
international system. European states such as the United Kingdom have been in the 
vanguard of ethical foreign policy.32 Even in the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal this 
tension was evident. The application of domestic liberal values of due process to a 
vanquished enemy -- even if as a more perfect way of cementing victory -- was one of 
several factors that contributed to the outcome of the internal bureaucratic battle between 
Morgenthau and Stimson in the United States and resulted in American support for the 
establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
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There certainly are competing views about the extent to which moral 
considerations are the driving force in the support of powerful liberal states for 
international criminal tribunals. One perspective is that “ethical” foreign policies should 
be viewed with suspicion, as foreign policies are hardly altruistic. This view can find 
support in the widely held belief that the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia were created as alternatives to a failure of political will to take preventive 
action in those conflicts, not some outcome of a crusading zeal for international justice.33 
But the moral element is nevertheless present to some extent.
Hans Morgenthau, the pre-eminent realist scholar of his day, captured the place of 
international morality and ethics in world politics most accurately when he wrote:
A discussion of international morality must guard against two extremes of either 
overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics or underestimating it by 
denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything but considerations of 
material power.
On the one hand, there is the dual error of confounding the moral rules people actually 
observe with those they pretend to observe, as well as with those which writers declare 
they ought to observe. “On no subject of human interest, except theology”, said Professor 
John Chipman Gray, “has there been so much loose writing and nebulous speculation as 
on international law”. The same must be said of international morality. Writers have put 
forward moral precepts that statesmen and diplomats ought to take to heart in order to 
make relations between nations more peaceful and less anarchic, such as the keeping of 
promises, trust in the other’s word, fair dealing, respect for international law, protection 
of minorities, repudiation of war as an instrument of national policy. But they have 
rarely asked themselves whether and to what extent such precepts, however desirable in
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themselves, actually determine the actions of men. Furthermore, since statesmen and 
diplomats are wont to justify their actions and objectives in moral terms, regardless of 
their actual motives, it would be equally erroneous to take those protestations of selfless 
or peaceful intentions, of humanitarian purposes, and international ideals at their face 
value...
On the other hand, there is the misconception, usually associated with the general 
deprecation and moral condemnation of power politics...that international politics is so 
thoroughly evil that it is no use looking for moral limitations of the aspirations of power 
on the international scene. Yet, if we ask ourselves what statesmen and diplomats are 
capable of doing to further the power objectives of their respective nations and what they 
actually do, we realize that they do less than they probably could and less than they 
actually did in other periods of history. They refuse to consider certain ends and to use 
certain means, either altogether or in certain conditions, not because in the light of 
expediency they appear impractical or unwise but because certain moral rules interpose 
an absolute barrier...34
The Canadian scholar Robert Jackson has characterized the ethical dimension in 
international relations as “the global covenant”.35 He describes this covenant as the result 
of a political conversation between humankind, conducted by means of the international 
society that has been going on for the past half century.36 “Fundamental to the global 
covenant is the recognition of ‘the other’, Jackson argues. “There probably is an 
underlying ability of human beings everywhere to recognize each other as fellow human 
beings -  however remote their kinship and however large their cultural differences”. 37 It 
is this element in international relations that is reflected in today’s international society. 
Global technology is a powerful hand maiden of the global covenant: it brings
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international crises into our living rooms instantaneously, with strong visual images 
generating compassion, disgust and cries for action by governments in response to 
conflicts and mass atrocities.
Even the classical realist E.H. Carr, while advancing the thesis of the conflict 
between “reality” and “utopia” as one between politics and morality, recognized that: “If, 
however, it is utopian to ignore the element of power, it is an unreal kind of realism 
which ignores the element of morality in any world order”.38 While Jackson is on solid 
ground in identifying the failure to give adequate credit to the human dimension of 
international relations as a shortcoming of the realist school, he may, however, have 
overestimated its impact. For the recognition of “the other”, and the degrees of action, 
outrage or lethargy a violation of that “other” kindles, frequently depends on factors such 
as geographic proximity, understandings of strategic interest, and race. Examples that 
come to mind include the U.N.’s failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide as a result 
of a combination of factors: the disaster of the then recent humanitarian intervention in 
Somalia and its effect on American foreign policy, the absence of any strategic interest in 
Rwanda from the perspective of the great powers, the fact that a domestic interest in 
powerful states that could have made a difference did not exist or was not articulated, and 
so on.
The massacres of black Africans in the Sudanese region of Darfur, only a decade 
after Rwanda and the pious intonations of “never again”, is another example of the 
significant limitations of the global covenant39. Here again, a desire not to jeopardize the 
larger peace process between the Arab government in Khartoum and the black Africans 
of Southern Sudan partially influenced initial inaction to halt the massive violations of
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international humanitarian law in Darfur. Moreover, as some of the victims made clear in 
television interviews broadcast around the world, they were killed raped and displaced 
from their homes by the lawless Arab “Janjaweed” militias -  and the international 
response to plight slow — simply because of their race and color.
The U.S.-led intervention in Somalia bucked the trend of non-intervention or 
intervention for immediately obvious strategic reasons. Long before 11 September 2001 
and the war against terrorism, former U.S. President George H.W. Bush ordered 
humanitarian intervention in that country when it collapsed into anarchy and state failure 
as a result of civil war -  an effort that was taken over by the United Nations, with 
American leadership, but ultimately came to grief. Perhaps this was an exception to a 
general rule of vanishing interest in Africa by the Great Powers after the Cold War, when 
the continent was perceived as having lost its strategic relevance. Perhaps it was 
undertaken to demonstrate the possibilities offered up by a post Cold War “new world 
order” -  a line of adjustments that led to the creation of international war crimes tribunals 
by the U.N. Security Council.
Justice in a Society of Unequals
The international criminal tribunals of the 20th century, having been established 
by powerful states, either as victors in war or as guarantors of international order, are not 
synonymous with, or even reflective of, Kant’s cosmopolitan interpretations of 
international relations in which he seeks to transcend the system of states and move to a 
civil society of mankind in which justice would, by inference, be totally objective and
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individual40. This is so because international war crimes justice cannot function 
effectively without the cooperation of states inside and across their national borders.
Rather, international criminal justice has great kinship with the natural law 
conceptual framework of Hugo Grotius, in which the law of nature is believed to have 
conferred individuals with rights and duties. In the post-Grotian adaptation in which it 
exists, it is evidence of what I will describe as an advanced international society. That 
society is “advanced” not because it is essentially different in substance from Bull’s 
depiction of it, but because its form has changed significantly. The extent of common 
institutions and international cooperation in several relatively non-controversial areas 
such as transportation, telecommunications, postal communications, public health, and so 
on, have vastly increased, and with it a sense of a greater stake in the society among its 
members. In this process, the substance has marginally improved, but only just. The 
essential attribute of sovereignty leaves enough scope for perspective and action as to 
guarantee that the anarchical dimension remains a constant.
It is one thing to acknowledge the role of morality and common institutions in 
international society. It is another to believe that the nature of that society has changed in 
any fundamental manner because of an appearance of having done so. Dorothy Jones, in 
her insightful analyses of the history of international organization and international 
justice in the 20th century, adopts the latter approach — wrongly, one submits41. She 
argues that states have developed a code of international ethics that rests on nine 
principles -  sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence, equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, non-intervention each other’s internal affairs, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, abstention from the threat or use of force, fulfillment in
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good faith of international obligations, cooperation with other states, and respect for 
human rights.42
All of this is true, and laudable. It is also the case that breaches of these 
principles are so numerous that, together with many of the 79 international instruments43 
she identifies as the source of the principles of this code, they are, in reality, aspirations 
towards which the international society is laboring. The pre-emptive war in Iraq, and the 
various other controversial interventions by other countries are just one indicator of how 
firm or fragile these principles are. To recognize this is to see things as they truly are, 
while granting that they could be different if states act to make it so. Respect for human 
rights, for example, has experienced steady progress, but this should not lead us to 
conclude that the international society is a one where rights and freedoms are 
predominantly respected, or that they are values that exist in total isolation. To do so 
would be to subscribe to, in Jones’s words, “the language of the fervent wish, decked out 
in legal dress”. This is why the tension between cosmopolitan conceptions of justice and 
order remains and limits the universality of international justice. And the perspective of 
power still restrains justice because the international institutions through which the new 
generation of post-Nuremberg international justice has come into being are still beholden 
to the great powers.
It is precisely for this reason that, when the Canadian law professor Michael 
Mandel and others including Russian legislators filed a complaint with the ICTY 
regarding war crimes allegedly committed by NATO forces during their 78-day bombing 
campaign to stop an 18-month crackdown on ethnic Albanian separatists by Serb forces 
in Kosovo in 1999, there was much buzz, but no indictment44. The allegations set out
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cases where scores of civilians were killed by NATO bombs, including the bombing of a 
bridge as a passenger train was crossing it, a strike against a refugee convoy near 
Djakovica, and one against a Serbian television building in Belgrade.45 The then chief 
prosecutor, Louise Arbour, ordered an investigation, but her successor, Carla Del Ponte, 
ultimately declined to file an indictment because the Prosecutor was unable “to pinpoint 
individual responsibilities”.
But even the mere fact of an assertion of jurisdiction implicit in an internal review 
by the chief prosecutor at The Hague met with resentment in the circles of power and 
influence in NATO capitals46 To begin with, the ICTY investigation was initially 
internal and confidential, though it was later made public. The Tribunal has a mandate to 
investigate and prosecute violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territories of the Former Yugoslavia from 1991. At a theoretical level at least, NATO did 
not question that remit. The real demonstration of the limits of international justice lay in 
the actions and statements by the United States Government, the normally “fearless” Del 
Ponte, and other officials of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. At a press conference in December 
1999, Del Ponte asserted the will to hold NATO accountable should evidence of crimes 
be confirmed, consistent with her responsibilities as an independent international 
prosecutor: “If I am not willing to do that, then I am not in the right place”, she said. “I 
must give up my mission.”47 But Del Ponte soon issued a statement in which she 
backpedaled, emphasizing that “NATO is not under investigation” and that “no formal 
inquiry” was underway”.48
While NATO shrugged off the ICTY investigation and its spokesman asserted the 
military alliance’s respect for the laws of war in its Kosovo campaign, the United States
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Government reacted differently: A White House spokesman asserted NATO’s exemption 
and characterized the Tribunal’s investigation of the legality of the NATO bombings as 
“completely unjustified”49. Spokesmen for the Tribunal later made it clear that an 
indictment or prosecution of NATO leaders and officials accused by Mandel was out of 
the question.
The reasons for this turn of events are not far-fetched. The U.S., a Great Power, 
is a major financial and diplomatic backer of the ICTY. The turnaround in the Tribunal’s 
fortunes following its frustrating early years in which it was able only to apprehend and 
try low-level Serb military personnel, to the arrests of higher-profile political figures 
indicted by it, including Slobodan Milosevic, has depended almost exclusively on 
NATO’s military and American political muscle. Del Ponte was initially under pressure 
to demonstrate the Tribunal’s independence, but ultimately, the international court could 
not bite the finger that has fed it. More generally, the United States has consistently 
opposed any possibility that its military personnel or political leaders will be brought 
under the purview of international criminal tribunals, in particular the International 
Criminal Court50. Critics like Mandel have asserted .that America supported the 
establishment of the UN Tribunal simply in order to further its strategic interest in the 
Balkans.51
Rare is the state that would punish its own war criminals. Even rarer is a Great 
Power that will do so. Great powers often see themselves as guardians of international 
order, and one of the unspoken prerogatives of their muscular military exertions, 
frequently in the service of a national interest but also sometimes on behalf of 
international society, is a lower threshold of accountability. When U.S. soldiers killed
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over 300 Vietnamese civilians during the war in Vietnam including infants and elderly 
persons, “no captains, majors, or generals were ever convicted” despite the precedent 
command responsibility for the acts of subordinates set by the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East in the famous Yamashita case52. The U.S. military chain of 
command tried to suppress the story until it was broken by journalists, leading to a trial of 
the lowly Lt. William Calley who was convicted of war crimes but paroled after a brief 
imprisonment53.
For the realists in world politics, war crimes justice is a suspect approach. High 
politics is much to be preferred. From the international society approach adopted in this 
work, war crimes trials are not the problem. They are necessary and beneficial, as just 
one of several tools, to the maintenance of international order in certain circumstances. 
But the dominant factor in the politics of war crimes justice is who the defendants are, or 
will be -  yours or minel For hegemons, the answer is clearly the former. Whatever may 
be said of the benefits of war crimes trials in certain circumstances -  and there are several 
-  this is how things work out in real life, even if not necessarily in the law books. 
Although powerful states frequently justify their self-exemption from international 
criminal procedure on the basis that they are able to bring their own citizens to justice for 
war crimes when appropriate, the track record points to few examples of this course of 
action54. The attribute of power, then, confers a significant degree of practical immunity 
from legal consequences in the international arena. This is far less so in areas such as 
international trade, where even the superpower United States has implemented adverse 
rulings by the World Trade Organization, than in the more political aspects of 
international law such as the use of force.
While one does not, like some neo-realists, take a dim view of international 
legalism, there is merit to the analysis that international institutions are “epiphenomenal, 
mere veils over state power”. 55 As the realist political scientist John Mearsheimer puts 
it: “Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of power in the world. 
They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no 
independent effect on state behavior”.56 Mearsheimer’s statement may be hyperbolic. 
International institutions do in fact affect the actions of weak states, and in limited 
circumstances, even powerful ones, because they can confer a legitimacy that a powerful 
state, acting alone, may lack. This has been demonstrated by the international political 
fallout of the United States-led invasion of Iraq that ousted Saddam Hussein. Moreover, 
the United Nations, and in particular its Secretary-General, has over several decades 
acquired a level of independent moral authority and diplomatic influence — often 
exercised behind the scenes -  that tests Josef Stalin’s famous sarcastic remark: “how 
many divisions has the Pope?” As a general rule, however, Mearsheimer’s position 
remains generally valid, and even scholars that are neither realist nor neorealist can
57agree.
International Judicial Intervention and Sovereignty
On the other hand, despots and sundry dictators of several illiberal states can no 
longer act politically or militarily with impunity with no second thoughts about 
consequence. In the past, it was only the prospect of a war in which the perpetrator of 
violations of international humanitarian law is defeated that offered any hope of external
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judicial intervention that international criminal tribunals represent, even with the caveat 
that this framework has a far greater impact on the behavior of weak states than strong 
ones. The creation of the permanent International Criminal Court is an indication of this 
nuanced reality.
While Christianity was the dominant basis of natural law theory in the time of
t V iGrotius, in the 20 century the natural law argument was advanced not in religious terms, 
but through what has been described as “the bright chain of reason” in international 
affairs.58 This line of thinking has found expression in the aspirations towards justice and 
peace in the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and other documents that influence to some degree the intercourse within the 
international society.
The second reason for the conceptual shift by which the international society has 
willingly adapted itself to accept and create a limited form of individual criminal justice 
at an international level is the emerging doctrine of what I call “contextualized 
sovereignty”. The classic notion of sovereignty is well explored in the sixteenth century 
political philosopher Jean Bodin’s treatise Les Six Livres de la Republic (1576).59 Bodin 
argued: “it is most expedient for the preservation of the state that the rights of sovereignty 
should never be granted to a subject, still less to a foreigner, for to do so is to provide a 
stepping-stone where the grantee himself becomes the sovereign”.60
In the contemporary international society, support for this doctrine is found in 
Article 2 of the UN Charter, which provides: “All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state ...Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
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authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state”. Other than in the exercise of the right of self-defence 
by a state under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a deviation from this basic norm of 
international society may only occur where (a) there is a breakdown of international order 
and an intervention is undertaken for valid reasons of international peace and security, as 
provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (b) where the intervention is executed 
with the consent or at the invitation of the legal government of the target state; or (c) for 
humanitarian purposes, to protect or rescue the civilian population from its own 
government or rebel forces or where there is widespread domestic anarchy that engenders 
state failure.61
The third justification, which is not provided for in the UN Charter, remains the 
subject of raging normative and practical controversy.62 There is a trend of opinion in 
international society, inspired to some extent by the global covenant, that sovereignty can 
no longer be absolute in the face of egregious violations of human rights such as 
genocide, not just in time of war, but of “peace” as well. Even classic realists like 
Morgenthau recognized this fact as one of the absolute limitations morality imposes on 
statecraft, noting that it was a failure to recognize this boundary that led Hitler to 
perpetrate the Holocaust, multiple wars of aggression, and ultimately to his destruction63. 
International relations underwent profound systemic change after the Peace of Westphalia 
(the Treaties of Munster and Osnabriick) that ended the Thirty Years War in Germany in 
1648, to one based on territorial sovereignty. The Westphalian system has been 
summarized thus:
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The actors of the Westphalia System are sovereign states -  territorial polities whose 
rulers acknowledge no equal at home, no superior abroad; except in very exceptional and 
restricted circumstances, individual human beings have no standing in international 
society. States are legally equal, differing in capabilities (‘Great Powers, Medium 
Powers, Small Powers’) but with the same standing in international society, which means 
that the norm of non-intervention is central no sovereign has the right to intervene in the 
affairs of another64.
This is the system that broadly remains in place to this day, but developments 
since 1945 have begun to chip away at its edges, and today individuals are recognized as 
having juridical standing in international law and society. Kofi Annan, Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, is a frequent and strong advocate for a more nuanced 
approach to sovereignty in appropriate cases, arguing for recognition of the sovereignty 
not just of the state itself, but of the people who are its citizens.65
The basis of this is an interpretation of sovereignty as responsibility, which is to 
say, it is not enough for a state to argue that it is sovereign in relation to other states in the 
international society, but it also has a responsibility under international laws, such as the 
United Nations Charter, not to violate the rights of its citizens. Where it fails to live up to 
this responsibility, and especially where mass atrocities on a large scale are part of he 
scenario, a right of the international community to come to the protection of the citizens 
of a delinquent state kicks in66. The advocates for this approach to sovereignty believe 
that in framing the debate in terms of responsibility of states under various international 
treaties such as the UN Charter, rather than in terms of a right of external states to 
intervene in the internal affairs of a state in appropriate circumstances, there is no transfer 
or dilution of sovereignty but only a re-characterization of it.67 The report of a
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respected group of statesmen commissioned by Annan has reinforced this concept and 
recommended that the UN adapt its understanding of the Westphalian system to 
incorporate what has become known as “the responsibility to protect”68.
This argument is applicable as well to judicial intervention within the wider 
framework of human rights enforcement, as was clearly the case in the Former 
Yugoslavia, where the International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was 
established in 1993 with no invitation from the governments of the states of the Former 
Yugoslavia (and while the conflict was still active, and well before military intervention 
by NATO in 1995). While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was 
established at the invitation of the Rwandan government, the interpretation of sovereignty 
as responsibility is echoed in that case as well.69 The systematic “ethnic cleansing” that 
occurred in the wars of disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia and the genocide in 
Rwanda provided the strongest ethical arguments for intervention. Further evidence of 
contextualization of sovereignty can be found in the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, which explicitly recognized genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as 
situations that would warrant external military intervention in a member state of the 
Union. But the massacre of more than 100,000 Hutus in Burundi in 1972 did not elicit 
any threat of intervention, nor did the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the 
breakaway Republic of Biafra from starvation during the Nigerian civil war from 1967- 
1970 engender intervention to end their suffering, though moral sympathy was much in 
evidence.
Today, we live in an international society in which the responses (at least moral, if 
not political or military) to such atrocities have shifted. But because the pace of political
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and military action has not kept up with declarations of value judgments, humanitarian 
and judicial intervention in the context of a global covenant remains far more the 
exception than the rule. The contextualization of sovereignty does not mean that the 
world’s habitual moral and political reticence to intervene against genocide has vanished. 
All it means is that, unlike in the past, powerful and willing external actors can now 
intervene in such situations should they decide to so. That decision will be driven in any 
given case more by a calculation of strategic interests than by ethical considerations.
Sudan’s Dafur region is a case in point. The international society’s response to 
the ethnic cleansing of an estimated 70,000 black Sudanese was ultimately not as tepid as 
it was to Rwanda’s genocide, but it still has been a token one that came well after the 
fact. Rare for an African conflict, the long civil war in Sudan eventually generated 
domestic political interest within the United States—politically influential and 
conservative Christian groups opposed to the allegedly continued of slavery in Sudan 
kept that country on the radar screen of the administration of President George W. Bush, 
and American involvement led to the cessation of hostilities between the Arab 
government of Sudan and the rebel groups from Christian Southern Sudan.
This in turn led to intense diplomatic pressure on the Sudanese government to end 
the Darfur crisis, even if after the fact of the massacres and the humanitarian 
displacement of over a million people by the Janjaweed militias allied with the Sudanese 
government. While Secretary-General Kofi Annan invoked the sacred duty of a 
government to protect its citizens -  sovereignty as responsibility -  and raised the 
possibility of international sanctions against Sudan’s government, there was a clear 
reluctance to call the massacres genocide, an approach indicative of the politically
explosive power of the word.70 American diplomats acknowledged that there were some 
“indicators of genocide”, but it was difficult to be certain in the circumstances. 
Condemning the humanitarian situation in Darfur, American Secretary of State Colin 
Powell told journalists when he visited Khartoum in July 2004: “We can find the right 
label for it later. We’ve got to deal with it now”.71 But the United States Congress, 
however, voted to describe the situation in Sudan as genocide. Powell, based on a 
detailed American investigation of events in Darfur, ultimately came around to a 
judgment that genocide had occurred in the Sudan. The European Union, meanwhile, 
declined to use the “G” word, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established an 
international commission to investigate the atrocities and determine whether they 
constitute genocide. That commission found that, while crimes against humanity had 
been committed, and the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for
nothose atrocities, the Sudanese government had not pursued a policy of genocide.
The African Union, which flatly stated even before the Commission’s report that 
it did not believe the massacres constituted genocide, responded to the first test of its 
constitutional obligation to intervene against massive violations of international 
humanitarian law by authorizing an intervention force of 300 armed soldiers in Darfur 
that would monitor the ceasefire between government and rebel forces in Sudan, and its 
mandate was later widened to protect civilian victims of attacks by the Arab militias. In a 
symbolic move Rwanda, together with Nigeria and a few other African countries, 
contributed troops to that force. The AU straddled itself between a reluctance to “name 
and shame” Sudan’s Government as complicit in the Darfur atrocities and a desire to act 
decisively in response to the massacres. The United States Ambassador at Large for War
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Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, whose efforts to travel to Sudan to investigate the 
massacres were frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the Sudanese government, 
named seven members of the Janjaweed that the United States believed were culpable for 
the Darfur massacres.73
International displeasure remained more bark than bite even after the Security 
Council adopted a resolution that threatened the Government of Sudan with punitive 
action if the latter failed to disarm and bring the Janjaweed militias to justice74. Violence 
against the victims of mass atrocities continued. The interplay of both initial inaction and 
a subsequent, graduated response in Darfur, the yawning gap between declarations of 
outrage and the reality of the victims on the ground, and the disparity between 
interpretations of events there from the perspective of legal accountability, all illustrate 
the continuing complexities of the concept of sovereignty and the divergence of interests 
that remains in international relations and renders the international society anarchical.
Out of this anarchical response, however, consensus has emerged that the 
instigators of the crimes in Darfur should face trial. But even that consensus soon 
became hostage to anarchy and almost disintegrated. Debate ensued over the options of a 
trial of Darfur atrocities at the International Criminal Court through a Security Council 
referral75, as recommended by the UN’s Commission of Inquiry and favored by European 
states, and an ad hoc tribunal established by the UN Security Council, an option favored 
by the United States in light of its strong opposition to the ICC. The United States was 
not able to muster enough support for its preferred option and the Council ultimately 
voted in favor of the ICC option, but not without inserting a clause exempting American 
personnel from the Court’s jurisdiction.76 Thus we can see that an international response,
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even after the fact and based mainly on a reactive attempt to punish violations if 
international humanitarian law through a legal process, has been buffeted by strong 
political winds.
International criminal law has “penetrated through the shell of sovereignty”77, 
even if its core essentially remains untouched. It is worth remembering that, for all the 
advance it made in prosecuting the criminal responsibility of individuals who acted 
ostensibly on behalf of the German state, the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg trials prosecuted the Nazi leaders for the extermination of Jews and other 
minorities only in the context of such crimes that the Nazis committed in foreign 
countries in the course of aggressive war. In other words, had Hitler confined his 
Holocaust of Jews within the borders of the German state and not crossed international 
borders with his ideology, whether the Nazis would have been brought to justice is open 
to conjecture.
But strategy and power still play a role in the argument for intervention. The 
norm of sovereignty is unlikely to be breached in the case of powerful states, regardless 
of the atrocities that might occur therein. In the contemporary international society, the 
“ethical” foreign policies of some liberal states have not led to more than mild noises 
about allegations of human rights violations in powerful states like China.78 Moreover, 
assertions of sovereignty, even by weak states, may prevent or affect the nature of 
international judicial responses to crimes against humanity. Attempts to establish an 
international tribunal to try the leaders of the Khmer Rouge for the genocide of 1975- 
1978 in that country met with resistance and ambivalence from the government of
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Cambodia, resulting in a compromise agreement for the establishment of a mixed 
national-international court.
The third and perhaps most important reason for the normative shift in favour of 
international criminal justice is the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War in 1989. This seminal event in 20th century history broke the ideological superpower 
rivalry that blocked agreement and effective action in the UN Security Council in the 
field of human rights. In the Cold War world, there was no appetite for judicial 
intervention as part of peace processes. It is thus no accident that, despite efforts by 
advocates of international justice, no international war crimes tribunal was established in
the 45 years between the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials on the one hand, and the Hague
and Arusha Tribunals on the other.
The shift thus confirms one aspect of the thesis of Hedley Bull and his fellow 
members of the English School of International Relations, and weakens another. It 
confirms the relationship between power and international law, in the sense that 
international law frequently serves to legitimize hierarchies created by the distribution of 
power, without prejudice to the moral case for the accountability of the weaker party. As 
Bull argued:
When questions of human justice achieve a prominent place in the agenda of world 
political discussion, it because it is the policy of particular states to raise them. The 
world after the First World War heard about the guilt of the Kaiser, and after the Second 
World War witnessed the trial of German and Japanese leaders and soldiers for war 
crimes and crimes against the peace. It did not witness the trial and punishment of
American, British and Soviet and soldiers who prima facie might have been as much or
as little guilty of disregarding their obligations as Goering, Yamamoto and the rest. This 
is not to say that the idea of the trial and punishment of war criminals by the international
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procedure is an unjust or unwise one, only that it operates in a selective way. That these
men and not others were brought to trial by the victors was an accident of power
79politics.
But there is a certain contradiction between the rise of this kind of justice -  which 
enforces international law -  following the Cold War, and the view of the English School 
that a balance of power in international society is an essential prop to international law. 
That may be true to some degree regarding the use of force by states, but is certainly not 
the case with regard to human rights norms that also form part of international law. It is 
most unlikely that trials would have been contemplated for the Cambodian genocide,80 or 
that the International Criminal Court would have been established, if a balance of power 
can be said to have served the cause of international law, for the existence of client states 
beholden to the United States or the Soviet Union would have prevented these states from 
supporting these initiatives.
International Law in the Anarchical Society
Nonetheless Hedley Bull and the English School, with its essentially sociological 
approach to international law, provide an excellent framework within which to study the 
relationship between order, on the one hand, and the aspirations towards human justice, 
and the international law that supports those aspirations on the other. In a contemporary 
assessment of the English School, Peter Wilson has identified its three essential elements 
as: (a) the absence of a common government that regulates the international society; (b) 
the importance of normative rules, with international law as its core, in shaping 
international societal behavior; and (c) the absence of solidarity among members of the
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international society.81 The English School sees the absence of solidarity as a cause of 
the unavoidable existence of a significant degree of anarchy in international society, and 
posits that this lack of solidarity has important consequences for the nature of 
international law, important as the latter is in the architecture of the international society. 
As Wilson notes, “sense can only be made of international law by making sense of 
international society”.82 It is by making sense of the international society that we can see 
why and how the absence of complete solidarity within it- despite the advanced stage of 
that society -  makes the prospect of a world justice that transcends the states system a 
distant one indeed.
Few events have demonstrated the nature of the international society as sharply as 
the pre-emptive war against Iraq by the United States and Britain in 2003, and the lessons 
it teaches about the nature of international law. The international crisis generated by that 
war captures the absence of solidarity within the “international community” as 
represented in the United Nations, and the role of power and the self interest of Great 
Powers, in world politics. That event will have profound consequences for international 
relations. It will especially impact on the future direction of international law, the role of 
the United Nations, and the future of United States foreign policy.
Bull argued in his classic text that the international society is only one of several 
elements in world politics, and by no means the dominant one. Other elements include 
that of a state of war, which the philosopher Thomas Hobbes believed was foremost. 
Yet others include power (especially the balance of its distribution) and international law, 
in addition to the pull towards a somewhat utopian world society that is based not on the 
states system, but on individuals as a civil society of mankind.
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Of all these factors, the role of power (military and economic) and its relationship 
to international law is the most critical. A balance of power was a major feature of 
international relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The nineteenth century 
balance of power was essentially a European one, involving Britain, France, Austria- 
Hungary, Russia, and Prussia-Germany. Its collapse led eventually to the First World 
War and the creation of the League of Nations. The twentieth century balance was 
embedded in the Cold War and nuclear deterrence between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. China represented an additional pole of power. With the implosion of the 
Soviet Union and the Cold War long over, the world is left with an American power that 
is not only dominant, but has practically no effective balance in sight. China remains a 
major global power, though for now an inward looking one.
The problem with a unipolar world is that international law -- a significant 
component of the maintenance of order in world politics — can become a major casualty. 
In such a world, international law can be violated with little direct consequence to the 
hegemonic power. Far from consolidating order, such use of power, even in the name of 
freedom, human rights and liberal democracy, will rather increase disorder. Bull 
believed that the effective functioning of international law and diplomatic intercourse 
depend to a large degree on the existence of a balance of power — or at least a staggered 
distribution of it. It is probably more accurate to say that, especially in matters of national 
security and the use of force, the stability of the international system depends more on 
how much a hegemonic power understands its long term interests as being advanced by 
obeying international law.
This is where the dynamics of power confront the nature of international law.
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The disappointment that many outside the United States felt at the American invasion of 
Iraq stems mainly from a faith in international law that misunderstands its fundamental 
nature. Theorists have spent much ink on whether international law, lacking as it does 
the centralized, coercive power or structure of law in the municipal sphere — a 
government with power to legislate, police and prisons to enforce — is indeed law.
It is, but for different reasons. “Those who would draw a clear distinction between 
law and politics are to be found more in ivory towers than in the corridors of power” . 
The nature of public international law, like most law in fact, is that “[P]olitics decides 
who the lawmaker and what the formulation of the law shall be; law formalizes these 
decisions and makes them binding.”84 From the positivist point of view, law must meet 
three tests in order to be valid: clear legislation in accordance with recognized procedure, 
the uniform possibility of adjudication, and enforcement or sanction. In this light, then, if 
we apply these three tests to international humanitarian law, we find that only the first, 
legislation, is uniformly present. Adjudication and enforcement exist only partially, as I 
have discussed above, and this suggests that international law, especially in the political 
domain of the use of force and international humanitarian law, is, as Oppenheim opined, 
“weak law” but “nevertheless still law.”85
To understand international law a slightly different paradigm is needed, especially 
in light of the absence of a single sovereign and the presence of a multiplicity of 
sovereigns. What this suggests is that international law is law, but on a basis other than 
the ones positivists are wont to look out for. States obey and respect international law 
first, because members of the international society of states can enforce it on their own in 
certain circumstances; second, national interest; and third, because of the influence of
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international or domestic public opinion — the interstate equivalent of peer pressure. 
From this standpoint, “law is enforced because it is obligatory, not obligatory because it 
is enforced”, and so it is not necessarily the case that international law is not binding 
because it cannot always be enforced.86
No state, however powerful, wants to be viewed as a habitual law breaker. This 
is why, whatever its real motives, the United States has justified its action in Iraq as an 
exercise of their right to pre-emptive self-defence. It also argued that it acted to enforce 
international law, represented in the UN Security Council resolutions Saddam had 
serially violated. Moreover, interpretations of who is or is not a law breaker in 
international society can sometimes become extremely subjective when issues not just of 
sovereignty or external national interest, but national security, are thrown into the mix.
Any way we look at it, however, it is impossible to get away from the reality that 
international law is a weaker kind of law than national law, or law that is nationally 
enforced. While international law as a "social reality" is an important factor in 
international society, it is not necessarily a dominant one in world politics. Seen from 
this sociological perspective, international law, as noted earlier, is a reflection of power in 
the international system, despite the formal sovereign equality of states in the United 
Nations. Voting rights in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are not 
equal, and "states of chief industrial importance" have special privileges in the 
International Labor Organization. It is for this reason that international law often binds 
the weak more effectively than the strong — which is why the enforcement of legal justice 
for war crimes is so uneven. For these reasons, the nature of international law allows it to 
be constantly "updated", adapting even to violations of it in certain circumstances.
The United Nations, around which the international society revolves as a forum 
for shared values, was wounded by the Iraq crisis. But hasty obituaries of the 
organization in the heat of the crisis are decidedly premature. For one, it is a far more 
elastic and adaptive organization than the high minded League of Nations. For another, 
the United States, despite its power, frequently needs the legitimacy conferred by the 
United Nations. Although it acted ultimately on its own with a "coalition of the willing", 
the U.S. sought that legitimacy in the form of an authorizing UN resolution —without 
success. It is a fact of international life that all states act both unilaterally and 
multilaterally at different times87. In 1979, in an earlier example of “regime change” the 
late Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, unilaterally invaded Uganda in 1979 
and ousted the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, in contravention of the principle of non­
interference in the internal affairs of African states that was a bedrock of the Charter of 
the Organization of African Unity.88 The United States' subsequent efforts to ensure 
greater United Nations involvement in post-war Iraq proved that these two realities can 
co-exist. That is the real nature of the international society. The United States is the 
world's hegemonic power. But from the complications that have attended its ouster of 
Saddam Hussein has emerged a realization that even its power has limits. Power and 
legitimacy are not always co-located, and even within the anarchy the societal nature of 
world politics -  as opposed to the international system -  makes acquiring legitimacy in 
the pursuit of strategic goals a recommended approach.89
The problem of power relations -  and its relationship to the international rule of 
law -  will not go away in the foreseeable future, certainly not for as long as America 
remains the world’s hyper-power. The nature of power and dominance is that those who
have it seek to maintain it, and history is very short indeed on examples of the possessors 
of such power giving it up voluntarily. Michael Glennon, in a realist essay on the nature 
of international law regarding the use of force, captures the inherent tension between 
hegemony and equality: “Hegemons have ever resisted subjecting their power to legal 
restraint. When Brittania ruled the waves, Whitehall opposed the limits on the use of 
force to execute its naval blockades -  limits that were vigorously supported by the new 
United States and other weaker states. Any system dominated by a ‘hyperpower’ will 
have great difficulty maintaining or establishing an authentic rule of law”90.
A certain degree of anarchy will always exist in an international society that is 
based on sovereign states and mobile non-state actors that pursue frequently divergent 
interests. With the very invasion of Iraq without the support of a United Nations 
resolution, progress -  such as it was -  towards a “thicker” international society has been 
slowed down, and the adversarial currents that challenged the societal nature of 
international politics and sought to stimulate a shift to a real community have been 
further weakened. That anarchy must be managed by addressing the fundamental issues 
that exacerbate it. Those issues are the ones of justice of a different kind, not legal -  
chief among them the question of poverty and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In clarifying the chief thesis of this work in Chapter 1, I noted that there are 
several kinds of justice, but that I concern myself here chiefly with formal, or legal 
justice. That is necessary for the sake of focus and relative brevity. Ultimately, however, 
there is a strong interconnectedness between the different kinds and meanings of justice, 
and while they can be separated in an exposition such as this, they all come together in 
the international society. Thus Kofi Annan has argued, in a solidarist vein:
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In fact, to many people in the world today, especially in poor countries, the risk of being 
attacked by terrorists or with weapons of mass destruction, or even of falling prey to 
genocide, must seem relatively remote compared to the so-called “soft threats” -  the 
ever-present dangers of extreme poverty and hunger, unsafe drinking water, 
environmental degradation and endemic or infectious disease. These kill millions of 
people every year. Let’s not imagine that these things are unconnected with peace and 
security, or that we can ignore them until the “hard threats” are sorted out91.
But the Iraq war will affect the path of international justice for war crimes. One 
of its consequences may be that international war crimes trials under the auspices of the 
United Nations will become less frequent than it was in the 1990s, especially now that the 
International Criminal Court is firmly established. This trend is already apparent. That is 
because the myth that the end of the Cold War spawned -  that the international society 
was now a community with one purpose -  has been shattered, not just by the Iraq war, 
but by the war against terrorism -  a war that is potentially endless. And it will take time 
to return to such a point of promise for human rights in international relations. Saddam 
Hussein, Iraq’s former ruler will be subjected to an Iraqi war crimes trial that is really a 
disguise for the classical context of such trials -  the victor trying the defeated in war -  
rather by collective action by the United Nations.
International or World Society?
Barry Buzan has critiqued English School theory as being excessively focused on 
international law and especially human rights. This approach, he and other critics argue, 
has trapped the international society-world society debate in a narrow framework that
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excludes the relevance of economics. But the reason human rights is so dominant in 
English School theory is because what Buzan terms a “tyranny of rights” can pose an 
existential threat to sovereignty.92 As Nicholas Wheeler has aptly observed, human rights 
goes to the heart of the relationship between governments and their citizens, and “poses
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the conflict between order and justice in its starkest form for the society of states”.
Buzan reconciles the tension by casting human rights as representing not absolute 
positions but “degrees of difference”. He anchors his interpretation on a “juridical” view 
of sovereignty in which that term is open to negotiation. That interpretation is in accord 
with the one I offer regarding “contextualized” sovereignty. In my definition, and 
doubtless that of many, the sovereignty of a state is not a blank check to commit 
genocide. It is also one where the tension between legalism and order is sometimes 
resolved in favor of the latter.
As well, although an in-depth critique of economic globalization is beyond the 
scope of this work, inserting the latter into a study of the tension between order and legal 
justice is inapposite, and not just for the reason of the primacy of the relationship between 
human rights and sovereignty cited above. Just as important, economic globalization is 
supposedly a win-win proposition. But, as regards legal justice, there is a huge difference 
between internationalization, which relates to standards and is not inconsistent with 
international society (indeed it is inevitable), and globalization, which would relate to 
jurisdiction and a world society or a world government that stipulates and enforces the 
law. That is why the backlash to “borderless justice” or universal jurisdiction over 
human rights crimes, which have direct political implications, has been far more 
profound in the case of attempts at legal globalization than in the economic sphere. Even
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economic globalization -  and the globalization of law relative to economic activity -- is 
not without conflict.94
It may well be , as Phillip Bobbit has speculated in a seminal essay, that “the 
nation state, whose legitimacy is based on its undertaking to improve the well-being of its 
people through law, would be superseded by a market state, which claimed power on the 
basis that it would maximize the opportunities of societies and individuals. It would do 
so less through law and regulation and more through the use of market incentives and 
private action”.95 But this is unlikely, for the reason that economic globalization is driven 
largely by the self-interest of its participants. It does not necessarily translate to any sense 
of a shared humanity or a uniform character of states and societies that form the bedrock 
of a universalist view of international order.96
Another critique of the English School is that its conception of international 
society is exclusively global and systemic, ignoring regional trends towards globalization. 
Buzan has noted that this aversion to regionalism accounts for the pessimism and 
pluralism of the writings of English School scholars. The European Union is often cited 
as a distinct example of a shift towards solidarity and a cosmopolitan world society. The 
“European” identity has become an increasingly strong one, and there are clear tensions 
between two identities, as it were: the sovereign national one of individual countries, and 
the supranational one of a closer European Union or super-state for which some 
European statesmen, citizens and civil society have clamored.
It is certainly the case that the degree of regional cooperation through common 
institutions (the whole point of an international society) is greater in Europe than in any 
other part of the world. It is equally the case that, in that context, EU institutions such as
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the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice recognize and 
adjudicate on the rights of individuals to a degree that significantly transcends the system 
of sovereign states. European Union states are also the strongest champions of the 
permanent International Criminal Court.
While prophecy may be rash, and there is no monopoly of certainty as to how the 
international society may evolve in future, Europe is a mature international society and 
not a world society, as proponents of universalism would argue. This is because, first, 
the institutions of the EU have been mediated by sovereign European states, not by a 
transnational civil society of individuals. Those states agree on close cooperation, but are 
on quite different wavelengths when it comes to the extent of integration. States such as 
Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Poland have not been as enthusiastic as France, Germany 
and Belgium for accelerated and even deeper integration.97 Even within the desired 
miniature world society or super-state of Europe, countries like France and Germany 
have run budget deficits for years in a row and have faced no effective sanction -  a 
feature not too different from a normal international society.
In short, one agrees with scholars of international law and relations who have 
argued that the states system -  and sovereignty — is not in serious decline. Rather, the 
loss of sovereignty is more apparent than real because “no institution -  private, regional, 
or international -  can compete with the nation-state’s authority, which it obtains through
98direct legitimacy conferred by popular majority vote or, at least, by consent”. What 
happens is a contextualized form of sovereignty whereby states relinquish total control 
over affairs that affect them in order to advance their strategic interests, but without 
taking away in essence their ability to dominate their territory." Bobbit has argued,
rightly, that the European Union, contrary to appearances, is not on a path to become a 
super-nation state -  which he describes as “a constitutional cul-de-sac”, but rather an 
“umbrella state” which he defines as “a free-trade and/or defense zone that allows for a 
common legal jurisdiction on some, but not all, constitutive issues”.100 He notes that the 
EU’s ability to induce human rights violating regimes into voluntarily amending their 
laws in return for admission to the single market as “a classic market state maneuver”. 
From the interpretations of sovereignty I have offered, with support from Buzan’s, 
sovereignty cannot be defined in absolute terms as a right of a state, to do what ever it 
pleases with its population. If that is so, as I posit that it is, a marked reduction in human 
rights violations, attained through observance of international standards, is not 
tantamount to a loss of sovereignty and so does not threaten a state so long as it has not 
lost its overall prerogative -  and indeed responsibility -  to maintain domestic order. It 
should be noted in this regard that none of the large liberal democracies has allowed 
within itself a “tyranny of rights” that robs a state of its duty to maintain law and order.
Nothing has tested the complex balance between order and human rights in 
Western liberal democracies as the “war on terrorism” triggered by the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001. The battle between order and individual rights has become as 
visceral as it gets, with the affected governments determined to do all in their power to 
ensure society’s very survival (the primary goal of the pattern of activities that sustain 
order), including through controversial detention policies towards suspected or accused 
terrorists and significant encroachments on privacy rights, and human rights groups 
battling against the rise of what they view as an increasingly “Big Brother” society akin 
to that depicted in George Orwell’s book Nineteen Eighty-Four. William Safire has aptly
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commented: “Your mother’s maiden name is not the secret you think it is”.101
That is why I part company with those scholars and activists who argue that the
English School -  or, indeed, international relations in general, should discard the primacy
of states as the organizing principle of international relations. Among the strongest
adversaries of sovereignty and proponents of a global “justice beyond borders” is the
transnational civil society movement, represented by its more formal, structural arm, non-
1governmental organizations (NGOs). Their influence in international affairs, from the 
adoption of the adoption of the treaty banning land mines to the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court over the opposition and reservations of a great power like 
the United States, is undeniably potent. Ann Florini, in an essay that is supportive of the 
NGO phenomenon but nevertheless captures the tension inherent in the world-society 
perspective that civil society so passionately advocates, has asked: “...does the rising 
power of civil society augur good or ill? Is the world to be rendered just and prosperous 
by hordes of concerned citizens banding together to demand, and create, a better world? 
Or will fragile progress toward democracy around the globe be undermined by unelected, 
unaccountable extremists?”103
Certainly, non-governmental organizations have acquired progressively firmer 
procedural standing within international institutions (including, in recent years, in the 
United Nations Security Council104) and, in some cases, a legal one105. This is a welcome 
development. But does this make transnational civil society a viable alternative to states? 
The answer is clearly no. Civil society is a welcome and fresh voice of partnership in 
international affairs, acting as a watchdog and questioning the excesses of states. If a real 
need for them did not exist, it is doubtful that they would have thrived as they have. But
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this does not give them the same legitimacy as states. NGOs cannot govern countries.
Moreover, even the very accountability of NGOs, derided by their critics as “self 
appointed do-gooders” and “unelected guardians of the global public good”106 is 
increasingly open to question. Andrew Hurrell has noted a need to challenge “a certain 
romanticization of the potentialities of transnational civil society”:
Civil society is after all, an arena of politics like any other in which the good and the
thoroughly awful coexist, in which the pervasive claims made by social movements and
NGOs to authenticity and representativeness need to be tested and challenged, and in
which outcomes may be just as subject to direct manipulation by powerful actors as in the
107world of inter-state politics.
Secondly, there is empirical evidence that, relative to European integration, the “more is 
better” approach is driven by the vision of particular politicians and is mostly out of step 
with the popular will in European countries. The “sense of self’ remains high.108 
Elections to the European Parliament in 2004 witnessed low voter turnout and the 
victories of euroskeptical political parties in several European countries. A major clash 
will occur as the process of European integration progressively challenges the maxim that 
“all politics is local”, with “governments increasingly facing situations in which their 
commitments under EU law clash with domestic political imperatives”.109
Taking the argument further and connecting it to legalism, it is clear that, despite 
their support for the International Criminal Court, it is unlikely that any European country 
would allow its nationals to be tried by the ICC rather than its own domestic courts under 
the Court’s principle of complementarity vis-a-vis national jurisdictions. The logical
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conclusion, then, is that the justice of the ICC will again be for the weak and poor states 
with little power in the international society. And, as we shall see when we discuss the 
ICC, even attempts to define the use of nuclear weapons as a war crime in its statute were 
rendered unsuccessful by the divergent self interests of various powers at the negotiations 
that created the court -  again, society, not community or universalism, at play.
That the exaggerated claims about the implications of globalization and the 
imminence of a world society do not reflect the complex reality of the international 
society as a situational context for war crimes tribunals is clear from the status of 
“empire” that several commentators have ascribed to the United States -  and the 
implications of this status for the rule of law on the international plane. The historian 
Niall Ferguson has countered this simplistic view: ,
All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other 
civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political 
fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not 
a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of 
information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and 
NGOs ..., the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations 
and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they 
choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is 
not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and 
Sarajevo.110
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is hoped that the foregoing examination of the nature of the 
international society, including the nature of international law, the absence of solidarity 
(despite claims to the contrary), and the primacy of the interests of sovereign states, has 
confirmed the approach I have adopted to a study of international criminal tribunals, 
especially as they have been established to promote international peace and security 
(although justice remains their primary goal) and thus sometimes find themselves in 
positions where both goals collide.111 One position that confirms my approach holds that 
there are three perceptions of the role of war crimes tribunals in international society: the 
“harmonious” view that emphasizes the linkage between peace and justice, frequently 
expressed as ‘peace through law’ or ‘no peace without justice’; the “adversarial” 
primacy-of-order perspective that sees only the potential of justice to upset political 
priorities that are better routes to peace, and the “conditional” view that supports
I *
international tribunals without discounting political considerations.
I have argued that the third perspective is the best we can achieve in the present 
stage of international society. The solidarist view of world law that presupposes a 
universitas rather than the societas113 that is the international society is not the dominant 
causative agency in the politics of war crimes justice because sovereignty remains, as 
Alan James puts it, “the very basis of international relations”.114 Except some other 
organizing principle of international relations were to come into existence that discards 
the states system, with its membership of individual and legally equal members, as the 
new basis of international relations, international criminal justice can only be conditional 
-  it will exist to the extent and in a form that states decide. It is unlikely that there will be 
uniform agreement that any system of international justice will permanently and
universally trump the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of states. The international society 
is far from being, in the words of Allen Buchanan, a “now vanished Westphalian 
world”.115 Rather, it is one in which pluralist and cosmopolitan models of governance 
“coexist, usually rather unhappily, with many aspects of the old Westphalian order”.116 In 
the following chapters I will demonstrate how the “adversarial”, primacy-of-order 
perspective has sought to checkmate the idealist, Kantian view of international justice 
that has bloomed at the end of the 20th century into a compromise of conditional 
international justice.
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No one was to recall the past misdeeds o f anyone except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven 
and the governors o f the Piraeus, and not even these i f  they successfully submitted to an 
examination... Trials for homicide should be held in accordance with tradition in cases 
where a man had himself performed the act o f killing or wounding.
Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution
With a truth commission, governments make a pact with the devil.
Our office looks for ways to send the devil to jail
Carillo Prieto, Mexican Special Prosecutor
In the preceding chapter I discussed the nature of the international society as a 
context for the quest for justice for violations of international humanitarian law. This 
chapter will examine and analyze how political considerations condition the choices 
states make when confronted with two possibilities: prosecuting (or supporting 
prosecutions), on the one hand, and pardons (political responses that do not invoke 
criminal trials, such as amnesties and truth commissions) on the other. The aim is to 
demonstrate the tensions between (1) at the international plane, cosmopolitan/liberal 
notions of legalism and sovereignty based challenges to such ideals, and (2) in primarily 
domestic contexts, order, in its most basic sense as a pattern of social activity that 
guarantees the provision of the primary goals of social life1 (in this context, stability), and 
justice. That occasional basic tension flares up in the context of societal transitions from 
conflict to peace, with the attendant questions of memory in societal construction. If 
prosecuting particular persons has the potential to destabilize the polity, should such a 
course be pursued?
139
I will examine here three examples of these two tensions. The first two are 
historical -  the unsuccessful attempt by the Allied Powers to prosecute the German 
emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II after World War I, and the political exemption of Japanese 
emperor Hirohito from the purview of the Tokyo war crimes trials in the wake of World 
War II. The third is a conceptual one -  contemporary debate about “transitional justice” 
in societies emerging from conflict. That debate is usually framed as one of a choice 
between, or a combination of criminal trials for mass atrocities, amnesties, and truth 
commissions.
The Dilemma
There are no straightforward answers to the question of whether violators of 
international humanitarian law should be prosecuted or pardoned -  especially when they 
are the political leaders the prosecution of whom might lead to a greater breakdown of 
order. Political exemptions from prosecutions are not new. They are, in fact, a not 
infrequent approach to the goal of order in some circumstances. The conundrum goes to 
the heart of the contest for primacy between order and justice in certain circumstances. 
The question is: do political exemptions or pardons promote order or do they encourage a 
culture of impunity?2 Should justice be done in every deserving case, though the heavens 
fall?
The proposition is made here that, while there is no “best way” to tackle the 
question of justice, there is a “better way” in which, while the option of pardons in some 
circumstances cannot be ruled out, political exemptions from prosecution for violations 
of international humanitarian law should be the exception and not the rule. In other
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words, on balance, legal accountability has a better track record than most of its 
alternatives (the real issue is: what kind of legal justice?). This proposition is not based 
on the liberal theory of a Kantian peace, but, as I will seek to establish later, on the 
international society-perspective that combines recognition of the sovereignty of states, 
the need to place increased value of the individual human life that is violated by 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the wishes of a political 
community, ascertained either through a democratic process or by consensus.
Meeting the challenge calls neither for excessive cynicism nor for cosmopolitan 
and overly legalistic formulas. To say that perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes should routinely be put beyond the reach of legal justice, in the 
name of order, is a perspective that denies the evolution of the international society. To 
say, on the other hand, that they must be prosecuted in all cases is to fail to take account 
of other factors that tend to complicate the picture in cases where the dilemma is present. 
Such a position would be a false assumption that the world has entered a Kantian age of 
universal justice. It has not.
The realist perspective is that the problem of what to do with conquered leaders or 
those in transition from the Olympian heights of power, with blood on their hands, is best 
left to political settlements and not to law courts. The argument is that, in some cases, 
insisting on prosecutions can do more harm than good. A peaceful settlement of a 
conflict can be precluded, triggering a breakdown of order. Or an escalation of a 
breakdown where one has already begun can occur. This can be the case where defeated 
parties renew conflict, or undefeated parties, seeing only prosecutions at the end of the 
tunnel, lose any incentive to put swords into plowshares and seek the “total victory” -
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and the sovereign state power that comes with it -  that can serve as protection from 
accountability. In other words, better to make a sacrifice for the future by sweeping 
violations of international humanitarian law under the carpet for the sake of peaceful 
societal transitions or interstate relations.
Ramesh Thakur has argued: “Criminal law, however effective, cannot replace 
public or foreign policy. Determining the fate of defeated leaders is primarily a political 
question, not a judicial one. The legal clarity of judicial verdicts sits uncomfortably with 
the nuanced morality of confronting and overcoming, through a principled mix of justice 
and high politics, a troubled past”.3 And as Henry Kissinger, commenting with 
admiration on the Congress of Vienna’s magnanimous dispensation towards France after 
the Napoleonic wars, asserts: “It is the temptation of war to punish; it is the task of policy 
to construct. Power can sit in judgment, but statesmen must look to the future”.4
The realist argument against legalism, especially as dispensed by the international 
criminal tribunals, can be summarized as follows: legalism may claim jurisdiction over 
the actions of great powers, complicate global diplomacy, and attack the historical 
concept that only sovereign states may impose criminal justice.5 The realist perspective 
is that attempting to isolate legal justice completely from political context is shortsighted. 
Legal justice is what a political community is prepared to enforce.6 I define a “political 
community” as a duly constituted society -- sovereign, part of a sovereign entity, or a 
conglomeration of sovereign entities -- with a cohesive political consensus on its internal 
social organization, including what constitutes legal justice.
That “consensus” may be attained through a democratic or other deliberative 
process. In the international society, the degree of legitimacy a political community
enjoys depends increasingly on how democratic its political and law-making processes 
are. In the international system that preceded the international society, this was not the 
case. In this definitional context, then, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the 
permanent International Criminal Court are, for better or worse, a kind of justice that 
groups of sovereign states have decided to create and enforce, fulfilling an impulse that 
has been a characteristic of the 20th century. The problem with the ad hoc tribunals is 
that they are the progeny of a more abstract level of political community, one whose 
“agency” and democratic credentials, in the nature of a Security Council dominated by a 
few powerful states, is decidedly weaker than, say, a standing international criminal court 
established directly by treaty. Thus, there is a frequent tension between that agency, 
legally valid though it is, and the national or sub-national variants of political community.
As its relates specifically to the conundrum of whether to prosecute or pardon, the 
realist argument is carried forward by noting that because international criminal tribunals 
lack the power to exercise pardons, they thereby lack an important attribute -  a political 
prerogative though it may be -  of a proper criminal justice system. Such tribunals, the 
argument goes, cannot, in fact, have pardon power because they pretend to be above 
politics. Support for the argument in favor of discretionary pardon power as a prerequisite 
for legitimacy has been found in the U.S. Federalist papers (No. 74) where Alexander 
Hamilton aptly expounded that “humanity and good policy... dictate that the benign 
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed...in 
seasons of insurrection or rebellion, a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or 
rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth”.7
The prerogative of mercy may indeed be necessary for the greater good. It is an 
indispensable aspect of sovereign political authority. As Ruti Teitel has argued, both 
criminal punishment and amnesties can be used to further the goals of political transition 
-  especially where amnesties are made conditional8. But she also argues that between the 
two, there is a preponderance of forbearance of punishment power in order to advance 
those transitions.9 This is a statistical reality, but it is should not be conflated with the 
respective impacts of both courses of action, which I address in greater detail below.
Arguments against prosecutions demonstrate the unequal and selective application 
of legalism in the service of interests that are often narrow and self-interested, but 
occasionally may be of a loftier nature, as in South Africa’s transition to majority rule. It 
is for reasons of narrow self interest that some great powers may support specific, 
localized efforts at international justice, but are reluctant to give carte blanche to across- 
the-board legal accountability at the expense of client states.10 To illustrate, the United 
States has not supported the establishment of an international criminal tribunal for East 
Timor, or widespread trials for mass atrocities in Chile, because the crimes committed in 
those contexts, especially during the Cold War, were committed by regimes to which it 
provided strategic support11. This is precisely why international criminal justice, which 
failed to develop as expected after the Nuremberg trials, became possible after the end of 
the Cold War. The selectivity that accompanies the prosecute-or-pardon dilemma is one 
of the darker, more endogenous qualities of criminal prosecutions for violations of 
international humanitarian law and is an intrinsic function of the nature of the 
international society.
Moreover, the argument that international criminal tribunals lack pardon power is 
erroneous in fact. First, provisions exist in the rules of procedure of the ad hoc 
international tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia whereby the Prosecutors 
of these tribunals, where permission is granted by the judges, can terminate judicial 
proceedings against an accused person for a variety of reasons including those of 
policy.12 While this is neither an acquittal (as no judicial finding on guilt or innocence 
has been made) nor a pardon in the strict legal sense, which can only occur following a 
conviction, it is a pardon in the policy sense in which that word is used in this work, 
insofar as it is an exercise of discretion by a prosecutor as to whether or not to prosecute.
Second, even in its strict legal sense, provision for pardons is in fact made in the
statutes and procedural rules of the ICTR and the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, and the ICC. In an important subtlety, the exercise of pardon power for a person
convicted by these tribunals can only be initiated by the state where the convict is serving
sentence, where conditions for pardon in the domestic legal systems of such states may
have been met. However, a convict cannot be pardoned without the approval of the
11judges of the international tribunal. This is a vivid illustration of how international 
criminal justice is constrained by the sovereignty of states. International courts do not 
possess the attribute of sovereignty, however independent or powerful they may appear. 
Admittedly, it is also the case that such courts do not have direct or exclusive prerogative 
to exercise pardon power in a pure legal sense because that would run counter to the logic 
of their creation -  to act as an accountability mechanism for egregious violations of 
international human rights.
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In the policy sense in which pardons are mainly examined here, compromise 
approaches have been adopted that are mute on the question of whether to prosecute or 
pardon, and instead seek to reconcile the requirements of peace and justice. A pragmatic 
approach is to negotiate peace agreements with warlords without sanctioning impunity. 
(I define “impunity” as the absence of accountability and the rule of law within states or 
other formal organizational structures, a situation where coercive power, not rules, 
regulations or law, is the organizing principle.)
A similar but more formalistic definition is that “impunity means the 
impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations 
to account -  whether in criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings -  since they 
are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if 
found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their 
victims”.14
A classic example of a pragmatic approach with strong ethical component is that 
of the former Yugoslavia, where the United States negotiated the Dayton Peace 
Agreement between the warring parties in 1995, with Slobodan Milosevic, President of 
the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia playing a key role in the negotiations. That 
agreement explicitly called for the prosecution of war criminals. Milosevic was not 
indicted at the time, but there was no deal to guarantee him immunity from indictment or 
prosecution, although the fact of his being NATO’s negotiating partner may have led him 
to believe he would not meet that fate. Yet, Milosevic was subsequently indicted by the 
ICTY for genocide and crimes against humanity and put on trial.15
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Inherent in this approach is a deferral to a later stage of the determination of 
whether to prosecute or pardon, putting peace well before justice. Here, the timing of the 
indictment is critical. The cart of justice cannot -  and, indeed, should not -  be put before 
the proverbial horse of peace, for a warlord may opt to continue a war in the hope of 
victory rather than come to the negotiating table were an indictment for violations of 
humanitarian law to be dangled over his head.
Another factor in prosecute-or-pardon situations is the position of the United 
Nations, which is involved in most negotiations and settlements of armed conflicts. 
While the U.N. must frequently navigate between the idealism of the goals of its Charter 
and the realism of world politics, it has taken a decidedly principled and ethical position 
on the prosecute-or-pardon question. It does not, and cannot, derogate from a sovereign 
political authority’s right to pardon crimes under domestic law. But it has staked out a 
moral high ground regarding violations of international humanitarian law, for which the 
international institution refuses to recognize that any amnesties can be valid.16 This is a 
solidarist position, consistent with the UN’s interpretation of sovereignty since the end of 
the Cold War. It supports the view that certain crimes are of international concern and 
cannot be the subject of purported amnesties by sovereign states, even if committed 
within their territories.
Having set out the dilemma, I now turn to an examination of some cases where 
the dilemma of whether to apply legal norms and prosecute individuals for war and other 
heinous crimes, or to seek a political solution in the interests of order, has been acute.
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Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Treaty of Versailles
Efforts by Allied countries to prosecute the German Kaiser following World War 
I represented the second major attempt in the 20th century, after the Constantinople war 
crimes trials for the massacres of Armenians, at international justice for crimes 
committed during World War I. Like Constantinople, it failed woefully. Gary Jonathan 
Bass has provided an excellent and much more detailed account of these unsuccessful 
efforts.17
Following Germany’s defeat in the Great War in 1918, the Allied Powers 
(especially Britain and France), motivated by the public and political outrage at atrocities 
by German soldiers, called for the trial of the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II for the 
crime of aggression and other crimes such as violating Belgium’s neutrality. At the time, 
aggression was not codified as a crime in international law and a trial on that basis would 
have amounted to retrospective jurisdiction. The Treaty of Versailles, by which Germany 
formally surrendered on June 28, 1919, included severe punitive measures such as sharp 
reductions in the strength of the German armed forces and disarmament, the payment of 
reparations to the Allies, the especially resented “war guilt clause” (Article 231) in which 
Germany accepted responsibility for World War I as a result of its aggression, the return 
of territory to Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and 
the trial of the Kaiser and other German war criminals. Articles 227 of the treaty 
provided:
Article 227: The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of 
Hohenzollem, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international 
morality and the sanctity of treaties
148
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the 
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one 
appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great 
Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, 
with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the 
validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it 
considers should be imposed.
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the 
Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on 
trial.
In Article 228 of the Versailles Treaty Germany recognized the right of the Allies 
to prosecute in the latter’s military tribunals Germans accused of violations of the laws 
and customs of war. It agreed to hand over all persons requested by the Allies for this 
purpose, and acceded to a jurisdictional primacy clause in which the provisions of Article 
228 would supercede any prosecutions or proceedings in German tribunals or those of her 
allies.
Since the Allies did not occupy Germany, however, they were unable to compel
the handover of suspected war criminals. Other key provisions of the Versailles treaty
were also not enforced, mainly as a result of disagreements and reluctance among the
1 8Allied Powers over their approach to a defeated Germany . Thus, the Allies “were 
strong enough to win the war, but not strong enough to secure the peace”19. In a sequence
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of events with contemporary resonance in former Liberian President Charles Taylor’s 
departure from Liberia and his exile in Nigeria (which steadfastly refused to hand him 
over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone for a trial despite the Court’s formal 
indictment and warrant for Taylor’s arrest), the Kaiser had abdicated his throne in 
November 1918 and gone into exile in the Netherlands.
Bringing the Kaiser to trial became a major issue in the internal politics of several 
Allied States. In Britain, Lloyd George’s government had called a general election in 
December 1918 and, as Gary Bass notes, “British members of Parliament were eager to 
translate Wilhelm II’s massive unpopularity into votes”20. George and several members 
of his government went on the campaign trail with ringing demands for the prosecution 
of the German emperor, with cries of “Hang the Kaiser” frequently uttered and heard. 
Their victory at the elections reflected the overwhelming popular mood in Britain on the 
trial of the Kaiser21. Similarly, French President Georges and Italian President Vittoria 
Orlando were staunch supporters of the Allied effort to bring the Kaiser to trial. Despite 
repeated Allied demands that the Kaiser be surrendered to stand trial, including assertions 
of Dutch obligations based on the legal postulations of Grotius and threats to severe 
diplomatic relations, the Dutch Government stood firm in its refusal to surrender the 
former monarch, and the Kaiser eventually died in his country of exile22.
The Versailles treaty and the failure to bring Wilhelm II to trial foreshadowed 
many of the same conceptual and practical issues embedded in the prosecute-or-pardon 
conundrum, as well as others that affect international criminal justice to this day. The 
abortive effort to try the Kaiser demonstrates how issues of justice for violations of 
international humanitarian law remain a lighting rod in international diplomacy and
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domestic affairs. These issues include those of whether legalism advances or opposes 
order (the heart of the matter); command responsibility and sovereign immunity, which 
presaged the Nuremberg trials, the U.N. ad hoc International Tribunals, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, and the ICC; who defines aggression in international law?; victor’s 
justice; and the impact of domestic political or foreign policy calculations on juridical 
intervention.
The Boomerang Effect.
The humiliation inflicted by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty triggered deep 
resentment in Germany and radicalized domestic politics, galvanizing the extreme right 
wing of the political spectrum Of special significance for Germans in this respect were 
the war guilt clause and the terms of reparations, both of which the Germans protested. In 
a telegraph from the German National Assembly to the Allies in Versailles, the Germans 
asserted: “The Government of the German Republic in no wise abandons its conviction 
that these conditions of peace represent injustice without example”.23 The government of 
the day refused initially to accept Articles 227 and 228 and experienced a period of 
severe instability induced by the internal domestic backlash from the Versailles treaty.
Examples of Germany’s parlous state at this time include the Kapp Putsch of 
March 1920, an uprising in Berlin by a right wing group led by Wolfgang Kapp (a right 
wing journalist who blamed the German government for the Versailles Treaty) and 
supported by several members of the German paramilitary forces and some army 
officers24. The uprising failed as a result of a general strike staged by German citizens 
against it. In 1923, right wing politicians in Bavaria attempted to overthrow the
government, with support from Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party, in the midst of the 
prevailing economic malaise and turmoil. When the Bavarian politicians hesitated in 
executing the plan, Hitler and his Storm Troopers staged an uprising in November 
192325. Sixteen Nazi storm troopers were killed in a gun battle with police during the 
Munich Putsch. Hitler was put on trial and imprisoned for nine months, during which he 
wrote his famous book Mein Kampf. That trial transformed him from an obscure 
extremist into the leader of the right wing political forces in Germany. Meanwhile, the 
Rhineland had declared its secession from Germany, and a state of emergency had by 
now been declared in the country.
Under threat of a military occupation issued by British Prime Minister Lloyd 
George and French President Georges Clemenceau, the German Government had finally 
signed the Versailles Treaty. Adolf Hitler reportedly met his would-be top lieutenant, 
Herman Goring, at a right wing political rally protesting French demands for the trial of 
German war criminals.27
There is a parallel in contemporary Serbia, where a nationalist backlash to the 
indictment and arraignment of extremist Serb leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic and 
Vojislav Seselj before the ICTY combined with the general economic stagnation to 
stimulate a marked increase in the popularity of the Radical Party, headed by Seselj, and 
of Milosevic. Ultimately, however, this trend was not strong enough to translate into an 
electoral victory. In the wry comment of a Serbian politician: “My genuine belief is that 
Mrs. Del Ponte [Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY] was the best head of an electoral 
campaign that the Radical Party ever had”.28
This is what might be termed “the matyrdom effect” of international criminal 
justice, whereby villains become heroes in the eyes of populations that feel humiliated 
either by the power of military conquerors, or by the failure of irredentist military 
adventures. Is this a valid argument against prosecutions? Clearly, German bitterness 
over the Treaty of Versailles and the Allies’ failure to occupy Germany after World War 
I combined with several other factors to bring about World War II, resulting in the kind 
of changes imposed on that country in the wake of that war. In that context, despite the 
criticisms that attended it, the international prosecutions of German war criminals in 
Nuremberg did more good than the harm wrought by the half-hearted domestic 
prosecutions of war criminals at Liepzig. This was a compromise suggested by Germany 
after it refused to hand over German war criminals to the Allies as required by Article 
228 of the Versailles Treaty. Rather, Germany proposed, it would try the accused 
persons before the German Supreme Court at Leipzig. In February 1920, the Allies 
agreed to this compromise. The increasingly likely and unpalatable alternative would 
have been for the Allies to march into and occupy Germany and arrest the accused war 
criminals themselves. Allied threats to occupy Germany had been issued simply to 
obtain the defeated nation’s signature to the Versailles Treaty, but the Allies were 
reluctant to mount a physical occupation in order to enforce justice for war crimes. From 
initial Allied lists of suspects that ran into a thousand names, agreement was eventually 
reached to par these down to 45 names, broken down according the extent of the impact 
of German war crimes on each Allied country -  16 from the Belgian list, 11 from the 
French, seven British, five Italian, and four from other countries29.
These trials, which began in May 1921 after much wrangling between the Allies 
and Germany over the latter’s apparent intention to use the trial process to protect the real 
culprits from prosecution and instead try obscure minions, were an abject failure30. 
Virtually all the defendants convicted were given ridiculously light sentences, and several 
escaped from custody. Whereas Nuremberg-style trials after World War I , even if 
victors’ justice, might have established the criminality of German atrocities such as 
unrestricted naval warfare against civilian targets, all the sham trials at Liepzig achieved 
was to reinforce the sullen defiance of the German leadership and its determination to 
emerge as the victor in World War II. Ultimately, concern for the preservation of the 
stability of the Weimar Republic was to lead Britain to back off from demands for the 
surrender of German war criminals.31
Command responsibility.
Following the armistice that ended the war on 11 November 1918 and preceded the more 
formal Treaty of Versailles, there was much agonizing and heated internal debate in the 
British Government over the fate of the German Emperor. Winston Churchill, the future 
Prime Minister, was cautious about the principle of command responsibility, which was 
Lloyd George’s main ground for arguing for a trial of the ex-Kaiser. He argued that while 
it was well “within our rights to kill him as an act of vengeance, b u t.. .if you are going to 
deal with him on the basis of what is called law and justice, it is difficult to say that the 
ex-Kaiser’s guilt is greater than the guilt of a great many very important persons in 
Germany who supported him” . He wondered if a case against Wilhelm II would be
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sustainable in a court of law. Several other members of the cabinet opposed a trial of the 
Kaiser because it had no precedent and were convinced it would be bad law.
Ultimately, Britain’s position on whether to try the Kaiser boiled down to a case 
for command responsibility -  essentially the basis of the anti-impunity trend driven by 
the ad hoc and permanent international criminal tribunals in the second half of the 20th 
century. The case was eloquently made by Smith, the then Attorney-General of the 
United Kingdom, to the Imperial War Cabinet. The chief law officer of the Crown 
predicated his case on the argument that a trial of German soldiers for war crimes, without 
one of the Kaiser as their leader would be, in effect, a travesty:
The ex-Kaiser’s personal responsibility and supreme authority in Germany have been constantly 
asserted by himself, and his assertions are fully warranted by the constitution of Germany. 
Accepting, as we must, this view, we are bound to take notice of the conclusion which follows: 
namely, that the ex-Kaiser is primarily and personally responsible for the death of millions of 
young men; for the destruction in four years of 200 times as much material wealth as Napoleon 
destroyed in twenty years; and he is responsible -  and this is not the least grave part of the 
indictment -  for the most daring and dangerous challenge to the fundamental principles of public 
law which that indispensable charter of international right has sustained since its foundations were 
laid centuries ago by Grotius. These things are very easy to understand, and ordinary people all 
over the world understand them very well. How then, I ask, are we to justify impunity? Under 
what pretext, and with what degree of consistence, are we to try smaller criminals? Is it still 
proposed -  it has been repeatedly threatened by the responsible representatives of every Allied 
country -  to try, in appropriate cases, submarine commanders and to bring to justice the governors 
of prisons? ...In my view you must answer all these questions in the affirmative. I am at least 
sure that the democracies of the world will take that view, and among them I have no doubt that 
the American people will be numbered. How can you do this if, to use the title claimed by
155
himself, and in itself illustrative of my argument, “the All Highest” is given impunity? ...In order 
to illustrate the point which is in my mind I will read to the Imperial War Cabinet a very short 
extract, which represents our view with admirable eloquence, from Burke’s speech in the trial of 
Warren Hastings:-
“We have not brought before you an obscure offendor, who, when his insignificance and 
weakness are weighed against the power of the prosecution, gives even to public justice 
something of the appearance of oppression; no, my Lords, we have brought before you 
the first man of India in rank, authority, and station. We have brought before you the 
chief of the tribe, the head of the whole body of eastern offenders; a captain-general of 
iniquity, under whom all the fraud, all the peculation, all the tyranny in India are 
embodied, disciplined, arrayed, and paid. This is the person, my Lords, that we bring 
before you. We have brought before you such a person, that, if you strike at him with the 
firm and decided arm of justice, you will not have need of a great many more examples. 
You strike at the whole corps if you strike at the head.”
Prime Minister, in my judgment, if this man escapes, common people will say everywhere that he 
has escaped because he is an Emperor. In my judgment they will be right. They will say that 
august influence has been exerted to save him...It is necessary for all time to teach the lesson that 
failure is not the only risk which a man possessing at the moment in any country despotic powers, 
and taking the awful decision between war and peace, has to fear. If ever again that decision 
should be suspended in balanced equipoise, at the disposition of an individual, let the ruler who 
decides upon war know that he is gambling, amongst other hazards, with his own personal 
safety.34
France, which had the greatest numbers of victims from World War I, was an 
even stauncher — and consistent -  advocate of prosecutions of the Kaiser and other 
German war criminals at the end of the war. Unlike the British, France at no time 
considered extra-judicial, summary execution for the Kaiser, and President Clemenceau
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anchored his support for a trial on the principle of command responsibility. He was, as 
were the British, motivated by the pressure of domestic public opinion.
Victors'justice and ex post facto law.
The question of the legal basis for trying the Kaiser for aggression, as was clearly 
implied in the Versailles Treaty, and that of might as right, arose early in the internal 
debate in Britain’s Imperial War Cabinet, mixed with the discussions about command 
responsibility. Initial exchanges in the war cabinet between Jans Smuts, the South 
African Defence Minister, Lloyd George, Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, and 
W.M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, turned on whether the Kaiser could lawfully 
be tried for waging war. The British and Canadian leaders held the strong view that the 
Kaiser had a criminal case to answer for “plunging the world into war”, which, in 
Borden’s opinion constituted a crime against humanity. But Australian Prime Minister 
Hughes had a penetrating response: “You cannot indict a man for making war. War has 
been the prerogative of the right of all nations from the beginning... he had a perfect right 
to plunge the world into war, and now we have conquered, we have a perfect right to kill 
him, not because he plunged the world into war, but because we have won. You cannot 
indict him, Mr. Prime Minister, for breaking the law.”35
The preceding dialogue puts into bold relief debates about the legality of war in 
international law that continue to this day -  from the ultimately unsuccessful General 
Treaty on the Renunciation of War (Kellog-Briand Pact, 1928), and the inclusion of
'Xfkaggression as a crime in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
The Kellog-Briand Pact failed because it was not positive law with any penalties for
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breach or enforcement mechanism, but rather a moral and policy declaration which 
several of the signatory states, including Germany, which had commenced a re-armament 
program and had no strategic interest in implementing. As such, it did not constitute clear 
international law, as I have argued in Chapter 2. Even before World War II, the pact had 
been violated on several occasions, including the Japanese and Italian aggressions in 
Manchuria and Ethiopia respectively.
The legality of, and limits to, the use of force, is at stake in this debate. We shall 
return to this topic when we consider the International Criminal Court. It captures as well
t l ithe 20 century roots of the assault on the concept of sovereign immunity -- even if, in 
this case, for selfish reasons of national interest rather than an altruistic concern for 
humanity -  that proponents of pardons believe constitutes a threat to order in an 
international society of sovereign states.
Sovereign Immunity Shields the Kaiser.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ adamant refusal to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm 
over to the Allies for a trial was based on several factors: its neutrality, an absence of 
enthusiasm for what it considered the Allies’ self-serving campaign for victors’ justice, 
and on the view that the Kaiser enjoyed sovereign immunity. Of even greater importance 
for the Kaiser’s ultimate escape from the then short arm of international justice was the 
extreme reluctance of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to support the campaign for 
Wilhelm’s extradition from Holland.
There were three major grounds for the American position. First, Wilson viewed 
the British and French campaign as dubious, self-interested legalism, and opted instead to
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use the end of the Great War as a means to a wider, more universalist framework for 
international law through the establishment of the League of Nations. He believed that a 
narrow pursuit of Kaiser Wilhelm would complicate the chances for the creation of the 
League, a project he pursued with messianic zeal. He toured Europe before the 
negotiations in Paris that ended World War I, selling his vision of a new international 
order to great acclaim. The League was, in Wilson’s vision, no less than a grand compact 
to reorder international relations along the best aspirations of liberal internationalism. 
Pursuing the Kaiser was a distraction from the larger strategic picture. “What we are 
striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right 
and justice -  no mere peace of shreds and patches”, he proclaimed37.
Second, through his delegates to the Paris Peace Conference Wilson argued that 
the Kaiser was protected by the principle of sovereign immunity -  a remarkably nuanced 
view for so liberal and purist an internationalist. Third -  and in a reflection of the 
national self-interest that is never far from the surface in the calculations of statesmen -  
American casualties in World War I were few relative to those of France and Britain. 
Indeed, the United States joined the war only in 1917, following a German naval attack 
on a ship carrying American citizens that claimed 128 American casualties -  an event 
that outraged and engaged American public opinion.
To the consternation of other Allies, the United States staked out its disagreement 
with war crimes trials of the Germans at the Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of War and the Enforcement of Penalties, established by the Paris Peace 
Conference and chaired by no other than Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of 
State. The American delegation filed a memorandum in which it stated the United States
opposition to the proposed war crimes tribunal and distanced itself from the proposal.38 
In the memorandum, the Americans contended that the distinction between offenses “of a 
legal nature” and those of “a moral nature” had become blurred by “ a determination to 
punish certain persons, high in authority, particularly the heads of enemy States, even 
though heads of States were not hitherto legally responsible for atrocious acts committed 
by subordinate authorities39. Lansing and James Brown Scott, the other American 
delegate, cited a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1812 that affirmed the immunity 
of sovereigns from judicial process40. They emphasized that a head of State could only be 
tried by his country and not by others, and ridiculed the retrospective criminalization of 
aggression:“The laws and customs of war are of a certain standard, to be found in books 
of authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with 
the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a 
court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminal law”41.
Lansing and Scott, echoing President Wilson, recommended not war crimes trials, 
but a formal condemnation of German war atrocities. In a telling phrase with echoes in 
the contemporary impulses to prosecute or pardon, the American diplomats wrote: “ 
These are matters for statesmen, not for judges”42. A quarter-century later, in a 
demonstration of how the policies of many states towards international prosecutions for 
violations of humanitarian law are subordinate to strategic interests, this position was to 
be repudiated at the Nuremberg trials.
Beyond Legalism: Hirohito and the Tokyo Tribunal
While the concept of command responsibility was having its heyday at the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the subsequently established International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, or the “Tokyo War Crimes Trials”), which sat 
from May 1946 to November 1948, proceeded along somewhat different lines. The 
IMTFE, which comprised 11 judges of various nationalities, tried 25 high-ranking 
political and military leaders accused of unprecedented war crimes and classified as Class 
A war criminals43. These included four former prime ministers, three foreign ministers, 
four war ministers, two navy ministers, two ambassadors, three economic and financial 
advisers, an influential imperial advisor (Koichi Kido), one admiral, and one colonel 
Kingoro Hashimoto)44. All had served in successive Japanese governments and the 
military during the war. By a majority decision, seven defendants were sentenced to 
death by hanging, 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment, one to 20 years, and another to 
seven years45.
To be sure, the Tokyo tribunal also had aspirations as avowedly lofty as those of 
the Nuremberg tribunal. The element that has chiefly triggered the ambivalence of 
historians towards the Tokyo war crimes trials is the extent to which the
commitment to justice was compromised by the double standards of the political and 
strategic considerations of the Allied Powers. It was General Douglas MacArthur, 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific (the “American Ceasar” who 
accepted the unconditional surrender of Japan at the end of World War II), rather than the 
Chief Prosecutor of the IMTFE, Joseph Keenan, that made the most important decision of 
the Tokyo trial process. That decision -  a deliberate and political rather than judicial one 
-- was to exempt Hirohito, the Emperor of Japan, from prosecution from war crimes even
161
as the country’s military, the political leadership, and even Hirohito’s royal household 
faced trial. Britain supported the U.S. position, but the Soviet Union insisted on a trial of 
the emperor46. In Tokyo even far more than at Nuremberg, America was the dominant 
ally and its position naturally prevailed.
History has taken a mixed view of this double standard. Some commentators 
have been critical of the political exemption of Hirohito from prosecution, and the Tokyo 
war crimes trials have historically been viewed as inferior to Nuremberg in terms of its 
relative success and international public awareness of the proceedings. Not least among 
the reasons for this divergent assessment is that, at Nuremberg, legalism (victor’s justice 
though it was, with a significant dose of political considerations thrown in) was utilized 
to the full -  a fact that was seen as a progressive deployment of power. Regarding Japan, 
however, many analysts saw Mac Arthur’s exemption of the Emperor as a retrograde step, 
a missed opportunity. William Webb, the Australian judge that presided at the IMTFE, 
believed that the trials were fundamentally flawed by reason of Hirohito’s absence from 
the dock47. So did Justice Henri Bernard, the French judge on the tribunal48.
But there is nothing to suggest that, with the exception of the exemption of 
Hirohito and a number of differences of a technical nature, the Tokyo trials were 
fundamentally different from Nuremberg in its nature as victor’s justice. In the words of 
John Dower: “Like Nuremberg, the Tokyo trial was law, politics and theater all in one”49. 
Moreover, as Dower also recounts, several senior military and civilian officials of the 
Allied Powers privately viewed the Tokyo trials as a sham. A top American military 
intelligence officer in the Allied Pacific Command Headquarters confided to a judge of 
the Tokyo tribunal his view that “this trial was the worst hypocrisy in recorded history”.
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In March 1948 George Kennan, the head of policy planning at the U.S. Department of 
State visited Japan and issued a stinging commentary on the Tokyo trials as “ill- 
conceived”, “political trials ...not law”. The trials surrounded the punishment of enemy 
leaders “with the hocus-pocus of judicial procedure which belies its real nature”, despite 
having been “hailed as the ultimate in international justice”50.
If the Tokyo trials were not regarded as being at par with Nuremberg, is this 
solely because of the failure to try Hirohito, or does this judgment arise from Western 
ethnocentrism, in which the West attaches the greatest importance, even in the context of 
justice, to European theatres, victims, and defendants?51 After all, critics have asserted 
that there were a number of cover-ups in the Nuremberg. There, Russia tried to avoid 
references to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that parceled out “spheres of interest’ between 
the Axis Germany and the Allied Soviet Union in August 1939, the existence of which 
was only indirectly affirmed through examinations of Ribbentrop at the trial, and it 
emerged as well that that Germany attacked Norway only to forestall a planned attack by 
Britain52. No less an authoritative figure than Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor 
observed, “On these matters, the tribunal was engaging in half-truths, if indeed there are 
such things”53.
Moreover, if Mac Arthur’s decision to exempt Hirohito is the rallying point of 
critical assessments of the Tokyo war crimes trials, it is important to address on the 
merits the question: was that decision justified? In order to better appraise MacArthur’s 
use of pardon power, it is essential to understand the unique cultural context of Japan at 
the time, and differing views of the link between that context and the politico-military 
one. Prior to World War II, the Japanese considered their emperor divine -  the Son of
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Heaven. In Japanese culture, the emperor’s subjects could not look him in the face and 
were obliged to bow and avoid eye contact for as long as they were in his presence. In 
short, the emperor was deeply embedded in Japanese psyche and history as a central 
factor in both, and at a far deeper level than the monarchies of Europe. In this context, 
then, he was seen as the embodiment of Japanese society and central to societal order.
Yet, in the first part of Hirohito’s reign (between 1926 and 1945), the influence of 
the military in government steadily increased apace with Japan’s rise in the early 20th 
century as a military and irredentist power in the Far East. The Japanese Imperial Army 
and the Imperial Navy exercised veto power over the formation of the country’s civilian 
governments since 1900. From 1932, following the assassination of the moderate Prime 
Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai, the military held virtually all political power in Japan and 
executed policies that fed into its military expansionism in Asia and set the country on an 
irreversible path to World War II.
It is against this background that there has been heated historical argument about 
Hirohito’s role in Japanese involvement and atrocities in World War II, and the extent of 
his personal guilt. There is widespread belief that he bore a great degree of command 
responsibility and was not the figurehead he was claimed to be as a justification for his 
non-prosecution. Especially in Asia, he was seen by many as the region’s Hitler. In this 
view, he was considered the head of state. Under Japanese law, only the emperor had 
authority to declare or launch a war. In any case, the war was fought by the Japanese 
military in his name, and he did not deny knowledge of military plans by Japanese 
generals to wage aggressive war against China, the Philippines and the United States. 
From a strict perspective of the equal application of justice and the rule of law (which, as
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noted earlier, though embraced by human rights advocates and the moral philosophy of 
liberalism, is absent at the international plane) it is easy to be scandalized at Hirohito’s 
exemption from the Tokyo war crimes trials. Yet there is a view of him as a figurehead 
who was unable to influence events in the face of the voracious military irredentism of 
Japan’s generals. He was no more than a mild-mannered fellow who wore a moustache, 
had a fondness for bacon and eggs, wore a Mickey Mouse watch, and was obsessed with 
marine biology. The Japanese government at the time certainly advanced the 
“figurehead” argument in supporting the Allied decision that made Hirohito immune 
from the legal process of the Tokyo tribunal.
But the weight of evidence suggests a strong case of the emperor’s command 
responsibility. In the saber-rattling lead-up to Japan’s attack on the United States, 
Hirohito was initially distant from military decision-making, and was concerned about 
the bellicose nature of Japanese demands that the United States and Britain give it carte 
blanche to invade China. Faced with the Imperial Cabinet’s unanimous support for war, 
however, Hirohito shook off his doubts and became a cheerleader of the war effort that 
was executed in his name. It fell to him, the “voice of the marble”, to make the radio 
broadcast that announced Japan’s unconditional surrender after the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States in 1945.
Although Mac Arthur did not favor the emperor’s abdication and allowed Hirohito 
to remain as emperor, the god-king was forced to renounce his divinity -  a significant 
humiliation in the Japanese cultural context. Perhaps this was a concession to senior 
members of the American government in Washington that had sought an investigation of 
the emperor’s war role. MacArthur resisted with an authoritative interpretation, in a
secret cable to Washington, of the reality on the ground in Japan after the war54. Hirohito 
was, in MacArthur’s eyes, vital for the future of Japan under the Occupation Government 
(1945-1952) and beyond. The American general wanted to guarantee the continuity of 
Japan’s body politic, and, in what was the ultimate strategic goal, facilitate the 
democratization process that would culminate in a transformation of the divine emperor 
into a constitutional monarch55. This was the fundamental reason why MacArthur 
decided to shield Hirohito from the inconvenient searchlight of the judicial process of the 
IMTFE. The “American Ceasar” believed he needed Hirohito as a symbol of continuity 
and cohesion of the Japanese people following their defeat. With the societal trauma 
among the Japanese population in the wake of their defeat, especially the humiliation of 
the atomic bomb, MacArthur saw Hirohito’s survival as a necessary counterweight to a 
fragile situation. “Seeing their God-monarch in the dock of a Western-run trial” could 
hardly have helped the situation56
MacArthur’s cable warned Washington that indicting Hirohito would plunge 
Japan into chaos from which the country would not recover, trigger guerilla warfare and a 
communist upsurge, and dash all hopes of introducing a liberal democracy -  the ultimate 
goal of the Occupation Government57. In sum, indicting the emperor would lead to a 
total breakdown of order, requiring at least a million troops and thousands of additional 
civil servants to reverse58. As an intelligence specialist who advised MacArthur on the 
issue recalled, he favored retaining Emperor Hirohito on the throne “because otherwise 
we would have had nothing but chaos. The religion was gone, and he was the only 
symbol of control. Now, I know he had his hand in the cookie jar, and he wasn’t any
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innocent child. But he was of great use to us, and that was the basis on which I 
recommended to the Old Man [MacArthur] that we keep him.”59
MacArthur did not stop at exempting Hirohito from trial. Occupation policy 
shielded the emperor from criticism, and ensured a conspiracy of silence about Hirohito’s 
war role at the Tokyo war crimes trials -  directly tampering with witness testimony, or 
what can only be accurately described, in common parlance in the American domestic 
legal system, as “obstruction of justice”. Hideki Tojo testified in the course of his trial 
that “there is no Japanese subject who would go against the will of His Majesty; more 
particularly, among high official of the Japanese government ...” He later recanted 
(under subsequent pressure from American officials), stressing Hirohito’s “love and 
desire for peace”60. In a conversation that took place between General Fellers, a senior 
aide to MacArthur, and the former admiral and Prime Minister Yonai Mitsumasa before 
the Tokyo trial began, the American is reported to have said: “It would be most 
convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that that the emperor is completely 
blameless. I think the forthcoming trials offer the best opportunity to do that. Tojo, in 
particular, should be made to bear all the responsibility at his trial. In other words, I 
want you to have Tojo say as follows: ’At the Imperial Conference prior to the start of the 
war, I had already decided to push for war even if His Majesty was against going to war 
with the United States’”61. Moreover, in pursuit of this policy, physical evidence in the 
form of documents and materials that might incriminate the emperor were deliberately
ignored and suppressed. Thus the prosecution at the Tokyo tribunal under Keenan
(\)functioned, in the words of Dower, “as a defense team for the emperor” .
Sordid as this direct tampering with evidence is, and as unflatteringly as it 
undoubtedly portrays the Tokyo war crimes trials, it is clear that a majority of Japanese, 
then and now, view the decision not to put Hirohito on trial as justified. It would be 
unhelpful to question whether the decision is “right” or “wrong”, as that inquiry would 
not produce a satisfactory answer in the world of politics and strategy that shapes 
decisions to prosecute or pardon in international criminal justice: realists who see little 
value in prosecuting political leaders, only the potential complications legalism can bring 
to political settlements, would call it the “right” decision and argue that it is justified, 
while universalists would surely view it as an outrage. An international society 
perspective on international justice that is conditional would recognize the uniqueness of 
this case given its cultural context. It might, depending on what part of the international 
society spectrum (rationalist or solidarist) the observer were to be, criticize the process by 
which Hirohito was saved from justice, but consider the outcome “typical” of the nature 
of that society. For, as already noted, the Japanese belief in the divinity of their emperor 
was a serious one indeed, and to have stripped Hirohito of that aura was already a serious 
strategic blow. To have stretched policy to the point of putting him on trial may have 
generated a backlash that might have undermined the goal of order itself. Random 
samplings of the opinions of Japanese citizens on this question indicate that many in 
Japan would have committed suicide in response to the embarrassment or loss of face that 
is taboo in Japanese culture63. At the very least, then, MacArthur’s decision was 
understandable.
Not everyone agrees that by saving the Japanese throne MacArthur paved a solid 
path to democracy in Japan. Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave are of the firm view
that the prospect of real democratic reforms was actually undermined by putting Hirohito 
beyond accountability for war crimes64. In a contrarian interpretation of MacArthur’s 
decision, they argue that the real story was as follows: Japan owed U.S. lenders huge 
sums of money by 1945. Former U.S. President Herbert Hoover, a Quaker, conspired 
with fellow Quakers in the Japanese elite to preserve the royal family in order to prevent 
Japan from lurching towards communism, ensure that the country’s financial barons 
stayed in place, and that debts to wall street financiers were repaid. In this account, 
MacArthur ensured Hirohito’s pardon in the hope that it would facilitate his well-known 
presidential ambitions by obtaining support from Hoover and other powerful 
Republicans.
For whatever reason, the prospect of Hirohito’s accountability was sacrificed to 
the imperative of order. Thus, a negative exercise of prosecutorial prerogative may have 
been justified by a successful outcome in an important societal transition that has 
benefited not only Japan, but international society and the world economy as well. 
Moreover, the Tokyo war crimes trials exposed to the Japanese people the excesses of the 
militarist policies of their governments, and laid an important foundation for a 
constitutionally guaranteed pacifist foreign policy65. In this sense, the numerous “big 
fish” that were tried at the Tokyo tribunal appears to have effectively counterbalanced the 
exemption of Hirohito. Despite academic criticisms, there is nothing in this especially 
unique situation to suggest that, 50 years afterwards, the Japanese society essentially 
regrets MacArthur’s decision to spare the emperor. And if that is so, the argument for 
that decision appears to have essentially been vindicated.
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But the pro and con of the political decision to exculpate Hirohito is one thing. 
Whether Japan has handled the legacy of its irredentist history astutely is quite another. 
The benefits of sparing Hirohito remain co-mingled with the deep wounds Japanese war 
crimes have left in some countries in Asia to this day and a certain moral ambivalence 
within Japanese society on the question of a formal apology by Japan for those crimes.66 
Asian countries that had suffered conquest and occupation at the hands of Japanese forces 
have long argued for a formal apology by Japan, and it was not until 6 June 1995 that the 
Japanese government issued a declaration expressing “deep remorse” for its aggression67.
The conspicuous pardon granted the Japanese emperor is hardly the only decision 
not to prosecute at the Tokyo tribunal. In his review of the Tokyo trial Yves Beigbeder 
has highlighted some fundamental examples of the endogenous qualities of international 
criminal law in deciding not just who, but what, gets prosecuted or pardoned68. The first, 
as I alluded in the introductory chapter of this work, is the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
on 6 August 1945, and of Nagaski three days later. The second is the exclusion from 
prosecution at the Tokyo trial, for political/strategic reasons, of the development of 
biological weapons by the Japanese army’s notorious Unit 731, and the use of these 
devastating agents on prisoners of war.
The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the decisive factor in 
Japan’s surrender and ended the country’s military expansionism. The bombings caused 
massive physical destruction and loss of human lives. But its most enduring legacy, other 
than the political controversy that has trailed President Harry Truman’s decision to 
authorize its use and questions about its legality (to which we will return momentarily) 
was its crushing psychological impact. The first (Hiroshima) bomb, with fission
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produced by 0.85 kilograms of uranium, released an explosive power equivalent to 
13,000 of TNT, reached a temperature of 7,000 degrees centigrade that killed persons 
within one kilometer range through intense bums and rupture of internal organs69. It 
released radiation that injured people within a 2.3 kilometer radius, generated atomic ash 
and “black rain” that resulted in the deaths of 140,000 persons by year end in 1945. The 
Nagasaki bomb claimed 60,000 to 70,000 victims in the same period70.
Hirohito’s imperial address announcing Japan’s surrender bears witness to the 
psychological humiliation inflicted by America’s nuclear weapons:
To our good and loyal subjects:
After pondering deeply the general conditions of the world and the actual conditions 
obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present 
situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. ...Moreover the enemy has begun to 
employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is incalculable, 
taking the toll of many innocent lives...We have resolved to pave the way for a grand 
peace for all the generations to come by enduring the endurable and suffering what is 
insufferable...71
In their destructive, indiscriminate impact, the atomic bombings were clearly 
beyond anything the world had seen, and certainly far beyond the prohibitions of the 
Hague Conventions and the poison warfare that was employed by the Japanese and was 
condemned by the United States during the war. Attempts by the defendants at the Tokyo 
trial to introduce the atomic bombings in evidence at their trial were ruled inadmissible 
by the Tokyo tribunal and omitted from the majority judgment72. But two of the 
tribunal’s judges held starkly opposing views on the matter, expressed in their concurring
and dissenting opinions. Justice Jaranilla opined that the means justified ends, and thus 
the atomic bombing was justified because it brought Japan to its knees and ended the war. 
Justice Pal, on the other hand, believed that: “As a matter of fact, I do not perceive much 
difference between what the German Emperor is alleged to have announced during the 
First World War in justification of the atrocious methods directed by him in the conduct 
of that war and what is being proclaimed after the Second World War in justification of 
these inhuman blasts”73. In 1993, nearly 40 years after Hiroshima and the Tokyo trial, 
Justice Roling, reviewing both the massive Allied aerial bombardments of Japanese cities 
that caused thousands of civilian deaths, and the atomic bombs, wrote: “I am strongly 
convinced that these bombings were war crimes...It was terror warfare, “coercive 
warfare”.. .forbidden by the laws of war”74.
In an Advisory Opinion75 in response to a majority resolution of the UN General 
Assembly (narrowly adopted after contentious debate, and in the face of vigorous 
opposition from France, Russia, Britain and the United States), the International Court of 
Justice addressed the question: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any 
circumstance permitted under international law?” The 15-member Court’s ruling was an 
equivocal one. It unanimously ruled that neither customary nor conventional 
international law specifically permits the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but, by eleven 
votes to three, that neither did both sources of international law “comprehensively and 
universally” prohibit it. By seven votes to seven, with a casting vote by its President, the 
ICJ ruled “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules 
of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules 
of international humanitarian law, but that in view of the current state of international law
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and the facts before the Court, it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self- 
defence, in which the very survival of the state would be at stake”. The Court then ruled, 
unanimously, that there was an obligation to pursue in good faith and conclude 
negotiations that result in nuclear disarmament under international control.
Effectively, beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there is no 
positive international law that governs the possession of nuclear weapons by the pre-NPT 
nuclear powers, that is to say, all five members of the U.N. Security Council. Thus, the 
use of such weapons is really beyond law, resting more in the domain of diplomacy and 
high politics. By that logic, whether or not using nuclear weapons is a crime is 
indeterminate, and so it can be said to have been defined out of any possible prosecutorial 
framework. The fact that such weapons have not been used in a war since 1945 owes 
itself not to the constraining power of law or the possibility of criminal accountability, 
but to the doctrines of deterrence and mutually assured destruction that such use would 
portend.
The decision not to prosecute the members and activities of Unit 731 exposes 
even more poignantly the arbitrariness inherent in the definitions of who or what are 
prosecuted or pardoned by international criminal justice. As Beigbeder reports, the Unit, 
euphemistically tagged a “Water Purification Unit”, was the Japanese army’s main 
bacteriological warfare research institution, and was led by Army Medical Lieutenant 
General Ishii Shiro. Employing 5000 Japanese personnel and motivated by doctrines of 
racial superiority similar to those that drove the medical experiments of the Nazi doctor 
Josef Mengele, Unit 731 performed sinister medical and biological experiments on
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between 3000 to 12,000 prisoners of war -  mainly Chinese and Russian but including 
some British and Dutch nationals -  between 1932 and 194576. These experiments 
involved exposure to bubonic plague, anthrax, typhoid, mustard gas and other deadly 
bacteriological conditions. The human “subjects” of these experiments were incinerated 
afterwards.
In 1947 the U.S. authorities granted Shiro and other participants in Unit 731’s 
experiments immunity from war crimes prosecution in a secret deal. In return, the U.S. 
obtained the Unit’s surviving scientific “research” secrets. Japanese authorities officially 
denied the existence of Unit 731 for nearly fifty years after World War II, even as the
77Unit’s activities were revealed in various public reports .
Transitional Justice: Between Truth Commissions and Criminal Trials
Countries in transition often face difficult choices in deciding how to deal with 
the past in order to increase the chances of a better future. The transition may be one 
from armed conflict (Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and other examples), 
a political one from dictatorship to democracy (Chile, Argentina and Nigeria in the 
1990s), a combination of both, or South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to majority 
rule in 1994. “Transitional justice” is often a critical component of the way forward. By 
“transitional justice” I mean the phenomenon and process by which a society utilizes 
legal and quasi-legal institutions to facilitate fundamental change from one political order 
to another or the construction of a new reality against the background of a profound 
historical memory78. It is a means of repudiating the past or building a bridge between it 
and the future. In short, transitional justice, like Janus, looks backwards and forward at
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the same time. It often involves, but is not limited to transitions towards democracy and 
the rule of law. And it can also be an attempt by a society, national or international, to 
face squarely a historical memory such as the Holocaust, slavery, and so forth. Such 
memories may not involve democratic transitions or rule of law issues, but in all cases 
there is a common thread -  the use of legal or quasi legal institutions. The objects of 
those institutions may vary, converge or diverge. Those objects may be the establishment 
of the “truth”, reconciliation, reparation, or criminal accountability.
Because transitional justice tends to involve choices between prosecution and 
pardon, the latter sometimes in the form of amnesties, it is one of the clearest expressions 
of the dilemma under examination. It belongs squarely in this discussion as well because, 
while at first sight the scope of transitional justice often appears to be limited to the 
domestic legal and political sphere, it frequently deals with violations of international 
humanitarian law that can legitimately be the subject of international jurisdiction. 
Apartheid, for example, is a crime against humanity in international law79. Moreover, the 
Nuremberg trial, though international, is regarded as an example of transitional justice 
because it marked the beginning of a shift from a fascist political order to a liberal 
democratic one. And because the universe of transitional justice encompasses, but is not 
limited to a cosmopolitan vision of legalism, it frequently runs into the opposition of 
realist or international society perspectives of domestic or international order.
What, then, is the best path to peace and reconciliation for fractured societies? 
Truth and reconciliation commissions aimed at uncovering the past, including sometimes 
by promising amnesty to individuals prepared to confess their crimes, or courts and 
tribunals -  national or international -  whose task is criminal prosecution? Does legalism
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unearth truth; does “truth” lead to reconciliation in the absence of accountability; and is it 
necessarily the case that legal justice contributes to reconciliation? These are but some of 
the many questions in this sphere to which there are no easy answers.
In the 1980s, truth and reconciliation commissions emerged as a middle ground 
between political exemptions from prosecutions and courtroom trials. This phenomenon 
was prominent in Latin America but did not, contrary to popular belief, begin in that 
region80. Its adoption following South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to black 
majority rule is probably the most famous example. No less than 25 countries have 
utilized combinations of truth commissions and amnesties to facilitate transitions towards 
stability81. These commissions had exhibited a wide variety of quality and substance, and 
some even pre-dated the 1990s. While truth commissions and criminal trials often claim 
the broadly similar aims of contributing to reconciliation, they approach these goals from 
fundamentally different angles. In countries such as Nigeria after the civil war that ended 
in 1970, and in Mozambique following the peace settlement in 1992 that ended the 
country’s civil war, complete amnesties were granted for acts committed in these 
conflicts. Seen from legalism’s point of view, it is fair to say that amnesty -  impunity, in 
effect -was the price to be paid for peace and reconciliation . This, then, was not even 
an attempt at a middle ground.
Mozambique is worthy of more than a passing mention in this context, for it is a 
rare example of a country that has healed post-conflict wounds without resort either to 
truth commissions or to criminal trials. Its success has been remarkable, for there is no 
indication, more than a decade after the guns fell silent, that the country (both the 
government and its citizens) entertains any sense of loss or regret at the unique path it has
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followed . Cultural factors and the strong role of religion and religious leaders in 
conflict resolution played a major role here. So did a deflection of the desire for 
retribution by invoking the responsibility of the extraordinary circumstances of war, 
rather than the intentional acts of individuals, for atrocities.84 Spain, which adopted a 
comprehensive amnesty policy and avoided what Ruti Teitel has termed “successor 
trials” in the post Franco era, is another example of success for that policy85.
But few other societies have had a similar experience. Through the prism of 
South Africa’s experience we may examine the strengths and weaknesses of truth 
commissions.
Forgiving and Forgetting in South Africa
Nelson Mandela’s release in 1990 from 27 years in prison marked the beginning 
of the end of apartheid. Mandela, in a manner of speaking, walked from prison to the 
leadership of South Africa, becoming that country’s fist black President in 1994 and a 
symbol of freedom and majority rule. The transition from apartheid to black majority 
rule was an exhilarating experience for the majority, but a traumatic one for most of the 
minority, who had to adjust to a velvet political revolution that righted one of recent 
history’s most egregious wrongs. The gravity of the crime of apartheid, juxtaposed 
against the economic, political and social complexities of the “rainbow nation” evoked 
the conundrum: prosecute, or pardon?
Apartheid’s ghost had to be laid to rest if the country was to move forward, but 
trials for crimes against humanity -  legalism -  were considered inappropriate in a
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situation where the difference between the outcome of a peaceful transition and a bloody 
civil war with a well-armed white minority government, lay in the success or failure of 
negotiations.
The negotiations resulted in the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). The creation of the Commission was based on faith in the cleansing 
power of truth, but largely without the accompanying legal culpability for crimes against 
humanity perpetrated against the black majority, or acts of violence by apartheid’s 
victims that were seen by many as a justified war of liberation from brutal tyranny -  but 
which, nevertheless, were violations of the official laws of an officially racist state.
For full confessions to the TRC, individuals responsible for major, politically 
motivated human rights crimes were able to obtain amnesty. As one member of the TRC 
commented, South Africa did not see retributive justice as an indispensable prerequisite 
for reconciliation. “The TRC approach trades justice for truth”, he observed frankly. “It 
is surely for every nation to decide its own approach to these kinds of difficult 
situations”86. In a similar vein, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who served as Chair of the 
TRC and its philosopher-king, has described the statesmanship of both F.W. de Klerk, 
who was South Africa’s last apartheid Prime Minister, and Nelson Mandela: “In our 
case, F.W. de Klerk showed remarkable courage in his reforms, but he was blessed not 
with an intransigent, bitter and vengeful counterpart, but with the almost saintly 
magnanimity of Nelson Mandela. The whites wanted to dig in their heels and the 
liberation movement was hell-bent on demanding every pound of flesh through 
retributive justice akin to the Nuremberg trial. Neither leader heeded these calls”87.
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The rationalizations of the TRC approach that attempted to create a mutual 
exclusivity between justice and truth are fundamentally problematic, as will be argued 
below. A commentator has attempted to create a subtle, but ultimately unsatisfactory, 
distinction between the amnesties granted by the South African TRC and blanket 
amnesties: “In fact the TRC was the best solution. It ensured that amnesty did not mean 
what the word literally means in Greek (“forgetting”), but was accompanied by a full 
revelation of the truth; a blanket amnesty would have allowed the criminals to hide
o o
everything forever” . It is as if the former ensured a significant degree of accountability, 
which in fact it did not. This reality is demonstrated by his apt characterization of the 
disappointment some South Africans felt at seeing “murderous henchmen of the former 
regime walking free, with their crimes exposed and recorded but not punished”89.
The TRC was officially established by an Act of Parliament in 199590. Because 
the South African TRC provides a good example of the several possible facets that could 
characterize such commissions (and found to a greater or lesser extent in the customized 
variants of such institutions in the various countries that have adopted the TRC model), it 
is helpful to quote the Act of Parliament at some length. The legislation provides, inter 
alia:
Since the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), 
provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by 
strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of 
human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence for all South Africans, irrespective of 
colour, race, class, belief or sex;
AND SINCE it is deemed necessary to establish the truth in relation to past events as well 
as the motives and circumstances in which gross violations of human rights have
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occurred, and to make the findings known in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in 
future;...
AND SINCE the Constitution states that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for 
victimization;
AND SINCE the Constitution states that in order to advance such reconciliation and 
reconstruction amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences 
associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the past;
2. (1) There is hereby established a juristic person to be known as the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission...
4. The functions of the Commission shall be to achieve its objectives, and to that end the 
Commission shall -
(a) facilitate, and where necessary initiate or coordinate, inquiries into -
(i) gross violations of human rights, including violations which were part of a systematic 
pattern of abuse;
(ii) the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights, including the 
antecedents, circumstances and factors, context, motives and perspectives which led to 
such violations;
(iii) the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved in such 
violations;
(iv) the question whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning on the part 
of the State or a former state or any organs, or of any political organizations, liberation 
movement or other group or individual; and
(v) accountability, political or otherwise, for any such violation;
© facilitate the granting of amnesty in respect of acts associated with political objectives, 
by receiving from persons desiring to make full disclosure of all the relevant facts 
relating to such acts, applications for the granting of amnesty in respect of such acts, and
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transmitting such applications to the Committee on Amnesty for its decision, and by 
publishing decisions granting amnesty, in the Gazette;...
(e) prepare a comprehensive report which sets out its activities and findings, based on on 
factual and objective information and evidence collected or received by it or placed at its 
disposal;
(f) make recommendation to the President with regard to -
(i) the policy which should be followed or measures which should be taken with regard to 
the granting of reparation to victims or the taking of other measures aimed at 
rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims...
All things considered, the truth and reconciliation approach to South Africa’s 
democratic transition was the best way forward at the time. Had the victims of apartheid 
insisted on legal accountability negotiations between them and the white minority would 
have broken down. An escalation of internal armed conflict that would have brought no 
benefits to either side was a high probability. Yet the benefits of a particular approach to 
transitional justice, at a specific point in time, should not lead us to conclude that that 
approach must be similarly beneficial for every situation. Even the passage of time can 
create a different perspective to the particular situation in question. What, then, are the 
pros and cons of truth and reconciliation commissions?
Pros and Cons.
The case for them is appealing. First, they approach reconciliation with a strong -  and 
welcome -  focus on victims; i.e. restorative justice, in which an effort is made to restore 
the victim’s human dignity. When a perpetrator confesses his crimes, the victim, by 
exercising a moral prerogative to forgive, is empowered and thus restored in a 
psychological sense. It can also be a contextually apt approach. Archbishop Tutu has
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noted that victim-focused approaches to justice are more akin to historical concepts of 
justice in African societies: “Retributive justice is largely Western. The African 
understanding is far more restorative -  not so much to punish as to redress or restore a 
balance that has been knocked askew. The justice we hope for is restorative of the 
dignity of our people”91. Moreover, criminal trials in common law systems or 
international criminal tribunals where common law adversarial procedures are dominant, 
frequently fail to address the victim as a person and focus exclusively on the
92perpetrator .
A second benefit of truth commissions is that of the healing effect they can have 
on the wider society because they are more accessible to ordinary citizens than criminal 
trials. The public airing of crimes, accompanied by confessions, engenders a greater 
degree of public participation than criminal trials with their arcane technicalities. Third, 
the amnesties offered by truth and reconciliation commissions encourage a greater 
willingness by persons involved in the events in question to participate in the process. In 
so doing, they tend to yield a far more complete narrative of events.
Fourth, it is worth noting the “truth” dimension of truth commissions. Positing 
that truth commissions are a superior vehicle for eliciting the “truth” than prosecutions, 
Priscilla Hayner has argued: “The purpose of criminal trials is not to expose the 
truth.. .but to find whether the criminal standard of proof has been satisfied on specific 
charges. A measure of truth may emerge in this process, but trials are limited in the truth 
they are able to tell as they must comply with rules of evidence which often exclude 
important information”.93 Martti Koskenniemi has also questioned the ability of a 
criminal trial to find or establish the “truth” of complex events involving the actions of
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many international players, including the Great Powers and international organizations94. 
In this context, whether “truth” is really established in war crimes trials is limited by the 
inadequate and selective treatment of context. This happens when one of the parties to 
the conflict -  or a third entity that may or may not be a party to the conflict -  establishes 
the framework for its resolution (including a criminal trial as one possible framework), 
that excludes the acts of one of the parties. This situation has been described as a 
D ifferent5. The party whose acts are excluded from the framework is usually the victor 
or an external party that undertook peace enforcement through military action96 . In this 
scenario -  a common one in international criminal justice -- whose “truth” do trials of an 
individual or select group of political or military leaders establish?
Fifth, proponents of truth commissions argue that such mechanisms facilitate 
reconciliation more effectively than prosecutions, and that criminal trials may hinder 
rather than help reconciliation97. South Africa’s Tutu has expressed reservations that 
international criminal tribunals established by the United Nations:
“risk disrupting fragile situations of transition from repression and conflict to a more 
democratic dispensation. Such tribunals may well ensure accountability and show there 
will be no impunity. That is fine as far as it goes. But you need something more than 
retributive justice for healing. In and of itself, the judicial process is handicapped. It 
alone cannot be effective in reconciling a society divided by hatred”98.
In an elegant and forceful articulation of the same argument, Ramesh Thakur has 
commented:
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“The international criminal justice route takes away from concerned societies the right to 
decide whether, how and who to prosecute for alleged mass crimes...It also takes away 
from them the options of alternative modes of reconciliation. The purely juridical 
approach to transitional justice traps and suspends communities in the prism of past 
hatreds. South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda have all made deliberate policy choices 
to escape cycles of retributive violence. The record of ‘restorative’ justice in bringing 
closure to legacies of systematic savagery is superior to that of institutions of 
international criminal justice; the latter’s closure is more authoritative but also more 
partial and premature”99.
On closer examination, however, the truth and reconciliation model in general, 
including the “South African miracle”, has significant weaknesses. These shortcomings 
make that model -  where unique political circumstances so demand -  a secondary option 
to criminal trials. South Africa’s TRC, for example, appears to have been the object of 
far more international than domestic admiration100. Even some thoughtful critics of 
“show trials” have a hard time coming up with evidence that establishes the salutary 
effects of “truth-telling” at truth commissions101. On the contrary, for all the controversies 
that attended or still surround them, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of half a century 
earlier have clear, empirical benefits in terms of their influence on the subsequent 
evolution of the societies from which the crimes they judged were perpetrated. The 
contemporary international tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may 
ultimately have a similar effect, with the benefit of hindsight, many years hence. A 
recent opinion poll in South Africa found that only 17 per cent of those interviewed 
thought that the TRC process had made a positive impact in that country, while two-
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thirds of persons interviewed were of the view that race relations had actually worsened 
post-TRC102.
To begin with, if, as I have argued, impunity is the absence of accountability, it 
follows that establishing a culture of accountability, broadly speaking, is a desirable 
normal state of things. This is not the same thing as blind legalism. It is thus necessary 
to introduce an element of accountability in order to deter the recurrence of impunity that 
generates conflicts. In other words, if impunity sows the seed that germinates an actual 
breakdown of order, is skirting accountability a wise choice in the medium to longer 
term? Would habitual amnesties not then be impunity, and, is that a path to order or 
disorder? Accountability in a complete sense is not -  or should not be -  subject to 
subjective definitions such as those advanced by advocates of truth commissions. It does 
not mean “truth-telling” for mass atrocities without the consequences of responsibility. 
This is so though other goals, including the establishment of the truth, may be seen as the 
end result of that process.
Second, and following from this weakness of definition and expectation, truth and 
reconciliation commissions, unable as they are to ensure or enforce accountability for 
mass atrocities, ultimately fail to fulfill the deep hunger that victims often have for 
justice. Those who favor truth commissions over criminal trials in every circumstance, 
whether by reason of a realist bent or a genuine belief in the moral superiority of truth 
commissions over trials fail to take into account this fundamental human urge for justice 
that is part of the law of nature. Wole Soyinka, the Nigerian poet and Nobel Laureate, 
has aptly argued that justice is the first condition of humanity.103 From Hedley Bull’s 
perspective, order is functionally prior to justice. But the relation between the two is an
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intricate one. While justice should not be done though the world perish, that justice is 
actually the flip side of order is demonstrated by (a) the central place justice occupies in 
virtually all the world’s major religions, which describe it as a constitutive value, and (b) 
the central place that issues of justice occupy in world politics. But justice has many 
faces, including, even in Scriptures, forgiveness under certain conditions. The point then 
becomes that, while it is not a frequently achievable ideal, avoiding it as a matter of 
course is not an option.
Experience in several post-conflict societies has shown that, where perpetrators of 
grave human rights crimes are not prosecuted for any number of reasons, the banished 
ghost of the victims’ thirst for justice returns years later to haunt these societies, 
reopening old wounds assumed to have “healed”. This weakness was famously 
illustrated by the spate of lawsuits in Britain, Spain and Chile in the late 1990s that 
sought to bring former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet to justice for massive human 
rights violations committed by the government he headed decades earlier. The 
polarization of domestic public opinion that accompanied Pinochet’s eventual return to 
Chile effectively refutes the argument that truth commissions are a sure path to truth and 
reconciliation. The contemporary view, in hindsight, is that the amnesty granted to 
Pinochet as part of Chile’s transition back to democracy was a straightforward case of 
impunity.
A similar situation exists in Argentina, where a military coup in 1976 sacked 
democracy and instituted a draconian reign of terror in which an estimated 30,000 
Argentines were systematically persecuted, kidnapped, tortured and murdered during an 
internal conflict (the “dirty war”) with guerillas until 1983, when democracy was
restored. The perpetrators of these state-sponsored crimes were not punished, protected 
as they were by several decrees in which former President Carlos Menem granted 
pardons to military officials and former guerillas104. In a policy reversal, Nestor 
Kirchner, who was elected President in May 2003, led a process of investigating and 
arresting members of the former regime responsible for these crimes, the national 
legislature has annulled some of the laws that shielded the armed forces from 
prosecution, and a court ruled unconstitutional two of the 10 decrees by which Menem 
granted pardons to members of the army in 1989 and 1990105. A public opinion poll in 
2003 showed that a clear majority of Argentines (60 per cent) favored reopening 
investigations, and many believe that until justice is done and the soldiers responsible for 
the crimes held accountable, Argentina’s society will be unable to reach closure and 
make peace with itself. One Argentine professional put it quite cryptically: “How can 
you call yourself a democracy if these people are exempt from prosecution? How can 
people have faith injustice in the future if it hasn’t dealt with the past?”106
This is the problem with “forgiving and forgetting”. Just as the Chilean and 
Argentine dilemmas become the subject of the wisdom of hindsight, so has the South 
African transition not been immune from a questioning of the conventional wisdom that 
the TRC process was a saintly affair. There were those who, while recognizing the 
necessary expediency of South Africa’s TRC, were somewhat skeptical of how history 
would judge it in the longer term. Some years ago, I argued that: “South Africa’s case 
may appear unique, but not enough time has elapsed since the TRC to evaluate it more 
definitively”107. By early 2004, a clear split had developed in the ranks of President 
Thabo Mbeki’s Government in South Africa over the arrest of a former security police
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colonel charged with the murder of three anti-apartheid activists -  an event that appeared 
to presage an attempt by some senior security officials in the African National Congress 
(ANC) Government to bring several generals of the former apartheid security force to 
justice108. The incident led to fears that South Africa’s “miracle” might unravel and 
prompted a flurry of negotiations between apartheid-era white intelligence operatives and 
the ANC Government, against the background of mutterings by pro-accountability, ANC 
stalwarts about the possibility of “Nuremberg-style trials”. The angst has sometimes 
been mutual: There has been a similar backlash within the minority white community 
over the ANC Government’s appointment of individuals considered “terrorists” under 
apartheid to senior security posts109.
Regarding societies that opted for the collective amnesia of blanket amnesties, the 
experience of countries like Nigeria is also instructive. Thirty years after its civil war, the 
country moved from a point of a willful suspension of memory (“no victor, no 
vanquished” was the phrase used by the country’s President Yakubu Go won when the 
war ended in 1970) to one of a truth commission established in 2001 with a temporal 
mandate stretching back more than three decades. Had Gowon’s policy been more 
consistently implemented over time, Nigeria might have gone the way of Mozambique 
and Spain, despite the large scale war crimes that were committed during the civil war 
that was fought to forestall the secession of its eastern region which declared an 
independent Republic of Biafra. But bad governance, human rights abuses and perceived 
political marginalization of the Igbo and some other ethnic groups have resulted in 
serious strains to the body politic.
In June 1999 President Olusegun Obasanjo appointed a Human Rights 
Investigation Commission headed by the respected former Nigerian Supreme Court Judge 
Chukwudifu Oputa. The commission, which visited South Africa to absorb lessons from 
that country’s TRC, investigated and received public submissions on numerous human 
rights abuses, in particular political assassinations, and submitted its report on 28 May 
2002. It was also required to recommend judicial, legislative and institutional measures 
to redress past rights abuses in the country. What this evolutionary process suggests is 
that judicial accountability in the form of full-blown trials for mass crimes in future is a 
possibility that, though unlikely, cannot be excluded, especially as the report of the 
commission was not released for public consumption by the Government. Nevertheless, 
it may well be that, for some societies, deferring the day of reckoning may facilitate a 
stronger ability to cope with the trauma of truth commissions or trials at a later date.
A third weakness of truth commissions is that they tend to make a false distinction 
between truth, as supposedly represented by truth commissions, and justice, as 
represented by criminal trials. It is not at all empirically established that criminal trials, 
despite the inherent clash of interests of the defendants and the prosecutor, are 
intrinsically incapable of arriving at the truth or indeed frequently fail to do so. To be 
sure, in some cases, an accused may be found not guilty on the basis of a technicality or a 
prosecutor’s failure to establish guilt with the required standard of proof. Meanwhile, 
beyond the courtroom, other persons or interests “know” that the accused is actually or 
probably guilty. But the ratio of cases where individual responsibility for mass atrocity is 
factually and judicially established outnumbers those where it is not. For, when it comes 
to violations of international humanitarian law, crimes such as genocide, crimes against
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humanity and war crimes are -  or can -- rarely be secret in the same manner as, say, the 
“perfect murder” of an individual that becomes an insoluble mystery. Rather, the 
planning and commission of such crimes usually involves a significant number of agents 
and a command structure.
In some cases before the international criminal tribunals, in particular the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, some accused persons have pleaded guilty 
and confessed the details of their crimes110. These confessions were just as remarkable as 
any in a truth commission, and shed light on the truth of the Rwandan genocide. In none 
of these cases were the pleas of guilt made in exchange for an amnesty, as courts are 
bound to impose punishment once the guilt of the accused person is established in a 
criminal trial111.
Moreover, even the extent of the “truth” that can be unearthed by a truth 
commission can be circumscribed by the commission’s terms of reference. South 
Africa’s TRC did not examine apartheid as a crime in itself -  a not insubstantial omission 
for so historic an exercise112. It has similarly been noted that the remit of the TRC did 
not include acts based on official policies that were not illegal under apartheid but, 
though not involving violence, were just as powerfully oppressive and discriminatory -
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race classification, social segregation, and forced population movements . That these 
policies, being the core of apartheid that they were, did not receive the searchlight of the 
TRC lays the “truth” and substance of the commission’s work justifiably open to charges 
of distortion. Thus, truth commissions, like international criminal criminals, can be 
influenced by the Differend.
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Fourth, while truth and reconciliation commissions are an option for dealing with 
some kinds of mass crimes, especially crimes against humanity, that approach is of little 
help when the crime in question is that of genocide. The scope of the genocide that 
occurred in Rwanda in 1994 was so vast, the time span of its commission so short, and its 
cruelty so shocking, that the Rwandan Government that came to power shortly thereafter 
decided that justice must be done for reconciliation to be possible.
The case for criminal trials
Having examined the strengths and weaknesses of truth commissions, I now turn 
to the case for prosecutions. There are a number of arguments that make prosecutions a 
necessary component of long-term conflict resolution in strife tom societies. First, justice 
(accountability through punishment) has a deep psychological impact on individuals and, 
by extension, on societies. When justice is done, and seen to have been done, it tends to 
provide a catharsis for those physically and psychologically scarred by violations of 
international humanitarian law. Deep-seated resentments -  key obstacles to co-existence 
-  are removed, and people on different sides of the divide can feel that a clean slate has 
been achieved. This objective is better achieved where the justice that is handed down is 
a complete one, involving not only retribution, but restoration as well.
Second, trials establish responsibility for crimes adjudicated, thus negating the 
notion of collective guilt that can hinder peaceful co-existence. Other members of the 
group to which the defendant or group of defendants may belong are thus spared the 
weight and shame of guilt for crimes they did not commit and are thus free to participate
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in national life on equal terms. This factor helps answer the question, for example: are all 
Serbs responsible for the crimes of their extremist leaders in the wars of the Former 
Yugoslavia; are all Hutus to blame for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994?
In this context, one differs with Mark Osiel’s concept of “administrative 
massacre” as a possible vitiation of individual responsibility on both legal and policy 
grounds114. According to Osiel, incidents of administrative massacre “characteristically 
involve many people in coordinated ways over space and time, impeding adherence” to 
the necessity of proving willful acts of particular defendants.115 The Holocaust of the 
Jews in Nazi Germany and the Rwandan genocide are perhaps the best examples of 
administrative massacre, involving many people and central coordination. It is an 
appealing argument, not because it successfully makes the case for mass amnesia, and 
thus a successful sociological excuse for impunity, but because it demonstrates why a 
synthesis of criminal prosecutions and truth and reconciliation commissions are often 
necessary. Another writer, in what is arguably a version of the “administrative massacre” 
theory, has criticized the “individualization” thesis, noting that individualization of guilt 
is not neutral in its effects as it fails to address the political, moral and organizational 
structures that bred the crime: “To focus on individual leaders may even serve as an alibi 
for the population at large to relieve itself from responsibility”116.
That may well be, but these arguments, in particular Osiel’s attempt to suspend 
mens rea, do not address the bald fact that the act of participation in a conspiracy to 
commit genocide, for example, is ultimately an individual decision, regardless of the 
prevailing pressures of the circumstance in question. From the point of view of legalism, 
it is only a valid defense of mental incapacity, as established in a court of law, that
should exculpate an individual from personal responsibility for his or her acts and 
omissions. Even the well-known concept of following superior orders offers no relief 
from individual criminal responsibility under the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, but 
may be considered only in mitigation of punishment117. For individuals to hide under a 
“not my will” defense for violations of positive law is a path not to order, but to disorder. 
And, from a policy viewpoint, accepting the concept of administrative massacre totally 
negates any contribution that a juridical approach can make to preventing conflict. That 
the leaders and other active perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide assumed they would 
be safe from judicial accountability, spreading the guilt, as it were, by roping in 
thousands of their fellow countrymen and women in the commission of the crime is an 
illustration of why administrative massacre is an unsustainable approach to punishing 
mass atrocities.
As for the question of the masses being psychologically or historically exculpated 
by the trial of individual leaders, the responsibility of such leaders must be the price they 
pay for the misuse of their power or authority. In other words, it is a necessary price of 
leadership that allows societies to move on after conflict. It would be an unsupportable 
argument, for example, to say that the German citizenry at large or all Japanese should 
bear legal responsibility for the Holocaust or the crimes committed by the Japanese 
Imperial Army in Asia prior to and during World War II.
Third, another point in favor of criminal trials as a contribution to conflict 
resolution and transitional justice is that trials conducted by international or national 
courts establish an indisputable, even if not complete, historical record of events with 
legally binding consequences where guilt or innocence is established. The problem with
this aspect of justice is that of whether such courts are truly independent or impartial in 
every instance. Attaching historical-record outcomes to criminals raises some problems, 
for, as has been noted: “For any major event of international politics -  and situations 
where the criminal responsibility of political leaders is invoked is inevitably such -  there
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are many truths and many stakeholders for them” . Nevertheless, where guilt is 
established, extremists convicted of violations of international humanitarian law are 
frequently banished from the political space, creating room for the growth of a 
democratic culture. This was certainly the case in Germany following the Nuremberg 
trials.
Limitations o f criminal trials
There are few perfect options for confronting impunity and achieving a significant 
degree of peaceful co-existence. Criminal trials, national or international, are not 
immune from the complex and messy nature of such efforts. The chief limitation of a 
criminal prosecution approach is that trials in courts of law for crimes committed in a 
political context are no substitute for political and other processes of reconciliation. 
Advocates of legalism, often human rights NGOs, frequently speak and write as if a 
courtroom trial is a panacea for all the challenges that face a society broken by war or 
repression. Trials provide a necessary foundation for additional, alternative processes of 
conflict resolution. On the other hand, the reality that they are often seen as vengeance 
by the parties to a conflict that are in a relatively weak position at the time that “justice” 
is done, is an important limitation. The point here is that, especially in the case of civil
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wars, post-conflict peace processes must include political dialogue involving opposing 
groups, even where trials that determine individual criminal responsibility are major 
components of such a process.
Following from this critique is the question of whether criminal trials result in the 
oft-touted benefit of reconciliation. Archbishop Tutu makes the point that criminal trials 
may check impunity, but do not really contribute to reconciliation. He cites the example 
of the ICTR, where he argues that the Hutus will say that the trials were instigated by the 
Tutsis against Hutu politics and the military119. This argument is valid, but only up to a 
point -  that rolling back impunity and reconciliation are two different concepts, a 
distinction that has often escaped policy-makers as they seek to utilize criminal law as an 
instrument of reconciliation120. In her famous critique of the Eichmann trial in Israel 
Hannah Arendt sought a way out of this hazy conceptualization by trying to keep things 
simple:
“The purpose of the trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest ulterior 
purposes -  ‘the making of a record of the Hitler regime ‘ -can only detract from the law’s 
main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment and 
to mete out punishment”121
But this simplicity, appealing as it is, remains difficult to realize. The frequently 
political contexts of the events that give rise to criminal trials for violations of 
humanitarian law will frequently involve didactic considerations in such trials, and is one 
reason why the excessive focus on the accused has come under criticism122. Such crimes 
frequently involve large numbers of people, and the motivation for the crimes is one
often connected with the identity of the victims. For this reason, trials for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes go beyond “pure” criminal trials for ordinary 
crimes, but rather are inherently political. So while the individual on trial answers for 
himself and not as a group, the group factor is frequently present in the form of 
conspiracy or common purpose, as well as in the form of the victim as a member of a 
group (ethnic, religious, political, and so on). And because war crimes trials and 
tribunals are often part of societal transitions or seek to construct societal order, it is 
difficult to get away from the “larger issues” of which the trial becomes a microcosm, 
although Arendt is surely right about the primary purpose of a trial. If these larger issues 
become engaged, why focus solely on the defendant? Surely, justice is more complete in 
this context if the victims as a targeted group are recompensed in some form. Hence the 
argument for restorative justice that is victim-focused, which may be additional to, or 
outside of, a criminal trial context.
There are two important questions that Tutu’s critique does not answer. The first 
is whether reconciliation, certainly a desirable but essentially moral or metaphysical 
concept, is a necessary condition for peace. The second is: do criminal trials represent 
“vengeance”? The answer to the first question depends on the prism through which the 
challenge is viewed -  Hobbesian, Grotian or Kantian? There is no question that Tutu’s 
perspective is a Kantian, irenist one of universal or permanent peace (“peace on earth”). 
As Hedley Bull has noted, this aspiratory paradigm stands in stark contrast with actual 
historical experience123. If this is so, it follows that we have established unrealistic 
expectations of criminal trial processes, and then criticize such trials for having failed 
when they do not transform the world as we expect them to. To say, as Tutu does, that
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trials do not achieve reconciliation but truth commissions do, is an artificial comparison, 
for by so doing we would be vesting in criminal trials the possibility of an unlikely 
outcome. This point is related to the one above about historical record outcomes, which 
are even more realizable than reconciliation. This situation has arisen mainly due to the 
language that has been used in the preambles of the statutes of international criminal 
tribunals such as that for Rwanda, where reconciliation was explicitly stated as one of the 
outcomes expected from the work of the ICTR.
There is no empirical proof of any situation, including the Nuremberg trials and 
the trials for the Rwandan genocide, where such trials have in and of themselves created 
reconciliation. The sociological standards against which criminal trials for mass 
atrocities must be judged, if we are to go beyond their primary purpose of rendering 
justice, is that of the establishment of co-existence, expressed, for example, through a 
democratic culture and economic and social integration. In other words, peace in the 
Grotian sense of the absence of order-destabilizing conflict.
Regarding the issue of criminal trials as vengeance, although such trials prevent 
unregulated, vigilante justice that is in itself a threat to order, they do indeed represent 
society’s vengeance — organized, sanctioned and controlled it may be -  on individuals 
that engage in deviant behavior on a massive scale. This is only a reflection of the 
current state of evolution of international and national societies. It does not make such 
trials any less desirable, though “reconciliation” may be a desirable objective as well. 
Following Tutu’s trend of thought to the logical conclusion it omits, it is worth noting 
that justice is an irreducible underpinning of all major religions, just as forgiveness and 
reconciliation are. In this sense, legal justice and reconciliation are but two sides of a
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coin, with one much more easily achievable in practice than the other. This is so even if, 
seen from a certain perspective that attaches a high degree of faith to human character, 
truth and reconciliation mechanisms may create a false impression of superiority over 
courtroom trials that do not always bring out the best in human nature because of their 
technical processes.
Synthesis
Truth commissions and criminal trials are not mutually exclusive. Sovereign 
states may choose the option of truth commissions without extinguishing the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals or national courts. And it is possible, even advisable, that both 
options be exercised at different points of a continuum. A state may begin with one and 
bring closure with the other -  or utilize both in tandem. Sierra Leone is an example of a 
post-conflict society that has utilized both truth commissions for crimes under its national 
jurisdiction, and criminal trials for violations of international humanitarian law. In that 
case the truth commission approach has been particularly beneficial because it 
encompassed children -  who had a uniquely prominent role of children as protagonists 
and victims of the Sierra Leone conflict -  where legalism could not. With a policy 
decision having been taken that children would not be tried before the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone despite the roles several of them played as child soldiers, the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission provided a forum for them to participate in their 
country’s transitional justice process.
This dual approach is also recommended because the scope of mass atrocities 
committed in a given case all too often overwhelms either a judicial tribunal or a truth
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commission where either one has the sole task of discharging the burden of addressing 
these crimes. Moreover, a combined approach better addresses the reality that, as David 
Forsythe put it in a different context, “some problems are simply too large for a judicial 
solution”124. Not all perpetrators of human rights crimes can be brought to justice, but 
neither should all such persons escape legal accountability. This is a safe middle ground.
An additional path to synthesis is to recognize that truth commissions and courts 
are fundamentally different. Hayner, writing on truth commissions, has argued that they 
are not a substitute for prosecutions and should not be seen as second best125. In theory, 
this is an excellent case for truth commissions. As noted above, they have their place 
because legalism cannot be practical response in every situation of mass atrocity. In 
practice, however, truth commissions have all too often served as an alternative to 
criminal prosecutions. But such mechanisms are most useful when what they are and 
what they are not is quite clear to the societies in which they are utilized as part of a 
political/societal transition. It is when they seek to serve, in effect, as a smokescreen 
“accountability” in which a recounting of history replaces culpability, that the limitations 
of truth commissions have been painfully exposed.
199
I Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1977) 83.
2 1 use the word “pardons” in a broad sense to describe not only formal pardons for offenses, but also policy 
decisions not to prosecute persons who, prima facie, may be guilty of violations of international 
humanitarian law.
3 Ramesh Thakur, “Politics vs Justice at The Hague”, International Herald Tribune, 15 August 2002.
4 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems o f Peace, 1812-1822 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, i 973), 138.
5 Testimony of Professor Jeremy Rabkin, Hearings on International Justice, Committee on International 
Relations, United States House of Representatives, 28 February 2002.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 51 -  58.
9 Ibid, 52.
10 See Joseph Nevins, “Justice Still Eludes Indonesia”, International Herald Tribune, 19 February 2004, 7.
II Ibid. See also Jeffrey A. Winters, “U.S. Media and Their Ignorance Partly Blamable for E. Timor’s 
Misery”, Jakarta Post, 28 May 2002, discussing U.S. media reporting of claims of U.S. involvement in 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975.
12 Article 51, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
www.ictr.org. and Article 51, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslvia, www.un.org/ictv.
13 See Article 27, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, www.ictr.org, and Article 28, 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, www.un.org/icty.
14 See “The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of the Impunity of the 
Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (civil and political), Revised Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet 
for the Commission on Human Rights, UN Document E/CN. 4 Sub. 2/1997/20/Rev. 1, October 2, 1997,17.
15 See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, “Peace Through Justice”, Washington Post, 6 July 1999.
200
16 Article 10 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides: “An amnesty granted to any 
person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 
4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.” The crimes referred to are crimes against 
humanity, Violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and 
Other serious violations of international humanitarian law. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/915.
17 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand o f Vengeance: The Politics o f War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), Ch. 3. This section owes much to Bass’s detailed history of the 
subject. Unlike Bass, however, I have sought in this chapter to analyze the connection between these 
historical events and the development of some important norms of international humanitarian law. I have 
also examined another work cited by Bass: James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and 
Diplomacy o f Punishing War Criminals o f the First World War (Westport, Connecticut: Grenwood, 1982).
18 See Ruth Henig, Versailles and After: 19J9- 1933 (London: Routledge, 1995).




23 Ibid, quoting A.M. Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1941), 112.
24 See “Seeds of Evil: The Rise of Hitler”, www.schoolshistorv.org.uk.
25 Ibid.
26 James F. Willis, Prologue, 177-178.
27 Bass, 60.
28 Nicholas Wood, “Milosevic’s Name on the Ballot Signals Serbian Nationalism”, The New York Times, 
27 December 2003. See also Misha Glenny, “The Prosecutor Muddies Serbian Waters”, International 
Herald Tribune, 17 February 2004. Not surprisingly, economic malaise as a factor in the nationalist 
backlash to war crimes prosecutions was as well active in Germany’s Weimar Republic between World 







34 Proceedings of the Imperial War Cabinet, November 28, 1918, as quoted in Bass, 69-70.
35 Bass, 103.
36 See article 5 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by 
proces-verbaux of 10 November 1998. Article 5 (2) provides that the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression will become effective once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 
defining the crime and setting out the relevant conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. Article 123: 
“Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
convene a Review Conference to consider amendments to this Statute. Such review may include, but is not 
limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5.”
37 Woodrow Wilson, Speech to the United States Congress, 11 February 1918, in The Papers o f Woodrow 






43 Numerous other trials were held at various military tribunals established by the victorious Allied Powers, 
with “conventional atrocities” or “crimes against humanity” classified as “Class B” crimes, and the 
planning, ordering, authorization and failure to prevent such atrocities categorized as “Class C” crimes.
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake o f World War II (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1999).
44 Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington: The University of 
Kentucky Press, 2001), 3.
202
45 Dower, Embracing Defeat, Ch. 15.





51 For an analysis of the politics of historical truth in the context of international criminal justice, see Martti 
Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show Trials”, Max Planck Yearbook o f United Nations Law, Vol. 6, 
2002,1-35.
52 Ibid, 21.











63 For example, Interview with Yoshiko Saito (Japanese national), Geneva, March 2004. I considered it 
better to pose the question to ordinary Japanese whose answers would, from this writer’s standpoint be as 
authoritative, if not more so, than scholarly authority or declarations on this question.
64 Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave, The Yamoto Dynasty: The Secret History o f Japan’s Imperial 
Family (New York: Broadway Books, 2000).
65 Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, 86-87.
203
66 See Yutaka Arai, “Revisionist Views on War Crimes by Japanese Prompt Fears for Nation’s 
Democracy”, Financial Times (Letter to the Editor), 26-27 February 2005, responding to an interview by 
Yuko Tojo, granddaughter of Hideki Tojo in the same newspaper. See “Let Japan’s Sleeping Gods of War 
Lie”, Lunch with the FT, Financial Times, 19 -20 February 2005.
67 Beigbeder, 75.
68 Ibid, 66-75.
69 Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War, An Oral History (New York: The New Press, 





74 Roling and Cassese, 84.
75 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1996.
76 Beigbeder, 72.
77 See, for example, Hal Gold, Unit 731: Testimony (Boston: Tuttle Publishers, 2004).
78 See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). See 
also Ifi Amadiume & Abdullah An-Na’im, The Politics o f Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 2000).
79 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by 
U.N. General Assembly resolution 3068 (XXVIII), UN Doc. A/9030, 30 November 1973. Art. 7 (j) of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court lists “the crime of apartheid” as one of several crimes that 
constitute crimes against humanity.
80 The Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of People in Uganda since 25th January 1971 was 
established by President Idi Amin Dada in Uganda in 1974. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: 
Facing the Challenge o f Truth Commissions (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 51. As Hayner 
notes without irony, the 1974 Ugandan commission is one of the few in her study that was not part of a
204
fundamental political transition, having been established by Amin in response to external political pressure 
to investigate the disappearances that were perpetrated by officials of his Own regime. When President 
Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986 he established another truth commission, the Ugandan 
Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights.
81 Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Ghana, Guatamela, Haiti, 
Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Phillipines, Sebia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. See United States Institute of Peace, Truth 
Commissions Digital Collection, www.usip.org
82 Jonathan Derrick, “Reconciliation: Incompatible or Inseparable?”, African Topics, August-September 
1999, 10-12.
83 See Helena Cobban, “Healing Lessons From Another War-Torn Society -  Mozambique”, Christian 
Science Monitor, 8 May 2003.
84 Ibid.
85 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 53.
86 Remarks by John Daniel, member of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at the 17th 
General Conference of the International Peace Research Association held in Durban, South Africa, June 
1998.
87 Desmond Tutu, “War Crimes Tribunals May End Impunity, But They Can’t Heal Hatred” (Interview by 
Nathan Gardels), New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 20:2, Spring 2003.
88 Jonathan Derrick, “Reconciliation”.
89 Ibid.
90 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, 26 July 1995.
91 Quoted in Marta Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Beacon Press, 1998), 81.
92 Agwu Ukiwe Okali, “ Note on Restitutive Justice at the International Tribunal for Rwanda”, 1998, 
unpublished paper on file with the author. See also Julie Mertus, “Truth in a Box: The Limits of Justice 
through Judicial Mechanisms”, in Amadiume and An-Na’im, The Politics o f Memory, 142-161.
93 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 100.
205
94 Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show Trials”.
95 J.F. Lyotard, The Differend. Phrases in Dispute, translated by G. Van Den Abbeele, 1988 and quoted in 
Koskenniemi, 17.
96 The Differend is applicable to the Nuremberg trials, and the role of NATO in ending the wars of the 
Former Yugoslavia.
97 Desmond Tutu, “War Crimes Tribunals May End Impunity”.
98 Ibid.
99 Thakur, “Politics vs Justice at The Hague”. Including Rwanda in this argument appears odd, as 
Rwanda’s present government is unshakably wedded to prosecutions for the impunity of its predecessor 
regime, including with the assistance of an international criminal tribunal. Except, perhaps, the aim was to 
juxtapose that country, on the one hand, with South Africa (truth commission) and Mozambique (blanket 
amnesty).
100 John Dugard, “Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience”, conference paper quoted in 
Anne-Marie Smith, Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 12.
101 Koskenniemi, 8.
102 E. Kiss, “Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice”, 
in R.I. Rotberg and D. Thompson, eds., Truth v Justice: The Morality o f Truth Commissions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 88 and Rotberg, “Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice 
and Reconciliation”, ibid., 19.
103 See Amadiume, “The Politics of Memory: Biafra and Intellectual Responsibility” in Amadiume and 
Abdullahi An-Na’im, 38-55.




107 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, “No Peace Without Justice: The Role of International Criminal and 
Humanitarian Law in Conflict Settlement and Reconciliation”, paper presented at a conference “From
206
Impunity to a Culture of Accountability”, organized by the United Nations University and the University of 
Utrecht, Utrecht 26-28 November 2001.
108 “The Threat to SA ‘Miracle’ “, Africa Analysis 20 February 2004.
109 Sharon LaFraniere, “A South African Journey: Bomb Maker to Police Chief’, The New York Times, 28 
February 2004.
110 Three accused persons have pled guilty before the Tribunal to Genocide and Crimes against Humanity: 
Mr. Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, Mr. Omar Serushago, a former leader of the 
lnterhamwe militia, and Georges Ruggio, a Belgian journalist.
111 Kambanda was sentenced to life in prison, serushago to 15 years imprisonment, and Ruggio to 12 years.
112 John Dugard, “Reconciliation and Justice”. For the contradictions of the TRC process see also 
Mahmoud Mandani, “The Truth According to the TRC”, in Amadiume and An-Na’im, 176-183.
1,3 Ibid.
114 Mark Osiel, “Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, University o f Pennsylvania 
Law Review 144, 1995.
1,5 Ibid.
116 Koskenniemi, 14.
117 Article 6(4), Statute of the ICTR.
118 Koskenniemi, 12.
119 Tutu, “War Crimes “
120 See Preamble of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
121 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality o f Evil, (New York: Penguin Books, 
1977), 5.
122 See Okali, “Note on Restitutive Justice”.
123 Bull, 17.
124 Forsythe, “Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, 199.
125 Hayner, op cit.
207 
Chapter 5
“The News from Absurdistan”: The Rise and Decline of Universal Jurisdiction
To define the interests o f mankind is to lay claim to a kind o f authority that can only 
be conferred by a political process
— Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society
One dimension of the cosmopolitan view of international justice is the push to 
obliterate geographical (and jurisdictional) boundaries in the pursuit of alleged war 
criminals. This is what has been termed “universal jurisdiction” or “borderless justice”. 
It is a campaign for accountability beyond the jurisdictional borders established in the 
centuries over which international law has developed. This chapter will examine that 
phenomenon. It will inquire into the legal basis of the assertion of this controversial form 
of jurisdiction that touches the heart of world politics, demonstrate how it illustrates the 
tension between universalist conceptions of justice and the nature of the international 
society, and establish that, although the concept is not without legal and historical basis, 
those foundations are of limited scope. Certain clearly defined circumstances permit trials 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction. But excessively broad assertions of a right to try 
presumed war criminals in the courts of countries other than theirs rest more on 
declarations of a cosmopolitan world society than on concrete legality.
Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction is a doctrine that asserts that some crimes are so shocking 
in the affront they represent to all nations that the national courts of any country can and 
should bring the perpetrators to justice. Accused offenders can be prosecuted in a
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country that asserts universal jurisdiction, whether or not a link exists between that 
country and the place where the crime was committed, or the nationality of the offender 
or the victim. In other words, universal jurisdiction, in its purest form, is one in which 
mankind acts on behalf of itself everywhere to ensure that the perpetrators of particularly 
heinous crimes will not escape justice on the basis of the limitations of national judicial 
systems or those of international courts. The doctrine assumes the existence of — or at 
least proposes — a community or a world society, rather than an international society of 
sovereign states. It is the strongest expression so far of the struggle to give birth to a 
cosmopolitan regime of legal justice in international relations.
Not surprisingly, then, it is arguably the hottest flashpoint of the tension between 
that worldview, on the one hand, and that of a pluralist, or even less expansively defined 
solidarist international society on the other. Henry Kissinger complained in 2001 that: “
In less than a decade, an unprecedented movement has emerged to submit international 
politics to judicial procedures. It has spread with extraordinary speed and has not been 
subjected to systematic debate, partly because of the intimidating passion of its 
advocates. To be sure, human rights violations, war crimes, genocide, and torture have 
so disgraced the modem age and in such a variety of places that the effort to interpose 
legal norms to prevent or punish such outrages does credit to its advocates. The danger is 
in pushing the effort to extremes that risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of 
governments; historically, the dictatorship of the virtuous has often led to inquisitions and 
even witch-hunts”.1
Elder statesman in the eyes of some, the reincarnation of Machiavelli for others, 
Kissinger, a geopolitical strategist with few equals in contemporary history, had reason to 
be irked: as National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State of the United States, he
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is credited with several controversial policies, some of which had serious implications for 
human rights. His extremist critics on the ideological left see him as a prime candidate for 
the exercise of just such “universal jurisdiction.”2 It emerged from a declassified 
telephone conversation between him and President Richard Nixon, for example, that 
Kissinger, in the service of a liberal democracy that is the United States, actively 
supported the overthrow of Salvadore Allende, a democratically elected president of the 
Latm American nation of Chile, by Pinochet in 1973 . The goal was to protect capitalism 
-- a strategic interest of the United States — by preventing the entrenchment of leftist 
governments in Latin America during the Cold War.
In the still anarchical international society, powerful officials of state like 
Kissinger exist in many countries. And, because the nature of statecraft often involves 
tradeoffs between morality and cold calculations in foreign and domestic policy that in 
extreme cases results in violations of international humanitarian law, the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction generates apprehension on the part of those whose duty it is to 
advance the strategic interests of states. The prospect of an arrest warrant served in an 
airport VIP lounge during an airplane stopover or on arrival at its destination is enough to 
cause discomfiture to many a traveling statesman. But there are those who are not high 
priests of realpolitik that have as well questioned the manner in which this controversial 
legal doctrine has sometimes been asserted.
The concept of universal jurisdiction is closely related to the international law 
principle of jus cogens — a norm of international law from which no derogation is 
permitted, not even by a treaty4. A clear example is the prohibition of piracy. Pirates 
have historically been considered hostis hominis generis, or “enemies of the human
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race”5. It is widely accepted in international law that, largely because piracy often occurs 
on the high seas where no nation can assert jurisdiction, any or all states may apprehend 
and punish pirates captured on the high seas or the territory of the arresting state. The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
may seize a pirate ship, aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control 
of pirates, and arrest the person and seize the property on board. The courts of the State 
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also 
determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to 
the rights of third parties acting in good faith.6
Thus, universal jurisdiction is a theory that clearly exists in positive international law.
Advocates of universal jurisdiction in relation to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and War crimes, have offered the need to combat impunity as the rationale for 
borderless justice. They see the doctrine as one way to bring to justice tyrants and errant 
high officials of state that are beyond accountability either because their acts are not 
contrary to domestic law or, where they indeed violate such laws, the legal system is in 
practice subordinate to the political authority wielded by such individuals. Alternatively, 
these individuals avoid accountability by reason of immunities or national amnesties 
conferred by truth and reconciliation commissions.
This is the heart of the matter. Who is fit to judge? Should the courts of one state 
judge the alleged infractions of leaders or citizens of another? Universal jurisdiction in 
this context is controversial because (a) it transcends -  or threatens to transcend -  the
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sacrosanct principle of sovereignty without the consent of states or the support of other 
accepted exceptions in international law such as enforcement action by or under the aegis 
of the United Nations Security Council; (b) for this reason, it can be a serious threat to 
international order. Before examining some contemporary cases of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, it is necessary to review its legal basis -  and its limitations -  as a 
response to violations of international humanitarian law.
There are several misconceptions about universal jurisdiction, although the 
doctrine has gripped the popular imagination since the “legal soap opera” that was the 
Pinochet case in Britain (that case was, technically speaking, more one of extradition and 
immunities than of universal jurisdiction, although the latter doctrine was discussed at 
various stages of the legal proceedings against the former Chilean leader in several 
countries).7
Territory has been the strongest basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in legal 
history. Jurisdiction is strongest where the state exercising it is the one where the crimes 
occurred. Human rights activists have confused the extraterritorial application of 
territorial jurisdiction with universal jurisdiction. Mutations of territorial jurisdiction 
include the nationality principle (where a state exercises jurisdiction over its national), 
the passive personality principle (where a state claims jurisdiction to prosecute an 
individual for offences committed outside its territory which has or will impact nationals 
of the state -  this was the basis of the celebrated trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 
1961 following his abduction from Argentina);and jurisdiction by a state over foreign 
nationals when they have committed an act abroad that compromises the security of that
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state. These kinds of jurisdiction are to be distinguished from the pure universality 
principle, where each and every state has jurisdiction to try specific offences.9
Universal jurisdiction should also be distinguished from the jurisdiction of 
international criminal tribunals, such as the ad hoc United Nations Tribunals for Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia, or the permanent International Criminal Court. As Cherif 
Bassiouni has noted, none of the ad hoc international tribunals established since the end 
of World War II (Nuremberg, Tokyo, Yugoslavia and Rwanda) has been based on the 
theory of universal jurisdiction.10 The ad hoc tribunals represent an extension of national 
territorial jurisdiction. An occupying power acquires and exercises jurisdiction over a 
defeated enemy state by virtue of conquest and physical occupation, as was the case in 
Iraq from the end of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 until the return of sovereignty to Iraq 
on 30 June 2004. In the case of the U.N. Tribunals, these courts assume concurrent 
territorial jurisdiction by virtue of the peace enforcement powers of the United Nations 
Security Council. Bassiouni clarifies the more nuanced case of the ICC by noting that the 
Rome Statute does not automatically confer the character of universal jurisdiction on 
situations referred to the Court. Rather, it only has a “universal scope” in relation to 
crimes within its jurisdiction [emphasis added]. In the case of the ad hoc U.N. tribunals, 
this limitation extends not only to crimes under their jurisdiction, but to the geographical 
boundaries of their jurisdiction as well -  Rwanda and neighboring states in the case of the 
ICTR and the states of the Former Yugoslavia in that of ICTY. In other words, the ICTY 
can only try individuals for crimes committed in the territory to which its jurisdiction is 
confined, and this cannot be accurately described as “universal” jurisdiction.
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This distinction may appear at first sight to be mere sophistry. But it is an 
important one. Bassiouni explains that, because cases can only be “referred” to the ICC 
by a State Party or a non-state party, the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be seen as flowing 
from the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. The point, then, is that an international, but 
nonetheless limited jurisdiction that merely reacts to states is not what would normally be 
considered “universal”, because the exercise of universal jurisdiction does not require an 
external trigger. Universal jurisdiction is either inherent by virtue of customary 
international law or specifically by treaty, or both. However, Bassiouni makes the 
distinction that a “referral” to the ICC from the Security Council (presumably in its 
capacity as a guardian of international security, with an automatic global reach), would 
constitute universal jurisdiction.
Against the background of the distinctions noted above, there are very few 
examples of actual trials based on the exercise of universal jurisdiction, with the 
exception of piracy.11 The notable contemporary exception was the trial of four 
Rwandans in Belgium, under Belgian law, for crimes related to the Rwandan genocide of 
1994. That case and the law on which it was based will be discussed below.
Most importantly, Bassiouni has sought to help clear the confusion between 
assumptions of universal jurisdiction on the basis of international human rights standards 
(at least in the view of the liberal human rights movement), and the actual state of 
international law on the matter. He establishes convincingly that the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction is far more persuasive in the writings of scholars and human rights activists 
with a vested interest in a advancing the concept, than it is in the actual practice of states, 
and that human rights groups have engaged in a self-interested misinterpretations of how
214
widespread the doctrine is in practice. Coming from an eminent academic expert in 
international criminal law, this critique is a weighty one. It highlights the problems of 
universal jurisdiction and why, despite its potential benefits in certain circumstances, it is 
necessary to approach the doctrine with caution.
Legal Basis: Declaratory v Positive Law
To understand the validity or otherwise of claims of universal jurisdiction, it is 
necessary to distinguish two situations. The first is one where jurisdiction is asserted on 
the basis of what ought to be universally punishable by the courts of all nations, usually 
because such acts are an affront to the collective conscience of mankind. This is the 
declaratory ethical tradition in action. The second is one where an act is actually made 
punishable on the basis of universal jurisdiction by a law authoritatively declared in 
accordance with recognized procedure, with a mechanism for adjudication, whether 
international or national, and an enforcement mechanism -  again, whether national or 
international. This is legal positivism12. Advocates in the declaratory tradition tend to 
believe that because the moral repugnancy of certain crimes is self-evident, coupled with 
the firm establishment of individual justice in international law, it must follow that 
jurisdiction over those crimes cannot be hemmed in by geographical borders. Legal 
positivists would share the same degree of moral outrage at these crimes, but interpret the 
applicability of universal jurisdiction against the standards of what law, national or 
international, really is. We can now test this approach on the three major violations of 
international humanitarian law -  war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
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War Crimes
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I clearly provide for the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction. However, some scholars are of the view that, absent the Geneva 
Conventions, state practice does not reflect the application of the doctrine to customary 
international law.13 But the view that the Geneva Conventions are somewhat tentative in 
their support for universal jurisdiction is unnecessarily conservative.14 In the first of the 
four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 the states parties to the treaty undertook to 
enact laws that would punish persons who commit or order the commission of any of the 
grave breaches defined in the Convention. In a clear provision of universal jurisdiction,
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such gave 
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of 
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting 
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima 
facie case15.
Amnesty International has asserted that at least 120 states have enacted legislation 
permitting their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct that would amount 
to war crimes.16 These claims may be exaggerated by interpretation, as noted above. 
Even Amnesty notes that “the absence of authoritative commentary or jurisprudence, as 
well as ambiguities in wording, in many countries makes it difficult to say with some 
certainty whether courts may exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct amounting to 
war crimes”. A few countries, such as Belgium, Canada and New Zealand, have national
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legislation that expressly confers universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed not 
only in international armed conflict, but in non-intemational armed conflicts as well. 
Considering that most contemporary armed conflicts are civil wars, this reality of so few 
states having the required national legislation is the more accurate indicator of the real 
state of universal jurisdiction over war crimes. Moreover, having a law on the books is 
often quite different from the political will to apply it in terms of a practical assertion of 
universal jurisdiction.
What has more often been the case is that several states have enacted laws that 
give their courts universal jurisdiction over certain ordinary crimes under national law 
(such as murder and crimes of sexual violence) which would amount to war crimes if 
committed in an armed conflict.17 This was the basis for the trial and the conviction in 
Switzerland of a former Rwandan soldier for crimes committed during the 1994 
genocide.18 And it was the first by a national court exercising universal jurisdiction 
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions19.
Historically, there is a judicial track record that suggests a consistent, if partial 
reliance on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for war crimes by the courts of the 
Allied Powers in the aftermath of World War II, although universal jurisdiction was not a 
basis for the Nuremberg trials.20 (The Nuremberg tribunal was based on the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction because the Allies, relying on their status as an occupying power, 
promulgated the Nuremberg Charter in the exercise of their right in that context to 
establish special courts.) Accused war criminals were prosecuted by United States
9 1military courts for crimes against non-nationals of allied countries.
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In the Hadamar trial, for example, a U.S. military commission tried Germans 
charged with killing nearly 500 Russian and Polish civilians at a sanitorium in Germany. 
Even in this case there is a territorial link to Germany, in which the U.S. was an 
occupying power. However, the commission invoked the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction, with the commission’s judgment explaining the basis of its jurisdiction as 
follows:
the general doctrine recently expounded and called universality of jurisdiction 
over war crimes; which has the support of the United Nations War Crimes 
Comission and according to which every independent State has, under 
International Law, jurisdiction to punish not only pirates but also war criminals 
in its custody, regardless of the nationality of the victim or of the place where, 
the offense was committed, particularly where, for some reason, the criminal 
would otherwise go unpunished. 22
In the same vein, another United States military commission in Shanghai asserted 
jurisdiction over Germans in China who were charged with the war crime of continuing 
hostilities against the Allies after the German surrender in 1945. Rejecting a defense 
claim challenging its extra territorial jurisdiction, the commission ruled:
A war crime is not a crime against the law or criminal code of any individual 
nation, but a crime against the ius gentium [international law]. The laws and 
usages of war are of universal application, and do not depend for their existence 
on national laws and frontiers. Arguments to the effect that only a sovereign of 
the locus criminis [place of the crime] has jurisdiction and that only the lex loci 
[law of the place] can be applied, are therefore without any foundation”.23
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Here the commission invoked universal jurisdiction in a case where the U.S. had a 
significant security interest and the accused persons were nationals of an enemy state 
occupied by the Americans. British military courts after World War II also adopted a 
similar jurisdictional stance in some cases.24 And what the historical cases demonstrate 
is not so much clear examples of universal jurisdiction but rather, an apparent confusion 
as to what the doctrine really meant. That universal jurisdiction was cited by these 
tribunals is perhaps evidence of the doctrine’s appeal even in the 1940s. Reference to it 
in this context is also not surprising, considering that its invocation served the strategic 
interests of the Allies.
Crimes against Humanity
With exceptions of the Apartheid Convention and the Torture Convention, there is 
no positive international law that establishes universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of 
crimes against humanity. Whether such crimes should, on ethical grounds, be the 
subject of universal jurisdiction, is another matter. One reason for this state of affairs is 
that, unlike the 1949 Geneva Conventions on war crimes, there is no specific convention 
covering crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity have been defined only in 
the statutes of various international criminal tribunals ranging from the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals, through the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. Over the years the definitions of that particular 
category of violations of international humanitarian law have evolved, with the definition 
in the Rome Statute the most detailed, incorporating the crimes of apartheid, torture, and 
various other more recent developments of international humanitarian law25. Crimes
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against humanity were first defined in the Nuremberg Charter as “murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in 
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”. One 
of the most important aspects of crimes against humanity is that they can be committed 
whether in times of peace or war, and thus do not require an activating element of armed 
conflict. The Nuremberg Charter’s definitional link to armed conflict is thus peculiar to 
that document and is not a general requirement in contemporary international law as 
defined in the statute of subsequent international criminal tribunals. But it is precisely 
the fact that crimes against humanity can be committed in a non-conflict context that 
makes it politically sensitive, for this wider definition covers the kinds of crimes that 
tyrants would usually commit in order to crush domestic political opposition in the name 
of order and national security in a time of “peace”.
The most valid progressive statement of whether universal jurisdiction can 
automatically be asserted against crimes against humanity is that made by Robert 
Jennings and Arthur Watts: “no general rule of positive international law can as yet be 
asserted which gives states the right to punish foreign nationals for crimes against 
humanity in the same way as they are, for instance, entitled to punish acts of piracy”, but 
there were “clear indications pointing to the gradual evolution of a significant principle of 
international law to that effect”.
As noted earlier, the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have 
contributed, through judicial activism, to a progressive development of universal
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jurisdiction. In 1999 the ICTR, allowing a motion by the Prosecutor to drop charges 
against a former Rwandan soldier accused of genocide on policy grounds, explicitly 
encouraged all countries to exercise universal jurisdiction over violations of international 
humanitarian law within its jurisdiction, which include war crimes in non-international 
armed conflict. The tribunal stated:
the Tribunal wishes to emphasize, in line with the General Assembly and Security 
Council of the United Nations, that it encourages all States, in application of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction, to prosecute and judge those responsible for serous crimes such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of international 
humanitarian law.27
Four years earlier, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY had declared, in a 
discussion on jurisdiction, that “It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the 
universal need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised 
successfully against human rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against 
the reach of the law and as a protection for those who trample underfoot the most 
elementary rights of humanity”.28
These statements are clearly indicative of a universalist bent in the jurisprudence 
of those tribunals. But it is relatively easy, in the context of crimes with a clear territorial 
ambit such as those on trial at Arusha and The Hague, and on which there is general 
international political agreement that the perpetrators should be brought to justice, to 
propound a universal justice. That is not the same thing as saying that there is a 
widespread agreement, let alone practice, among states on asserting universal jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity. The controversy between the United States and the 
International Criminal Court notwithstanding, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
international criminal tribunals does not pose as significant a threat to sovereign states as 
would the widespread exercise of such powers by the national courts of similarly 
sovereign states. As will be seen later, it is at the domestic judicial level that the stakes 
are much higher: international tribunals have no independent law enforcement 
institutions, but states that adopt universal jurisdiction can actually enforce it within their 
territories should they choose to do so. According to Amnesty International, only a few 
states, such as Canada, Belgium, New Zealand, and Venezuela, have national laws that 
expressly authorize universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.
Genocide
It is the “crime of crimes”. But, incongruous as it may appear, and strong though 
the case for it undoubtedly is, positive international law, at least as it exists in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, does not provide for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. This is in stark contract to 
the Geneva Conventions on war crimes.
This legal gap was no accident: it was the result of a political process that 
recognized the gravity of the crime of genocide, but was unwilling to empower states at 
large to punish it without a strong jurisdictional basis. In the wake of the 1994 genocide 
in Rwanda, there has been much talk in the international society of states to “never again” 
allow a recurrence of genocide. But, despite the moral sense of outrage that genocide 
evokes, and the strenuous, aspiratory arguments of human rights groups, no explicit step
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has been taken in positive international law to make genocide a universally punishable
29crime.
The Genocide Convention states, in pertinent part:
Article 1: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and punish.
Article 4: Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article 3 [genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, complicity in 
genocide] shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible 
leaders, public officials or private individuals.
Article 5: The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions 
of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for 
persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
Article 6: Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal o f the State in the territory o f 
which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may 
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction [emphasis added].
Article 8: Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as
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they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide 
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
From the plain text of Article 6, it is clear that the jurisdiction envisaged is a 
territorial one. Only if (a) an “international penal tribunal” is established, and (b) state 
parties to the Convention also become state parties to such a tribunal, can the latter have 
universal jurisdiction.30
Advocates of universal jurisdiction for genocide have sought to establish that, 
while article 6 clearly affirms a territorial jurisdiction in the absence of an international 
tribunal, it does not prevent the exercise of other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction such
-l i
as active or passive personality jurisdiction. Reviewing the Convention’s travaux 
preparatoires, Amnesty International seeks to establish that this permissive 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct that amounts to genocide is the result of a 
compromise that was arrived at by states negotiating the Convention after an initial draft 
of that article prepared by Raphael Lemkin was rejected. Similar proposals by Saudi 
Arabia and Iran introducing an express universal jurisdiction to prosecute offenders or 
extradite them to other state parties, which were rejected.32 Article 7 (the original version 
of Article 6) read: “The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any 
offender under their Convention within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective 
of the nationality of the offender and or the place where the offence has been 
committed”.33 The Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, rejected that language and replaced 
it with the one that survived in the final version of the Convention.34
Raphael Lemkin, the Polish lawyer who coined the word “genocide” and lobbied 
hard for the adoption of the Genocide Convention, tried to obtain accountability through
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pure universal jurisdiction and not a permanent international criminal tribunal. He 
believed the world was “not ready” for such a court, which would be too obvious a threat 
to state sovereignty.35 Even that roundabout route to justice was too much for the 
strategic interests of states. If, a full 56 years later, this tension persists in international 
society, it surely was bound to have been even sharper in 1948. As William Schabas has 
commented, Article 6 of the Genocide Convention “was a pragmatic compromise 
reflecting the state of the law at the time the Convention was adopted”, and “although 
universal jurisdiction, and the related concept of aut dedere aut judicare (prosecute, or 
extradite), had long been recognized for certain crimes committed by individual outlaws, 
few in 1948 wanted to extend it to crimes which would, as a general rule, involve State 
complicity”.36
A duty to prosecute perpetrators of genocide has not been formerly established, 
but a permissive right to do so, or extradite, is gaining ground. International law and the 
form of the international society are not static. Even if we discount the crusading 
writings of some publicists of international law, we cannot fail to notice the judicial 
pronouncements of the International Court of Justice and resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council and General Assembly. These all point in a certain direction, 
even if individual states will still act in a mostly strategic and self-seeking fashion.
From a policy perspective, it is desirable that, where a strong basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a national court exists (most appropriately by virtue of the 
criminalization of genocide in domestic law), the crime can be prosecuted by a court 
outside of where the crime was committed, or outside of an international tribunal with 
competence to do so. A careful reading of the Genocide Convention, especially when
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articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Convention are taken together, suggests a basis for this 
approach. The caveat is that there must be strong links between the prosecuting state and 
the defendant.
Although the Genocide Convention consciously did not include a duty to 
prosecute or extradite, the International Court of Justice noted in 1996 that there are no 
territorial limitations to the obligations of all states to prevent and punish genocide. The 
Court has pronounced that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are 
rights and obligations erga omnes, noting that the obligation each State has to prevent 
and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention” .
The Pinochet Case
The multiple law suits in the late 1990s against Augusto Pinochet Urgarte on the 
basis of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by courts in Spain and Belgium, and his 
arrest and 18 month detention in the United Kingdom, marked a high point for the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction and its advocates. For many leaders around the world, 
however, it was a most unsettling development, one that brought home a new sense of 
vulnerability. Pinochet’s travails, widely televised to millions around the world in an age 
of instant communications, were a giddy period that observers and practitioners of 
international justice pronounced as a revolution in international law and human rights.38
As Richard Falk has observed in an excellent review of the Pinochet legal 
proceedings, they meant different things to different people.39 For many, it was a major 
blow against impunity. For others, it was a welcome lifting of the veil of sovereign 
immunity. And for many victims of his oppressive rule in Chile, it was a chance for
226
Pinochet to face justice beyond borders after the self-amnesty that accompanied his exit 
from power had sealed his domestic impunity.40
While Pinochet was undergoing medical examinations in Britain in late 1998, 
Balthazar Garzon, a crusading Spanish investigating magistrate, issued an international 
warrant against Pinochet dated 16 October 1998, for alleged crimes against humanity 41 
The next day, a London magistrate issued a provisional warrant for Pinochet’s detention. 
Pinochet mounted an initially successful legal response that saw the Divisional Court of 
the Queen’s Bench unanimously quash the first Spanish international arrest warrant and a 
subsequent one with additional charges that included crimes of torture.
The Crown Prosecution service appealed on behalf of Spain to the House of 
Lords. This appeal dealt mainly with issues of immunity and extradition, and so was not 
so much about universal jurisdiction, although the doctrine was the underlying basis 
Judge Garzon’s attempt to bring Pinochet to justice. Several human rights groups, 
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were invited as “intervenors” 
to clarify some of the issues of international law in dispute at the trial. By a vote of 3-2 
on 25 November, the House of Lords ruled in favor of extradition on the important 
ground that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity for crimes under international law. At 
issue: Were the alleged crimes part of his normal functions as a head of state?
Issues of immunity lie at the heart of the controversy over universal jurisdiction. 
The targets of attempts at universal jurisdiction are frequently sovereigns and other high 
officials of state. And concepts of sovereign immunity, sacrosanct in the international 
system of centuries past, remain a major plank of order in today’s international society.
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In the first House of Lords decision, a majority of the judges ruled that 
“international law has made it plain that certain types of conduct, including torture and 
hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part pf anyone. This applies as much to 
heads of state, and even more so, as it does to anyone else; the contrary conclusion would 
make a mockery of international law”. Lord Steyn stated in a separate opinion that, the 
criminal charges against Pinochet being “international crimes deserving punishment”, it 
was “difficult to maintain that the commission of such high crimes may amount to acts 
performed in the functions of a Head of State”.42
The pro-Pinochet arguments were made by the minority-opinion judges. Lord 
Slynn stated: “it does not seem to me that it has been shown that there is any State 
practice or general consensus let alone a widely supported convention that all crimes 
against international law should be justiciable in national courts on the basis of the 
universality of jurisdiction. Nor is there any jus cogens in respect of such breaches of 
international law which require that a claim of State or Head of State immunity, itself a 
well established principle of international law, should be overridden”.43
The British Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Jack Straw, was vested with 
authority to make final decisions on extradition, on the basis of other strategic, non-legal 
considerations, and, in theory, his decision could directly contradict the judicial 
decision.44 Were Pinochet’s opponents trying to settle in law courts matters best left to 
diplomats and statesmen?
In the event, Straw authorized Pinochet’s extradition, minus the additional charge 
of genocide in the Spanish request, on the basis that it was not an extradition crime under 
British law. 45 The House of Lords decision was eventually set aside as a result of a
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conflict of interest involving one of the judges — Lord Hoffman, who had strong personal 
links with Amnesty International, an intervenor in the case. At a rehearing of the original 
appeal to the House of Lords (with an enlarged, seven member panel that excluded Lord 
Hoffman), Chile supported Pinochet’s immunity claim and asserted its sovereign 
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Chilean territory.46
On 24 March 1999, the House of Lords ruled 6-1 against Pinochet’s claim of 
immunity. But the law lords based their decision on the narrow ground of positive 
British law (its obligations under the Torture Convention, which had been incorporated 
into domestic British law and made torture a crime in the United Kingdom irrespective 
of the place of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator).
Pinochet eventually returned to Chile on 2 March 2000, with the 1978 amnesty 
law and his immunity as “Senator for Life” intact. However, subsequent decisions by 
Chilean courts stripped him of his immunities following a legal complaint filed by human 
rights lawyers, and the former leader was placed under house arrest on 2 December 
2000 47 Pinochet was later indicted for his responsibility in the abduction and murders of 
75 victims in the October 1973 “Caravan of Death”. However, subsequent medical 
examinations of the over-80 former dictator led the Chilean Supreme Court to find him 
unfit to stand trial.
That appeared to have ended the Pinochet saga, with justice winning the day in 
principle, if not in practice. But a Chilean court reopened the controversy by ruling that 
Pinochet could stand trial, following the broadcast of a television interview in which he 
appeared lucid enough to defend himself as “a good angel” and passed blame for the 
atrocities committed during his rule to his subordinates.48 Chile’s Supreme Court upheld
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this ruling in a decision of 3 January 2005, thus closing all legal obstacles of a trial of 
Pniochet.
Belgium’s Law v American Power
In the decade between 1993 and 2003, the Kingdom of Belgium became the 
epicenter of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. An apparent judicial revolution was 
underway, with attempts at the globalization of justice and a conscious effort to bring the 
primacy of order to its knees at the altar of justice. In the heyday of universal jurisdiction 
that led to Kissinger’s predictable plaint, this small European country was virtually alone 
in its will to authorize prosecutions in its domestic courts for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The attempt was short-lived.
In 1993, Belgium made the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two additional 
protocols part of its domestic law. The statute criminalized 20 acts that are “grave 
breaches” under the conventions as “crimes under international law”. On 10 February 
1999, Belgium amended and expanded the 1993 law to include genocide and crimes 
against humanity, adopting the definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.49 The new legislation gave Belgian courts sweeping, 
unconditional and universal jurisdiction of utopian scope: “The Belgian courts shall be 
competent to deal with breaches provided for in the present Act, irrespective of where 
such breaches have been committed”.50
It has been observed that the universal jurisdiction conferred on domestic courts 
by the Belgian law went well beyond its treaty obligations, as no international law 
required Belgium to prosecute crimes against humanity or genocide.51 The decision to
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expand the Belgian law was the result of a domestic political process that had its genesis 
in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a former Belgian colony.52 A colloquium organized by 
a liberal political party in the Belgian Senate in 1996 recommended an expansion of the 
1993 law in order to close gaps that might exist in international justice.53 The report of a 
parliamentary commission in 1997 provided further support for a new law, concluding 
that “it is necessary to include in domestic criminal law provisions that punish crimes 
against humanity, in particular the crime of genocide”.54
The executive arm of the Belgian Government through the Minister of Justice, 
made clear its intention that official immunities would be no barrier to prosecution, and 
that the new law would apply to crimes committed before it entered into force. But the 
attempt to strip away immunities was not altogether successful, as will be seen when an 
important decision of the International Court of Justice is discussed below. It is 
noteworthy that, even before the adoption of the new law in 1999, Belgian courts were 
already attempting to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity by 
claiming support in customary international law. It was on this basis that, on 6 
November 1998, Daniel Vandermeersch, an investigating magistrate in Brussels, ruled 
during proceedings against Pinochet that the court could assert universal jurisdiction over 
acts committed in Chile that amounted to crimes against humanity.55
The 1999 law engendered a flood of investigations, indictments and prosecutorial 
attempts against the political and military leaders of various countries. These efforts 
warmed the hearts of human rights enthusiasts and the victims of rights abuses, presaging 
— in their expectations -  a universal community in which justice for human rights 
violations would be borderless. In short order, cases were filed against Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon of Israel by the survivors of the 1992 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila 
refugee camps in Lebanon by pro-Israeli Lebanese militia under Israel control when 
Sharon was Israel’s Minister of Defence. Similar suits were brought against Saddam 
Hussein, then President of Iraqi, for attacks against Iraqi Kurds in 1991 that were alleged 
to be crimes against humanity; against Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestinian National 
Authority, and against President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. Suits were filed against 
several other political leaders of foreign countries. It was becoming clear even to the 
many supporters of the Belgian law that assuming the role of the world’s moral/judicial 
policeman created diplomatic and even practical logistical problems that could not be 
overlooked.56
One landmark case that was conclusively and successfully prosecuted in Belgium 
under the 1993 law involved offenses committed during the Rwandan genocide. On 7 
June 2001, a Belgian court with 12 jurors sentenced four Rwandans -  two Roman 
Catholic nuns, a physics professor and a former government minister -  to prison terms of 
12 to 20 years for crimes committed during the genocide.57 Although they were charged 
with war crimes under the 1993 law and not genocide or crimes against humanity, the 
precedent-setting case attracted much publicity because of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction and because it was a jury trial. The case was relatively uncontroversial -  the 
convicts were living in Belgium at the time of their arrest. The New York Times, in an 
editorial on the case, expressed support for the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. It 
noted that “Ideally, trials should be conducted in the country where the crimes occurred, 
but Rwanda lacks the resources and judicial expertise to provide adequate trials”.59 The 
case was also viewed in some quarters as one of partial atonement by Belgium for its
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historical and contemporary responsibility for creating a national socio-political situation 
that ultimately gave rise to the genocide in Rwanda.60
If the Belgian trial of the Rwandans won general acclaim, the indictment of Ariel 
Sharon, a sitting head of government, generated contentious debate on the merits of the 
Belgian law and the extent to which it could complicate the country’s diplomatic 
relations. Sharon cancelled a scheduled visit to the European Union’s Brussels 
headquarters and recalled Israel’s newly appointed ambassador to Belgium. The 
country’s then Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, called the law “embarrassing” and hinted 
that it would be reviewed to protect the immunity of serving senior officials of state.61 In 
a repudiation of the Belgian law’s refusal to side-step sacred cows, the Belgian Supreme 
Court would later rule that Sharon was immune from prosecution while serving as a 
prime minister, although the court upheld the principle of universal jurisdiction and left 
open the possibility of a suit once the Israel leader left office. With nearly 30 suits 
against various world leaders filed under the Belgian law, and a British citizen reportedly 
arriving at a Belgian embassy abroad and requesting a Belgian investigation of his claim 
that the British Broadcasting Corporation was attempting to assassinate him, universal 
jurisdiction suits in Belgium had turned into what one Belgian newspaper editor 
headlined “The News from Absurdistan”. 63
The dam broke when indictments were filed against several United States political 
and military leaders in connection with the bombing of a civilian shelter in Baghdad that 
killed over 400 people in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.64 The prosecutorial targets 
included former President George Herbert Walker Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney 
(who had served as a Secretary of Defence under Bush I), Secretary of State Colin Powell
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(former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the 
American military commander in the Gulf war. Subsequent suits relating to the American 
and British pre-emptive war against Iraq in 2003 were filed against President George W. 
Bush, Powell and U.S. military commander Tommy Franks.
These lawsuits were the most important factor that led to the ultimate death of the 
Belgian law in its potent form -  and the inevitable decline of universal jurisdiction. The 
United States issued several warnings to Belgium, which also hosts the headquarters of 
NATO. American officials like Powell and Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence, 
made it clear that the United States would withhold its financial contributions to the 
construction of a new NATO headquarters in Brussels, and would boycott meetings in 
Belgium until the Belgian law of 1999 was rescinded and the suits against U.S. leaders 
dismissed.65 “Belgium needs to recognize”, Rumsfeld said, “that there are consequences 
for its actions”.66
Faced with this confrontation between the universal jurisdiction law and the 
world’s most powerful nation, the cosmopolitan notions of justice represented by the law 
gave way to political reality. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, previously a 
staunch defender of the law, pledged quick action to repeal it. Belgian Senator and 
human rights campaigner Alain Destexhe, one of the law’s main sponsors, told a 
journalist that Rumsfeld’s threat left Belgians with “a kind of vertigo”. “Suddenly, the 
law became very unpopular. People like me were saying, ‘We’ve got to get out of 
this”.67
On 1 August 2003, the Belgian Parliament passed a new law amending the 1999 
law, repealed the 1993 law, and established a mechanism for quashing pending
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complaints that were outside the new, strict confines within which the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction could now take place in Belgium. Under the new law’s provisions, 
Belgian courts could assert universal jurisdiction over international crimes only where the 
accused is of Belgian nationality or lives in Belgium; where the victim is Belgian or has 
lived ill Belgium for at least three years prior to the commission of the crimes, or where 
Belgium has a treaty obligation to prosecute.68 Unless the accused is Belgian or lives in 
Belgium, it is entirely up to the state prosecutor to decide whether or not to proceed with 
a complaint. The prosecutor could reject a complaint without investigation if he 
considered it “manifestly without grounds” or on the grounds that another country has a 
better claim to jurisdiction. Officials of NATO or European Union countries are 
automatically exempted from Belgian jurisdiction under the new law. Thus, the new law 
has aligned Belgium to the more restrictive universal jurisdiction laws of other European 
countries.69
Following the repeal of the universal jurisdiction law, the cases against Bush and 
other American officials, as well as those against Sharon and other Israeli officials, were 
dismissed by the Belgian Supreme Court. Without a doubt, the principle of universal 
jurisdiction had suffered a serious blow. That blow came from within -  the decision of 
an apex domestic court. Another was to land from without -  an international jurisdiction.
You Can’t Touch Sovereigns
70The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Yerodia case was just 
as damaging to the doctrine of universal jurisdiction as the repeal of the Belgian law. 
Emanating as it did from the Peace Palace at The Hague, it was less political in its
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motivation and appropriately restrained. But the result was the same. The issue for 
decision in that case was not universal jurisdiction as such (though reference was made to 
it) but rather that of the immunity of certain individuals under international law. This, 
however, is legal sophistry. As noted earlier, immunity and universal jurisdiction are 
often linked in the contemporary legal and political sphere. Judicial challenges to 
immunity from prosecution of international crimes have often been inspired by the 
concept of universal jurisdiction.
At issue was the legality of a “international arrest warrant in absentia” issued on 
11 April 2000 by a Belgian investing judge in Brussels, against Yerodia Ndombasi, then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The warrant 
was based on the Belgian law of 1999 and circulated internationally through the 
International Police Organization (INTERPOL). It charged the Congolese diplomat with 
criminal responsibility for war crimes under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and crimes 
against humanity, in particular hate speech that was reported by the media and allegedly 
incited the population to attack Tutsi residents in the Congolese capital of Kinsasha.
As the ICJ noted, and Belgium did not contest, the alleged acts on which the 
arrest warrant was based were committed outside Belgium, Yerodia was not a Belgian 
national at the time, and he was not in Belgian territory when the warrant was issued and 
circulated. Moreover, no Belgian nationals were victims of the attacks that reportedly 
resulted from Mr. Yerodia’s statements. Yerodia was re-assigned as Minister of 
Education in November 2000 and in April 2001 ceased to hold office as a Minister 
altogether.
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The Congolese government, which brought the case to the ICJ, urged the Court to 
rule that Belgium violated the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute 
inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers; in so 
doing, it violated the principle of sovereign equality among States, and all states, 
including Belgium, were thereby precluded from executing the warrant. The DRC argued 
that Belgium be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant and to inform the foreign 
authorities to whom the warrant was circulated that Belgium “renounces its request for 
their co-operation in executing the unlawful warrant”.71
Belgium for its part argued that, although it accepted the immunity of serving 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from jurisdiction before foreign courts, such immunity 
applied only to acts done in the course of their official functions. Belgium asserted that 
there was no evidence that Yerodia was acting in an official capacity when he made 
statements alleged, and in any case the warrant was issued against him personally.
The International Court of Justice ruled that Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy 
full immunity from civil suit throughout the duration of their office, when they are 
abroad. No distinction, the Court concluded, could be drawn between the “official” 
or “private” acts of such an official of state, or between acts done before the person 
assumed office and acts performed while in office.72 It found that the jurisprudence 
of international criminal tribunals such as the ICTR, ICTY and ICC, which expressly 
state that sovereign immunity is no bar to prosecution, cannot be applied to national 
courts in this context, and that no exception to sovereign immunity exists in 
customary international law regarding national courts. Lest it be seen as providing 
tacit encouragement to impunity, the ICJ noted that “jurisdiction does not imply
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absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction”. It also 
clarified that “the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they 
might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts”.73
Accordingly, the ICJ laid down some circumstances in which the immunity of a 
Minister of Foreign Affairs would not shield such an official from prosecution: in the 
courts of their own countries; if the state they represent or have represented decided 
to waive that immunity; after a person ceases to hold such an office, a former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs may be tried in the court of another state that has 
jurisdiction, for acts committed before or after his or her period in office, as well as 
for acts committed during the period in a private capacity; an incumbent or former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs may be tried before international criminals established by 
the Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
such as the ICTR and the ICTY, and the permanent International Criminal Court.74
By a 13-3 vote, the Court found that the issue and circulation of the arrest 
warrant was a violation of Belgium’s legal obligation to respect the immunity and 
inviolability of a serving Minister of Foreign Affairs under international law. By 10- 
6, it ruled that Belgium must cancel the warrant and so inform the authorities to 
whom it had been circulated.75
This decision, coming as it did from the apex judicial organ of the United Nations, 
an institution seen by virtually all state and non-state actors in international society as 
the last word in international law, was especially weighty. Although it dwelt on
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immunity, and did not address at significant length the issue of whether or not 
Belgium had jurisdiction, it nevertheless gave the advance of universal jurisdiction a 
decidedly frosty reception that has diminished the latter’s conceptual appeal and 
influence.
The decision appeared to have had a dual purpose. First, although one can only 
speculate on this point, it was probably aimed at restraining the spirit of the Belgian law 
and discouraging radical judicial interpretations of international law by national courts 
and scholars. By delineating the situations where sovereigns were untouchable and 
where their immunities were forfeited, the ICJ, in a ruling that human rights advocates 
unsurprisingly view as retrogressive, acted as a quarterback for traditional notions of 
international law. Certainly, the decision was seen by dispassionate observers as reigning 
in a political/legal movement that was fast becoming a runaway train.
Second, the decision had the effect, if not the motivation, of reasserting the ICJ’s 
primacy in international law at a time when it appeared that the political spotlight -  and 
the attendant financial resources -- had shifted to the ad hoc international tribunals at The 
Hague and Arusha. As of 2000, when the U.N. General Assembly granted the first 
significant increase in the ICJ budget since 1946, the Court’s annual budget was $10 
million, while that of the ICTY was $100 million. Shifting from a Cold-War imposed 
mode when it was derisively dismissed as “the case of the empty courtroom”, the ICJ’s 
docket exploded phenomenally in the 1990s.76 Part of this stream of cases inevitably 
included questions of international humanitarian law as it concerned the rights and 
obligations of states, which was the preserve of the Court, in contrast to the criminal 
responsibility of individuals, which is the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals
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such as ICTY and the ICTR (“norm entrepreneurs” that swept unto the international 
society in the 1990s77).
Two separate opinions of the judges of the ICJ in the Yerodia case on the matter of 
universal jurisdiction appear to support a conclusion that it was the real issue simmering 
beneath the surface of the decision. It should be noted that the DRC did not make a 
specific claim on universal jurisdiction in its final submission to the Court, and so the 
court could not address it in its majority opinion. Judge Guillaume is particularly 
persuasive, and differs starkly in his conclusions on the status of universal jurisdiction in 
international law from that of Judge Abdul Koroma.
Judge Guillaume thought it useful to address in a direct manner the question of 
universal jurisdiction, in other words, whether the Belgian judge had jurisdiction to 
indict Yerodia.78 Dismissing the Belgian claim to jurisdiction, Judge Guillaume 
rendered one of the most elegant and well supported arguments against unbridled 
borderless justice, beginning by tracing the development of opposing views on 
universal jurisdiction. It is worth quoting at length:
The primary aim of the criminal law is to enable punishment in each country of 
offences committed in the national territory. That territory is where evidence of 
the offence can most be gathered. That is where the offence generally produces 
its effects. Finally, that is where the punishment imposed can most naturally 
serve as an example. Thus, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
observed as far back as 1927 that ‘in systems of law the principle of the 
territorial character of law is fundamental’.
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The question has however, always remained open whether states other than the 
territorial state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute offenders. A wide 
debate on this subject began as early as the foundation in Europe of the major 
modem states. Some writers, like Covarruvias and Grotius, pointed out that the 
presence on the territory of state of a foreign criminal peacefully enjoying the 
fruits of his crimes was intolerable. They therefore maintained that it should be 
possible to prosecute perpetrators of certain particular serious crimes not only in 
the state on whose territory the crime was committed but also in the country 
where they sought refuge. In their view, that country was under an obligation to 
arrest, followed by extradition or prosecution...
Beginning in the eighteenth century however, this school of thought favouring 
universal punishment was challenged by another body of opinion, one opposed 
to such punishment and exemplified notably by Montesqieu, Voltaire and Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau. Their views found expression in terms of criminal law in the 
works of Beccaria, who stated in 1764 that ‘judges are not the avengers of 
humankind in general... A crime is punishable only in the country where it was 
committed’.79
Q A
Judge Guillaume noted treaty exceptions to the absence of universal jurisdiction, 
as well as the limited practice of certain states such as Germany, which has limited 
universal jurisdiction over genocide committed by a foreigner abroad. He declared: 
“...international laws know only one true case of universal jurisdiction: piracy”, and as 
well that “universal jurisdiction in absentia as applied in the present case is unknown to 
international law”.81
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The president of the ICJ went on to link this understanding of the law and its 
development to a strong view of contemporary judicial policy:
“ International criminal law has itself undergone considerable development ...It 
recognizes in many situations the possibility, or indeed the obligation, for a state 
other than one on whose territory the offense was committed to confer 
jurisdiction on its courts to prosecute the authors of certain crimes where they 
are present on its territory. International criminal courts have been created. But 
at no time has it been envisaged that jurisdiction should be conferred upon the 
courts of every state in the world to prosecute such crimes, whoever their 
authors and victims and irrespective of the place where the offender is to be 
found. To do this would, moreover, risk creating total judicial chaos. It would 
also be to encourage the arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly 
acting as agent for an ill-defined ‘international community’. Contrary to what is 
advocated by certain publicists, such a development would represent not an 
advance in the law but a step backward”.82
Despite Judge Koroma’s call in his own separate opinion that the ICJ decision in 
the Yerodia case not be seen as a rejection or validation of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, the judgment was undoubtedly seen around the world precisely as a rejection 
of the theory, or at the least as strictly curtailing its scope. Judge Guillaume’s separate 
opinion simply provided an intellectual explanation for the unspoken, “body language” of 
the majority ICJ ruling. Judge Koroma’s separate opinion nonetheless points up how 
starkly divided lawyers - even two members of the International Court of Justice-and 
policy makers are on the subject. He argued:
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“On the other hand, in my view, the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant 
show how seriously Belgium views its international obligation to combat 
international crimes. Belgium is entitled to invoke its criminal jurisdiction 
against anyone, save a Foreign Minister in office. It is unfortunate that the 
wrong case would appear to have been chosen in attempting to carry out what 
Belgium considers it international obligation.
...In my considered opinion, today, together with piracy, universal jurisdiction is
available for certain crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity,
83including the slave trade and genocide”.
Policy Issues in Universal Jurisdiction
In seeking to radically extend what Robert Jackson called the “global covenant” 
the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, as represented by the Belgian law, clearly has run 
into a serious obstacle. That stumbling block is the nature of the international society. 
That we live in a society, not yet a real community is reflected in Judge Guillaume’s 
opinion when he refers to “an ill-defined international community”. That society 
continues to be one of sovereign states, and there are clear limits to how far justice should 
be not just borderless, but completely unregulated in its borderless nature. Even the 1994 
German legislation that authorizes the assertion of universal jurisdiction recognizes the 
contemporary nature of the international society of sovereign states. The law states that, 
where an appropriate link does not exist between Germany and the prospective 
defendant, “prosecution would violate the principle of non- interference, under which 
every state is required to respect the sovereignty of other states”. Wisely, Germany based 
its assertion of jurisdiction on a realization Belgium would only come to a decade later.
In rejecting the immunity of serving state officials -  a foundation of intercourse in 
the international society — without the backing of positive international law, Belgium’s 
universal jurisdiction law was a recipe for potential disorder. Let us assume, for example, 
that Belgian authorities had arrested Ariel Sharon, Yassir Arafat or Donald Rumsfeld in 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It is certain that their countries would have used 
force to obtain their release or in reprisal. That such a scenario does little to advance 
international law is self-evident. There are several supporters of the universal jurisdiction 
doctrine who accept that, in the pure form in which Belgium sought to assert it, the. 
principle was liable to abuse. As the numerous opportunistic suits brought against world 
leaders demonstrated, the perfect became an enemy of the good. In addition to the total 
absence of sustainable bases for jurisdiction in the Belgian law and its attempt to assert 
jurisdiction in absentia, any private citizen could file a complaint against anyone. How 
ridiculous the situation had become was poignantly illustrated when a fringe political 
party in Belgium filed a complaint against the country’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Louis Michel, for approving arms sales to Nepal. As a Belgian law professor 
commented, “it was not the government that was making foreign policy, but independent 
judges”84. And while the inevitable repeal of an unsustainable law was described as 
another lost battle in a “clash of civilizations” between Europe and the United States, it 
was more accurately a clash between cosmopolitan and positivist conceptions of 
international law and society.
Is there space for the doctrine of universal jurisdiction in international society? 
There most undoubtedly is. Were it otherwise, the doctrine would not exist in a number 
of treaties. Crimes like hostage taking cannot be effectively checked without some form
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of universal jurisdiction. But a universal jurisdiction that is based solely on the nature of 
the crime, and not on any other connections to a potential prosecuting state, will be 
exceedingly difficult to translate into state practice. Certainly, it remains important to 
discourage impunity with accountability. But every legal theory ought to be subject to 
empirical tests -  and even to common sense standards. In this case, the practice of states 
is a clear indicator of the possibilities of universal jurisdiction. The exercise of such 
jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime will be difficult to attain when we 
consider the nature of international society.
This is why an effort by some eminent scholars and practitioners of international 
law to clarify this subject in the “Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction” has not 
resolved the debate.85 The Principles have essentially restated the sweeping viewpoints of 
scholastic activism on this thorny question, and avoid some of the more difficult issues. 
They seek to maintain universal jurisdiction on the basis of the nature of the crime and 
nothing else. They avoid taking a position on the assertion of jurisdiction in absentia, 
arguing that trials in absentia are acceptable in the civil law tradition of which Belgium is 
a part. The Princeton Principles do not recognize the substantive immunity of heads of 
state and government — complete immunity of sitting heads of state, with the exceptions 
laid down by the International Court of Justice in Yerodia, from prosecution for acts 
performed in their official capacity. It is unhelpful to juxtapose clear exceptions such as 
the Nuremberg Charter and the statutes of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals and the 
permanent International Criminal Court, with the jurisdiction of national courts under 
customary international law. And while recognizing the great potential for politically 
motivated litigation, the Principles propose no remedy. They could not have, having
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foregone an opportunity to do so by stipulating some connection between the offender 
and the prosecuting state. The postulations of the Princeton Principles are so starkly 
divergent from the subsequent decision of the International Court of Justice in the 
Yerodia case and the repeal of the Belgian law that some middle ground is simply not in 
sight. The competing tensions that engender hesitation on the parts of states to 
unreservedly embrace universal jurisdiction are real, just as the ICJ decision in Yerodia is 
a legal fact of life with weighty implications in the international political sphere. For 
these reasons, the influence the Princeton Principles were meant to have will likely 
remain illusory.
Thus, there appears to be qualified merit in Lord Browne Wilkinson’s dissent 
from the Princeton principles when he argues:
“I am strongly in favor of universal jurisdiction over serious international crimes i f , by 
those words one means the exercise by an international court or by the courts of one state 
of jurisdiction over the nationals of another state with the prior consent of that latter state, 
i.e. in cases such as the ICC or the torture convention.
But the Princeton principles propose that individual national courts should exercise such 
jurisdiction against nationals of a state which has not agreed to such jurisdiction. 
Moreover the principles do not recognize any form of sovereign immunity.... If the law 
were so established, states antipathetic to Western powers would be likely to seize both 
active and retired officials and military personnel of such Western powers and stage a 
show trial for alleged international crimes. Conversely, zealots in Western States might 
launch prosecution against for example, Islamic extremists for their terrorist activities. It 
is naive to think that, in such cases, the natural state of the accused would stand by and 
watch the trial: resort to force would be more probable...I believe that the adoption of 
such universal jurisdiction without preserving the existing concepts of immunity would 
be more likely to damage than to advance the chances of international peace”.86
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The point on which one would add a caveat to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s dissent 
is his requirement of prior consent, without exception, of the state whose citizen is 
subject to prosecution in the courts of another state. In a world in which the moral 
dimension in international relations is stronger than it was once, a few states will 
occasionally summon political will to prosecute persons accused of violations of 
international humanitarian law. But such jurisdiction must be based on something more 
concrete than moral outrage. And, from the standpoint of international society, Lord 
Wilkinson is right when he worries about the potential consequences of attempting to 
bring to justice in foreign courts the high officials of another state.
Lord Browne’s observations lead us to another fundamental weakness of the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction: the justified concern that it can only be exercised 
against citizens of weaker nations by the courts of powerful states87. For if powerful 
states such as the United States can successfully resist the doctrine as we have seen, it 
follows that the citizens of states that do not have recourse to similar strategic leverage in 
the international society are in a weaker position should more powerful states decide to 
implement it. As Professor Shadrack Gutto has pithily observed, “What would happen if 
an African state like Djibouti would prosecute let us say a national of the United States 
for crimes against humanity? The prosecuting state would either be bombed or will not 
receive aid from the World Bank”88
With a careful eye to balancing these tensions, Germany has prosecuted a small 
number of individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed 
during the wars of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In one such case, the Supreme 
Court of Diisseldorf in 1997 convicted Nikola Jorgic, a Bosnian Serb, on 11 counts of
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genocide and 30 counts of murder during the “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims.89 
The Court established that in June 1992, Jorgic, the leader of one of the paramilitary 
groups in the Doboj region of Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with another person 
executed 22 citizens of Grabska (including disabled and elderly persons) who had 
gathered outdoors as a result of the fighting in the region. They forced three other 
Muslims to carry the victims to a mass grave, where their bodies were disposed of. The 
accused and his subordinates later forced 50 residents of another village from their 
homes, brutally abused them and shot six of them. In an appeal from the convict, the 
Federal High Court of Germany rejected the appeal in 1999. It confirmed, however, only 
one count of genocide involving 30 persons, and addressed the question of a German 
court’s jurisdiction to try a national or Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The court ruled that its jurisdiction could not be questioned if legitimate grounds 
existed for the exercise of such jurisdiction under German law. Those grounds included: 
the provisions of Section 16, article 220a of the German Penal Code, which conferred on 
German courts jurisdiction to prosecute certain international crimes including genocide, 
and the provision in the Genocide Convention (to which Germany became a party in 
1954) that genocide is a crime which all nations should punish. That the prosecution of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia declined to prosecute this 
case was another ground on which it asserted jurisdiction. Also pertinent, the German 
High Court ruled, was the fact that the convict had lived in Germany from 1969 to the 
beginning of 1992, when he returned to Bosnia but remained registered in Germany even 
after his departure. His German wife and his daughter still lived in Germany and he 
visited them even after the commission of his crimes, and he was arrested in Germany,
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which he had entered of his own volition90. Short of a scenario where the crime was 
committed in Germany, or the accused or the victims were German, there could hardly be 
a stronger example of the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The situation, then, is that while universal jurisdiction exists in limited forms in 
treaties and in the national laws of some states, it has gone into relative decline at a more 
general level. Despite the doctrine’s visibility and moral appeal, its absence and near- 
dormant state in the general practice of states is one more indication of how the nature of 
international society balances the tension between order and cosmopolitan notions of 
justice. The repeal of the Belgian law and the ICJ’s Yerodia bear out the thesis that two 
conceptions of justice -  cosmopolitan or human, on the one hand, and state or 
international, on the other -  remain locked in competition. True, the existence of the 
concept of universal jurisdiction in customary international law demonstrates Hedley 
Bull’s acknowledgement that even traditional notions of order cannot exist without 
justice, and human justice has made significant advances in the past century.
Nevertheless, consistent with the fundamental structure of international society, 
the sovereignty-based, positivist approach to international justice is not in real decline. 
This is not an argument in support of impunity for dictators. Rather it is an empirical 
statement based on an examination of the relationship between law and politics in a world 
of sovereign states. And what that analysis points up is that, because the “international 
community” is more of an aspiration than reality, there are limits to the globalization of
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justice. As far as justice for war crimes is concerned, the world society has not yet 
arrived.
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PART III
CASE STUDY: THE POLITICS, DIPLOMACY AND PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 1994 - 2004
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Chapter 6
Genocide and International Judicial Intervention
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
— Y.B. Yeats, The Second Coming
Previous chapters have discussed, the historical background to and conceptual 
framework for the inquiry into the tensions between political and judicial responses to 
violations of international humanitarian law. This chapter will begin the major case study 
of this work — the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the international judicial intervention 
that followed in its wake. It will trace the path to judicial intervention, demonstrate how 
the inaction of the society of states impacted on the dynamics of the relationship between 
Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and such other 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 
31 December 1994, established by UN Security Council resolution 955 of 8 November 
19941. I will analyze the early challenge to the very legitimacy of the Tribunal. And I 
will conclude with an examination of the relationship between the framework of the 
Tribunal and the overarching political and strategic considerations of the parties to the 
conflict.
In analyzing the international response to the genocide, this chapter empirically 
establishes that the notion of “international community” is more illusory than real, and 
the international society and its characteristics as noted in Chapter 3 is the more accurate
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perspective for this response. Following on from there, this chapter answers the question: 
can international criminal tribunals be best understood as a legal or political process, or 
one in which legalism is a subset of a larger political framework?. If, as I seek to 
demonstrate empirically, international criminal tribunals are completely framed by 
political negotiations, processes and interests, then the resulting nature of international 
justice for violations of international humanitarian law, which is thus profoundly political, 
supports my thesis that this kind of justice can best be explained by the international 
society perspective of international relations. It cannot be considered as a straightforward 
exercise in international law. It also supports the position stated in the Introduction 
chapter about why the study of international law can be helped by an understanding of 
international relations.
Historical Background
The expansion of the European-dominated international system of the late 19th 
century was an indirect factor in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. That expansion occurred 
mostly through colonization. Rwanda is made up of three ethnic groups - the Twa 
(historically pigmy hunters believed to have been the area's first inhabitants), the Hutu of 
Bantu origin and believed to have come from Cameroon, and the Tutsis who are believed 
to have come from Ethiopia in the 13th and 14th centuries. The Hutus, who constitute 85 
percent of Rwanda's population, were mainly farmers, while the Tutsis, who comprised 
14 percent prior to the genocide, were mainly pastoral keepers of cattle.
There are nonetheless contending historical accounts of the nature of the relations 
between Hutus and Tutsis - conflicted or harmonious, hierarchical or egalitarian. What
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tViis clear is that the Tutsis eventually established a kingdom around the 15 century in the 
east of today’s Rwanda, and had expanded westward and southward by the 16th century. 
This expansion engendered a corresponding loss of autonomy for the mainly agricultural 
Hutu3. The Tutsi and Hutu groups lived in a mutual arrangement of symbiotic and 
organic integration for the next three centuries. Certain cultural practices of Hutu origin 
and Hutu participation in the advisory councils to the Tutsi monarchy were significant 
realities of this relationship. The dividing line between the two groups was not as rigid as 
is commonly presumed by non-Rwandans - they both spoke (and still speak) a common 
language, Kinyarwanda; intermarriage was not infrequent, and, with the performance of 
certain socio-cultural rites, a successful Hutu could cross over the socio-ethnic line and 
now be regarded as a Tutsi.
But tensions between the two groups emerged even in the pre-colonial period in
tVithe 19 century. The appropriation of private pasture land by the Tutsi monarchy and the 
institution of payment of dues - in commodities or service - by the Hutu and socially 
lower ranked Tutsi in exchange for access to land was a major contributor to this changed 
texture of relations. This institution was known as ibikingi.
Europe's "scramble for Africa" in the late 19th century made Rwanda a German 
protectorate as a result of the Anglo-German treaty of 1880 by which much of East 
Africa became German colonies. Germany was to lose these territories after World War I, 
and Rwanda was transferred to a Belgian mandate under the League of Nations in 1919. 
Belgium asserted its political authority in Rwanda far more actively than Germany had. 
To sustain and strengthen its hold in the country, the Belgian colonizers used a classic 
divide-and-conquer method, first among the Tutsi to select those who would most
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willingly advance Belgium's agenda, and then between Tutsis and Hutus. A struggle 
ensued within rival camps in the Tutsi ruling class for the colonial administration’s 
patronage. A group opposed to the Rwandan king Mwami Musinga (whose independent 
streak had earned him Belgium's displeasure) emerged victorious. The Belgians 
dethroned Musinga and banished him to neighbouring Burundi in 1925. It is noteworthy 
that in the neighbouring Belgian Congo (today's Democratic Republic of Congo), the 
Belgian king Leopold had presided over grotesque massacres of Congolese natives in 
order to enforce rubber production quotas that supplied his personal wealth. Historians 
estimate that King Leopold ordered the killings of some 10 million victims between 1880 
and 19205.
In Rwanda, Belgium over the next several decades supported the Tutsi ruling 
class in expanding the colonial power’s delegated hegemony to other parts of the country. 
Belgium introduced several radical reforms of Rwandan society that widened ethnic 
divisions. The education of children of Tutsi notables in European style schools was 
encouraged. This in turn gave Tutsis great advantages over the Hutus in recruitments for 
administrative positions in the colonial administration as well as in business activities. In 
1933-1934 Belgium introduced identity cards that divided Rwandans along ethnic lines 
between Tutsi and Hutu.
These policies were based on Belgian perceptions of Tutsi racial superiority over 
the Hutu. The Tutsis were taller, lankier and thin-lipped and had aquiline noses, so 
Belgian colonialists judged them closer to Europeans in their physical traits than the 
generally shorter and thick-lipped Hutus. The pseudo-science fostered by the Belgian 
colonialists has parallels with Hitler's theory of the Aryan "master race" that led to the
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Jewish Holocaust by the Nazis in the 1930s and World War II. In an interesting 
demonstration of this parallel that exists between the roots of the Rwandan genocide and 
the Holocaust, Amy Chua has argued that, contrary to the view among supporters of 
globalization that the expansion of free market economies and democracy will reduce the 
incidence of ethnic hatred and violence, the phenomenon of globalization actually fuels 
ethnic violence in the non-western world.6 She argues that this consequence arises 
because free markets frequently put wealth in the hands of minorities, in the case of 
Rwanda the Tutsi ethnic group, triggering resentment by poor majorities -- in Rwanda’s 
case the Hutus.
This factor combined with colonial practices such as ethnic stereotyping to 
produce a potent mix of hatred. Philip Gourevitch describes how Belgian colonialists 
fostered myths of racial superiority through dubious "science":
In addition to military and administrative chiefs, and a veritable army of churchmen, 
the Belgians dispatched scientists to Rwanda. The scientists brought scales and 
measuring tapes and calipers and they went about weighing Rwandans, measuring 
Rwandans’ cranial capacities, and conducting comparative analysis of the relative 
protuberances of Rwandan noses. Sure enough, the scientists found what they 
believed all along. Tutsis had "nobler", more "naturally" aristocratic dimensions 
than the "coarse" and "bestial" Hutus. On the "nasal index", for instance, the 
median Tutsi nose was found to be about two and a half millimetres longer and 
nearly five millimetres narrower than the median Hutu nose.7
Tutsis warmed to these pseudo-scientific myths in order to perpetuate their 
political, economic and social dominance in Rwanda. As Bill Berkeley puts it, “elitism
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evolved into racism, and a myth of historic Tutsi domination - and cunning - came to be 
broadly accepted by Hutus and Tutsis alike"8. This situation fostered progressively 
increasing resentment on the part of the Hutu population.
Three factors created the immediate conditions for the first major wave of 
violence in colonial Rwanda. The first factor was the increasing agitation by Tutsis for 
independence from Belgium in the mid-1950s9. The second (and most important) was 
the arrival of mostly Flemish Belgians as missionaries in Rwanda in the 1940s, in 
contrast to the predominantly French Belgians who preceded their compatriots at the turn 
of the century10. The Flemish Belgians transposed Belgium's domestic politics into the 
combustible mix that was Rwanda's. For the Flemish - the majority of Belgium's 
population - were engaged in a struggle against the political dominance of the 
francophone political leadership class. Not surprisingly, they empathized with Rwanda's 
Hutu and began to provide them with political support. This led to an alliance between 
the Belgian missionaries and the Rwandan Hutu within the religiously dominant Roman 
Catholic Church. Here the Hutus, largely shut out from the professional educational 
system and having gone instead to religious seminaries, were dominant as clergy. The 
church was thus to play a strategic role in the political mobilization of the Hutus. Several 
clergymen and women became active perpetrators of genocide. The third factor that 
triggered violence during the colonial era was the Belgian colonizers' resistance to the 
scenario of an independent Rwanda led by Tutsis, who by now enjoyed the support of 
elements of the international communist movement.11
A group of nine Hutu intellectuals published the Hutu Manifesto in March 1957, 
demanding democracy.12 The manifesto embodied the rising degree of intolerance and
xenophobia that had become typical among the Hutu. It branded the Tutsis "foreign 
invaders" and asserted that "Rwanda was by rights a nation of the Hutu majority"13. In 
November 1959, these tensions and a series of events (most immediately that of an attack 
on a Hutu politician by Tutsis) triggered what Rwanda’s Hutus termed a "social 
revolution". This situation was simply a reversal of what the Hutus considered the 
tyranny of the minority with a new tyranny of the majority. It was not simply dominance 
that was sought, but one that was to be characterised by the active persecution of Tutsis 
as an integral component. This new movement of extremist Hutu politicians and 
peasants announced that it had cast off the yoke of centuries of domination by the Tutsi 
minority. The movement was led by Gregoire Kayibanda, who later became the 
president of the new republic in 1962. Kayibanda's PARMEHUTU party utilized ethnic 
differences as a wedge to consolidate power. Its primary agenda was not governance, but 
to establish a tyranny of the majority. A referendum organized in 1961 consolidated the 
1959 revolution and facilitated full independence in 1962. That process was 
accompanied by mass killings of Tutsi and the flight of tens of thousands more to the 
neighbouring countries of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Belgian Congo.
The events of 1959 - 1962 arguably amounted to the first genocide in Rwanda, 
even if the numbers of victims were nowhere near the death toll in 1994. At any event, 
they were the first of a series of mass atrocities that would continue, with impunity, for 
the next 35 years. From 1961, a group of Tutsi refugees in the diaspora organized 
themselves into a military force and launched repeated stealth attacks on Rwanda from 
bases in Uganda and Burundi.14 These attempts by Tutsi rebels to re-enter Rwanda by 
force of arms during the 1960s led to revenge massacres of Tutsi inside Rwanda.
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In 1973 Kayibanda was ousted in a military coup by Juvenal Habyarimana, a 
Hutu army officer from the north-western part of the country. The coup was the direct 
result of tensions between southern Hutus, on the one hand, and northern Hutus who felt 
marginalized by their southern brethren, on the other. Although Habyarimana pledged to 
end mass killings of Tutsis, he was just as steeped in nepotism as his predecessor in 
office. He concentrated power and access to wealth in the hands of a small group of 
Hutus from his home region, especially a core group of relations of his wife, Agathe. 
This group was known as the Akazu (small hut), borrowing a term used for the courtiers 
, of the king15. This group played a major role in the genocide of 1994.
Habyarminana's policies towards the Tutsis were contradictory. He severely 
restricted opportunities for the Tutsis in education and in government, while maintaining 
financially beneficial relationships with Tutsi businessmen.16 Most important, he firmly 
denied Tutsi exiles and refugees the right of return to their country, to which they were 
entitled in international law, claiming that pressures on land made refugee return
1 7impracticable . This policy led to the revival of the armed struggle by Tutsis outside 
Rwanda and the civil war that served as an immediate context for the genocide.
A combination of factors, namely an economic downturn as a result of the fall in 
the price of coffee, Rwanda’s main export commodity, and the end of the Cold War, led 
to pressure on Habyarimana from Western European donors, in particular France, to 
embark on political reforms away from a one-party state to multiparty democracy. He 
was reluctant reformer, but was faced with little choice. For the Tutsi rebels, all of this 
was too little and too late. On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the
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military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), attacked Rwanda from their base in 
Uganda. A full-scale war had begun.
The RPA was under the command of Paul Kagame and comprised mostly Tutsi 
soldiers who had fought alongside Yoweri Museveni in the civil war that brought the 
latter to power in Uganda in 1986. Kagame had risen to become deputy director of 
military intelligence in the Ugandan army under Museveni. But he and his fellow 
Rwandan Tutsis in that army were not Ugandan citizens by birth, although they acquired 
Ugandan nationality as Rwandan exiles - Kagame was in fact an infant survivor of the 
massacres of Rwandan Tutsis in 1959 who had been taken into exile in Uganda by 
refugee parents. Kagame and his fellow travellers felt a strong psychological pressure to 
return to Rwanda, by force of arms if necessary. Museveni, while not ungrateful for their 
support, was relieved to see them return to Rwanda, for ethnic tensions had developed 
between the “Rwandan-Ugandans” and some indigenous Ugandan ethnic groups.
Predictably, the RPF invasion triggered a new wave of massacres of Tutsis in 
Rwanda in the months that followed. Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) initially beat 
back the RPF attack with the military support mainly of France18, but the French 
Government nonetheless prodded Habyarimana to open up Rwandan politics.19 The 
Rwandan despot made reluctant, half-hearted gestures in that direction but had no 
intention of ceding significant degrees of power. Meanwhile, the RPF had regrouped 
following its initial military setback. In 1991 and 1992 it captured enough territory in 
Rwanda to bring Habyarimana to the realization that it presented a credible threat and 
forced him to the negotiating table.
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International peace talks to end the Rwandan conflict began in the northeastern
Tanzanian town of Arusha in 1992, but stalled on the sensitive questions of
representation in a proposed broad based transitional government (BBTG) and the
makeup of the new Rwandan armed forces. Habyarimana and his ethnic supporters
feared that granting the Tutsi rebels and the internal Rwandan opposition a dominant role
*
in the transition would be tantamount to a "negotiated coup".20
The pressure of circumstances however - military, economic and domestic 
political pressure - left him with few alternatives. In August 1993 he buckled and signed 
the Arusha peace accords. The agreement included protocols on refugee returns, as well 
as political power sharing and shared membership and command of the armed forces. 
Habyarimana's nightmares were happening in real time. The Arusha Accords awarded the 
RPF and domestic opposition parties a majority of seats in the interim cabinet and the 
parliament, and the RPF was awarded 50 percent of officer-level positions in a 
reintegrated national army, including 40 percent of the army rank and file.
The combination of the Arusha Accords and the RPFs progressive military 
victories radicalized and polarized the Rwandan polity even further. Hutu extremists felt 
betrayed by Habyarimana and were extremely apprehensive about the inevitable loss of 
power and privilege that would flow from the implementation of the Arusha agreements. 
From their perspective, the accords amounted to ethno-political class suicide. The peace 
deal could not be allowed to stand.
Following the Arusha Accords, the UN Security Council established a peace 
keeping operation, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 
1993. UNAMIR absorbed an earlier and smaller UN military observer force, the United
Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), along the Uganda-Rwanda 
border. The new peacekeeping mission's mandate included ensuring security in Kigali, 
the Rwandan capital, monitoring observance of the ceasefire between the warring parties, 
monitoring the security situation in the lead-up to elections for a longer term government 
that would replace the transitional government, investigating breaches of the Protocol of 
Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the two parties, monitoring the 
return of refugees, and supporting humanitarian assistance activities. Lt. General Romeo 
Dallaire, the Canadian soldier who had commanded UNOMUR, was appointed Force 
Commander of UNAMIR. With a force strength of 2,548 troops that included two 
infantry battalions - only one of which was eventually deployed on the ground in Rwanda 
-UNAMIR was a small force in comparison with other UN peacekeeping missions in the 
early 1990s. Dallaire recalls his distinct impression at the time that, compared to U.N. 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Mozambique, Rwanda was 
a sideshow: a "tiny central African country that most people would be hard-pressed to 
locate on a map"21. This foreboding was to be proved right by the international response 
to subsequent events in Rwanda.
Meanwhile, Habyarimana was busy attempting to derail or delay the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords. He bribed, coerced and rallied Hutu politicians, 
including his more moderate political opponents, by casting all Tutsis as the common 
enemy. The opposition parties split into factions in mid-1993, between extremist "Hutu 
Power" factions and more moderate ones as a result of these machinations. Jean 
Kambanda, who was later to become the country's prime minister, was the favourite 
candidate of the Hutu Power factions of the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR)
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party for the post of prime minister, while signatories to the Arusha Accords stuck to 
their choice of the more moderate Faustin Twagiramungu. With each of the opposition 
parties presenting conflicting candidates for posts in the BBTG, that government could 
not be established, essentially rendering the peace accords inoperable.
These ominous events were fuelled by the influence of anti-Tutsi hate propaganda 
broadcast by the Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) and Kangura 
newspaper, and the militarization and transformation of youth wings of the main Hutu 
political parties into militias. RTLM claimed in its broadcasts that the RPF's agenda was 
to restore Tutsi hegemony and wipe out the benefits of the 1959 social revolution. It 
called for attacks against all Tutsis in Rwanda, who were branded accomplices of the 
invading RPF. The RPF, sensing an imminent breakdown of the Arusha Accords, 
prepared for a decisive military push against Habyarimana's government. Hutu 
extremists, on the other hand, were planning an equally decisive "final solution" to the 
"Tutsi problem" - genocide. This plan included the preparation of lists of individuals to 
be targeted, large scale importation and distribution of weapons to the extremist Hutu 
militias. Events in neighbouring Burundi, which has a similar Hutu-Tutsi population 
ratio as Rwanda, were grist to the mill. There, Melchiore Ndadaye, a popularly elected 
Hutu president, was assassinated in October 1993 by extremist Tutsi soldiers in the 
Burundian army, stoking the diabolical rage of the Rwandan Hutu extremists.
On 6 April 1994, a regional summit of heads of state was convened in Dar es 
Salaam, the Tanzanian capital where, it is believed, Habyarimana finally agreed to
77implement Arusha. Travelling back to Kigali the same day in the company of 
Burundian president Cyprien Ntayamira, the Rwandan president's jet was hit by two
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missiles, killing him and his Burundian counterpart. RTLM immediately blamed the 
assassination on the RPF, although other schools of thought believe that Hutu extremists 
disappointed at Habyarimana's "betrayal" were the culprits. At any rate, within an hour 
of the plane crash Hutu militias and the Presidential Guard established roadblocks around 
Kigali and commenced massacres of Tutsis.
One of the first targets early the next morning was the Rwandan Prime Minister, 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu politician who advocated peaceful co-existence 
with Tutsis. She was killed by members of the Presidential Guard believed to have acted 
on orders from Col. Theoneste Bagosora, chief of staff at the Rwandan Ministry of 
Defence. Bagosora is widely believed in Rwanda to have been the mastermind of the 
genocide and is on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at Arusha.23 
Ten Belgian UNAMIR peacekeeping soldiers assigned to protect Uwilingiyimana were 
also murdered along with her. This prompted the withdrawal of the Belgian UNAMIR 
contingent from Rwanda, an outcome that was evidently planned, or at least desired, by 
Bagosora and his associates on the so-called "crisis committee" he established 
immediately after Habyarimana's death.24
Over the next 100 days, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
massacred in all regions of Rwanda - the fastest genocide in history. On 8 April, 
extremist Hutus in the RGF, led by Bagosora, installed an Interim Government headed by 
Jean Kambanda as prime minister. It was precisely in order to execute the genocide plan 
that Agathe Uwillingiyimana had to be assassinated - to create a vacuum of power and 
succession. Kambanda and his government then presided over the genocide of Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus, reviewing the progress of the massacres at cabinet meetings.
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Despite Dallaire's best efforts, UNAMIR was too thin on the ground to affect the 
course of the genocide. The world failed Rwanda in its hour of need as Rwandans 
hacked Rwandans to death. This was not, as some western analysts are wont characterize 
it, "a tribal slaughter". Rather, it was coldly calculated genocide motivated by a desire to 
maintain political power, capitalizing on ethnic cleavages. The world did not respond to 
stop the slaughter while it was happening, but intervened afterwards to seek justice for 
the perpetrations of the genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Rwanda in 
1994. It is to why and how this was so that we shall now turn.
Spectators to Genocide
The world's failure to launch a military intervention to stop the genocide has been 
copiously analyzed in several books and reports.26 It is not the main focus of this work. 
Rather judicial intervention, the use of international legal institutions to intervene in the 
Rwandan conflict - after the fact of the genocide though it certainly was - and the 
political and strategic context of that intervention, is what this chapter is about. Events 
and processes in international affairs, however, are rarely coincidences. It is in this 
context of international criminal justice as a default option to preventing genocide that 
the world's non-response in a military-humanitarian sense will be discussed here, in order 
to demonstrate how the nature of the international society affected the likelihood of 
humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. I will establish the political link between that non­
intervention and the judicial intervention that followed in its wake and point out how the 
former has impacted the latter.
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The global covenant was tested during the Rwandan genocide and found wanting. 
There is undoubtedly a combination of several factors that accounted for the non­
military/humanitarian intervention to prevent, or halt the genocide. But the most 
important background or conditioning factor, at a conceptual level, was that of a society, 
not a community of states. At a practical level that factor is demonstrated by the actions 
or inactions of states and the limitations of the United Nations as the institution where 
states collaborate in the pursuit of sometimes common but at other times divergent 
interests.
The three states whose foreign policies and actions had the greatest impact on the 
course of the genocide were the United States, Belgium and France. Of these, America 
was by far the most influential. Its positioning will therefore be considered first. 
Humanitarian intervention, despite the phrase, is frequently guided by strategic interest. 
The U.S. administration under President Clinton judged that it had little strategic interest 
in Rwanda. Thus, not only did it not act, but worse, it blocked actions or initiatives that 
might have affected outcomes on the ground even if not prevented the genocide.
As Samantha Power has noted, "the United States has never in its history 
intervened to stop genocide and had in fact rarely even made a point of condemning it as 
it occurred"27. In this context the interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999 
were exceptions to this characteristic of American foreign policy. And those 
interventions can be credited largely to sustained pressure by Madleine Albright, 
Ambassador to the United Nations and later Secretary of State in the Clinton 
administration, and other interests in the United States. This insularity has a long history, 
going back to the late 18th century when Thomas Paine signed the American Declaration
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of Independence because Europe was "too thickly planted with kingdoms to be long at 
peace" and George Washington warned his country against "entangling alliances".
Not only did Rwanda offer no strategic interest to warrant American intervention, 
but it was doomed, even before the genocide erupted, by the shadow of Somalia. In 1993, 
18 American soldiers participating in a United Nations peacekeeping operation under U.S. 
command were killed by Somali militias, and their bodies dragged through the streets. 
This setback so traumatized American public opinion that the Clinton administration 
enacted a new restrictive peacekeeping policy known as Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD-25). The policy laid out sixteen factors that would influence United States 
decisions on whether to support or participate in peacekeeping operations. U.S. 
participation required that such participation had to advance American interests, be 
deemed essential for the operation's success, and have legislative support in the U.S. 
Congress. The likelihood of casualties had to be low, and a clear exit strategy had to be 
articulated.28
Several U.S. policymakers, in post-mortems of the country’s foreign policy 
responses to the Rwandan genocide, confirmed that the American experience in Somalia 
was the most powerful influence on U.S. policy towards the Rwandan genocide.29 At its 
core, the Somalia experience and its impact can be interpreted as having triggered a 
response that questioned the basis of humanitarian or peacekeeping intervention by 
American forces in foreign lands. Was the projection of American military power, with 
the hazards inherent in such exercises, to be determined by the idea of a cosmopolitan 
international community or by the strategic national interest in an international society, 
with such interest domestically defined? Clearly, the question was resolved in favour of
273
the latter approach, thus foreclosing a serious military effort by a great power or great 
powers acting concert to prevent or stop the genocide of 1994.
Based on an absence of political will to intervene in Rwanda, the U.S. 
government took a number of far-reaching policy positions. First, it studiously avoided 
calling the massacres in Rwanda genocide. Using the "G-word" as Power termed it, 
would have raised the stakes for international society and put further pressure on America 
and other nations to take action to halt the genocide as required by the Genocide 
Convention. In other words, legalism would have kicked in, and that scenario was out of 
kilter with political and strategic considerations in Washington D.C. and some other 
capitals. From late April, by which time the genocide was well advanced, and for the 
next several weeks this policy continued. The U.S. administration, with support from 
Britain and China, blocked the use of the word "genocide” in a statement by the president 
of the United Nations Security Council on 30 April. The original draft of the statement 
clearly specified "genocide": "The Security Council reaffirms that the systematic killings 
of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in part constitutes an act of 
genocide... The Council further points out that an important body of international law 
exists that deals with perpetrators of genocide".30 But the final statement was to read:
The Security Council condemns all these breaches of international humanitarian law 
in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalls 
that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible. In 
this context, the Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic 
group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a 
crime punishable under international law.31
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Meanwhile, on 13 April, the RPF Representative at the United Nations, Claude 
Dusaidi, had written to the president of the Security Council stating that "a crime of 
genocide” had been committed against Rwandans in the presence of a United Nations 
peacekeeping force. Dusaidi called on the Council to establish an international war crime
'X'Jtribunal and apprehend persons responsible for the atrocities. This appears to have been 
the first time the idea of setting up a war crimes tribunal was put to the Council. In an 
irony reflective of sovereignty as the hallmark of the international society, Rwanda held a 
rotating seat on the Security Council in 1994 and was represented by Ambassador Jean- 
Damascene Bizimana, Permanent Representative of the extremist Hutu government that 
was perpetrating the genocide. This situation, however, while a personal embarrassment 
for most of the other ambassadors on the Security Council, was not a weighty factor for 
decision-making by the Council on the genocide.
Secondly, the United States rejected proposals from the UN Secretariat for 
assistance to jam the RTLM and so stop its broadcasts that were inciting the genocidal 
massacres. The UN clearly did not have the technical capacity to do so. While a State 
Department adviser for the region supported this position, the U.S. Department of 
Defence recommended a rejection of the proposal on the grounds that it would cost 
$8,500 an hour to position a jamming aircraft over Rwanda, and that jamming a national 
radio station would violate Rwanda's sovereignty.34 Dallaire commented: "The Pentagon 
judged that the lives of the estimated 8,000 - 10,000 Rwandans being killed each day in 
the genocide were not worth the cost of the fuel or the violation of Rwandan airwaves.”35
Here I disagree with Kuperman who, in arguing that the genocide could not have 
been prevented or halted after it had gotten underway, asserts that the radio broadcasts
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were not an essential driver of the massacres.36 The evidence, anecdotal and judicial, 
establishes exactly the opposite. The judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda in the "media trial" has established once and for all the crucial role hate 
media, including RTLM, played in fanning the genocide, beginning several months 
before and continuing during the massacres.37 Kuperman recalls the curious legal 
opinion of a Pentagon lawyer that silencing a hate radio that was broadcasting explicit 
instructions for genocide would have violated the American principle of freedom of 
speech.38 The noted American First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams has rebuffed this 
argument, asserting that inciting genocide does not rise to a standard that could be 
protected by the First Amendment39.
Thirdly, American policy during the genocide was perceived as sympathetic to the 
RPF.40 This raises the question of whether there was a grand strategic design to replace 
French influence in the African Great Lakes region. If such a design can be identified at 
all, it can only be one that evolved in response to events. Those events were not driven 
by any Anglo-Saxon master-plan, but rather by the excesses of Rwanda’s francophone, 
Hutu-dominated governments. As for France and Belgium, their main diplomatic roles 
during the genocide lay in France's decision not to reinforce UNAMIR and instead, 
obtaining Security Council authorization to establish a controversial, parallel 
humanitarian intervention force in the waning days of the Rwandan conflict. The force, 
named Operation Turquoise, was blessed with the robust mandate under Chapter 7 of the 
United Nations Charter that UNAMIR never had. The Security Council authorized 
Operation Turquoise41 on the strict condition that it would last for no longer than sixty 
days. It was also operationally restricted to western Rwanda. The RPF was consulted by
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the French government on the humanitarian operation. For its own strategic reasons, the 
RPF agreed to the plan despite its misgivings about the French.42 Belgium's troops 
having been targeted in early April as part of the genocide plan, the country pulled its 
troops from Rwanda the week of 14 April 1994. This development broke the back of 
UNAMIR and removed any viable threat to the armed forces and militia that carried out 
the slaughter. It has been observed that Belgium also played a major role in the practical 
disintegration of the UNAMIR, not only by withdrawing its troops, but by persuading 
other countries involved in Rwanda at the time to leave the country in order to justify its 
own response to the Belgian public 43
The United Nations Secretariat, meanwhile, like most players in the crisis (with 
the exception of one or two governments) interpreted the information it received from 
UNAMIR in early 1994 in the context of the ongoing political and ethnic violence, rather 
than as portends of genocide. Kofi Annan, then Under-Secretary-General for 
peacekeeping operations, instructed Dallaire to discuss information the latter had 
received about weapons caches in Kigali with President Habyarimana. The United 
Nations Secretariat has been criticised for not doing enough to prevent the genocide. 
And Kofi Annan, who has been personally criticized by Rwanda on this score and was 
met with critical demonstrations by Rwandan citizens when he visited the country in 
1998, has expressed regret for not having done more than he did to stop the massacres.44 
But, as Kuperman explains, much of this criticism is overblown.45 Member states of the 
United Nations decided by their actions and inactions not to intervene in Rwanda.
It cannot be doubted that UN Secretariat officials, especially senior officials in the 
Department of Peace-keeping Operations in New York46, could have responded in more
imaginative ways when confronted with knowledge of the violent plans of Hutu 
extremists. Romeo Dallaire has detailed in his memoirs his meetings with these officials, 
the sense of impending cataclysm he strained to get across in his reports, and the 
circumstances that worked against him.47 But even he acknowledges the role that the 
material and logistical limitations of the UN Secretariat and the “political state of mind in 
the Security Council regarding the future of the [UNAMIR] mission”, as well as the 
larger geopolitical context of simultaneous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 
Mozambique, Haiti and Somalia, played in shaping the responses he received from the 
Secretariat.48 No doubt, as the genocide unfolded it is entirely possible that then 
Secretary-General Boutros Ghali and Annan might have opted to fall on their sword and 
resign in frustration at the non-response of the international community to requests by 
Boutros-Ghali for additional troops to strengthen UNAMIR. But that is a matter of 
speculation, one that places a somewhat exaggerated burden on the instincts of 
international civil servants for heroism.
The United Nations response is more indicative of the role of international 
institutions as epiphenomenal, relying on the power and political will of the states; a will 
to act was not forthcoming in the case of the Rwandan genocide. Thus the real constraint 
was the mandate of UNAMIR, inspired by the reluctance of states to intervene. Framed 
as it was within the traditional concept of the peacekeeping — effective neutrality —in 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the mandate constrained aggressive military action to halt 
the slaughter.
Meanwhile, another group of states in the U.N. Security Council in 1994 
favoured intervention to stop or contain the genocide, or at least were not in favour of a
reduction of the force strength of UNAMIR at the time it was desperately needed and 
thus sending a signal of lack of resolve to the genocidaires. Czech Republic, New 
Zealand and Nigeria were active members of this group. On 13 April 1994, Ibrahim 
Gambari, Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations presented a draft resolution on 
behalf of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) calling for an expansion of UNAMIR's size 
and mandate. Nigeria was concerned that the Security Council was preoccupied far more 
with the security of United Nations personnel and foreigners than the fate of Rwanda's 
innocent civilians/9 Again, on 28 April, Gambari called the Security Council's attention 
to its focus on a cease-fire but not on civilian massacres.50 But Nigeria had voted for 
Security Council resolution 912 which reduced the UNAMIR strength -- largely due to 
institutional pressures to reach a consensus— a vote that Gambari, in retrospect, regrets.51
It was New Zealand's Ambassador Colin Keating, supported by Czech 
Ambassador Karel Kovanda, who proposed that the Security Council issue a statement 
calling the killings in Rwanda a genocide. Keating it was, as well, who proposed a draft 
resolution on 6 May that would beef up UNAMIR and change its mandate to peace 
enforcement after the political embarrassment that followed resolution 912. But his 
proposal was watered down into a compromise, based on a report to the Council by 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali that recommended a force of 5,500 troops. The 
Council adopted resolution 918 a few days later, but without Chapter VII enforcement 
powers. When resolution 929 authorizing Operation Turquoise was tabled and adopted 
by the Security Council on 22 June, New Zealand and Nigeria, together with Pakistan, 
Brazil and China abstained.
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“Never Again” Yet Again
Returning to the nature of the international society, the question must be asked, in 
light of Rwanda: would the society of states take robust action to prevent or halt another 
genocide? If the answer is yes, then the society of states has made progress and 
solidarism would have become a stronger force in international affairs. If the answer is 
no, then the "international community" as I have posited, remains more of an aspiration 
than reality, and the world society very far off indeed. The outcomes of the 60th General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 2005, which will consider a report on threats and 
change in world politics by a high-level panel established by the Secretary-General, will 
provide guidance as to whether or not a “responsibility to protect” (humanitarian 
intervention to prevent or stop genocides) will be adopted by member states of the United 
Nations.
There exists a widespread global sentiment that another Rwanda-like genocide 
should not be allowed to happen52. But the gap between the recognition of moral values 
and state action remains wide. The massacres and deportations in Darfur in 2004 and the 
feeble international response have made the point. One simple reason, in addition to 
others I have advanced in Chapter 3, is that, intervention is not cost-free. It involves 
putting soldiers in harm's way and few states, especially democracies, are willing to take 
that risk with little to justify it to their publics other than moral concern. As the United 
States discovered when it intervened in Somalia, originally on humanitarian grounds, 
humanitarian intervention is often messy in practice. Nicholas Wheeler has argued that 
there is a certain moral bankruptcy to this position. But it happens to be the prevailing 
reality, though one that is without question under assault by the solidarist worldview of
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international politics. Even in the context of an international society I would argue that 
genocides such as Rwanda and Darfur merit intervention.
Kofi Annan has stated: "I long for the day when we can say that confronted with 
a new Rwanda or a new Srebrenica, the world would respond effectively, and in good 
time. But let us not delude ourselves. That day has not yet come. We must all do more 
to bring it closer."54 And so the world for now appears left with only the remedy of 
judicial intervention. In Rwanda, the conspicuous inaction in the face of genocide 
coloured the subsequent international judicial intervention that took place in a number of 
significant ways.
First, the failure to intervene meant that the RPF ended the genocide in July 1994 
and established a new government in Rwanda. The RPF government thus believes it is 
on moral high ground vis-a-vis the "international community". This has left the Security 
Council with limited practical leverage to ensure Rwanda's cooperation with the 
International Tribunal and other attempts to investigate human rights abuses by the 
current government’s troops, during and after the genocide.
Second, the world's moral failure to stop the genocide has left Rwanda believing 
that only it can guarantee its own security in the face of continuing threats from the 
remnants of the genocidaires scattered in its neighbouring countries. This has practical 
implications for order in the Great Lakes region. Third, non-intervention has left a sense 
of guilt over policy towards Rwanda in some western countries, leading to strategic 
alliances with the RPF government in Kigali.
Fourth, non-intervention has affected the overall dynamic of Rwanda's relations 
with the United Nations, and thus with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Rwanda has tended to view the international judicial intervention that the tribunal 
represents as a fig leaf, even if one that also serves Rwanda’s strategic interests. Rwanda 
assesses even the Tribunal's officials from the perspective of the politics of intervention 
and non-intervention in the genocide. Officials of the Tribunal from non- Francophone 
countries are generally viewed with less suspicion than those from France or francophone 
African countries close to France, who have to prove their bona fides. This factor is not a 
decisive one in the scheme of things, for Rwanda must deal with the Tribunal as an 
institution regardless of who represents it. Nevertheless, in combination with others, it 
affects the dynamics of Rwanda’s cooperation with the International Tribunal in 
significant ways.
Send in the Lawyers
The society of states, whether through the United Nations or alternative 
arrangements, did not send troops to halt the slaughter. But within the Security Council 
the dynamic evolved towards international judicial intervention --the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal to enforce individual accountability for the genocide and 
other violations of international humanitarian law. The road to the international tribunal 
began in April 1994, the first month of the mass slaughter. Although, as we have seen, 
the United States and Britain were reluctant to put the label ’’genocide" on the killings in 
Rwanda at that time, the statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 30 
April 1994 condemned all breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda and 
noted that the persons who instigated or participated in such acts where individually 
responsible. The statement made reference to the killing of members of an ethnic group
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with the intention of destroying the group, wholly or partially, as constituting a crime in 
international law and requested the Secretary-General to make proposal for an 
investigation of the atrocities committed during the conflict.
In its resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, the Security Council 'requested the 
Secretary-General to present a report on the investigation of violations of international 
humanitarian law. In its resolution 925 of 8 June 1994, following a report by the 
Secretary-General on the situation of Rwanda of 31 May 1994 in which the latter 
concluded that the killings constituted genocide, the Security Council noted that "acts of 
genocide" had occurred in Rwanda and that genocide was a crime punishable under 
international law.
Against this background, the Security Council adopted resolution 935 on 1 July 
1994, instructing the Secretary-General to establish urgently an impartial Commission of 
Experts to investigate the atrocities and provide conclusions on the evidence of grave 
violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, including genocide.55 The 
Commission was also to obtain information through the work of other bodies, notably 
that of the UN Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, Mr. Rene Degni-Segui, who had a similar 
mandate from the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.56
On 26 July 1994, the Secretary-General established the Commission of Experts. 
The Commission had three members: Mr. Atsu-Koffi Amega of Togo (chairman), Ms. 
Habi Dieng of Guinea and Mr. Salifou Fumba of Mali. The Commission, whose 
members served in their own capacities, began its work on 15 August 1994 in Geneva. 
Information on the details of the genocide and other atrocities poured in to the 
Commission of Experts from non-governmental organizations, private individuals,
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churches and the Governments of Spain, United States, France and Ireland. The 
submissions from the U.S. included those from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Senate and the Department of State. All the submissions pointed to a well planned and 
executed massacre of Tutsis and Hutus that were political opponents of the Habyarimana 
regime. They cited the particular responsibility of specific high-ranking officials of the 
regime and the journalists of the RTLM for instigating the slaughter. Most of the reports 
(especially those from the NGOs) recommended the establishment of an international 
tribunal to try the perpetrators of the killings in Rwanda.
Degni-Segui submitted two reports to the Commission on Human Rights, made 
available as well to the Commission of Experts. His first report confirmed the 
responsibility of the Hutu interhamwe (“those who work together”, ostensibly members 
of the youth wing of the ruling MRND party) militias and the Interim Government of 
Rwanda that was established on 9 April 1994. Degni-Segui recommended that an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal be established, or else the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established on 25 May 1993 to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 199157, be expanded to cover the Rwanda
f  o
crimes. His second report condemned RTLM's role in the genocide and that of the 
former interim government that had by then fled Rwanda to Zaire and was actively 
preventing the return of Rwandan refugees to the country.59 A significant finding by both 
Degni-Segui and the Secretary-General's Commission of Experts was that the RPF troops 
had also undertaken revenge killings and persecution of Hutus on a systematic scale. 
These included the murder of the Archbishop of Kigali, the Bishop of Kabgayi and 11
other priests - all Hutus - on 3 June 1994 at the historic Catholic Centre in Kabgayi that 
had been recently captured by the RPF in the course of the conflict. Given the influential 
role of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, this massacre caused quite a stir, even it paled in 
comparison to the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis that were slaughtered during the 
genocide. Degni Segui also reported the massacres of 63 other individuals by the RPF. 
The RPF itself, which by July 1994 had established a new government in the country, 
acknowledged these killings by its soldiers, although it described them as "isolated 
incidents". The victims had been summarily executed and their floating bodies, bound 
hands and feet, were recovered from the Kagera river (the same river where Hutu 
extremists had dumped the bodies of Tutsi victims months earlier) in late August and 
early September 1994.60
The work of the Commission of Experts became a statistical battleground 
between the genocidal Hutu-dominated former government, now exiled in Zaire, and the 
RPF Govemenment, with both sides submitting lists of alleged perpetrations and victims. 
The RPF gave the Commission a list of Hutu individuals that instigated and organized the 
genocide. The leaders of the ancien regime provided the Commission with (a) the names 
of several persons it claimed were massacred by the RPF, (b) the specific sites of 15 mass 
graves that held the victims of RPF atrocities, and (c) written testimonies of some Hutus 
who had escaped from RPF-occupied zones during the war.61 The politics of justice had 
began in earnest. These facts were important because they were to frame the mandate of 
the international judicial intervention that followed. And, especially regarding the 
admittedly lesser crimes by the RPF that could nevertheless not be swept under the carpet,
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they were central to the battle for what the future historical record of that international 
intervention would say.
The Commission of Experts concluded that individuals from both sides of the war 
in Rwanda had committed serious breaches of international humanitarian law - genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes (in this case violations of the obligations set out 
in article 3 common to the four Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 and in Protocol II 
additional to the Geneva Conventions and relating to the protection of victims of non- 
intemational armed conflicts, of 8 June 1977). The Commission found that acts of 
genocide were perpetrated by Hutu elements against Tutsis in "a concerted, planned, 
systematic and methodical way".62 These acts, the Commission reported, constituted 
genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention of 1948 - chiefly the 
commission of the massacres with the intent to destroy, wholly or partially, the Tutsi 
group.
The Commission also concluded that Tutsi elements engaged in mass 
assassinations, summary executions, and crimes against humanity against Hutu 
individuals and these allegations deserved further investigation. However, it did not 
uncover any evidence that RPF forces acted with genocidal intent.
The Commission had to rule on whether the conflict that formed the immediate 
context of the crimes in Rwanda was an armed conflict and, if so, whether it was an 
international or non-international armed conflict. These determinations would in turn 
point to which rules of international humanitarian law would apply. Rwanda became a 
party to the Geneva Conventions on 5 May 1964 and acceded to the Convention's 
Additional Protocols on 19 November 1984. The Commission found that an armed
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conflict undoubtedly existed in Rwanda between 6 April and 15 July 1994, and the 
conflict was of a non-international character because it was confined to Rwandan 
territory and did not involve the active military engagement of any other state.63
In reaching this legal assessment, the Commission observed in its report that 
ascribing the status of a non-intemational armed conflict did not mean the Rwandan civil 
war did not have serious consequences on its neighbouring states, which had to absorb a 
massive influx of refugees from Rwanda, and on the wider international community. The 
threat that the Rwandan war presented to international peace and security in the context 
of the Charter of the United Nations was obvious. But the essential character of the 
conflict was non-intemational. Thus the provisions of common article 3 to the four 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II thereto were applicable.64
Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions bind parties to a non-intemational 
conflict to the humane treatment of persons not actively involved in the fighting, 
including soldiers who have laid down their arms and those removed from combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention or other causes. It prohibits "at any time and in any in place 
whatsoever":
a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
b) Taking of hostages
c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; and
d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples;
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Next the Commission examined the question of individual responsibility in 
international law, and that of the merits and disadvantages of international prosecution by 
an international tribunal versus prosecution in domestic courts. In the circumstances this 
was not surprising, if for no other reason than Rwanda's total lack of judicial capacity in 
1994 to undertake such a task. But there were other reasons why the Commission 
supported an international approach to prosecutions for the Rwanda crimes. Valid as 
those reasons were, the arguments on which the Commission based its recommendations 
pointed to future conceptual and political tensions between Rwanda and the international 
society over the pursuit of justice for the crimes of 1994.
The Commission of Experts recognized that prosecutions in a municipal tribunal 
would be more sensitive to the expectations of a local community by reason of its 
proximity to where the crimes occurred. It would be less difficult to gather evidence. 
And the judgements of such courts would have an impact multiplied several times by the 
local ownership of the process by the affected community. Conversely, an international 
tribunal may be perceived as being too remote from the communities they were meant to 
serve.65 The Commission reasoned that an international jurisdiction and the local 
relevance of such a jurisdiction were not mutually exclusive, and the two could be 
reconciled if such a tribunal were to be situated in Rwanda.
However, recognizing the high possibility that, in the emotionally charged 
atmosphere prevailing in post-genocide Rwanda, municipal trials for violations of 
international humanitarian law could fall victim to perceptions of bias, the Commission 
weighed in favour of an international criminal tribunal sitting outside Rwanda. In its 
view, the need for independence, objectivity and impartiality of such a court trumped
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other factors. Another significant argument was that the tribunal would have better 
familiarity with the "technique and substance of international law" than a municipal 
court.66
For these reasons, the Commission of Experts recommended the establishment of 
an international criminal tribunal to adjudicate the Rwandan atrocities. This came as no 
surprise. The somewhat baffling recommendation by the Commission, bucking its earlier 
reasoning, was that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia should be expanded to cover the crimes perpetrated in Rwanda, rather than 
create a separate ad hoc international tribunal. In other words the perpetrators of 
genocide and related crimes in a central African country should be tried not in an 
international tribunal situated on Rwandan territory or at least in the African continent, 
but in an ad hoc tribunal originally dedicated to war crimes in the Balkans and situated in 
a European capital.
It is difficult to rationalise this recommendation. Was it a desire to hasten the 
expansion of such a tribunal into a permanent international criminal court? To be sure, 
the ICC later came into being, and has its seat at The Hague, but it is institutionally 
separate from the ad hoc Yugoslavia tribunal. And the logic of its location is a somewhat 
different matter, for the ICC is permanent and not limited to any particular geographical 
region in its jurisdiction, and so The Hague - just as any other major city - might as well 
have been the successful candidate to host the ICC. An ad hoc prosecution of Rwandan 
war criminals is, however, another matter. The interim report of the Commission of 
Experts provided the formal basis for the establishment of an international tribunal by the 
Security Council. It was followed by a formal request from Rwanda to the Security
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Council to establish a tribunal67. The Rwandan request was a marked difference from the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia where the Security Council established the ICTY 
without an invitation from any of the warring parties. Thus, at least at the formal level, 
international judicial intervention in Rwanda proceeded with the consent of the affected 
state, whereas in the former Yugoslavia it did not.
The United States, having played a major role in blocking an international 
response to halt the genocide, now took the lead in creating an international tribunal. It 
largely drafted and negotiated with other members of the Security Council in late 1994 a 
draft resolution setting up such a mechanism. These negotiations, especially with 
Rwanda, whose rotating seat in the Security Council had by then been taken by the 
victorious RPF government, were difficult. Serious political tensions had developed 
between Rwanda and the Western states in the Security Council over several issues of 
policy and strategy in the emerging international framework of judicial accountability. 
Rwanda’s requests for more time for these difficulties to be ironed out were essentially 
rejected by the Western powers in the Council, which had already made significant 
compromises in a final draft resolution based on Rwandan objections.
On 8 November 1994, at the 3453rd meeting of the Security Council under the U.S. 
rotating presidency, Argentina, France, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Spain, Britain 
and the United States sponsored a draft resolution to create a tribunal. When the draft 
resolution was put to a vote, 13 of the Council’s 15 member states voted in favour, one 
(China) abstained and one voted against. The negative vote was cast by Rwanda. Thus 
did the Security Council, acting under the peace enforcement powers conferred on it by
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Chapter VII of the United Nations, adopt a resolution establishing an international 
tribunal68.
As noted a moment ago, several political and strategic issues loomed large in the 
voting patterns for the tribunal's creation and the diplomatic horse-trading that led up to 
the vote. The most important of these are what I call "framework" issues. They include 
the period for which crimes committed therein would fall within the International 
Tribunal’s mandate, and the specific crimes over which it could exercise jurisdiction. 
Others include the "primacy" of that jurisdiction, the death penalty debate, and the 
location of the tribunal. Many of these issues were related to the question of the 
independence of the International Tribunal.
The Framework
In its statement after the vote on Security Council Resolution 955, Rwanda cited 
its disagreement with the timeframe of crimes that the International Tribunal would 
adjudicate.69 Rwanda had proposed that the remit of the ICTR extend backwards to the 
massacres of Tutsis from 1 October 1990, when the civil war began, up to 17 July 1994, 
when the RPF took Kigali, established a new government, and brought the war to an end. 
That this proposed timeframe was calculated to maximize the de-legitimization of the 
previous Rwandan government through the comprehensive judicial and historical record 
the tribunal would establish is not in question. Conversely, in the pre-vote negotiations, 
the new Rwandan government strenuously objected to the extension of the Tribunal's 
mandate to crimes committed after 17 July 1994, for that framework would inevitably 
focus on revenge killings committed by its own forces. This is a classic demonstration of
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the CQncept of the Dijferend at play. The Security Council's compromise decision was to 
extend the International Tribunal's temporal jurisdiction backwards to 1 January 1994 in 
order to capture within the judicial framework part of the preparations to wipe out Tutsis 
and the Hutu political opponents of the ancien regime.
The statement by Jean-Bemard Merimee, the French Ambassador to the United 
Nations, captures this tension. Merimee, noting the significance of taking into account 
offences committed as from 1 January, also highlighted the importance of the Tribunal's 
remit extending to post-July offenses in Rwanda and neighbouring states, especially in 
the refugee camps in Zaire.70 He pointed to the possibility of further violations of 
international humanitarian law beyond December 1994, and asserted the Security 
Council's competence to further extend the Tribunal's temporal remit in that event. But 
this was not to be, for massacres of Hutus in a refugee camp in Kibeho near Zaire in 1995 
by the now Tutsi dominated Rwanda army in response to the use of that camp by the 
extremists that carried out the genocide, were to go unpunished for lack of any effective 
international jurisdiction.
Simply put, the RPF, having won the war in Rwanda, and with Tutsis the victims 
of a genocide, did not intend that an international tribunal should judge its own crimes 
and thus introduce any attempt at a balanced judicial/historical record. As will become 
clear when we examine Rwanda's subsequent relations with the International Tribunal, 
this was really the heart of the matter. This tension was also foreshadowed in the 
statement by Rwanda's Ambassador Bakuramutsa after the vote on the ICTR, when he 
expressed concern that the statute of the International Tribunal would lead it to "dispense 
its energy by prosecuting crimes that come under the jurisdiction of an internal tribunal"
292
(a reference to war crimes, to which the RPF had admitted in the report of the 
Commission of Experts), "instead of devoting its meagre human resources, and probably 
equally meagre financial ones, to trying the crime of crimes, genocide...".71
Primacy
The statute of the ICTR provided that both the International Tribunal and national 
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute violations of international 
humanitarian law in Rwanda and neighbouring states during the calendar year of 1994. 
But, in what was to establish the normative supremacy of the international court, the 
statute provided as well as that: "The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have 
primacy over the national courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its
nocompetence...." What this means is that although Rwandan and other national courts 
(the latter in the exercise of universal jurisdiction) could try the culprits of the crimes of 
1994, the International Tribunal had the first call. As such, even if proceedings against an 
accused person had begun in such national courts, the International Tribunal could 
request that such proceedings be discontinued and the persons on trial handed over to it.
This is the essential quality of international judicial intervention, under the 
auspices of the Security Council, in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In the case of 
Rwanda, the International Tribunal’s primacy has not been asserted through a take-over 
of cases in the Rwandan courts, for these did not involve the leadership of the genocide 
that the Tribunal considered its prime targets. Thus, such a scenario would have been 
truly absurd except in cases where a national judicial proceeding could be manifestly
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shown to be a kangaroo court73. Rather, the Tribunal’s focus has been on ensuring that 
it had the upper hand in obtaining custody of the "big fish" accused of responsibility 
for the genocide, virtually all of who were at large in third countries. Thus in the early 
years of the tribunal, efforts by the Rwandan government to apprehend major accused 
persons hiding in foreign countries were unsuccessful, as several countries preferred to 
surrender fugitives from justice to the International Tribunal. As for other national courts, 
initial judicial proceedings against some Rwandan accused persons in Belgium and 
Switzerland, for example, were terminated and the accused handed over the International 
Tribunal at the latter's request.74
Legally speaking, the primacy provision had the formal effect of rendering the 
International Tribunal independent of Rwanda and its authorities. This presaged major 
tensions between the two entities, for it also meant that not only did Rwanda have 
minimal input into the judicial work of the International Tribunal in respect of the 
prosecution of the genocidaires, but also, as we shall see later, from a legal standpoint it 
was on weak ground in terms of influencing how and by whom RPF forces might be 
prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
New Zealand, which together with the United States was an original sponsor of 
resolution 955 and had led the Security Council’s pre-vote negotiations with Rwanda over 
six weeks, was quick to assert the need to prevent the International Tribunal from coming 
under Rwanda's thumb. "New Zealand could not support any proposals that would 
change the international character of the tribunal or introduce any suggestion that the 
Tribunal could be subordinated to Rwandan political intervention", Ambassador Keating 
stated.75 Pointing to the probable future tensions between Rwanda and the International
294
Tribunal (but almost certainly not intending that his words would become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy), Keating urged Rwanda, although having voted against the Tribunal’s creation, 
to cooperate with it in light of the efforts made by the Security Council to accommodate 
Rwandan concerns about the court's framework.76
Spain, in a similar vein, emphasized the importance of the Tribunal's 
independence: "Just as in the case of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, we believe 
that the independence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda is its most important 
attribute: independence vis-a-vis Governments, independence vis-a-vis national tribunals 
and even independence vis-a-vis the United Nations itself."77 Britain's Ambassador, Sir 
David Hannay made clear that the "international character" of the tribunal had to be 
maintained, and some changes proposed by Rwanda could not be made without 
sacrificing that character78.
If, as we have seen, other states in the Security Council were prepared to--and did 
— ultimately override Rwanda's objections to the framework of the International Tribunal, 
China was not. Despite its reservations on the very concept of international judicial 
intervention (which will be discussed shortly), China had been prepared, based on 
Rwanda's initial request for an international tribunal, to support the draft resolution on the 
establishment of such a tribunal. From China's standpoint, however, the eventual absence 
of Rwandan support for the resolution had changed the picture in a fundamental manner. 
Rwanda's full cooperation was essential if the International Tribunal was to be effective, 
China argued. The Security Council's efforts to address Rwandan objections did not go 
far enough, and Rwanda's request for further consultations should have been acceded to. 
Li Zhaoxing, China's Ambassador, thus concluded that, "it is therefore an incautious act
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to vote in a hurry on a draft resolution that the Rwanda Government still finds difficult to 
accept, and it is also hard to tell what impact this may have on relevant efforts in future. 
Therefore, the Chinese delegation cannot but express its regret and has abstained from the 
vote"79. (Emphasis added).
The actual effect of international judicial intervention's primacy, then, is to 
suspend the sovereignty of state actors in the judicial sphere in certain respects and to 
vest it in the Security Council, in the case of international criminal tribunals such as the 
ICTR and the ICTY. Nigeria's Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari alluded to this normative 
anomaly in his post-vote statement in the Security Council: "It is our understanding that 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda is designed not to replace, but to complement, the 
sovereignty of Rwanda.. .".80 In fact, legally speaking, what Gambari warned against had 
already happened. (Politically, however, the reality turned out somewhat differently, as 
we will see later).
Rwanda was not the only country affected by this normative scenario. Resolution 
955 conferred jurisdiction on the ICTR for genocide crimes against humanity and war 
crimes committed, first within Rwanda in 1994 (no matter the nationality of the 
perpetrator), but also in respect of such crimes committed by Rwandan citizens in 
"neighbouring states" during the same period. There was no indication of just who those 
neighbours were, but the provision is understood to refer to the countries with which 
Rwanda shares a border - Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), Uganda, Burundi 
and Tanzania.
In just one illustration of the tension between sovereignty and international 
judicial intervention, Odyek Agona, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Uganda's Permanent
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Mission to the United Nations, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council 
one week before the vote on the draft resolution.81 Uganda, which was not a member of 
the Security Council at the time, pronounced itself opposed to the language of the draft 
statute of the International Tribunal that conferred the latter with primacy over national 
jurisdictions. The East African state asserted that it "considers that its judicial system has 
primacy and supreme jurisdiction and competence over any crimes committed on Uganda 
territory by its citizens or non-citizens, at any particular time."82 Uganda stated that it 
would agree to language that circumscribed the jurisdiction and competence of the 
proposed tribunal to "Rwandan territory and the territory of those member states which 
expressly declare acceptance of such jurisdiction". It pointed to the ongoing debates in 
the United Nations General Assembly on a standing international criminal court as a 
forum to which it would refer its full view on the surrender of its national jurisdiction 
over violations of international humanitarian law.
Closely interwoven in the issue of primacy and the independence of the 
International Tribunal was that of its eventual location. While it was not until February 
1995 that the Security Council was to decide on the seat of the tribunal, it was already 
apparent in early November 1994 (when the tribunal was formally created) that it would 
not be located in Rwanda. Rwanda read this as a slap on the face. How could an 
international tribunal "for Rwanda" - especially given the country’s unique need to see 
and feel justice for the genocide - be situated outside Rwanda?
The answer is to be found, again, in the emphasis on the international tribunal's 
primacy and its independence from Rwanda. The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia had already been situated in the Hague, far away from the Balkans
and setting the precedent. Indeed as we have seen, the ICTR avoided being consigned to 
The Hague by a whisker. In that context it is not surprising that it was not located in 
Rwanda itself. One reason for this is that, as Jose Alvarez has noted in a study of the 
logic and limitations of primacy, the prevailing wisdom at the time was to organize trials 
for mass atrocities away from the regions where the crimes occurred.83 That approach 
reinforced the state-centric prism from which international lawyers viewed such atrocities 
(although the purpose of criminal trials were to assign individual responsibility), thus 
necessitating top-down intervention by the "international community's most reputable 
enforcer, the United Nations". Trials in the locus criminis were likely to be show trials, 
or selective and incompetent in applying the international norms that are the legacy of 
Nuremberg ,85 This is the will-not-or-cannot argument. In the former Yugoslavia, it 
would have been inconceivable in 1993 that any national court would put senior political 
or military figures on trial for the crimes that accompanied the break up of that entity. In 
Rwanda, the infrastructure for such an effort simply did not exist. And the Rwandan 
government's willingness to put members of its own forces on trial for committing mass 
atrocities was far from palpable. Moreover, the atmosphere in Rwanda in the aftermath 
of the genocide was one in which many survivor-victims could accurately be described as 
the “walking dead”. In these circumstances it was not surprising that several, especially 
Western, members of the Security Council concluded that an environment in which 
impartial justice could be handed down was absent.
For Rwanda, China, Nigeria and Pakistan, however, Kigali was the best place to 
establish the International Tribunal provided necessary arrangements could be made for 
its efficient operation.86 While these countries appeared focused on the tribunal's
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potential positive impact on Rwandan society, the group of states that opposed locating 
the Tribunal in Rwanda were more concerned about its independence from Rwanda. Thus 
the latter group focused on the international court as a post-Nuremberg instrument to 
advance international law for a global audience. As of the vote on resolution 955 in 
November 1994, Pakistan argued that the Security Council should consider alternative 
locations only in the event it was clear that citing the Tribunal in Kigali would undermine 
its efficiency and impartiality -- an indication of which way the wind was blowing. And 
Rwanda, citing this as one of several reasons for voting against resolution 955, expressed 
its "surprise to see that the authors of the draft still hesitate to indicate where the future 
seat of the Tribunal will be".87
This was an admittedly difficult political problem to solve, for while the 
independence of the tribunal was seen as paramount at the time, subsequent lessons from 
international judicial intervention have pointed up the limited relevance of the ad hoc 
tribunals to the societies whose conflicts they were established to address. The 
compromise that was already imminent by the time the vote was taken on resolution 955 
by the Security Council was that of the imperative of establishing a major arm of the 
Tribunal in Kigali. The statement of the United States supporting the establishment of 
such an office and underscoring that a large part of the International Tribunal's work 
should be done in Rwanda was a clear indication of this compromise.88 That office was 
to be that of the prosecutor, which was to conduct investigations, mostly in Rwanda. The
on
Security Council later established the seat of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania .
Still, the question must be asked whether citing the judicial seat of the ICTR in 
Rwanda would have undermined the independence of the Tribunal. In retrospect, as a
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former senior official of the tribunal acknowledged, the answer is "yes”.90 Indeed, 
subsequent events also indicate that "independence" and impartiality" are relative terms 
in the context not of trials and judgements in individual cases before the tribunal (in the 
case of the ICTR these were unquestionably fair), but rather in that of carrying out the 
mandate of the Tribunal to investigate and adjudicate atrocities by both the genocidal, 
extremist Hutu Government, and the RPF forces that formed the post-genocide 
government.
At any rate, the safe distance between Arusha and Kigali created space in which 
the judges of the International Tribunal could consider evidence and adjudicate in a 
dispassionate manner. The obvious disadvantage of this situation was that the Tribunal's 
judges were somewhat divorced from the reality of the enormity of the genocide. Thus, in 
the early years of the tribunal, they bent over backwards not be seen as a victor's court - a 
situation the defendants manipulated with great success to slow down or disrupt the 
judicial proceedings through frivolous motions, leading to sarcastic assessments of the 
Tribunal by Rwandans.91 Not surprisingly, trials initially moved at a plodding pace, a 
situation that has been progressively reversed to one of brisk judicial proceedings. Indeed 
for several years after the tribunal was established, its judges resisted pressure to visit 
Rwanda and see the mass graves of genocide victims, believing that this would taint them 
emotionally and politically.92
That the Tribunal may have come under direct Rwandan political influence had its 
seat been in Kigali is apparent from a number of factors. The first is the effective socio­
political organization established by the victims of the genocide through victims support 
organizations such as Ibuka (“remember”), and their close links with the Rwandan
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authorities - many of the latter genocide survivors as well. Second, while the Rwandan 
authorities fully understood the very high standards of impartiality the ICTR had to 
maintain, the country's authorities include self confident, strategic thinkers capable of 
playing political "hardball". Their strong public reactions to occasional judgements of 
the ICTR that did not accord with their perspective, coupled with the "spontaneous" 
protest rallies and demonstrations by citizens and victims groups, leaves open to 
conjecture what might have been the psychological impact of such activities on 
international judges sitting in Kigali. It is this anecdotal peculiarity of the Rwandan 
national context, one in which there is a tendency to use the fact of the genocide to 
advance strategic political interests , that makes the situation there different from, say, 
Sierra Leone, where a mixed national/international court adjudicating mass atrocities in 
that country is situated. Third, were the ICTR situated in Kigali, the prospects for 
investigations into crimes allegedly committed by the RPF would have been even more 
difficult - not that the Tribunal's location in another country has made it easy, for reasons 
we will see later.
The death penalty was perhaps the most emotional issue for Rwanda that led to 
vote against resolution 955. The framework of the International Tribunal, as contained in 
the resolution, ruled out capital punishment, which is part of Rwanda's penal code. The 
Tribunal's statute provided for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Given that the 
ICTR was to try the architects of Rwanda's genocide, this situation created what 
Madeline Morris has called "anomalies of inversion" in which the "big fish" got better 
treatment at the International Tribunal in accordance with international human rights
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standards, while foot soldiers tried in Rwandan national courts could presumably get the 
death penalty if convicted.94
But the death penalty issue in the process of creating the Tribunal was really a 
proxy battle in the global politics of international human rights. The European states in 
the Security Council would not support the inclusion of the death penalty in the remit of a 
UN tribunal. That would be viewed as antithetical to, first, the "ethical" foreign policies 
of several liberal European states, and second, UN human rights standards that have 
made a definite shift away from capital punishment in the past four decades. Thus, the 
choice was between creating an international tribunal with death-penalty sentencing 
powers (a near impossibility in the contemporary international society) and having no 
tribunal at all. In this context, it is not surprising that Colin Keating, who possessed 
much moral authority as a strong advocate of humanitarian intervention to halt the 
genocide, made clear his country’s firm position on this thorny topic. Following the 
principle of "an eye for an eye", he stressed, was not "the path to establishing a civilized 
society, no matter how horrendous the crimes the individuals concerned may have 
committed."95 Rwanda, which was later to execute 22 persons convicted of genocide in 
1998, brushing aside appeals for clemency from Pope John Paul II and human rights 
groups, saw things rather differently.96 And it was no surprise that the United States, 
much criticized by European states for its tradition of capital punishment, was consistent 
in its sympathy for Rwanda's position on this particular point97
Bound up as well in the question of the independence of the ICTR was that of its 
independence from the ICTY at The Hague. The implications of the Security Council's 
decision to extend the ICTY Chief Prosecutor's responsibilities to cover the ICTR, as
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well as the rationales that have been offered for it, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Suffice to say at this juncture that failure to appoint a separate Chief Prosecutor for the 
ICTR, despite the tribunal's institutional status as one separate and independent from the 
ICTY, was an additional ground on which Rwanda cast the sole vote against resolution 
955. Argentina, in its statement after the vote, noted that it would have preferred a 
separate prosecutor for the ICTR. In 2003, almost a decade later, this issue was to come 
to a head.
Why the International Tribunal was Created
There are a number of reasons why the international society intervened judicially 
in Rwanda after the fact. First, as several other practitioners and commentators have 
asserted, the ICTR, as the ICTY, was established primarily as an act of political 
contrition for the failure of political will to intervene militarily to halt mass atrocities, and
no
not because there was a proactive, deliberate policy to promote international justice. 
Faced with its moral failure, the society of states did the next best thing - establishing a 
mechanism of judicial intervention to ensure that those responsible for the massacres 
were brought to justice. It was the path of least resistance, for it did not offer up the 
prospect of body bags that accompanied the far more risky option of sending in troops to 
stop the slaughter under a Chapter VII mandate. And the society of states could look 
itself in the face and say: "we did do something". It was largely for this reason that the 
United States, in light of its role in the debates on military intervention, championed the 
creation of the ICTR.
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Other rationales were grafted on to this fundamental guilt factor. It was 
conceived that such a tribunal would help achieve reconciliation between Tutsis and 
Hutus and deter future atrocities. The latter premise should be seen in the context of the 
apprehension diplomats felt that the conflict, although settled in Rwanda for the time 
being by the RPFs military victory, could be carried into Zaire and thus a clear and 
present danger to international peace and security remained." Thus, the ICTR became 
the first international criminal tribunal to be handed a remit encompassing 
"reconciliation" as a goal of juridical intervention. The ICTY statute had no such 
provision, and neither did the Nuremberg Charter.
Second, reacting as it was to an event that had already happened, the ICTR, like 
the ICTY, was then seen as a useful tool to advance the development of international 
criminal law - and within it a retributive model of accountability - as a post Nuremberg 
legacy.100 It was clearly understood (certainly by European delegations to the UN, as 
well as by human right advocates) that the ICTR and the ICTY would serve as a trial run 
for the creation of a permanent international criminal court.
Thirdly, the ICTR was created because the ICTY had been established 19 months 
earlier in May 1993 and was thus a strong precedent. And there are commentators like 
Samantha Power who believe that the existence of the ICTY at The Hague provided a 
precedent that was more than merely institutional: "With a UN court in place to hear 
charges related to the killing of some 200,000 Bosnians, it would have been politically 
prickly and manifestly racist to allow impunity for the planners of the Rwandan slaugher, 
the most clear-cut case of genocide since the Holocaust."101
304
Who killed the President?
Like the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1963, it may never be 
known who fired the missiles that brought down president Habyaramina's plane and 
killed him and his Burundian counterpart on 6 April 1994. Does it matter? From the 
legal standpoint of international judicial intervention, it does not. The ICTR was 
established to hand down justice for the genocide and other violations of international 
humanitarian law in Rwanda. These, by definition, are mass atrocities. The killings 
began in full force after the plane crash, although the conspiracy that led to the massacres 
was in place much earlier. Thus successive chief prosecutors of the Tribunal have not 
considered determining who killed the Habyaramina a line of inquiry worth pursuing for 
the Tribunal's purposes.102 The genocide is an objective fact and the identity of the 
Rwandan President’s killers is not of central relevance to the Tribunal's task of 
adjudicating individual criminal responsibility for the massacres, although, of course, it is 
important for Rwandans.
Nevertheless, the question of Habyarimana's assassination is an explosive 
political question that hangs in the background, making occasional ghost-like 
appearances as if to remind the Tribunal and the world that the genocide and the 
international judicial intervention it spawned are surrounded by questions that are 
profoundly political103. Supporters of the regime, such as Kenya under former President 
Daniel Arap Moi, were quick to point out in the Tribunal's early days, ultimately to no 
avail, that this should have been the starting point of inquiry for the ICTR104.
The reason the assassination is so politically significant is that, in the hands of the 
extremist forces in the dock of Arusha, if they are able to pin responsibility on the RPF,
they would be better able to deflect their individual responsibility for the massacres at a 
political, even if not legal level. It would thus serve as a political justification for the 
genocide: the Tutsis killed the President of the Republic and the Rwandan masses reacted 
uncontrollably. Ergo, those of us in the dock are merely scapegoats. Responsibility for 
the atrocities could thus be divided between Tutsis and Hutus, and the establishment of 
an international tribunal that has so far prosecuted only Hutus would be seen as victors’ 
justice. The legitimacy of the ICTR would therefore be greatly weakened.
Hutu extremists began to allege RPF responsibility for the plane crash as soon as
it happened. The French judge Jean Louis Brugiere prepared a report based on
investigations he conducted on behalf of the families of four French crew members who
also died in the plane crash, which blamed the current Rwandan President Paul Kagame
and his RPF forces for the assassination of Habyarimana105. The report was leaked to the
French newspaper Le Monde in the lead up to the tenth anniversary of the genocide in
«
early April 2004. Kagame strenuously denied the report’s allegations. "The RPF and 
myself have nothing to do with the death of Habyarimana", Kagame declared at a press 
conference in Brussels. "I cannot comment on what Judge Brugiere may have found or 
may have fabricated. The story is invented."106
There are several hypotheses about the identity of the persons who shot down 
Habyarimana's Falcon 50 jet, and Gerard Prunier ably analyzes them all in his magisterial 
history of the genocide.107 But it is clear that he believes — with abundant support from 
first hand information and commonsense deduction - - that the greater likelihood is that 
Habyarimana was assassinated as part of a plot by the extremist akazu for whom he had 
become a political liability by virtue of his concessions to the RPF, in order to advance to
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the "final solution" phase of the genocide plan. There are few stronger indicators of this 
probability, and the connection between the two events, than the speed with which the 
attack on Habyarimana's plane was followed by the establishment of roadblocks in Kigali 
manned by death squads who began to search houses for Tutsi victims. The time lag 
between the two events was no more than 45 minutes.108
Some authoritative sources are sceptical of the Brugiere report. Bernard Muna, 
the former deputy chief prosecutor of the ICTR holds the position that the Brugiere's 
report is based largely on the theories of Paul Reyntjens, a Belgian academic who was a 
close adviser to Habyarimana.109 Moreover, the Brugiere report relied significantly on 
interviews (with the tribunal's permission) in Arusha with several accused persons on 
trial at the tribunal, including Hassan Ngeze, as well as a defector from the RPF who had 
fallen out with the regime and went into exile in the United States.110
The Brugiere report has reopened controversy — and old wounds — in relations 
between Rwanda and France. As noted earlier, the shooting of Habyarimana's plane 
appears to have merely signalled the start of the massacres, but put nothing new in place 
in terms of preparations for the genocide. From all the evidence established by the ICTR, 
the genocide had been meticulously prepared. Moreover, the area where the plane was 
shot down was under the control of the Rwandan Government Forces111.
There are yet other angles to the question of who shot the plane, based largely on 
who had interest in Habyarimana's death. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the 
RPF had no strategic interest in committing the act -- as Prunier argues -- a school of 
thought, speculative though it is, is that Habyarimana's death would certainly have 
benefited the RPF by demoralising the Rwanda Government forces, and the visceral
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slaughter of Tutsis that (predictably) followed would give the RPF an excuse to renew 
hostilities and push for the decisive military victory and political power that was its 
ultimate goal. After all, there was a state of war, and Habyarimana could be considered a 
legitimate target112.
All these theories are, in the end, speculative. Only concrete or credible 
eyewitness evidence can confirm who did the deed of Habyarimana's death. In the 
absence of either, all that Rwandans and the world have to go on is circumstantial 
evidence and logical deductions. And in Rwandan politics, nothing can be taken fully at 
face value. The real questions remain: was the genocide prepared in advance? It is clear 
that it was. What then could have launched it? Answer: a bold act, such as the 
assassination of Habyarimana that could be used as a convincing pretext. In the words of 
The Economist: “The crime was planned in advance; the machetes had already been 
ordered. It would have happened anyway”113.
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Chapter 7
The Politics of Justice: The International Prosecutor Is Ousted
We try to keep politics out o f it, but over the years I ’ve seen how hard it is.
- Carla Del Ponte
This chapter seeks to establish in an empirical manner through a case study, the 
political and strategic environment in which the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda pursues justice. It will review and analyze the tension between political and 
legalistic approaches to violations of international humanitarian law inherent in the split 
of the previously combined position of chief prosecutor of the ICTY and the ICTR, and 
the removal of the Swiss lawyer Ms Carla Del Ponte as chief prosecutor of the ICTR. 
That tension arose chiefly from Del Ponte’s attempts to investigate and prosecute one of 
the parties to the Rwandan conflict of 1990-1994.
The ICTR has made significant strides in advancing the cosmopolitan norms of 
international humanitarian law, i.e. individual criminal responsibility for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, or what Hedley Bull called “human justice” in a 
world of states.1 As noted in the previous chapter, it was the first international criminal 
tribunal to hand down verdicts for the crime of genocide, ruling that rape can be genocide. 
It has been particularly successful in bringing to justice the high ranking political leaders, 
military commanders and other individuals accused of responsibility for the genocide and 
other violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda in 1994. In this context it 
was the first international criminal tribunal to convict a head of government, in this case 
the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, of genocide, a precedent that the ICTY built upon 
in indicting and prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic.
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I cite these strides in the work of the Tribunal first because they are facts that 
form part of its legal and political context, for the establishment of norms -- described as 
“norm entrepreneurship” -  by international war crimes tribunals is a political dynamic in 
so far as it seeks to affect or modulate the behaviour of states or individual political 
leaders in national and international society by enforcing norms in the name of the 
“international community”.3 But, especially because they represent the progress of the 
solidarist view of international relations, in this case international justice as policy, I cite 
them to protect myself from a charge of selecting self-serving cases to suit my arguments 
in the cases I examine below.
What this case demonstrates is that other political and strategic factors impact on 
war crimes justice as applied in the ICTR (and other such tribunals) and are therefore 
just as important -  or even more important -  a reality. It illustrates the tension between 
Rwanda’s pursuit of its strategic interests and the International Tribunal’s efforts to 
protect its judicial independence as a court of law. These political and strategic interests 
have significantly limited the potential of the ICTR to fully achieve (a) its specific 
mandate to prosecute the persons responsible for the violations of international 
humanitarian law in 1994 committed by both sides to the conflict, and (b) the wider goal 
of contributing to reconciliation as expressed by the Security Council in the Tribunal.
I make significant use of interviews with key principals at the tribunal and a 
diplomatic representative of the great power that has been most actively supportive of the 
Tribunal, personalities who have been among the prominent dramatis personae in these 
events, in addition to standard research and analysis, to demonstrate the interplay
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between justice and politics that is a particular characteristic of international criminal 
tribunals.
Rwanda (and others) v Carla Del Ponte
When the ICTR was established in 1994, its statute provided that the ICTY chief 
prosecutor would also be the chief prosecutor of the ICTR.4 Thus for much of the past 
decade, the two tribunals had a common prosecutor. The South African Judge Richard 
Goldstone was the first prosecutor for both tribunals. He was followed by the Canadian 
Judge Louise Arbour, who was succeeded in 1999 by Carla Del Ponte, the former 
Attorney-General of Switzerland. On 28 August 2003, the Security Council decided that 
the ICTR should have its own full-time prosecutor, splitting the chief prosecutorial post 
and effectively removing Carla Del Ponte as ICTR prosecutor against her wishes.5 Del 
Ponte was nevertheless reappointed as chief prosecutor of the ICTY.
This chapter analyzes Del Ponte’s removal and the Security Council’s decision. It 
concludes that there were a combination of factors, some institutional, others of a raw 
political nature, that led to the chief prosecutor being ousted from her prosecutorial role 
in Arusha. Taken together, these factors were all ultimately political, to the extent that 
they demonstrate how the great powers determine the framework of war crimes tribunals. 
And the decision was the outcome of a political process in the Security Council. Mixed 
with what is, from an objective standpoint, a potentially beneficial impact on the 
effectiveness of the Tribunals, the decision was also taken to serve medium to longer 
term strategic interests of the great powers regarding the future and lifespan of the ICTR 
and the ICTY. Carla Del Ponte's prosecutorial policies had become inimical to those
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interests. Her convictions about her statutorily guaranteed "independence" as a 
prosecutor clashed with the reality that it was the Security Council, the tribunal’s parent 
organ and a political body that called the shots.
It is widely believed, certainly by Del Ponte herself, that she was removed as 
ICTR prosecutor as a result of a diplomatic campaign waged by the Rwandan 
government in reprisal for her attempts to investigate war crimes committed by RPF 
troops in 1994 and bring charges against some of those soldiers (all of whom were Tutsi) 
before the Tribunal. However, the publicly stated reason for her removal from the ICTR 
post had to do with expediting the efficient implementation of the road map to wrap up 
the work of the ICTY and the ICTR by 2010. In that context, there were valid questions 
about the continued viability of having one prosecutor for ICTR/ICTY. Management 
problems in Del Ponte's prosecutorial office at the ICTR also appear to have become 
intertwined with the "completion strategy" question. I shall examine the question of a 
single prosecutor for the International Tribunals at the Hague and Arusha, followed by 
the completion strategy question, and then the "Rwanda factor".
Yoked to The Hague
A root problem that had faced the prosecutorial function of the ICTR was the 
structural one of the ICTR situated in Arusha and the ICTY headquarters at The Hague, 
having a single chief prosecutor in the first place. The arrangement appeared plausible 
and workable when it was made. The ICTY had been established 19 months earlier than 
the ICTR in May 1993. It was not fully appreciated in the early days of 1993-1994 just 
how complicated and time consuming the trials at both Tribunals would become. There
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was also a certain view that both courts would benefit from the development of a 
common prosecution strategy, standardized procedures, and case law, developed in the 
then newly emergent system of international criminal justice and facilitated by their 
having a single chief prosecutor.6
But this is an apolitical view, or an apolitical rationale for a politically inspired 
construct. The counter-factual is that the ICTR having been established largely out of 
guilt and then only because the ICTY existed as a precedent, there was a perhaps 
unconscious instinct to situate it in the shadow of the The Hague by having the ICTY 
chief prosecutor supervise prosecutions at the ICTR. Moreover, it was clear that, in 
establishing the two International Tribunals, a totally new concept of intervention had 
emerged in the international society, and it was strategically important at the time to 
centralize control of that instrument in one person who would be accountable to the 
Security Council.
Furthermore, setting common jurisprudential standards is a task for judges, not 
prosecutors. The two tribunals have appellate courts that are technically separate but are 
composed of the same judges. As most verdicts at the trial level are appealed, the 
appellate chambers were expected to ensure that there were no embarrassing 
contradictions in the jurisprudence that was being established for the first time since 
Nuremberg. All of this is to make the point that having one prosecutor for both tribunals 
was not essential or even logical - a rough equivalent is to argue that, because the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were established by the same group of allied states, they 
should have had the same prosecutor for separate war crimes tribunals in two continents.
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There also was a fundamental, practical question: could one chief prosecutor 
oversee prosecutors at The Hague and Arusha at the same time, with the heavy caseloads 
at both courts and the necessary commitment of time? Even in the early days of the 
ICTR and the ICTY Judge Goldstone had a difficult time heading the prosecution 
functions of both Tribunals.7 And, as an internal investigation by the UN’s Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) found ten years after the ICTR was created, the 
expected synergy from having a common chief prosecutor for the two Tribunals did not 
materialize, leading the internal watchdog to conclude that "consideration needed to be 
given to the ICTR having its own Prosecutor."8
As we have seen, at the time ICTR was established in 1994, Rwanda criticized the 
strong - and subordinate - institutional link to the ICTY of the prosecutorial office of the 
ICTR, a Tribunal that was formally separate and independent from the ICTY.9 Argentina 
would also have preferred a tribunal with its own appeals chamber and prosecutor but 
"understood the reasons why the present solution was accepted", and was pleased to see 
that as a compromise, a deputy chief prosecutor was to be appointed for the ICTR.10
The greatest political impact of the original design that yoked the ICTR to ICTY 
through one prosecutor based at The Hague was that the arrangement appeared decidedly 
"colonial". It created a strong impression of the ICTR as an appendage of the ICTY, 
reinforcing a view that the "African" Tribunal was not really as important in the eyes of 
global policy makers as the "European” Tribunal. The Rwandan government certainly 
felt that justice for their citizens was not as high a global priority as justice in the 
Balkans.11 Thus the ICTR appeared second class in relation to the ICTY by reason of
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having a "part-time chief prosecutor" based at The Hague and pre-occupied with the trials 
of Slobodan Milosevic and other accused Balkan war criminals.
When Arbour was the chief prosecutor of both Tribunals, Bernard Muna, her 
deputy for the ICTR, essentially ran the prosecution and enjoyed a large degree of 
delegated authority. Upon Arbour's departure, Muna's relationship with her successor 
Del Ponte soured progressively because the latter whittled down Muna's role and insisted 
on centralizing decision-making for the ICTR prosecution office at The Hague. Del 
Ponte eventually removed Muna from his position in 2001 by declining to recommend to 
the Secretary-General the renewal his appointment upon its expiration ; the deputy chief 
prosecutor's position (and that of chief of prosecutions) were then subsequently left 
unfilled for nearly two years (partly because of internal disagreements between the 
Prosecutor and the then newly appointed Registrar, Adama Dieng over the qualifications 
of the candidates and on procedural issues regarding the selection process), creating 
grave management problems for war crimes prosecutions for the ICTR half of her 
office.12
Carla Del Ponte had been aware of the criticisms of neglect of Rwanda war 
crimes trials by a Hague-based chief prosecutor. On arrival at the ICTR, she indicated a 
desire to rent permanent accommodation at Arusha and divide her residence between The 
Hague and Arusha, but subsequently appeared unable to follow this through. Her 
subsequent visits to Arusha and Kigali (about four times a year) still did not remove an 
impression of a parachuting prosecutor who ran the ICTR prosecution team by remote 
control from The Hague.
All of this notwithstanding, there was nothing in the public domain to indicate 
that the Security Council was considering a re-structuring of the post of chief prosecutor 
of the ICTR and the ICTY. However, as Del Ponte approached the completion of her 
initial four-year appointment as chief prosecutor of the ICTY/ICTR in September 2003 
and a renewal was up for consideration by the Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan wrote a letter to the Council recommending the appointment of a separate 
prosecutor for the ICTR. It was on the basis of that recommendation that the Council 
split the previous single prosecutor position into two13 and in a subsequent decision14, 
appointed former Gambian attorney-general and Supreme Court Judge Hassan Bubacar 
Jallow chief prosecutor of the ICTR. Annan's letter anchored his recommendation on the 
need for efficient completion strategies for both Tribunals. The Security Council's 
decision agreed with this rationale, with the Council noting that it was "convinced that 
the ICTY and the ICTR can most efficiently meet their responsibilities if each has its own 
Prosecutor.15
Completion Strategy
Several states on the Security Council have become increasingly weary of 
financing the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, although the costs of 
both Tribunals do not amount to more than a tiny fraction of global military spending by 
the Western powers that contribute most of the Tribunal’s costs16. This is an indication 
that the real reason for the pressure for a completion strategy may be that, after a decade, 
the Tribunals are close to discharging their core mandates, and their continued existence 
exerts pressure for the application of similar judicial interventions in other, politically
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inconvenient situations where such a course of action is not perceived as a matter of state 
interest by the great powers.
There is, of course, the quite valid need to avoid “mission creep”. The Tribunals
had no "sunset clause" that assured a date for the completion of their work, a situation
that Brazil had expressly criticized during the statements in the Security Council that
followed the vote that established the ICTR.17 The cases before the two ad hoc Tribunals
initially moved at a plodding pace, largely because they had too few judges and crowded
dockets. After a decade of existence, it was obvious that if nothing drastic was done,
hearings would continue for another 15 to 20 years -- situation that would make a
mockery of the phrase "ad hoc Tribunals". It became imperative to establish an end date
— initially called an "exit strategy" but later changed to the more elegant and politically
correct phrase "completion strategy" — for the ICTY and ICTR to wrap up their trials. In
Rwanda’s case, where the ICTR prosecution relied mostly on witness testimony (unlike
the Nazi trials where there was a long trail of documentary evidence, or the former
Yugoslavia, where Western powers had satellite images of mass graves and
communications intercepts of the conversations of Serb military commanders) the
accuracy of recollections from memory of events that occurred more than a decade ago,
was an additional concern. The Security Council has set a cut-off date for the end of
2008 for trials and 2010 for appeals for both International Tribunals. To achieve that
18target, all investigations by the prosecution were to be completed by the end of 2004 .
For the United States, the main financial and political supporter of the two courts, 
there were even more strategic reasons to shorten the lifespan of the Tribunals: America's 
critics were making good use of the inconsistency in principle between American support
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for the ad hoc tribunals and its vigorous opposition to the ICC. In reality, however, the 
ad hoc tribunals were set up to deal with specific regional conflicts and did not pose as 
much of a strategic threat to America as the ICC, which covers many more countries by 
treaty arrangement and thus aims to be universal. Even then, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
an attempt had been made to bring charges against U.S. troops for alleged war crimes 
committed during the NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999 - an incident that infuriated 
American policy makers and strengthened their resolve against the ICC.
Thus both ad hoc, UN Security Council created tribunals and the ICC were 
institutions that reflected the same ideal of cosmopolitan justice, but were different only 
as a matter of specifics -  the ad hoc tribunals created by the Security Council were more 
easily amenable to great power influence than a standing international war crimes 
tribunal established by treaty. An overly extended life span for the ICTY and the ICTR 
had become inconvenient, and consistency of position from an American foreign policy 
perspective had to be established. U.S. war crimes ambassador Pierre Richard Prosper 
announced the year 2008 as Washington’s preferred completion date for the work of the 
tribunals19. It is no coincidence that this view was to become the official policy of the 
UN Security Council.
An important factor in U.S. policy is also that of a general shift in preference from 
top-down, international interventions to the establishment of accountability by national 
courts for violations of international humanitarian law20. Prosper faced criticism for his 
proactive policy push for a specific end date for the work of the Tribunals, with some 
critics complaining that his statements called the independence of the ad hoc Tribunals 
into question -  a criticism that glosses over the political reality that the Tribunals were
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created by the great powers and their lifespan thus dependent on the political decisions of 
those powers.21
To calls for a completion strategy involving significant pruning of numbers of 
investigations in order to meet a cut-off date of 2004, Carla Del Ponte was initially 
politically tone-deaf. She saw her role as an independent prosecutor. One of 
investigating, indicting and prosecuting accused war criminals as long as there were any 
at large. As late as November 2001, addressing the Security Council, Del Ponte outlined 
her intention to launch a further 136 investigations at the ICTR to bring her investigative 
mandate to an end by December 2004.22 This was an "outer universe", as the chief 
prosecutor explained that several factors affected whether or not investigations resulted in 
actual prosecutions - some of the suspects may be dead, not all investigations succeeded 
in gathering substantive evidence, and some of the accused persons simply could not be 
traced.23
Despite these caveats, several members of the Security Council, judges of the 
ICTR, and even Del Ponte’s staff in Arusha and Kigali were uneasy with such a large 
number of investigative targets. Knowing how slowly the wheels of justice turned, there 
was no realistic prospect of completing so many investigations of alleged war criminals 
by the end of 2004. Moreover, not a few of her colleagues believed that many of the 
additional suspects Del Ponte was bent on pursuing were persons who ought to be no 
priority for an International Tribunal that hitherto had focused mainly on apprehending 
the "big fish". But Del Ponte now sought to establish what she called "the local face of 
the genocide" by indicting persons who, though only of minimal significance in the 
planning nationwide massacres in the national context, were important ringleaders at
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local levels. She believed that she should investigate and propose indictments as long as 
there were targets, but several members of the Security Council became increasingly 
concerned at her purist approach. By July 2002, reluctantly responding to the political 
pressure from states, Del Ponte revised her investigations program for the ICTR from 136 
new suspects to 14, with 10 ongoing investigations, making a total of 24 projected new 
indictments.24 In May 2003, however, the number of new investigative targets increased 
to 26.25
At the Security Council
What, then, happened in the capitals of members of the Security Council and in 
New York regarding the future of the ICTR chief prosecutor? U.S. Ambassador Prosper 
provided this rationale for the removal of Del Ponte:
The management of the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] was severely lacking from
the very beginning, exacerbated by the fact that the prosecutor was based at The 
Hague. There were all the problems [between Del Ponte and the ICTR deputy 
prosecutor 7J Everyone was afraid to make a decision because it had to be cleared at 
The Hague - and that's no way to run an office. The set-up was inherently inefficient. 
That was a driving factor. The next part was the completion strategy. Because the 
prosecutor's office was inefficient, the chances of our reaching a completion strategy 
were reduced. So we put the two together and decided that this [removing Del Ponte] 
was the best way to go."26
It is clear, then, that United States foreign policy played a critical role in Del
Ponte's ouster. But the manner in which the process transpired was not scripted by
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Washington. It was rather the United Kingdom that proposed splitting the position of the
97ICTY/ICTR chief prosecutor and appointing a separate prosecutor for ICTR. The U.S. 
was drafting the Security Council resolution on a decision on Del Ponte's mandate when 
it came up for review in August 2003. America's initial strategy, led by Prosper, had 
been to deny the chief prosecutor a full four-year appointment. Rather, Del Ponte's joint 
appointment for ICTY and ICTR would be extended for one year only, with the
9Rpossibility of yearly renewals. This strategy was designed to be used as a leverage to 
ensure that the completion strategy followed a script written by the great powers, 
especially the U.S. That way, they could say to Del Ponte: "either you get things moving 
in a certain direction or you may lose your job."29
It was at this point that Britain proposed the idea of splitting the prosecutorial 
functions of the two tribunals. Washington’s initial response was cautious. It did not 
oppose the British proposal, and in fact eventually warmed to it. But the U.S. still felt 
committed to its original approach. As it "shopped" its draft of a resolution around to 
members of the Security Council, however, Washington found that it was "not getting 
any traction" on its proposal for a one-year extension, but "everyone was getting excited 
about the proposal for a split" of the prosecutor's functions.30 The U.S. then swung 
behind the British proposal. It still toyed with the idea of renewing Del Ponte's mandate 
at The Hague for one year, with roll-overs while approving a new chief prosecutor at 
Arusha for a full four-year term. The possibility was discussed by several diplomats, but 
it proved too complicated and was dropped.
While national diplomats in various capitals and in New York were talking 
quietly to themselves about Del Ponte's future, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had
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perhaps the most accurate picture of the institutional problems that had afflicted Del 
Ponte’s tenure as chief prosecutor of the U.N. ad hoc tribunals (the chief prosecutor is 
appointed by the Security Council, but on the recommendation of the Secretary-General), 
was coming to his own conclusions about the position. He too, keenly aware that, in his 
words ’’the question of the separation of the prosecutor function has been around for quite 
a long time,"31 reached an assessment that the completion of Del Ponte's four year term 
presented the perfect opportunity to solve the problem once and for all. Annan was 
motivated largely by the logistical problems that confronted a prosecutor in directing 
prosecutions in two tribunals thousands of kilometres apart, the need for undivided 
attention to both the cases at Arusha and the Milosevic trial at The Hague, and the 
Security Council's judgement that the time had come for the ICTY and the ICTR to each 
have its own prosecutor if the work of the two tribunals was to be completed in good 
time.32 The negotiations among members of the Security Council were low-key, but it 
was Annan's letter of 28 July to the Council recommending a split that sealed Del Ponte's 
fate.33
The Swiss-born prosecutor, however, was determined to retain her dual position -  
and to fight for it if necessary. She flew to New York in late July and held two tense 
meetings with Annan. Following their initial meeting, the Secretary-General agreed to 
give Del Ponte a chance to lobby Security Council members to renew her appointment at 
both Tribunals, which was to expire on 15 September.34 On 29 July Del Ponte met 
Annan again to brief him on her discussions with members of the Council before 
returning to Europe. Sensing that what she termed a “political” decision on her fate had 
already been made, she made a proposal she thought could save the day and take the sting
out of the looming decision to relieve her of her Rwanda post: Del Ponte informed Annan 
that, if her post was to be split, she would rather be prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda than the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. Could she choose between The Hague and Kigali?, she asked. "No", she 
recounted that Annan responded. "The trial of Milosevic is too important to be left in the 
hands of someone else"36. It is doubtful that Carla Del Ponte’s request was anything 
more than a tactical ploy to keep her double-barrelled title. Few believe she had any real 
desire to give up the Hague for Arusha. Leaving the UN Headquarters building after her 
meeting with the Secretary-General, and with political reporters in tow, Del Ponte was 
asked about the encounter. "No comment," she responded. "Ask the Secretary-General". 
But she was to tell the media later that the head of the UN's office of legal affairs had 
informed her that a majority of Security Council members favoured dividing the 
prosecutor's post. Annan, she said, was "inflexible" and "I realized there was no room for 
negotiation."37
Rwanda's Campaign
Although Rwandan officials disavowed any role in Del Ponte’s removal from her 
post,38 Del Ponte attributes her removal from the ICTR largely to pressure by Rwanda's 
government on various members of the Security Council in response to Del Ponte's
•>Q
attempts to investigate war crimes committed by the RPF. Circumstantial evidence 
points to a concerted diplomatic lobby by Rwanda to have Del Ponte consigned to The 
Hague as ICTY prosecutor and a separate prosecutor appointed for the ICTR. In addition 
to New York, part of that campaign is believed to have taken place at the annual summit
329
of heads of state and government of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique in July 
2003, bringing the African members of the Security Council on board40. The relative 
weight of the Rwandan campaign vis-a-vis the other factors discussed above is difficult 
to determine. That it had some influence on some key member states of the Security 
Council is not in doubt. It is not certain whether the Rwandan campaign's influence on 
the great powers was predicated on the order-based, strategic argument that derives from 
a perceived need to ensure the stability of Rwanda's government, as Del Ponte and many 
observers believe, or on the institutional reasons discussed earlier. It is more likely that, 
for certain states at least, both factors were important.
Rwanda's relationship with the ICTR has always been one of shifting alliances 
and moods, guided by what the country considers as its strategic interest. Its leader, 
President Paul Kagame is widely respected as a cerebral, strategic soldier and political 
leader. His credibility rests on his reputation for discipline and for having ended the 
genocide with the RPF military victory. In the latter fact lies the tension in Rwanda's 
relationship with the International Tribunal's mandate to prosecute crimes committed by 
both sides to the conflict. Thus, despite the letter of the Tribunal's statute, the RPF has 
consistently been sensitive to what it sees as attempts to create a moral equivalency 
between the genocide of nearly a million Tutsis and war crimes of relatively far lesser 
gravity committed by the troops that liberated the country. It has sought to ensure that 
the day when the ICTR would indict RPF (and mostly Tutsis) troops would never come. 
When the then ICTR registrar, Okali, met with Paul Kagame in Kigali in 1998, Kagame 
described his country and the Tribunal as "partners” in the search for justice41. Whether 
that “partnership" concept includes trials of RPF troops is open to conjecture. For the
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Hutu opponents of the Rwandan government, the credibility of the Tribunal - and the 
possibilities of political reconciliation — rest on whether or not the .ICTR is able to punish 
crimes committed by RPF soldiers. Absent such accountability, these Hutus say, the 
Tribunal is the justice of the victor. From this perspective, the Hutu extremists that 
authored the genocide regret not the massacres they planned and committed, but losing 
the war.
This situation was always a challenge for the ICTR. The nature of the institution 
meant that it could not function effectively — including in investigating RPF crimes -- 
without Rwanda's cooperation because much of those investigations had to take place in 
Rwandan territory. Although non-cooperation could trigger sanctions by the Security 
Council if the Tribunal reported as much, in reality the guilt that states felt over their 
failure to prevent or halt the genocide, coupled with the close strategic relationship the 
U.S. and Britain established with Rwanda after the genocide, made resort to such a tool -- 
at least in the early years of the Tribunal's work — unlikely.
It was in this context that the Tribunal had to proceed. And there was a tactical 
question: should the ICTR investigate RPF war crimes early on, when the likes of alleged 
genocide mastermind Theoneste Bagosora were yet to be judged? Or should such 
investigations be left to the tail end of the Tribunal's work? Despite the provisions of the 
statute, in light of the heavy caseload from the genocide, were trials of RPF prosecutions 
really unavoidable? We will return to this question later.
In the beginning, however, the Government of Rwanda indicated in its 
interactions with the ICTR prosecution that it would cooperate with investigations of 
alleged RPF crimes. But subsequent events proved that, when faced with the imminence
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of such inquiries, Kigali balked.42 It soon became evident that the Rwandan authorities 
were not inclined to allow the investigation and possible indictment of RPF soldiers.
In the period from 1997 to 1999 chief prosecutor Louise Arbour and her deputy 
Bernard Muna embarked a discrete conversation with the Rwandan government on this 
sensitive aspect of the chief prosecutor’s task.43 The response from Kagame was initially 
positive. The ICTR senior prosecutors wanted the government to turn over files on 
alleged massacres such as the killings of the Catholic priests in Kabgayi. They sought to 
persuade the Rwandan authorities, including through Rwanda's military prosecutor that 
cooperating with the International Tribunal was in the country’s interest.
Del Ponte's appointment as the new chief prosecutor - and the jarring note 
introduced by the Barayagwiza case, in which the Tribunal’s appellate court ordered the 
release of a high ranking genocide accused and reversed its decision following the 
deterioration of relations between Rwanda and the international court, delayed these 
negotiations.44 Moreover, Del Ponte's aggressive stance complicated the more
cautious strategy of her predecessors.45 Some ICTR prosecution investigators were 
subsequently dispatched to European countries to follow up on investigative leads 
regarding alleged war crimes by RPF soldiers. But this approach was never going to 
yield nearly as much as investigations on the ground in Rwanda conducted with 
Rwanda's cooperation.
When Del Ponte first discussed the investigations into RPF atrocities with 
President Kagame sometime in 2000, the Rwandan leader pledged his cooperation, but he 
later backtracked as a result of pressure from hard-liners within the Rwandan military. 
Their argument: The RPF government had integrated several Hutu soldiers of the former
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RGF into the new post-genocide national army. Not a few of these integrated soldiers 
had doubtless committed atrocities. If they (former RPF troops) are to be prosecuted, 
then the Hutus in the army would have to face trial too, they argued. If everyone who 
committed violations of international humanitarian law were to be prosecuted, order 
would be threatened.46 In the African political context, a coup attempt by disgruntled 
Tutsi soldiers who would feel threatened by ICTR indictments could not be ruled out. 
And such a scenario would be profoundly destabilizing to the RPF’s hard-won victory.* 
Kagame had to keep his troops pacified by not giving in to the chief prosecutor's 
demands.
Del Ponte met with Kagame in Kigali again in April 2001. Kagame again 
promised his government's cooperation. Rwigamba, the Rwandan military prosecutor, 
participated in the meeting. He told the media afterwards: "We reiterated our 
determination to cooperate in dealing with suspects of genocide and other crimes against 
humanity...especially, on behalf of the [Rwandan] military we reiterated the same 
cooperation" 47
One year later the picture had changed, with a decidedly frosty chill emanating 
from the Rwandan authorities towards Del Ponte's investigations. Three specific 
investigations of RPF crimes were already underway, and Del Ponte was hoping to issue 
the first indictments before the end of the year 48 "We have opened investigations into 
three massacres”, she said. "I have spoken to Paul Kagame. I showed him a list of the 
massacres and said we will be investigating. I said that if Rwanda wants justice and 
peace there must be accountability on both sides."49 But the international prosecutor 
noted that the Rwandan leader had not delivered on his pledge to cooperate, and most of
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the investigations into massacres allegedly committed by the RPF had been conducted 
outside Rwanda.50
The relationship between the ICTR prosecutor's office and the Rwandan 
authorities had by now become so tense that the Tribunal relocated the chief prosecutor's 
"special investigations team" that was conducting those investigators from Kigali, where 
it had been based all along, to Arusha, Tanzania, the seat of the Tribunal in order to 
ensure a more free atmosphere for their work. This move, of course, also had the 
disadvantage of limiting the investigator's access to Rwandan sources. Del Ponte felt, 
however, that she could not compromise the security of her staff.
In mid-2002, Rwanda suspended cooperation with the Tribunal by imposing 
restrictions on Rwandan witnesses who had to travel from Kigali to Arusha to give 
evidence as prosecution witnesses in trials. This action was based on claims by some of 
the witnesses — who also happened to be survivors -- that they had been subjected to 
insensitive treatment at the hands of defence counsel, court officials and even judges. 
With witnesses effectively barred from coming to Arusha to testify in the hearings, 
several trials ground to a temporary halt. In these circumstances, the Tribunal's judges 
issued judicial rulings in the cases affected by the witness crisis, reprimanding Rwanda's 
non-cooperation and reminding the Rwandan government of its statutory obligation to 
cooperate with the Tribunal's judicial work.
This was to no avail. The Tribunal's President at the time, the South African 
Judge Navanethem Pillay, formally reported Rwanda's non-cooperation to the Security 
Council, backing up complaints by Del Pone. It took the Council a full six months to 
respond to Judge Pillay's report. This delay created the impression, right or wrong, that
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the Council's commitment to exerting pressure on Rwanda was open to question. 
Nevertheless, several governments especially the U.S. privately pressed Kigali to resume 
cooperation with the Tribunal. The flow of prosecution witnesses from Rwanda to 
Arusha resumed after several months, but by then Rwanda's relationship with Del Ponte 
had deteriorated even further.
When Del Ponte met on 18 November 2002 with representatives of the Alliance 
for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), an extremist Hutu opposition group based in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Rwandan government issued a press release 
condemning the prosecutor in strong terms for hobnobbing with "a known terrorist 
organization which regards genocide in Rwanda as an unfinished business..."51 The 
Rwandan statement continued:
"For sometime now, the ICTR prosecutor has acted in a manner clearly designed to 
politicize the office she occupies and indeed, she has on several occasions confessed 
that some of the decisions she has made were motivated by political considerations 
and pressure. Carla Del Ponte's meeting with a known Rwandan terrorist and 
genocidal organization., comes as a culmination of her deliberate policy of 
dangerously veering from the issues of justice, to a point where she is now wining 
and dining with people whose confessed ideology and practice is genocide. Today, 
the people of Rwanda have lost faith in Del Ponte's objectivity and capacity to 
deliver justice....
It is in light of these shocking revelations, therefore, that the Government of Rwanda 
calls upon the international community and the United Nations Security in particular 
to hold her accountable for her deliberate conduct, which clearly bears grave 
consequences."52
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On that ominous note, then, the die was cast. Rwanda had drawn a line in the 
sand. But Del Ponte was not one to be easily cowed. Barely one week later, seeking to 
capitalise on Rwanda's strong relations with Britain, Del Ponte responded to Rwanda’s 
attacks against her. The occasion was a speech the international prosecutor delivered to 
the British Parliament's All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and 
Genocide Prevention in London on 25 November 2002. Following a review of the 
Tribunal's judicial activities, Del Ponte described the prevailing situation in which the 
Rwandan authorities had withdrawn their cooperation with the ICTR, and expressed her 
disappointment:
Although it has been publicly stated that the reason for the suspension of cooperation 
is the way witnesses are treated, the true reason is to be found elsewhere. As I 
indicated to the Security Council, we have good reasons to believe that powerful 
elements within Rwanda strongly oppose the investigation, in the execution of the 
ICTR mandate, of crimes allegedly committed by members of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army in 1994. Despite assurances given to me in the past, no concrete assistance 
has been provided in response to repeated requests regarding these investigations. 
There is no genuine political will on the part of the Rwandan Authorities to provide 
assistance in an area of work that they interpret to be political in nature...
Only a few  days ago, the Government o f Rwanda released a statement accusing me 
o f acting politically and also o f abusing my office, fo r having met with 
representatives o f groups opposed to the Kigali Government. Without commenting 
further on my rights and duties as an independent Prosecutor. I  wish to record my 
disappointment. For me, a victim is a victim, a crime falling within my mandate as 
the ICTR Prosecutor is a crime, irrespective o f the identity or the ethnicity or the 
political ideas o f the person who committed the said crime. Justice does not
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accommodate political opportunism. No one should remain immune from  
prosecutions from the worst crimes. The political and military leadership o f Rwanda 
has to accept to respond to the allegations o f crimes that may have been committed 
by their own side. I f  they are genuinely interested to foster true peace and 
reconciliation in their country and in the Great Lakes Region, they should fully and 
unconditionally cooperate with the ICTR (emphasis in original).53
Del Ponte was careful to stress that prosecuting the instigators of the genocide of 
Rwanda’s Tutsis remained "without any ambiguity" the core of the mandate of the 
Tribunal's mandate. But she raised the philosophical question of denying justice to any 
victim of the crimes within the Tribunal's remit - genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. This is the argument of principle versus pragmatic relativity that is at the 
heart of the thorny question of prosecuting the soldiers of the government that is now in 
power in Rwanda.
But Del Ponte, principled as she appears to be in her judicial work, has indeed 
occasionally introduced political considerations into judicial matters. Her opening 
courtroom statement in the Barayagwiza appellate hearing is a case in point. Seeking a 
reversal of the appellate chamber’s initial decision to release Barayagwiza, the 
international prosecutor bluntly told the appellate judges, not in a legal proposition but in 
an appeal to political facts of life, that: "whether we like it or not, we must come to terms 
with the reality that our ability to continue our investigations depends on Rwanda". 
Without Rwanda's help "we might as well open the doors to the prison. It is my hope that 
Barayagwiza will not be the one to decide the fate of this tribunal."54
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On one hand, this was a reluctant admission of the political reality that affects her 
work. Given the political framework of international criminal tribunals, this is an 
inevitable reality. On the other, it was also a conscious application of political tactics to 
supposedly purist juridical ends. Either way, her verbal appeal to politics in that case has 
lent her to criticisms of double standards by her Rwandan and other critics. In London, 
she again appealed to political / strategic realities in soliciting British support: "I am 
particularly turning to you," she told the British parliamentarians, "as I believe that the 
United Kingdom is in a strong position to recall to the Government of Rwanda its 
obligations of cooperation. The financial aid allocated by your country to Rwanda 
corresponds to a very substantial part of the budget of Rwanda...."55 This was a clear 
appeal to hegemonial power and influence in aid of the "pure" principle of justice. In the 
next breadth she offered the argument of legalism's imperative -  justice as policy — 
against that of strategy, drawing parallels with the Balkan states of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and Croatia:
Obviously, there is always a 'good' reason to justify non-cooperation. There is 
always some political consideration or struggle, some forthcoming election. There 
will always be unresolved strategic issues of genuine concern to the International 
Community... Broad concerns of this kind will occupy the minds of those who have 
to deal with the reconstruction of divided societies... My point, however, is that 
some "magical" or "ideal" moment will never arise for cooperating with International 
Tribunals. No system of justice anywhere in the world is expected to work that way. 
The right time concerning investigating and prosecuting crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes is always now, today.56
As the summer of 2003 approached - and with it the matter of the renewal of Del 
Ponte's appointment - Rwanda emphasized its position that it would try RPA soldiers 
suspected of war crimes in the exercise of its national jurisdiction, and that the ICTR 
should focus on the genocide of Tutsis. There were three problems with this position. 
First, while Rwandan courts surely had jurisdiction over these crimes, the jurisdiction of 
the ICTR was pre-eminent over that of national courts. Second, although Rwanda 
frequently claimed to have tried Tutsis suspected of war crimes, or to be perfectly willing 
to do so, its record in this respect was spotty. As some human rights groups have 
observed, the Rwandan military court has tried just one senior officer, a major, for war 
crimes committed in 1994.57 The officer confessed to a massacre of more than 30 people 
and was sentenced to life in prison, but he successfully appealed his sentence and was set 
free.58 Of five others convicted of war crimes in 1994, four were privates, one was a 
corporal, and all were given light sentences: the corporal, convicted of killing 15 civilians, 
was sentenced to a two-year prison term.59 Alison des Forges, a Rwanda expert and 
human rights activist whose record as a chronicler of the genocide does not easily lend 
her to any possible charges of anti-Tutsi bias, commented wryly that "Rwanda has had 
nine years to deal with such cases, and it has not done a significant job."60
Rwanda's record is reminiscent not just of the domestic trial of German war 
criminals in Leipzig following World War I, but is consistent with a pattern that is 
recurrent in many other countries, including powerful states and victors in war. Few are 
willing to try their own war criminals, but would be happy to put on trial those of other 
defeated states or groups. The third problem with Rwanda's position is the perception
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problem it hands the ICTR. If the Tribunal ends up not having prosecuted any Tutsis, 
many will consider that it failed to discharge its mandate in full.
Ambassador Prosper, seeking to leverage American influence with both the ICTR 
and the Rwandan government, offered to mediate between Carla Del Ponte as chief 
prosecutor and Rwanda on the specific matter of investigations into alleged RPF 
atrocities. But first, what was Washington's point of departure on the accountability of 
RPF forces for crimes committed in 1994? Was it opposed to the ICTR undertaking 
such prosecutions, if they would have the effect of destabilizing Rwanda and the Great 
Lakes region as Rwanda claims they would? The prevailing anecdotal assumption is that 
the United States would not like to see RPF troops and commanders prosecuted by the 
ICTR in such a scenario. Undoubtedly, this sympathy exists in a larger, geopolitical 
context. But the situation is considerably more nuanced.
For Prosper, the starting position of his government was that allegations of 
atrocities by RPF soldiers needed to be investigated. "We are agnostic as to who 
investigates these allegations, so long as it is done fairly and properly and it is genuine. 
If it is by the International Tribunal, that's fine; if it is by Rwanda, that's ok, but it is 
necessary to close the chapter of 1994".61
From this perspective, Prosper tried to broker an agreement that recognized the 
International Tribunal's primacy but gave Rwanda a sense of ownership of the 
investigations. In the spring of 2003, Prosper met in his 8th floor office in the U.S. 
Department of State in Washington with Carla Del Ponte, accompanied by her aides, and 
the Rwandan delegation, for negotiations on the issue. On the Rwandan side there was 
attorney-general Gerald Gahima, Richard Sezibera, then Rwandan's ambassador in
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Washington D.C., and Martin Ngoga, a Rwandan diplomat in Tanzania who was Kigali's 
official observer at the ICTR in Arusha.
Del Ponte’s recollection is that she was invited to Washington for a general 
discussion on cooperation between her office and the Rwandan authorities, but to her 
“surprise”, Prosper suggested that she let the Rwandan government take over 
responsibility for investigations into alleged crimes by the RPA62. But she was unwilling 
to pass on to the Rwandan authorities the information she had gathered in her 
investigations. And, against the background of positions that Kagame had expressed to 
her in their meeting in 2002, she doubted the workability of any understanding that would 
be reached at this meeting if such an agreement was based on the Tribunal’s primacy63. 
The international prosecutor believed the Rwandan leader’s current position left little or 
no room for an ICTR role in prosecutions of RPF soldiers. Against this background, Del 
Ponte declined to relinquish the Tribunal’s investigations, but rather agreed to Rwanda 
conducting its own investigations in the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction, which 
would be reviewed by the international prosecutor after two or three months to assess 
their credibility64.
Over coffee, the delegations worked out an agreement whereby Rwanda would 
carry out some investigations of RPF suspects and submit the results to the ICTR for an 
assessment.65 If they were judged to have been a credible and fair process, the Tribunal 
would not issue indictments but support prosecution in Rwandan courts. The meeting 
then tried to reach an understanding on what events would actually be investigated. Thus, 
it was a "partnership approach" towards these investigations, and all parties walked away 
believing they had reached an understanding.66 This was important because the tension
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between Rwanda and the Tribunal was, in Prosper's view, detrimental to the Tribunal and 
"ripe for resolution", not to mention that the spill-over effect of resolving the standoff 
would be beneficial to the political equation in the Great Lakes region as a whole.67
On returning to The Hague, however, Del Ponte later telephoned Prosper and 
informed him that she had received advice against implementing the agreement. Prosper 
presumed this advice had come from the U.N. headquarters in New York. Del Ponte then 
backed out of the understanding and followed up her oral communication with a letter to
/ o
Prosper . A subsequent meeting that had been planned in Kigali fell through. The 
"deal" was dead.
Meanwhile, Rwanda’s campaign against Del Ponte in the Security Council was 
picking up, riding on the British proposal for a split of the chief prosecutor's post and 
America’s still-tepid support for it.69 The African states in the Council were by now 
supportive of a split. Rwandan diplomats approached the United States for more robust 
support. America gave in, tacitly. America’s response was: "if you get the votes, we're 
with you.”70
Rwanda's campaign did not put forward the main reason for its opposition to Del 
Ponte -  its resistance to her attempts to investigate alleged RPF atrocities. Rather it dwelt 
on the more appealing - and objectively more persuasive - rationale that ICTR 
prosecutions were suffering neglect at the hands of a "part-time" prosecutor that 
considered Rwanda only as part of a far-flung prosecutorial empire and had spent only 38 
days in the preceding year in Arusha and Kigali. By late July, diplomats in the Security 
Council, and human rights groups were publicly confirming Rwanda's campaign. "We 
and others have been heavily lobbied by the Rwandan government complaining about
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Del Ponte, saying her work has lagged behind and that she is too busy in The Hague", a 
diplomat from a Security Council member state told the New York Times.71
There was initial division in the Council over the proposed split of the chief 
prosecutor’s job, although a majority of member states was clearly in favour of the 
approach. While Britain and the United States backed the move, some Council members, 
such as Germany and Spain, shared Del Ponte's view that it was too late in the day to split 
the prosecutor's job. "If I had to vote, I would vote for giving her an extension of one or 
two years on both courts”, said Inocencio Arias, Spain's ambassador to the United 
Nations and the President of the Security Council for the month of July 2003. Removing 
Del Ponte from the Rwanda Tribunal "makes it look as if she did a bad job", he said. 
"She didn't do a bad job."72
Some members of the Security Council that were in favour of the decision were 
nevertheless critical of what they perceived as Rwanda's political interference regarding 
Del Ponte. "No government, particularly the Rwanda government, should interfere in the 
work of the Tribunal and the independence of the prosecutor", said Mexico's ambassador 
to the U.N., Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, while confirming his country's support for the 
decision to split the chief prosecutors post.73 Ultimately, the decision eventually won the 
unanimous support of the Council's 15 members, and was described by a key player in 
the process as "one of the easiest decisions the Security Council has made".74
Prosper is dismissive of the view that investigating RPF crimes, and the related 
consideration that such investigations may destabilize Rwanda, was behind the removal 
of Carla Del Ponte from her Rwanda post. "The completion strategy and management 
issues were the driving force" he explained. "Indicting the RPF had nothing to do with
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this. That’s a myth."75 It was to dispel this myth, Prosper contended, that the United 
States ensured the inclusion of a compromise clause in the Security Council resolution by 
which the post was split, explicitly calling on Rwanda, Kenya, DRC and the Congo to 
cooperate with the prosecutor on investigations, "including investigations of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army ”76
Although Del Ponte pronounced her self "saddened" at the Council's decision77 but 
"relieved" by the wording of resolution 1503, she told the media interview her version of 
the events that resulted in her sacking in which she laid blame squarely on President 
Kagame and the primacy-of-order perspective in Rwanda. Del Ponte recounted that, at a 
meeting she had with Kagame, the Rwandan's President insisted that it was up to his 
government to investigate alleged RPF atrocities while her duty was to prosecute the 
genocide. "This work of yours is creating political problems for me", she recalls the 
Rwandan leader as saying, "you are going to destabilize the country this way."78 In Del 
Ponte's words, "Probably, if I had given in - if I had accepted his orders - 1 would still be 
here."79 The international prosecutor was saying, in other words, that the tension 
between legalism and order was the direct cause of her defenestration.
The Rwandan government’s concern with the stability of its domestic order is 
entirely consistent with state behaviour in this kind of situation. There is, at the very least, 
a perceived if not actual tension between bringing members of the victorious army to 
justice, and order in its basic form within such a fragile polity, although whether this 
tension translates into actual destabilization depends on how Rwanda’s Tutsis 
collectively react to prosecutions of RPF soldiers in a country where the society of states 
clearly has invested far less in pursuing even-handed justice than it has in the Former
Yugoslavia. In the latter, the great powers, in pursuit of the strategic interest of bringing 
the states of the former Yugoslavia into the mainstream economic and strategic Western 
alliance over the long term, have used admission to the European Union as part of a 
carrot-and-stick approach to compel cooperation with the ICTY. As that International 
Tribunal is the beachhead of the construction of a particular order in the region, and the 
appearance of any of the parties successfully resisting accountability would weaken that 
process, the great powers have ensured that not only Serbian war criminals but also 
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Kosovars and even Macedonians suspected of war crimes have 
been indicted by the Hague Tribunal.
In the case of Rwanda the calculations appear to be different, with international 
criminal justice playing a somewhat more nuanced role, wittingly and unwittingly. Let us 
imagine one scenario where the ICTR prosecutes RPF soldiers, especially if they had 
significant ranks and roles in the “struggle to liberate Rwanda”, as that country’s 
government officially describes the civil war, and some elements in the army, feeling 
betrayed, become restive and take unconstitutional steps to register their protest. What 
then? Would the “international community” that failed the country once now intervene 
in its “internal affairs”? That is most unlikely. Then again, we can imagine another 
scenario, one in which the Rwandan government, Mandela-like, pursues a path of 
forgiveness that encompasses submitting RPF troops to accountability for war crimes. If 
the Hutu extremists in exile in the Great Lakes region were to respond in kind and seek 
political accommodation, it would have been a worthwhile move. But if they did not, and 
were to utilise the historical record established in those trials to further their opposition to 
the Tutsi dominated government on ethnic grounds, attempting to apply even-handed
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justice (although the crimes by both sides are not comparable in scope) would have 
backfired.
These constructs for now remain hypothetical. Del Ponte, for her part, would not 
accept the argument that stability in Rwanda should have been prioritized over her 
prosecutorial functions during her tenure at the Tribunal. For her, “stability must proceed
sofrom the application of justice” -- a classic legalist/liberal worldview of international 
justice. Del Ponte, in fact, expressed to Kagame and the Security Council her position 
that an amendment of the Tribunal’s statute by the Security Council that removed the 
prospect of prosecuting crimes committed by RPF forces was an option81 — although, as 
she ought to know, an impractical one at this point in the life of the Tribunal. Absent such 
a decision, she would implement that mandate in its current form, which meant 
investigating both parties to the conflict82.
An additional element in Del Ponte's removal as chief prosecutor of the ICTR was a 
campaign by several Rwandan civil society groups in tandem with the Rwandan 
Government's efforts. In a petition to the Security Council in July 2003, a group of 46 
organizations in Rwanda representing women, genocide survivors and students urged the 
Security Council "to strongly consider the dismal record of Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda when deciding on her renewal in 
September 2003."83 The NGOs indicted Del Ponte on the following grounds: that she 
had failed to articulate a coherent long-term prosecution strategy; lacked a 
comprehensive approach to the inclusion of sexual violence charges in its cases; that 
there were undue delays in appointing key leadership personnel in the Office of the 
Prosecutor and unpredictable hiring decisions that had undermined the work of the
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Tribunal; and that the care and dignity of genocide survivors had not been accorded 
priority.84
This petition focused on issues of direct relevance to the Tribunal’s daily work, with 
emphasis on the gender aspects of justice. This dimension of the Tribunal’s prosecutions 
has long preoccupied NGOs that observe the Tribunal, and for good reason: women, both 
as victims of rape and survivors of the slaughter, bore the brunt of the genocide. In a 
context in which sovereign states were the prime movers of events, the impact of the 
NGO campaign lay in the all-inclusive air with which it clothed opposition to the feisty 
Swiss prosecutor. The message it sent was: "even the grassroots organizations don't want 
her too."
All things considered, then, it was virtually impossible for Del Ponte’s prosecutorial 
role at the ICTR to have survived such a determined and carefully orchestrated political 
onslaught on her position by Rwanda and the great powers. Nevertheless, several 
international human rights groups, while non-committal on Del Ponte's individual fate, 
were concerned about the potential longer term impact of the split of the prosecutor 
position on the larger question of the international prosecutor's independence from the 
Rwandan government. There was concern that, given the outcome in this battle between 
a puny “David” (a prosecutor employed by an intergovernmental organization (the UN), 
and a “Goliath” (a sovereign state with effective control of its territory), the incoming 
chief prosecutor of the ICTR would have little incentive to act independently of the 
Rwandan government and challenge the latter’s strategic interests.
In what is essentially a battle between liberal legalism, on the one hand, and state 
power, strategy and order in world politics on the other, will the purist view of justice
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pushed by Del Ponte - with legal backing from the Tribunal's statute - prevail? It is more 
likely that the opposing view that is selective about the instruments and subjects of justice 
- national courts or international tribunals, your defendants or mine - that, in the words of 
Shinoda, "warns against inappropriate implementation of legality that ignores political
Of
considerations" -  will emerge triumphant. It is increasingly unlikely that the ICTR will 
be able to prosecute any substantive figure from the RPF, although the outside chance 
remains that it could indict a few low-level Tutsi soldiers86. Even in that scenario, the 
Tribunal, with time for it to complete its work running out, may be forced by 
circumstances to hand over such indictees, among others, to Rwanda for trial in national 
courts.
Hassan Bubacar Jallow, Del Ponte’s successor as chief prosecutor of the 
International Tribunal, has visited Rwanda frequently and cultivated good relations with 
the Rwandan government since his appointment. Given the deadlines imposed by the 
completion strategy and the reality he faces in the need for Rwanda’s cooperation, it is 
unlikely that Jallow will reopen active investigations of RPF atrocities with a view to 
bringing charges, unless the Security Council were to make a robust political intervention 
in the matter. Such an outcome would, in effect, be victor's justice - surely not what the 
Security Council intended when it framed the remit of the ICTR. But perhaps, as Okali 
has noted, "it is a little optimistic to think that the world is ready yet for international 
criminal adjudication of the conduct of victorious forces in armed conflict".87 It remains 
to be seen whether the advent of the ICC as a supposedly independent and permanent 
institution will alter this existing reality.
There are those who argue that this outcome cannot be accurately described as 
victor’s justice, and that the Tribunal is unlikely to prosecute the RPF not because it does 
not want to, but simply because it will not be able to gather enough evidence to do so. 
’’Prosecutions cannot happen in a vacuum", says former ICTR deputy chief prosecutor 
Muna. His analysis: The way the Tribunal is politically constructed, it cannot go into 
Rwanda and forcefully oblige Rwanda to turn over RPF soldiers. It has no SFOR 
[NATO’s Stabilization Force that largely provided muscle for the apprehension of war 
criminals in the former Yugoslavia]. The ICTR was created at Rwanda's demand, even if 
they [Rwanda] were not pleased at the outcome. The international community saw 
Rwanda as a partner. If this was purely a UN initiative, the Security Council would have 
created an enforcement mechanism. It would be wrong, therefore, to blame the Tribunal 
should the institution close its doors without prosecuting any Tutsis.88 In this view the 
Tribunal, after all, is an epiphenomenal interstate institution, reflecting, for better of 
worse, the degree of political support it has from its political master -  the Security 
Council.
If this scenario is the one that unfolds, then the most that can be said, as not a few 
attorneys and policy makers even in the ICTR prosecutor's office argue, is that faced with 
these limitations the Tribunal should focus its efforts on the more heinous crimes of 
genocide and crimes against humanity committed against Tutsis. This would be an 
imperfect outcome, but we live in an imperfect world. It is possible that the feared 
negative impact of this "victor's justice" will be counterbalanced by power realities and 
the evolution of democratic governance and economic growth in Rwanda. This situation 
would be akin to that in which the Nuremberg trials have been criticized for serious flaws,
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but those flaws have not obviated the outcome 50 years later - the construction of a 
democratic, peaceful and wealthy Germany, on the ashes of Nazi ideology despite - or 
perhaps because o f - the victor's justice imposed by the Allied Powers.
Nevertheless, the contradiction of one-sided justice would be better avoided by the 
Security Council. That contradiction has not been allowed to ossify at the ICTY, despite 
initial claims by the Serbs that their leaders are on trial there because they lost the war to 
NATO's military superiority. In the end, behind the veil is a struggle over what version 
of history will prevail in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region of Africa.
Del Ponte argued that having one prosecutor for the ICTY and the ICTR 
strengthened the hand of the holder of that office. While it may strengthen the hand of 
the individual that holds the office, it has clearly not strengthened the ICTR 
institutionally, as we have seen. From both institutional-efficiency and political 
standpoints, the decision to split the prosecutor’s role for two judicial institutions that are 
statutorily independent is a welcome one. It will free the prosecutor of the ICTY to focus 
on the significant challenges that confront that Tribunal, and give prosecutions at the 
ICTR the undivided leadership and managerial attention the equally weighty challenges 
at that court so clearly deserve.
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Apprehending W ar Criminals: Law, Politics and Diplomacy
Kabuga is our Osama bin Laden 
- Rwandan genocide survivor
The very idea of international criminal justice for violations of international 
humanitarian law is predicated on a framework in which sovereign states cooperate with 
international criminal tribunals, giving effect to their judicial orders and providing 
political and financial support. This is what makes the work of such tribunals possible. It 
could not be otherwise, for the ICTR and the ICTY have no police forces or prisons of 
their own. These two tribunals, created as they are by the UN Security Council's 
enforcement powers, impose on states an obligation to cooperate with them. In the 
treaty-based ICC, that obligation is taken on by accession to the treaty regime. And for 
the "hybrid" courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the weak legal framework 
for state cooperation has had important practical consequences. That court, not having the 
Chapter VII enforcement power of Security Council-created ICTY and ICTR, cannot 
compel the cooperation of states. Charles Taylor, the Special Court’s most important 
indictee, is in exile in Nigeria, which has declined to hand him over to the Court.
In this chapter I review the cooperation of states with and their political support for 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, beginning with the legal basis for that 
cooperation. In so doing, we will see how a combination of legal and political/strategic 
factors made possible the apprehension in various states of persons indicted by the 
Tribunal. As well, we shall see how the absence of political will in some cases has 
limited the Tribunal's success.
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Legal Basis
The legal basis1 in international law for the cooperation of states with the ICTR is 
Article 2 of Security Council resolution 955. In Article 2, the Security Council decided 
that all States shall cooperate hilly with the International Tribunal and that consequently 
all states shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the 
provisions of the resolution and the Statute of the Tribunal. Article 2 also provided that 
implementing the provisions of the resolution and Statute included the obligation of 
States to comply with judicial requests or orders issued by the Tribunal under Article 28 
of its statute.
Article 28 of the statute provides:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal for Rwanda in the 
investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance of an order 
issued by a Trial Chamber [of the Tribunal], including but not limited to:
(a) The identification and location of persons;
(b) The taking of testimony and production of evidence;
(c) The service of documents;
(d) The arrest and detention of persons;
(e) The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal
of Rwanda.
Several African and European states, and the United States, have provided the 
International Tribunal with the judicial cooperation envisaged in these and other statutory
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provisions. As we have seen, in the discussion on the Tribunal's legitimacy, decisions of 
the United Nations Security Council are binding on member states. Article 48 of the 
organization's Charter obligates U.N. member states to support decisions of the Security 
Council by cooperating in their implementation.
It might be wondered why the provision in Article 2 of resolution 955 is necessary 
if decisions of the Security Council are automatically binding on states. Are the 
decisions of the Security Council somehow, then, subordinate to the domestic laws of 
member states? Certainly, the answer is no, for the reasons that follow. The first part of 
the answer to this seeming contradiction lies in Article 2 itself, in which the council 
decides that all states shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal" (second 
emphasis added). Both words are mandatory in law. The second part of the answer can 
be found in the nature of international law and the general problems of enforcement that 
attend it, as discussed in Chapter 3. This provision is a bow to the practical realities of 
sovereignty. And, in making it mandatory for states to take necessary measures under 
their domestic law, the Security Council, intentionally or not, makes a practical 
recognition of the theories of monism and dualism in the relationship between 
international law and municipal law.
According to the monist doctrine, international law and state laws are mutually 
reinforcing aspects of one system -- law in general. Monists believe that all law is a 
single body of legal rules that are binding — whether on states, on individuals or on non- 
state entities. Dualists believe that the juridical origins of state law and international law 
are fundamentally different; the source of state law being the will of the state itself, and 
that of international law being the common will of states.4 Thus, in the dualist view, for
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international law to apply within the domestic sphere, it needs to be enabled, empowered 
or validated by domestic legislation.
The practical impact of the monist and dualist attitudes to international law on the 
work of the ICTR is that it tends to condition how national institutions, including judicial 
institutions and law enforcement agencies, react or pro-act to the needs and requests of 
the International Tribunal for judicial cooperation or assistance. States with a dualist 
perspective believe that, to facilitate such cooperation with the ICTR, it is necessary to 
adopt enabling domestic legislation. Monist states see no legal bar to cooperating with 
the International Tribunal's requests for arrests of suspects in their territory and their 
transfer to the Tribunal at Arusha. In practice, however, political and non-legal 
considerations weigh more heavily on the degree of cooperation the ICTR has received 
from states than issues of monism and dualism. This has been especially true of African 
countries, in particular in the early years of the Tribunal. It has been observed that “Not 
one of the African states that have executed arrest and transfer orders of the Rwanda 
Tribunal had a legal instrument at their disposal authorizing national authorities to 
comply with such order”5. Their responses have been conditioned more by political 
reflexes than legal considerations. The adoption of domestic legislation, while it may be 
indicative of a dualist legal tradition, is not an automatic barometer. A number of states, 
all non-African, have adopted domestic cooperation acts in relation to the ICTR6.
Whether or not a state is monist or dualist, the position taken by the UN Secretary- 
General in the formative stages of the ICTY that “the establishment of the International 
Tribunal on the basis of a Chapter VII decision creates a binding obligation on all States
n
to take whatever steps are required to implement the decision” holds true.
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Moreover, the practice of various states in regard to facilitating the apprehension of 
fugitives from justice at the request of the ICTR confirms the view that: "The fact that 
municipal courts must pay primary regard to municipal law in the event of a conflict with 
international law, in no way affects the obligations of the state concerned to perform its 
international obligations."8 This has not prevented the occasional legal challenge to the 
arrest and surrender of ICTR indictees in domestic courts, in the rare case of protracted 
nature.
The case of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a former Seventh Day Adventist pastor 
indicted by the ICTR and arrested in the United States, was one such case. In the 
Barayagwiza case the United States had applied political pressure to Cameroon to 
surrender an ICTR indictee to the Tribunal.9 It has applied similar pressure on other 
countries, as will be seen below when the political dimension of state cooperation is 
examined. In this context, the Ntakirutimana case provided the U.S. with the first - and 
so far, only - domestic legal and political test of its commitment to the ICTR.
In 1996, the ICTR indicted Elizaphan Ntakirutimana on charges of genocide, 
complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
violations of the Geneva Conventions.10 These charges were based largely on allegations 
that in April 1994 Ntakirutimana and his son, Gerard, a medical doctor, had planned and 
executed the massacres of hundreds of Tutsis at a church complex in Mugonero in the 
Kibuye region of western Rwanda.11 The victims had been instructed by the clergyman 
to hide in the church premises as the massacres of Tutsis unfolded across Rwanda. The 
Tutsis were separated from non-Tutsis who were released, and on 16 April Pastor 
Ntakirutimana returned in a convoy of several vehicles and armed individuals and
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12participated in the slaughter of unarmed Tutsi men, women and children. Following the 
genocide, Ntakirutimana left Rwanda and eventually immigrated to the United States 
where he lived in Laredo, Texas with another son, Eliel Ntakirutimana, a medical doctor.
On 7 September 1996, the ICTR issued a Warrant of Arrest and Order for Surrender 
of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana which read in pertinent part:
To: The United States of America,
I, Judge William Sekule, Judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Considering the United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 
1994....and Articles 19 (2) and 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda.
Considering the indictment submitted by the Prosecutor against Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana, and confirmed by me.... on 7 September 1996, a copy of which is 
attached to this warrant of arrest,
HEREBY DIRECT the Authorities of the United States of America to search for, 
arrest - and surrender to International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Elizaphan 
Ntakirutimana, [who] is currently believed to be in the United States of America... 
And to advise the said Elizaphan Ntakirutimana at the time of his arrest, and in a 
language he understands, of his rights as set forth in the Statute...and of his right to 
remain silent and to caution him that any statement he makes shall be recorded and 
may be used in evidence.
REQUEST THAT The United States of America, upon the arrest of Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, promptly notify the Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, for the purposes of arranging his transfer to the custody of the
13International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda...
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This document represents the general format of warrants of arrest and surrender 
orders issued by the ICTR. Arrest warrants invariably are addressed to states; they state 
the legal basis of the warrant in international law (the relevant decision of the Security 
Council and the statute and procedural rules of the International Tribunal); they 
enumerate the charges against the accused person; they provide for the respect of due 
process rights; and they provide guidance on how to initiate the actual surrender of the 
accused to the International Tribunal.
On the basis of this warrant U.S. federal marshals arrested Ntakirutimana, then 73, 
on 26 September 1996. But his transfer to the ICTR was to become an obstacle course, 
for the Rwandan clergyman subsequently mounted a spirited legal battle in U.S. courts 
that tested America's commitment to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, tested 
American extradition law, and delayed his effective surrender to the Tribunal for three 
and a half years.
The United States had enacted domestic legislation14 on 10 February 1996 to 
establish a basis in its domestic law to implement two international agreements its 
executive branch of government had entered into with the ICTY and the ICTR.15 When 
the U.S. Federal Government filed a request at the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas to secure Ntakirutimana's surrender to the Tribunal in January 1997, his 
defence team, headed by former U.S. attorney-general Ramsey Clark opposed the motion 
on the basis of four main arguments: (1) that the ICTR was not legitimate as it was 
improperly created, (2) that extradition would be unconstitutional, there being no valid 
treaty between the U.S. and the ICTR; and (3) that the U.S. authorities had not
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established enough evidence to meet to standards of "probable cause" and (4) that he 
would not receive a fair trial at the Tribunal.16
The U.S. Government and an amicus curiae brief filed by the New York based 
NGO Lawyers Committee for Human Rights17 argued that (1) the Rwanda Tribunal was 
validly established under the authority of the United Nations Charter; (2) member states 
of the United Nations should cooperate with the Tribunal because they were "obligated to 
abide by and carry out decisions made by the Security Council"; (3) the Agreement on 
Surrender of Persons was properly authorized under U.S. law and created a binding 
obligation to surrender Ntakirutimana under domestic law and a legal basis for 
extradition by either treaty or statute; and (4) disputed the defendant's claims that he 
would not receive a fair trial and that the International Tribunal had not shown probable 
cause.18 U.S. Magistrate Judge Marcel C. Notzen ruled that the Congressional-Executive 
Agreement of Surrender of indictees to the ICTR and the ICTY was unconstitutional and 
could not provide a legal basis for extraditing Ntakirutimana. Rather, Judge Notzen 
ruled, extradition required a treaty, and no treaty existed between the U.S. and the 
International Tribunal; he then ordered Ntakirutimana's release from custody.19 This 
decision was legally unsound, displaying as it does a lack of understanding of the status 
of the ICTR in international law and the basis of obligation that exists in the United 
Nations Charter (a multilateral treaty to which the U.S. is a party and has ratified).20 
Indeed, Judge Notzen ignored that core argument altogether in his decision. His legal 
reasoning stemmed in part, no doubt, from the ambiguous status of international law, 
including validly concluded treaties, in American domestic law. American law provides 
that even international treaties concluded by the United States are invalid if they are
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unconstitutional. In other words, the U.S. constitution is asserted by some American 
lawyers as superseding international law in the American legal sphere, a position that 
goes beyond dualism to one of primacy. Louis Henkin has stated that "treaties are 
subject to constitutional limitations that apply to all exercising federal power", and noted 
that the U.S. constitution does not forbid the President or Congress to violate 
international law.21 However, "suspending domestic law does not relieve the United 
States of its international obligations."22
At a practical level, Judge Notzen's ruling was an*embarrassing setback to U.S.'s 
political positioning in the 1990s as the leading political and operational supporter of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia.23 
Ramsey Clark had already echoed the challenge to the legitimacy of the Tribunal. "This 
is the first time in our history that we've been asked to surrender a person to a tribunal 
and one of doubtful legality", he told the Houston Chronicle. "There is nothing in the 
U.N. Charter that allows for a criminal tribunal."24
The Tribunal, in a position articulated at the time by this writer, took the view that it 
was up to the U.S. Government to determine its next move, but restated its view that 
states, including the United States, were required to cooperate with the Tribunal.25 And 
the U.S. Department of State, which bore the political burden of ensuring the surrender of 
the fugitive from justice on American territory, reassured the media of its conviction that 
Ntakirutimana would still be surrendered.26
As decisions on extradition are not subject to appeal under U.S. law, the U.S. 
Government refiled its request for the surrender of Ntakirutimana with a different judge 
in the Laredo judicial division. The magistrate that was to hear the case recused himself
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and the matter subsequently ended up on the docket of the U.S. District Court (a federal 
court) for the Southern District of Texas. There, Ntakirutimana filed a writ of habeas 
corpus. Judge John Rainey denied the writ and upheld Ntakirutimana's surrender, ruling 
that the Surrender Agreement and the National Defence Authorization Act provided 
adequate constitutional basis for extradition.27 Ntakirutimana petitioned for habeas 
corpus to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit28
The appellate court, in a majority ruling handed down by Judge Emilio Garza held 
(1) that it was not unconstitutional to surrender Ntakirutimana to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, even in the absence of a treaty, so long as extradition was 
authorized by statute; (2) the district court's finding of probable cause was supported by 
sufficient preliminary evidence; and (3) issues involving the legal validity of the creation 
of international tribunals by the Security Council, and whether the Tribunal would 
guarantee the petitioner's rights under the U.S. Constitution and international law, were 
beyond the scope of habeas review.29 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of 
Ntakirutimana's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and lifted the stay of extradition.
In a separate, specially concurring opinion in which he expressed his doubts about 
Ntakirutimana's probable guilt, Judge Robert Parker acknowledged the role of high 
politics in the Ntakirutimana saga. Speculating on the final decision of the Secretary of 
State (whose prerogative it is to approve extradition) on the extradition of the Rwandan 
clergyman he stated: "I fully understand that the ultimate decision in this case may well 
be a political one that it is driven by important considerations of state that transcend the 
question of guilt or innocence of any single individual. I respect the political process that
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is necessarily implicated in this case, just as I respect the fact that adherence to precedent
^  1
compels my concurrence."
Meanwhile, Judge DeMoss, dissenting from the majority, in turn acknowledged an 
opposing political factor -  sovereignty:
"Notwithstanding our nation's moral duty to assist the cause of international justice, 
our nation's actions taken in that regard must comport with the Constitution's 
procedures and with respect for its allocation of powers...
The Attorney General...stakes her case on the validity and enforceability of a 
warrant issued by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
which is a non sovereign entity created by the United Nations Security Council, 
purporting to "Direct" the officials of our sovereign nation to surrender the accused. 
In defence of this, the Attorney-General relies exclusively on what my colleagues 
have termed a "Congressional Executive Agreement" - the coincidence of an 
"executive agreement" with the Tribunal, entered on behalf of the United States by 
an ambassador appointed by the President in the course of his duties to conduct 
foreign affairs, and a purported enabling act passed by simple majorities of both 
houses of Congress and signed into law by the President.. .."32
Ntakirutimana then applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for a review and setting 
aside of the Fifth Circuit Court’s decision, but in January 2000 the Supreme Court denied 
review. In late March 2000, his extradition having been authorized by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, a U.S. airplane carrying Ntakirutimana, accompanied by U.S. 
marshals, landed at Kilimanjaro International Airport at Arusha, Tanzania. Diplomats 
from the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda and officials of the ICTR registrar's office constituted 
the “welcoming party”. The U.S. authorities handed him over to Tribunal officials after
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procedural formalities. Thus did the Ntakirutimana saga draw to a close. And with this 
demonstration of dogged commitment in the face of a political embarrassment, the 
United States, in the words of one commentator, "with little public notice... dipped its toe 
into the waters of international justice. It remains to be seen whether Uncle Sam will 
ever wade in deep enough to get his trunks wet. But he has crossed the water's edge."33 
Ntakirutimana was subsequently tried by the Tribunal, found guilty, and sentenced to ten 
years to prison.34
The Politics
The level of direct political support that states have given the ICTR depends on a 
number of factors. These include the connection between particular states, on the one 
hand, and Rwanda (and the genocide) on the other. Another factor was the general 
foreign policy of particular states towards human rights questions (of which violations of 
international humanitarian law were prominent, whether or not those states were linked to 
Rwanda before or during the genocide). And third, there was the practical question of the 
presence of fugitives from justice, sought by the ICTR or the Rwandan Government, on 
the territories of particular countries. In all three contexts, African, European and North 
American (United States and Canada) states were the theatres for the politics and 
diplomacy of the capture of Rwandans (and in one case a non-Rwandan) accused of 
perpetrating the 1994 genocide.
From the discussion above, we have seen how questions of law played out in a case 
where a fugitive's surrender to the International Tribunal encountered a robust challenge 
in the domestic legal sphere. What is clear is that in all cases political attitudes to
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accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes affect the level and 
depth of cooperation and support.
The United States, the prime mover of the Rwanda Tribunal among the great 
powers, supported the Tribunal for a number of reasons. First, it has sought to expiate its 
political guilt for inactioi£ during the genocide by subsequently lending its political 
weight on the global stage to the charge for accountability. Closely allied to this reason 
was its historical leadership of the earlier effort at the Nuremberg trials. To be sure, the 
circumstances were different in 1994 from 1945, when U.S. troops fought in World War 
II, but the opportunity presented for moral leadership was essentially similar.
It was quite fortuitous, then, that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright happened to 
be, as a Jew of European origin, a genocide survivor.35 Either by this reason or 
independently of it, she had championed military intervention in the Balkans, the modem 
day European theatre of mass atrocities, as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
from 1992. Thus, although she opposed similar intervention in Rwanda after Somalia in 
line with her Government's policy at the time, she was psychologically primed to throw 
her weight behind a war crimes accountability effort. Third, from a strategic point of 
view, U.S. support for the Tribunal was support in effect for Paul Kagame and a number 
of other Anglophone leaders - Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia 
and Isiais Aferworki of Eritrea - in central and eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa who 
were seen as representing a "new breed" of African leaders "worthy" of America's 
support. This factor is applicable far more directly to Kagame, and to the others more by 
extrapolation. Museveni was no great supporter of the ICTR. He believed that it was a
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big waste of time and money and, like Churchill and Stalin, that the perpetrators of such 
heinous crimes should simply be rounded up and shot.
European countries have also been firmly supportive of the ICTR. Some of them 
have foreign policies with an “ethical” dimension, placing strong emphasis on the moral 
dimensions of international affairs, and tend to be active in humanitarian responses to 
global crisis - to the extent that there are such responses. European countries have also 
been a favourite hiding place for Rwandan genocidaires. These countries, such as 
Belgium, Switzerland and Netherlands, have been quick to apprehend genocide suspects 
and indictees at the Tribunal’s request.
The growing support for institutionalized international criminal accountability in 
Europe in the 1990s was also a major contributory factor to European support for the 
ICTR. Thus, although the United States has remained the largest financial backer of the 
Tribunal through assessed (compulsory) contributions to the U.N. budgets of the ICTY 
and the ICTR, Europe was by far the leader in contributions to a voluntary contributions 
trust fund for the ICTR set up by the U.N. General Assembly in 1995. Moreover, 
Anglophone countries like Britain also saw support for the ICTR as an extension of 
support for the Anglophone RPF that was now wresting Rwanda from its francophone 
colonial roots.36
Weak African Support
African support for the ICTR has been far more ambivalent, especially in the 
Tribunal's early years. With the conspicuous exceptions of leaders like Alpha Omar 
Konare, the former President of Mali and currently Chairman of the Commission of the
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African Union, President Benjamin Mkapa (head of state of Tanzania, the Tribunal's host
T7country), Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, and King Mswati III of Swaziland , African 
leaders were initially unsure of just how to respond to the idea of an intrusive 
international tribunal in the creation of which they played little or no political role. Some 
were suspicious, some apprehensive and the majority noncommittal, adopting a wait-and-
38see posture.
Thus, although African states have largely cooperated in the apprehension of the 
war criminals from Rwanda, a certain reticence in public and political engagement with 
the Tribunal has remained constant. Discussions on the ICTR in the United Nations have 
been dominated by non-African States. Indeed, to watch or participate in these 
discussions is to become aware of how marginal issues of cosmopolitan international 
justice are to the foreign policies of most African states. This trend can be compared 
with the clear political support that European states have provided to the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal at The Hague - an attitude based on conscious foreign policy in several Western 
capitals and recognition of a linkage between the political evolution and enlargement of 
the European Union and resolving the question of war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia.
Moreover, with one exception, no African state has contributed to the voluntary 
contributions trust fund of the ICTR, which has received contributions in excess of 
$8 million.39 Thus it is fair to say that, were it left to African states the ICTR would not 
exist, let alone operate, and this would not be simply for the reason of paucity of 
resources for such an endeavour. It is clearly far more a question of a very limited 
commitment to legalism — liberal or not -- as a dimension of conflict resolution and a 
means to the construction of a stable political order. And yet, political discourse in many
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African countries is suffused with references to the Rwandan genocide and the need to 
avoid its repetition in any other African country. It is precisely this sentiment that led to 
the inclusion in the Charter of the African Union of a right to military intervention in 
cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Of course, the Rwandan 
genocide and the African response to it cannot be discussed in isolation from the politics 
of exclusion and ethnic domination that are still prevalent in the continent despite the 
gradual progress of democratization and has frequently produced violence.40
To what, then, can we ascribe the general political apathy of African states towards 
the ICTR? Three factors are clearly at play. First, a conceptual resistance to legal justice 
and a preference for amnesties and truth and reconciliation commissions is a major factor. 
This argument has several strands: war crimes trials could further destabilize fragile 
societies in transition from a period of conflict by trapping old hatreds within the quest 
for "vindictive" legal accountability; the new fad of war crimes trials does not necessarily 
represent a commitment to peace because the Western nations that are its chief advocates 
invariably provided support to despotic African regimes during the Cold War; Africa has 
more immediate needs for justice of a different kind - access to basic necessities like 
clean water and healthcare; and dialogue and reconciliation are seen as more reflective of 
societal/cultural norms than imported notions of legalism.41
But a second and self interested reason is that of a fear of the possible unintended 
consequences of being too supportive of war crimes trials. There are few countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa where politically or ethnically aspired mass killings or war crimes 
have not occurred in the past four decades. These events necessarily implicate the 
responsibility of the political and military leadership, past or present, in these countries.
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Consequently, there is little appetite for a normative approach that could return to haunt 
its supporters.
Third, the manner of the Tribunal's creation - as an ad hoc and interventionist 
institution that is externally imposed - is one reason why several African political leaders 
look at the ICTR with mixed feelings and provide it with only cautious support. This is 
the question of ownership, of the tension between international and domestic justice. 
Many an African leader would be quick to condemn violations of international 
humanitarian law, but would simultaneously assert that the proper persons to judge war 
criminals are the courts of their own countries -- if there is no better alternative than a 
legal trial. Lost in this response is any confrontation of the question of what happens 
where (as is frequently the case) domestic courts have no capacity or political will to 
bring highly placed individuals to justice for war crimes. (Ethiopia, were national courts 
have tried past officials for violations of international humanitarian law, is a striking 
exception.) Truth and reconciliation commissions thus became an easy halfway house 
that offers a path out of the dilemma. Rwanda is also a rare exception to a continental 
political aversion to a legalistic approach to justice.
This third factor offers some insight into the apparent contradiction in which 
Africa's leaders are decidedly cool to ad hoc international criminal tribunals, but several 
have led their countries to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
They can point to its consensual nature as a treaty-based international court. But here, as 
well, there are in a few cases significant elements of strategic self-interest at play. For 
others, signing up to the Rome Statute may be a commitment that looks good on a foreign 
policy resume, but the consistency of which is yet to be tested. And even in the case of
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the ICC, the African states "missed the boat" by their general failure to engage more 
actively and politically with the ICTR.42 That failure has placed them in a relatively 
weak political position in the politics of the ICC, as we shall see later.
Kenya and America's Bounty Hunters
It is against the background of these factors that we can now turn to Kenya, a 
country with a pivotal place in any assessment of the cooperation of African states with 
the ICTR, and the role of U.S. war crimes diplomacy in that country and the Great Lakes 
region in general.
Under the leadership of then President Arap Moi, Kenya enjoyed close relations 
with the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda. It was thus understandably lukewarm to the 
idea of an international tribunal, especially as it had sought without success to link 
accountability for the genocide with the shooting of Habyarimana's plane43 (in obvious 
sympathy with Hutu extremist claims that the RPF bore responsibility for the plane 
downing). In the same period that the Tribunal was beginning its work in 1995, several 
members of the defeated former Rwandan Government and other leaders of the genocide 
had begun to move from Zaire to Kenya, where the capital, Nairobi, offered better 
lifestyles and more modem amenities. In these circumstances, Kenya soon acquired a 
reputation as the leading host to high-ranking fugitives from justice for the genocide. It 
thus became the main target area for the special investigators of the office of the 
Tribunal's chief prosecutor, known as the "tracking team."
The tracking team's reports led then chief prosecutor Arbour and her deputy, 
Muna to plan a major arrest operation that was to apprehend a number of the Tribunal's
indictees and suspects in Kenya, to be executed by Kenyan law enforcement authorities. 
But it was clear to the international prosecutors that the exiled Rwandan genocidaires 
were living in Kenya with the blessing of Moi's government. A major arrest operation 
could not be planned, let alone successfully executed, without the political approval of 
the Kenyan leader. Arbour and Muna decided to solicit the assistance of the great powers 
and a number of other influential states in applying political pressure on Moi.44 A 
situation where Kenya had become a major regional link for the exiled Rwandan regime 
was becoming politically unsustainable for Kenya, a country that is largely dependent on 
donor aid 45 At the same time the Rwandan leader Kagame, whose relations with Moi 
were understandably frosty, was coming to the realisation that he had to deal with Moi's 
government - unpalatable as the prospect was - in order to advance his country's strategic 
interests. At the top of those interests was that of the apprehension of the Rwandan 
genocidaires in Kenya, as well as economic ones. Rwanda is a landlocked country, and 
Kenya is the region’s economic hub, from which land based commerce and the shipping 
port of Mombasa are indispensable to the Rwandan economy.
Meanwhile, Arbor and Muna had obtained the support of Canada, which, through 
its ambassador in Nairobi, took the lead in the application of diplomatic pressure on Moi 
to break with his government policy of sheltering war criminals. Canada was supported 
in this effort by the U.S., Britain and South Africa. Arbour ultimately met with Moi, 
who, assenting to the planned swoop, asked the international prosecutors to meet with 
Kenyan Attorney-General Amos Wako. Arbour and Muna met with Wako, with whom 
they prepared a strategy for the arrest operations. Muna then reported their plans and 
progress to Tribunal registrar Okali, who subsequently provided the final political and
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legal liaison for the operation in meetings with the Kenyan Attorney-General and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
On 18 July 1997, Kenyan authorities arrested seven persons in Nairobi at the 
International Tribunal's request in a stunning raid code-named "Operation NAKI" 
(Nairobi-Kigali) and transferred them to the Tribunal's detention centre in Arusha.46 At 
the top of the list of fugitives captured in the NAKI operation was former Rwandan 
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda. Others apprehended in the raid were Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, former Minister of Family Welfare and Women Affairs (the first woman 
ever to be indicted by an international criminal tribunal), her son Arsene Shalom 
Ntahobali, the journalist Hassan Ngeze, and erstwhile senior military commanders 
Gratien Kabiligi and Aloys Ntabakuze. The NAKI operation,was the most successful 
such operation in the Tribunal's history, and provided the ICTR with a much needed 
boost in legitimacy at a time when it was till a fledgling international judicial institution. 
But this success could not have been achieved without the political agreement of a 
reluctant sovereign state, and the political pressure applied by influential external parties 
in the nature of influential Western states and South Africa.
There are two ironies here. The first is that the execution of NAKI was delayed by 
a day because Kagame, returning from a trip to South Africa, visited Nairobi during that 
period and met with Moi, following the intercession of South African leader Nelson 
Mandela.47 Six high level Rwandan suspects escaped the dragnet of the operation as a 
result of a leak that occurred by reason of the delay 48 The second irony is that although 
other accused persons or suspects were subsequently arrested in Kenya at the Tribunal's
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request, none of those captured in Kenya included the wealthy persons that were close to 
Habyarimana and also had actual links with the Kenyan leadership.49
Rewards for Justice.
None of those individuals has been more elusive than Felicien Kabuga, the 
millionaire Rwandan businessman who was a major shareholder in the hate radio station 
RTLM and allegedly financed the murder squads and the importation of machetes and 
other weapons that were used to execute the genocide. He is wanted by the Tribunal on 
charges of genocide. In 1994 Kabuga fled to Switzerland, from where he was expelled in 
1995. He then settled in Nairobi, where he had strong relationships with President Moi 
and powerful members of Moi’s government, including mutually beneficial business 
deals. In 1995, Kabuga's daughter wed Habyarimana's son in Nairobi.
Kabuga is on the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) "most wanted list" 
together with Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. Government has offered up to US$ 5 
million for information leading to Kabuga's capture. But the fugitive, deploying his 
considerable wealth, international connections and multiple aliases and passports, has 
remained several steps ahead of international law. He was one of the "big fish" that 
escaped from the NAKI operation in 1997. A handwritten note found in the house where 
he was believed to be hiding revealed that he was tipped off by a Kenyan police 
informant.50 In the words of one genocide survivor, "Kabuga is our Osama bin Laden".51 
Although Kenya, under international pressure, had revoked Kabuga's Kenyan residence 
permit in 1997, he is believed to have continued receiving protection from senior officials 
of the Moi-era government on Kabuga's payroll. The ICTR subsequently went after his
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financial assets, and $2.5 million in Kabuga's bank accounts in France, Belgium and 
Switzerland were frozen at the Tribunal chief prosecutor's request in 1999.
It was around this period that the U.S. government began to take an active interest 
in bringing Kabuga to justice through its “Rewards for Justice” programme. The total 
budget of that programme is uncertain, but it is a global initiative that encompasses the 
ICTR and ICTY, and the $25 million reward for information leading to the capture of Bin 
Laden. Under the program, the full bounty of, say, $5 million in the Kabuga case could 
be given as reward to an informant, or a lesser sum could be disbursed. How much an 
informant is paid is determined by an internal committee, and the highest actual payment 
appears to have been $500,000.54 A reward is paid in cash, unless otherwise indicated by 
an informant. In one case, the U.S. authorities brought three suitcases stuffed with cash 
to a payment meeting with an informant, who indicated that he wanted half of his 
payment in cash and the other half in a bank account.55 Such are the resources and 
pragmatic tactics that the U.S. authorities have deployed in their hunt for Kabuga, 
without success as of this writing. While the program brought the FBI close to locating 
Kabuga on a number of occasions, the scent of near success has frequently proved a 
mirage, on one occasion tragically.
In 2002, two Kenyan sources came forward, claiming to possess information that 
would lead to Kabuga's arrest.56 One of the informants was William Munuhe, who 
contacted the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, the locus of the U.S. hunt for Kabuga in the 
region under the local direction of the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Johnny Carson and the 
overall direction of war crimes ambassador Prosper.
The Kenyan sources indicated to the American authorities that Kabuga was 
receiving protection from the high echelons of the Moi government.57 Washington 
obtained information on the vehicles in which Kabuga travelled - vehicles of a 
government security team. The Americans tried to establish with Kenyan authorities a 
discrete plan to arrest Kabuga, but as Prosper recalls, the informants became 
compromised. One of the two informants was kidnapped for a weekend, threatened, 
released and subsequently kidnapped a second time. The second informant (Munuhe) 
had by now become very afraid. Realizing that the hunt for Kabuga was no ordinary 
criminal investigation, as the information the Americans were receiving appeared to point 
all the way to the then President Moi and the Permanent Secretary for Internal Security in 
the Office of the President, Zakayo Cheriuyot, Prosper brought in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to administer polygraph tests, first on the two informers (to ascertain 
the veracity of their claims), and then on Permanent Secretary Cheriuyot (the latter 
almost certainly with Moi's knowledge and acquiescence). For Prosper, this was a 
necessary precaution before the U.S. Government could apply stronger political pressure 
on Moi to surrender Kabuga to the ICTR. While the two informants passed the lie- 
detector test, the Kenyan permanent secretary failed it - "miserably", in Prosper's 
recollection.
With this outcome, the American authorities reverted to Moi. The septuagenarian 
politician's rule was coming to an end after 20 years, under pressure from opposition 
politicians to relinquish power. The Americans were now anxious to step up the 
momentum in the manhunt for Kabuga and apprehend him before Moi left office. A 
stakeout was set up to snare Kabuga at a house in the affluent Nairobi neighbourhood of
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Karen.58 Munuhe was to lure the Rwandan there. Outside, U.S. and Kenyan security 
agents waited in hiding, ready to pounce on Kabuga as soon as he appeared. Kabuga 
never showed up, and Munuhe was later murdered with a shot to the back of his head.59 
Thus ended -- temporarily at least — the trail to Kabuga. The U.S. authorities relocated 
their second informant outside Kenya to assure his safety.60
In January 2003 a new Kenyan government headed by President Mwai Kibaki was 
elected, and Kibaki pledged his support to the hunt for Kabuga. But first, he needed to 
clean up Kenya's security and intelligence services which at every turn had been shown 
to have been compromised by Kabuga or interests loyal to him. Nearly two years later in 
late 2004, Prosper acknowledged that the search for Kabuga had lost momentum, but 
asserted that it would resume in earnest.61 Kabuga's pursuers in Washington believe that 
he has remained in Kenya but entered and left the country frequently after the manhunt 
for him became intense in 2002. The Kenyan authorities, however, have consistently 
discounted the possibility of Kabuga's presence on Kenyan territory. And the 
investigators of the International Tribunal admit they simply do not know Kabuga's 
whereabouts. "Sometimes we can be very close. Sometimes we can be very far," 
Richard Renaud, the Tribunal's chief of investigations commented. "This guy is very 
smart. He has a lot of money. He has a lot of contacts. And he travels a lot."62
Meanwhile, in the wider Great Lakes region, the U.S. Rewards for Justice program 
has made progress. The international conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has 
served as the political context for the handover of some Rwandans sought by the Tribunal 
to stand trial. The historical slaughters of Tutsi in Rwanda over the past 45 years have 
contributed to a significant Tutsi minority in the DRC, who are resented by indigenous
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Congolese. And the 1994 genocide provided the immediate context for further conflict in 
the region when the defeated genocidaires blended into about two million ordinary Hutu 
civilians and crossed the border into DRC in one of the swiftest and largest movement of 
refugees in history. There the war criminals regrouped, planned and executed military 
incursions into Rwanda. Perceiving its national security to be under threat, Rwanda's 
new Tutsi-dominated army invaded DRC in 1996 using the subtuferge of an "indigenous 
revolt", defeated the Congolese despot Mobutu Sese Seko's army with little resistance 
(Mobutu fled into exile in Morocco and France and later died of illness), and installed 
Laurent Kabila, a flamboyant Congolese dissident who had spent many years in exile in 
Tanzania, as the new head of state of DRC.63
Ultimately, however, Kabila fell out with his Rwandan puppeteers and asserted his 
own authority by aligning himself with the pro-genocide Hutu forces in the region, and 
orchestrated mass killings of Tutsis, publicly supported by his political adviser Yerodia 
Ndombasi.64 Rwanda responded in 1998 with a second invasion of DRC in order to oust 
Kabila, who invited the military intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe and at least five other 
African states that ultimately saved him from certain defeat. The conflict, described as 
"Africa's first World War", lasted five years. Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and was 
succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. Several troops of the genocidal former Rwandan 
Government Forces fought on Kabila's side during the war. In their various incursions 
into the Congo since 1994, the Rwandan army is alleged to have massacred more then 
200,000 Hutus in the Congo.
The Lusaka Peace Accords in 1999 (ultimately not respected by the warring parties) 
called for the handover to the ICTR of persons accused of the 1994 genocide who fought
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on Kabila's side. And it was in the context of subsequent negotiations that ultimately led 
to a peace deal between the parties in South Africa that the U.S. launched the Rewards 
for Justice Program in the Great Lakes region, seizing what it saw as an evolving political 
window of opportunity.
From the beginning of the African part of the rewards programme, Prosper adopted 
a partnership approach that sought to secure the “buy-in” of the political leadership of the 
three main countries that harboured Rwandan war criminals in the region - Kenya, DRC 
and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazaville) in cooperation with senior officials of the 
ICTR, in particular its registrar, Adama Dieng. Prosper was anxious to demonstrate to 
the region, through meetings and joint press conferences with these officials, that the 
American programme had local political support, in clear contrast with the Balkans, 
where the governments of the states of the former Yugoslavia resisted endorsing the U.S. 
rewards programme and thus robbed it of any political legitimacy in the region.65
In this context, two political factors influenced the generally moderate Congolese 
President Joseph Kabila. First, he recognized that the strong presence of the ex-RGF 
forces, the interhamwe militia and the ALIR in his military and governmental structures 
presented him with a major foreign relations problem He had inherited this situation 
from his father. This topic was discussed during Kabila's meeting with President Bush in 
Washington D.C. in 2002.66 Second, it posed an internal security problem as well. Some 
of the Rwandan exiles had aligned themselves with hard line elements in Kabilia's 
Government, creating further political complications. Moving against them too 
precipitately might affect the internal political order in unpredictable ways.
Thus, although he wanted to get rid of these wanted men, including approving their 
being brought to justice at Arusha, in doing so Kabila would be making a significant 
gesture to Rwanda, and was reluctant to do so without a reciprocal action of equal 
significance by Rwanda.67 The peace talks in South Africa’s Sun City, which included 
Rwandan negotiators, provided an enabling environment for a quid pro quo. As 
Rwandan and other foreign forces began their withdrawal from the Congo under intense 
international pressure, Kabila made the political decision to support the apprehension of 
Rwandan war criminals in this country and their handover to the ICTR under the U.S. 
Rewards programme.
Nevertheless, the results, although a significant achievement compared to the 
prevailing situation before the rewards programme, have been modest in comparison to 
the numbers (at least 15) of ringleaders of the Rwandan genocide believed to be hiding in 
the DRC. As of this writing, five persons have been captured and handed over to the 
International Criminal Tribunal. The biggest catch among them has been Augustine 
Bizimungu, former chief of staff of the Rwandan Government Forces who fought 
actively in the DRC army - and had been one of the Tribunal's highest priorities for 
arrest. Bizimungu was arrested in Angola in August 2002 after American authorities 
confirmed his presence at a demobilization camp. Others captured under the aegis of the 
American programme are Tharcisse Renzaho, former governor of Kigali (arrested in 
DRC, 2002), Yusuf Munyakazi, a militia leader during the genocide (DRC, 2004), Jean- 
Baptiste Gatete, a senior civil administrator (Congo, 2002) and Idelphonse Hatagekimana 
(Congo, 2003).
In conclusion, this chapter has established how, yet again, the definition by states of 
their strategic interests has influenced the level and kind of support they give to 
international criminal justice despite the mistaken impression that the creation of 
international war crimes tribunal represents a major shift away from the Bullian, 
international society perspective on international affairs. State cooperation with the 
ICTR has ranged from the forthcoming to the hesitant and conditional and, in the rare 
case where national interests are deemed to dictate such a course of action, non- 
cooperation. As we will see in the next, concluding chapter of this dissertation, not even 
the creation of a standing International Criminal Court, designed to remove the ad hoc 
approach to punishing war criminals and instead institutionalize it, has brought about an 
end of history as we know it in the attitudes of states towards international war crimes
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Conclusion: The Politics of the International Criminal Court
We believe that states, not international institutions are primarily 
responsibl for ensuring justice in the international system
— Marc Grossman, U.S. Under Secretary of State
The establishment of the Court by a treaty signed by 120 states at a diplomatic 
conference in Rome in 1998 is a remarkable development that, at first sight would appear 
to presage "global justice", "justice for all", or an end to impunity. But it is nonetheless a 
phase in the struggle between universalist notions of justice, on the one hand, and 
international society conceptions of international order based on sovereignty, on the other. 
In other words, the ICC is not “the end of history" (to borrow Francis Fukuyama's 
memorable phrase) in international criminal justice.
As a conclusion to the argument of this thesis, this chapter will attempt to analyze 
of the political dynamics and implications for the international society of the ICC. There 
are several aspects of the ICC with important political /strategic ramifications, but owing 
to space constraints, only Iwo will be addressed here. These are (1) the framework of the 
ICC -- the "balance of power" between the Court and the sovereign states that are parties 
to its statute as expressed in the "complementarity" of the Court's jurisdiction; and (2) the 
United States’ opposition to the ICC. In doing so in the context of a permanent 
institution created by treaty, as opposed to the ad hoc international tribunals established 
by the Security Council’s fiat, I seek to demonstrate the permanence of the tensions that
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have been examined in previous chapters, so long as sovereign states remain the 
dominant unit in the international society.
The UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998 was much more than a 
normal diplomatic event. It drew hundreds of civil society organizations in addition to 
160 states and numerous international organizations. A palpable sense of history was in 
the air. Five weeks of frenetic negotiations later, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court was adopted after 120 states voted to create what has been optimistically 
described as "the last great international institution of the twentieth century”. 1 Seven 
states voted against the Rome Statute, with 21 others abstaining. Among the dissenting 
states was the United States, which was an active participant throughout the negotiations 
and drafting process. Although the vote was not recorded, China, India, Iraq, Israel, 
Libya, Qatar and Yemen are believed to have voted against the Court’s creation.
The success of Rome and the establishment of the ICC more generally can be 
attributed mainly to a coalition of states known as the "like-minded" group of about 60 
states that included most of the European states. The role of civil society organizations 
was also a major contributory factor.
Expectations of a drawn out ratification process, one in which attaining the 
minimum threshold of 60 ratifications would take several years, were ultimately 
confounded. The ICC treaty was ratified by 66 states by April 2002 and went into 
operation in July 2002.2 Although the momentum of ratifications has slowed, as of this 
writing 97 states had ratified the Rome Statute -  roughly one half of all members states of 
the UN Of these, 26 are African states, 11 are Asian, 15 Eastern European states, 19
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states in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and 26 Western European and other 
states.
The Political Framework of the ICC
The ICC is the product of a major ideological or conceptual battle in international 
relations between visions of cosmopolitan world society and those of international 
society that favour interstate cooperation, but one predicated on sovereignty. Both sides 
have claimed victory, but the institution in its current form is a compromise from that 
battle. This is the most important point of departure in assessing the ICC.
That this battle is real and was present in the minds of protagonists is evident in 
the exultant and optimistic commentary of the cosmopolitan group, the more muted 
wariness of the advocates of an international order in which sovereignty remains 
ascendant, and the determined opposition of the United States, for which sovereignty is 
nothing short of sacrosanct. ICC supporters such as Antonio Cassesse expect it to 
become "the central pillar in the world community for upholding the fundamental dictates 
of humanity.”3 Leila Nadya Sadat adopts the metaphor of "revolution” and "counter­
revolution" to describe the deep significance of the Court and the opposition to it. She 
admits that, despite the conceptual and potential practical shift the ICC represents, many 
aspects of the Rome Statute "reflect the constraints of classical international law that did 
not yield to the forces of innovation and revolution at Rome."4 Observing the 
unsurprising nature of this fact, Sadat also agrees that "if state sovereignty (and 
particularly its expression as nationalism) is often blamed for the violent conduct of
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world affairs, international governance is not necessarily looked upon as a superior 
alternative.”5
One concurs with this observation, which leads me to clarify my view on the ICC 
before proceeding further. First, the ICC is an important institution in international 
affairs. It has the potential to fill the gap left by the reality that although credible national 
prosecutions are to be preferred to top-down, international approaches, in several cases 
national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute mass atrocities. 
Second, the ICC’s potential value should not result in a failure to see the political nature 
of the Court. Third, the establishment of the ICC is an important advance for the 
cosmopolitan conception of international justice, although as Sadat accepts, that world­
view did not ultimately prevail in Rome to the extent its advocates had hoped. This is a 
political reality, and from it flows another one -- that many (though certainly not all) 
proponents of the ICC see the institution as a prelude of sorts to a world government. 
This would be an unhealthy outcome, for the concept of a world government, while it 
appeals to Utopians, is one that enjoys little consensus and requires a type of 
centralization of police powers that poses its own unique dangers of dictatorship.6 This is 
why the most essential aspect of the ICC framework is the fact that it will complement, 
not supplant the jurisdiction of states. How this will work out in practice remains to be 
seen, but the likely implication is that the universalist vision and cosmopolitan ambition 
of some of the Court's proponents will be circumscribed by the nature of the international 
society.
At the Rome conference and the negotiations that preceded it states were keen to 
avoid extensive intrusions into their sovereignty, although transnational civil society
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lobbied for an outcome in which the court would have jurisdictional primacy over states 
parties. The defining reality of the ICC is well summed up by Spyros Economides: 
“What was supposed to be a major departure from the traditional conduct of international 
relations was coloured by that very same method of conducting international relations”.7 
Thus states constructed a regime which denied the ICC enforcement powers to compel 
states to cooperate with the Court's requests for judicial cooperation and assistance.
Under the complementarity principle, the ICC cannot accept jurisdiction over a 
case that it is being investigated or prosecuted by the state on whose territory the crime 
occurred unless that state is "unwilling or unable to genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution", or where the state with jurisdiction has investigated the 
case and decides not to prosecute, unless the decision stems from an unwillingness or 
inability to prosecute.8 In determining unwillingness on the part of a state, however, the 
ICC will consider whether the national proceedings are designed to shield the person 
from the ICC's jurisdiction, there has been a kind of delay that indicates the absence of 
intent to bring the concerned person to justice, or the national proceedings were not 
independent or impartial.9
The ICC is thus essentially a substitute for national jurisdiction. It is a centralized 
institution that rests on the foundations of decentralized power in the international 
society, unlike the U.N. ad hoc tribunals, and thus is a contradiction in terms. Despite the 
apparent victory the Court's creation represents for the solidarist or universalist world 
view, at the heart of the ICC lies the paradox that it was created to render human justice 
in a world of states, on which the Court will depend to a very large degree. It will not be 
free from their influence. One way in which that control will be exercised is the
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Assembly of States Parties that have ratified the Rome Statute. This is the organ that 
elects the judges, prosecutor, and registrar of the Court, approves its budget, and 
generally has something of an institutional oversight and policy role in the same manner 
in which the UN Security Council is the political parent of the ad hoc international 
tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia. Another potential source of political 
influence will be countries that are not party to the Rome treaty, particularly the United 
States. Through their absence these countries will deny the Court the universality it seeks 
by limiting its reach.
The complementarity provisions of the Rome statute include an explicit emphasis 
in its preamble that "the International Criminal Court established under this statute shall 
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions". They are the most important in a 
framework that ripples with a constant tension between universalism and sovereignty, 
resulting in a Court with international, but not universal jurisdiction. That a universal 
cosmopolitan justice is the Court’s ultimate goal is explicitly clear from a policy 
statement by the Court's President, the Canadian judge Phillipe Kirsch, who prior to his 
election to that position was the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission on the ICC 
established after the adoption of the Rome statute. "Universal ratification of the Rome 
Statute", Judge Kirsch said, "remains an essential long-term objective of the Court. 
Universality is necessary to establish a truly global reach in the fight against impunity."10
The Security Council, charged as it is with responsibility for international peace 
and security in the UN Charter, could not logically be absent from the ICC's framework. 
The Council can also refer a situation in which one or more of the relevant crimes have 
occurred to the Court under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.11 In that case the principle of
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universal jurisdiction is applicable because there are no geographical limits to the 
Council's remit. Perhaps even more important from a political standpoint, the Security 
Council can request a deferral of the commencement of an investigation by the ICC with 
a resolution to that effect adopted under its peace enforcement powers in Chapter VII of
1 9the U.N. Charter. And in that case the investigation or prosecution must be deferred for 
12 months, with the request renewable under the same conditions.
Few things are more indicative of the political stakes in the ICC than this 
provision. The provision for Security Council power to request a suspension of 
proceedings (the Rome Statute does not say how many times such a request can be 
renewed) is the "Singapore compromise" between the members of the Council that 
wanted a stronger role for it and states that believed it was important to preserve some 
distance between the Court and the UN although an institutional link between the two 
organizations was recognized as helpful for the ICC.13 Britain's agreement to this 
compromise proposal was critical to its adoption in the Rome Statute. China and France 
were also strongly opposed to the extent of the Prosecutor's powers. India wanted the 
Court statute to include a ban on nuclear weapons, and Sri Lanka wanted the inclusion of 
terrorism as one of the core crimes. Many Arab countries (with the exception of Egypt, 
an American ally) opposed the very creation of the Court, fearing it would serve Western 
agendas.14 It is doubtful that subsequent events in Iraq gave them any reason to alter 
their positions. But if a court could not be avoided, they wanted one that would serve 
their interests: creating a loophole to attack Israel’s occupation policies in the West Bank 
and Gaza. And, notably, most Asian states were and have remained sceptical of the ICC. 
They remain the region with the lowest ratio of ratification of the Rome treaty.
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The ICC's strongest attribute is that, unlike the international criminal tribunals for 
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it was the direct outcome of a treaty negotiated and 
agreed between sovereign states. To that extent, its democratic legitimacy cannot be 
seriously questioned. As we have seen, those states have maintained their primacy in the 
distribution of competences between them and the Court. But they have, at the same time, 
created an institution that bridges an important gap in the normative architecture of 
international law. To the extent they have given up a bit of sovereignty in the process, it 
is by mutual consent, and no one can legitimately quarrel with that.
This democratic legitimacy runs into problems only to the extent that the Rome 
Statute seeks to confer on the Court jurisdiction over states not parties to the Statute, or 
which have not otherwise accepted its jurisdiction. Just as concerns exist about "imperial 
overstretch" by the great powers, so is it appropriate to caution against what could be 
termed "universalist overreach" by the ICC.
The United States and the ICC
All we need from the United States is benign neglect. Is that asking for too much?
International Criminal Court official, The Economist
Official policy in the United States towards the establishment of an independent, 
permanent international penal tribunal has always been at best ambivalent and at most, as 
now, that of visceral opposition. The reasons for this are not hard to see. Several lawyers 
and diplomats who work or have worked for the executive arm of the U.S. government 
have carefully considered the pros and cons of U.S. participation in such a court, seeking 
assurances that will protect American strategic interests. They were generally supportive 
of the Court if the necessary safeguards for their national interest were obtained. But
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often, that level of engagement is disconnected from the less informed “main street USA" 
in which a majority of politicians are reflexively opposed to subjecting U.S. citizens to 
such a sensitive act of international governance as international criminal justice under any 
circumstances. And, on such major matters of national interest at least, it is these elected 
political leaders, not the diplomats who negotiate on America's behalf, that influence the 
foreign policy decisions of the President of the United States who has constitutional 
responsibility for foreign relations.
The fundamental ambivalence I have referred to is evident in the fact that the kind 
of court the U.S. wanted was precisely the kind that a majority of other states did not - an 
explicitly politically controlled one. This ambivalence and eventual opposition is rooted 
in an attitude of historical exceptionalism, a fundamental commitment to its sovereignty, 
and a view of international law that flows from that worldview. How the last two factors 
are interpreted -  a matter of style, if not of substance - largely depends on which 
American political party occupies the White House at any given time. But a significant 
pointer to the reality that the interpretation of U.S. attitudes to international law is more a 
matter of style (or rhetoric) than substance is the fact that, in recent years foreign policy 
and military actions that are controversial in international law have been taken by 
Democratic and Republican Presidents - the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 and the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 are the most famous examples. Both military interventions were 
undertaken in the course of “upholding our values”15. Similarly, there has been more or 
less bipartisan consistency of opposition to U.S. participation in an independent ICC 
under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
396
397
To understand the U.S. position on the ICC at a normative level it is helpful to 
refer to Robert Jackson’s discussion of "national responsibility" as one of four traditions 
in theories of international relations.16 According to Jackson, the national responsibility 
is one in which values such as national self-interest, national security and national 
welfare are the guiding lights of state action. The normative basis of this approach is that 
the state — however formed — is prior to any international associations it may form or 
join, and its citizens can have a prior claim to defining the responsibilities of then- 
national leaders, who are actually their servants:
According to that domestic-focused way of thinking, international law and international
organization are instrumental arrangements which are justified by how well they serve
the national interests of states. This is the thinking that inclines many Americans to
17believe that their laws always trump international law when they come in conflict—
As Jackson explains, this idea of national responsibility is rooted in classical 
realism, which is nevertheless based on values and value judgement — contrary to much 
conventional thinking, one might add. But the values on which the idea of national 
responsibility is based are certainly not those of liberal internationalism. In Jackson’s 
words:
National responsibility is an authentic morality, however, and should not be confused
with narrow self-interest. Realism as classically understood is an ethical theory: it
conceives of the state as a moral community; it involves defending the national interest,
which is a moral idea. The national interest is one of the most important justifications of
18pluralist world politics, perhaps the most important...
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Similarly, Jason Ralph has illuminated the basis of American opposition to the 
ICC, this time from the perspective of the cultural dimensions of the country’s democracy. 
The cultural value of that method of governance, by which the United States was bom, 
also defines in the eyes of Americans who they are, and has led it to be distrustful of any 
institution that threatens to subjects the country’s actions to the decisions of foreign 
judges in ways that are not controllable by Washington. The fundamental reason for this 
policy position is that the United States interprets the internationalization of democracy 
as the idea of an international society of democratic (sovereign) states, and not that of a 
world society without borders represented by an independent prosecutor for the ICC.19
Against this backdrop, we can now proceed to examine - -and perhaps better 
understand -- the “clash of the titans” in the politics of the International Criminal Court. 
As the Rome Conference drew to an end, David Scheffer, then U.S. Ambassador at Large 
for War Crimes Issues and head of the American delegation, rose and made a final 
intervention. He was clearly faced with a looming defeat for the key U.S. proposals for 
an amendment of the draft statute before the vote. "I deeply regret, Mr. Chairman", 
Scheffer said, "That we face the end of this Conference and the past four years of work 
with such profound misgivings and objections as we have today", and noted that the 
Rome Statute would create "a court that we and others warned of in the opening days - 
strong on paper but weak in reality." He proposed an amendment that would effectively 




Despite its disagreements with the Rome Statute, the Clinton administration 
continued negotiations in the Preparatory Commission established after the Rome 
Conference, hoping to obtain concessions that would make U.S. participation in the Court 
possible. By mid-2000, however, its efforts became complicated by a piece of draft 
legislation in the U.S. Congress that rendered the possibility of U.S. participation a lost 
cause. The "American Servicemembers Protection Act", popularly known as the "Hague 
Invasion Act" was introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (Republican - North Carolina) in 
the U.S. Senate on 10 May 2001 and introduced in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Tom Delay (Republican - Texas) the same day. Adopted by Congress and 
signed into law by President Bush on 2 August 2002, the legislation prohibits cooperation 
with the ICC, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over U.S. citizens and “Allied 
Persons”, and the provision of U.S. military aid to any country that has ratified the ICC 
Treaty, but exempted NATO countries and key non-NATO American Allies. It 
required the UN Security Council to grant immunity from prosecution by the ICC to 
American personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. Most dramatically, it authorized the 
U.S. President to "use all means necessary and appropriate" (a phrase that encompasses 
the use of force) to obtain the release of members of the U.S. Armed Forces detained or 
imprisoned by or on behalf of the ICC.
The Clinton administration had signed the Rome Statute just before leaving office 
in December 2000 but announced that the treaty would not be submitted to the Senate for 
ratification.23 The Bush administration subsequently "unsigned" the treaty by a letter to 
UN Secretary-General on 6 May 2002 nullifying the earlier U.S. signature.24 These 
measures were followed up by a diplomatic campaign to sign bilateral agreements with
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individual states exempting U.S. citizens from the possibility of ICC prosecution for 
crimes committed on their territories.25 As of this writing, the U.S. has signed Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements (BIAs), dubbed "bilateral impunity agreements" by critics, with 80 
countries. These agreements have been signed in the context of Article 98 of the Rome 
Statue. Article 98 provides that the ICC cannot request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its treaty obligations to a third 
state. It was included in the Rome Statute at American insistence. Among the 80 states 
that have signed bilateral immunity agreements, several are from the developing world, 
heavily dependent on U.S. aid, and those among them that are candidates for future 
membership of NATO were threatened with shaky prospects for their candidacy should 
they fail to sign on the dotted line26.
Even traditional Western allies have not been immune from U.S. pressure. U.S. 
diplomats have noted, in defence of their arm twisting other countries into signed Article 
98 agreements, that countries in Europe that were recently admitted into the European 
Union declined to sign the agreements precisely because they faced a similar threat to
77their candidacies for EU membership by the Union's older members. This, in other 
words, is a tu quoque defence.
In the UN Security Council the U.S. government threatened to shut down UN 
peacekeeping missions by vetoing their renewal if US troops were not granted immunity 
by the Council. It backed up its threats by vetoing the renewal of a UN peacekeeping 
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 30 June 2002, overriding opposition from the 
European Union, NATO, and the Bosnian government28. Kofi Annan sent a letter to US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell criticizing the U.S. demands as a threat to the legitimacy
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of the Security Council that "flies in the face of international treaty law". In short order, 
the European parliament adopted a resolution in which it “deeply deplored” the U.S. veto, 
noted that the “Hague Invasion Act” went well beyond the exercise of the U.S.’s 
sovereign right not to participate in the ICC, and noted that the legislation denied the U.S.
*70itself the very military intelligence and cooperation it needed to fight terrorism .
Nevertheless, on 12 July, following two weeks on debate, the Council balked in 
the face of U.S. demands and adopted resolution 1422 (2002) which granted immunity to 
U.S. members of UN peacekeeping missions and those of other non-state parties to the 
ICC for 12 months. Legalism had precipitated, yet again, tensions between cosmopolitan 
notions of justice and international order. It was certainly possible that the closure of the 
UN mission, or the possible unravelling of other peace operations as a result of the 
double standards in liability of peacekeepers from different countries to criminal 
prosecution, could have led to renewed conflict in these conflict zones. In a trenchant 
criticism of resolution 1422, Kai Ambos, a German participant in the negotiations of the 
Rome Statute, commented on its anomalous nature:
In light of the Council's resolution, the [ICC] becomes itself a threat to peace, because 
only under this condition can the Security Council adopt a resolution under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. Let us pause to assess this truly grotesque logic: a resolution as it was 
adopted by the Security Council on July 12th presupposes that the ICC must be labelled 




When the U.S. sought a renewal of the immunity upon the expiry of its 12-month 
time frame in 2003, it ran into the determined opposition of several members of the 
Security Council and Secretary-General Annan.31 "Blanket exemption is wrong", Annan 
wrote. "It is of dubious judicial value, and I don’t think it should be encouraged by the 
Council." For the states that were wavering once again in the face American pressure, 
Annan’s letter was a welcome intervention that tipped their views firmly into opposition 
mode. The letter was also one instance of a clear departure from the epiphenomenal 
status that realists grant to international institutions. With the Secretary-General having 
gone on record on the legality of the exemptions, it is doubtful that the members of the 
Security Council would have liked to be caught on the wrong side of the law as it were. 
It is a demonstration as well of the limits of power in its relation to international law and 
how the latter feeds back to international relations.
Meanwhile, China was threatening to veto the renewal resolution, and more than 
40 countries requested a public debate on it. A major scandal had empted in this period 
as abuses of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. troops in Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison were 
revealed, further undercutting U.S. ability to sway the debate. China pointedly noted that 
it could not support a resolution that could shield U.S. troops from culpability for abuses 
such as those at Abu Ghraib.33 Faced with the backlash from Iraq, China’s opposition 
and that of Annan, the U.S. withdrew the draft resolution. Of China’s opposition, U.S. 
officials noted that the Asian power, which had similarly voted against the ICC treaty and 
had previously supported U.S. efforts to limit its reach, was really engaged in 
brinksmanship on other issues. "They don’t care about the ICC", one diplomat reportedly 
said. "It all has to do with Taiwan".34 A solidarist international community? Not so. The
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divergent and shifting tendencies demonstrate the dominance of Hedley Bull’s concept of 
an anarchical society, one in which the cosmopolitan and realist perspectives co-exist in a 
state of constant friction.
I now turn to other substantive bases for U.S. opposition to the ICC's jurisidiction. 
The Rome Statute provides that when a person commits a crime under the statute, the 
state where the crime was committed or the state of nationality of the offender would 
have to assent to the trial of the offender by the ICC.35 This means that the Court can 
prosecute a national of a state not party to the Rome Treaty, where the offender is a 
national of the non-state party but the state on whose territory the crimes is committed 
gives its consent to prosecution by the Court. Scheffer had attempted to change this 
provision to require the agreement of the state of territorial state and that of the 
nationality of the defendant, but failed. This is the most important reason why the U.S. is 
adamantly opposed to the ICC, for the American position is that it cannot allow its 
citizens to be prosecuted by an international tribunal under a treaty to which it is not a 
party. Interestingly, the U.S. Surrender Agreements with the ICTY and the ICTR, in 
theory at least if not in practice, allowed for the surrender of U.S. citizens as well as those 
of other countries, from that country.
U.S. resistance to the ICC's jurisdiction stands on two legs, one political, the other 
legal. Its overall political response is that of the peculiarity of the U.S. role in 
international order. Given U.S. troop deployments in various trouble spots around the 
world and its position as the lone superpower, the U.S. position is that American troops 
offer a tempting target for malicious, politically motivated prosecution by the ICC. 
More than 300,000 American troops are deployed in about 140 countries. Discounting
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the 140,000 troops in Iraq as of 2004, the vast majority of these troops is stationed in 
Europe and Asia. Because America shoulders unequal responsibility, it should not, from 
its national perspective, be liable to equal accountability. Despite the arguments put 
forward by supporters of the Court - the remote prospect of an American being indicted 
by the Court, and the option of relying on the complementarity principle to try its own 
national in that scenario - the U.S. remains unmoved. America's distrust of the good faith 
of other nations is understandable, because its role in world politics has earned it deep 
resentment in some quarters. And there are those who oppose America simply on 
ideological grounds. These foes would exploit any loophole to embarrass or humiliate it. 
As of mid-2004 more than 100 complaints have already been filed at the ICC against 
Americans.36 In a telling point, The Christian Science Monitor, justifying U.S. wariness
of the ICC, wrote: " the chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, wants to go after
corporate officials who do business with nations that have committed mass atrocities." 
This is another classic illustration of the anarchical nature of the international society and 
the self interest that motivates its members. The Monitor editorial is a pointer to a 
national interest in shielding the amoral activities of some corporations from international 
scrutiny. It is all the more telling coming from a newspaper that has long espoused liberal 
ideals at home and abroad.
Let us now examine six politico-legal reasons for U.S. opposition to the ICC. 
First, if U.S. determination to put its nationals beyond the reach of the ICC on the basis of 
political inequality before the law is unacceptable to many, the legal basis for its position, 
dispassionately examined, is on rather solid ground. The United States maintains that the 
exercising of jurisdiction over its nationals by the ICC would violate the international law
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principle that a treaty cannot bind a state that is not a party to it without that state’s 
consent.38 This rule of customary international law is codified in Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.39 While the U.S. is not a party to this Convention, it 
can find justification in the customary law norm. Although this position is opposed by 
some commentators 40on the basis of the well known principle that a state has jurisdiction 
over crimes committed on its territory regardless of the offender’s nationality, the U.S. 
position is well founded, for the following reasons. First, a multilateral treaty is a 
democratic process of international society. It is profoundly undemocratic to seek to bind 
by a treaty agreed by mutual consent of states one that has chosen not to be party to such 
a treaty. Second, the principle of territorial jurisdiction of a state would be applicable if 
that state chose to try an offender under its domestic laws. The U.S. does not dispute this 
legal fact of life41. But that is not the case here. The Rome Statute empowers parties to it 
to hand over to an international court a national of a non-state party for trial over a treaty 
based crime. The U.S. position hinges on this subtle but fundamental point. It argues 
that absent state consent or a UN Security Council mandate, an international organization 
to which it does not belong has no such legal powers. This position would hold true not 
just for the United States, but for any other non-state party as well. The ICC provision in 
question is an attempt to import into the Court's remit the controversial doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction. Of course, in the international society, in which dispersed power is 
a fact of life, this universalist overreach has greater implications for international order in 
the case of US, which is better placed to rebuff such an intrusion on its sovereignty than a 
weaker nation. But the ICC statute is on weak ground here all the same.
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It has been argued that "defenders of this position have attempted to analogize the 
establishment of the court to the creation of a mechanism to settle inter-state disputes", 
and that the argument confuses the concepts of state responsibility and individual 
responsibility.42 This very argument itself is confused, for the exercise of treaty-making 
power by a state does not depend on whether the subjects of that treaty are states or 
individuals. The bottom line is that treaties are entered into by states in the exercise of 
their sovereignty, which encompasses their citizens. Individuals do not make treaties in 
international law. Thus, we can see that Article 12 of the Rome Statute clashes with a 
standing principle in international law and to that extent cannot bind a non-state party.
The second reason for the U.S. antagonism towards the ICC is simply because, as 
noted earlier, it wanted a political court dominated by the Security Council, where the 
U.S. would be reassured by the comfort of its veto power. It did not achieve this outcome, 
though the political constraints on the Court as it was actually established, made to 
assuage U.S. anxieties, are obvious. Put simply, the U.S. does not wish to be bound by 
externally enforced international law on issues that involve the use of force. This position 
is reinforced by America’s view of its national identity, based in turn on what Paul Kahn 
has described as “its myth of popular sovereignty” 43. From this perspective the 
prosecution of one American soldier would be one too many. As Scheffer told a 
journalist in the hallways of the Rome Conference, "bland assurances of the unlikelihood 
of any given outcome simply don’t move the mail back where I come from."44 Scheffer 
was evidently committed to the ICC project, but his hands were tied by the domestic 
political reality in his country. The conservative Senator Jesse Helms, who headed the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that handles treaty ratification, had warned that,
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absent a complete U.S. veto over what cases the Court would take up, the Rome Statute 
would be "dead on arrival" at the U.S. Senate if submitted it for ratification.45
A third U.S. objection was that a ten-year "opt-out" clause was not included in the 
Rome Statute, whereby a state party can opt out of the Court's jurisdiction for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The U.S. made this proposal because it is more likely to be 
accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as an active military power, than the 
crime of genocide. An obvious reason for this position, other than the U.S. strategic 
design to create a court weak enough to conform to its national interest, is that of the 
significant differences between America’s “forward-leaning” war-fighting doctrines in 
relation to international humanitarian law, and those of several other countries 46 One 
example of this divergence in doctrines of military necessary is American military 
doctrine regarding the targeting of electrical power systems during a war.47 U.S. military 
doctrine considers the bombardment of national power systems an essential component of 
an effective military engagement. But this kind of military activity effectively targets 
civilian populations, an "unspoken but known result" of such bombardment48. This is the 
concept of collateral damage - civilian deaths as an unavoidable consequence of war. In 
the modem world in which armies no longer charge at each other across expansive open 
fields, but powerful states bomb their adversaries from high altitudes with "precision 
bombs" that are not always so precise, debate rages about the necessity and 
proportionality of this kind of targeting.
That civilians should not be military targets is a well accepted notion in 
customary international law. Yet the bombing of electrical power grids was 
systematically utilized in the 1991 Gulf War. The argument for bombing electric grids is
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that they are potent sources of support for the armies of the adversary. But the 
humanitarian perspective is that bombing electrical grids usually has a greater impact on 
civilian life and population than on military objectives. In other words, collateral damage 
is so severe that such military activity could amount to a direct targeting of civilians. This 
dilemma of war is captured when, say, an American bomber pilot about to drop a 
precision bomb in this age of virtual warfare and “embedded” journalists, and looking at 
his presumed target on the monitor of his cockpit, brags: Tve got the target on my nose". 
Meanwhile, the pictures of the destruction his bombing has wrought as shown in graphic 
detail on our television sets are not what would be called military targets. Rather, the 
images are frequently ones of civilian casualties in hospital wards.
Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which codified the nature 
of non-combatant immunity, provides that civilian populations as well as individual 
civilians should not be the object of attack, and that acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.49 Even more to the point of the present discussion, the Protocol has offered 
a clear definition of what would amount to indiscriminate attacks, including: “Those 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.50
The United States has not ratified Protocol I, citing "fundamental and 
irreconcilable flaws".51 U.S. military manuals in international law adopt language that is 
similar and sometimes identical to Protocol I. The U.S. was a major influence behind 
the formulation of Protocol I and signed it on the first day it was opened for signature.
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But the Reagan administration subsequently received internal advice that the Protocol 
was inimical to U.S. strategic interests and declined to forward it to the Senate for 
consent and ratification.53 An important reason for the U.S. position on Protocol I is that 
in customary international law the primary duty to protect the civilian populace rests with 
the defending nation, and not with the attacking one, which has a secondary duty.54 The 
U.S. views Protocol I as seeking to shift that burden to the attacker, irrespective of the 
defending nation’s actions.55 Even weak states violate the laws of armed conflict, 
particularly when faced with superior firepower in a "David versus Goliath" situation, by 
using civilians as human shields. In such cases civilians, including women and children, 
are placed in the direct path of weaponry and at military installations in order to increase 
the numbers of civilian casualties and score propaganda points. This was the case, for 
example, in Iraq during the U.S. invasion of that country in 2003.
Some commentators have found the U.S. rejection of the ICC on the basis of its 
non-inclusion of a ten-year opt out clause for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
puzzling, because the Rome Statute includes a seven-year opt out clause in relation to 
war crimes.56 But if the U.S. delegation in Rome believed that, while the prospect of its 
committing genocide is remote, it could very well be accused of crimes against humanity, 
it was not far off the mark. The prisoner abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
triggered impassioned debates about whether the treatment of Iraqi prisoners was 
tantamount to torture, (a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute57). This is a classic 
example of U.S. actions over which international humanitarian law could implicate the 
superpower (Iraq is not, however, a party to the ICC treaty). At the least, the acts of 
sensory deprivation and the photographing of nude prisoners with U.S. troops in
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menacing positions over them, could be interpreted as "inhumane acts intentionally 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental and physical health" - a 
crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.58 Seen from this perspective, the U.S. 
position and its self-interested motivation become clearer. One problem with the U.S. 
proposal in Rome was that, from the standpoint of an effective and workable treaty, the 
position is a self-defeating one, for it would apply not just to the United States, but to all 
other parties to the Statute. A law from whose jurisdiction (or large parts thereof) its 
subjects can opt out for prolonged periods is obviously one of very limited effectiveness.
Fourth, the U.S. also rejected the Rome Statute because it includes the crime of 
aggression as one of the core crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction. This crime, 
however, has not yet been defined, and jurisdiction will commence if agreement is 
reached by state parties to the Rome Statute at a review conference to be convened seven 
years after the Rome Statute entered into force.59 The point here is to note the basis of 
U.S. opposition to its inclusion: that aggression is a matter that ought to dwell within the 
purview of the UN Security Council and not the ICC. The world's pre-eminent military 
power, and the basis on which it undertakes the use of force should not, in its own view, 
be subjected to the judgement of the rest of the international society. One man's "just 
war" could be "aggression" in the definition of another. The U.S. pre-emptive invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 is the illustration of why the inclusion of aggression in the Rome Statute 
would be problematic for the U.S. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in an interview with 
the British Broadcasting Corporation, characterized the war as "illegal"60. This remark 
was no different in substance from his consistent prior position that the war was "not in 
compliance with the provisions of the UN Charter”. But the power of the "I -word"
410
411
generated a predictable and defensive furore in Western capitals. The Secretary- 
General's remarks could be legal grist for the mill of a future complaint to the ICC 
prosecutor against members of the “Coalition of the willing”, should the ambit of the 
crime of aggression be agreed at a Review Conference on the Rome Statute.
If the U.S. response to the inclusion of aggression was predictable, perhaps more 
intriguing is its rejection of the Rome treaty because it includes provisions that 
countenance a possible future expansion of the crimes within its remit to include 
terrorism and drug trafficking61 -- a fifth reason for its rejection of the Rome treaty. The 
explicit desire to bring the crimes within the ambit of the ICC is spelt out in the Final Act 
of the Rome Conference that adopted the Rome Statute.62 The impetus for a political 
decision to reconsider the statute in the future in this context of drug trafficking arose 
from the fact that the initiative of the Caribbean states which led to the creation of the 
ICC was motivated by a desire to create an international framework of accountability to 
fight transnational drug trafficking. It was thus ironic that the Rome treaty developed in 
other directions and omitted this issue.
As for terrorism, the prospect of an international enforcement mechanism for this 
crime has roots going as far back as 1937, when the League of Nations adopted a 
convention against terrorism and prepared a draft statute for an international criminal 
tribunal.63 India was the only country that ratified the convention, which never became 
law. The U.S. opposition to the ICC because it might conceivably acquire jurisdiction 
over terrorism is contradictory. The terrorist attack on the U.S. on 11 September 2001 
has turned the conflict between extremist political Islam and the West in to an existential 
one. There are a number of international treaties, based on a limited form of universal
411
412
jurisdiction, and several of them actively promoted by the U.S., that are aimed at fighting 
terrorism.64 Although these treaties permit states to prosecute or extradite offenders, the 
reality is that the judicial systems of several state parties are simply too weak to cope 
with the political and security pressures that accompany these kinds of criminal trials. 
This point becomes even more germane when we consider the terrorist bombings of U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and terrorist bombings in other countries in 
recent years. Henry Kissinger has aptly observed: “Terror has no fixed address; it has 
attacked from Bali to Singapore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York 
and Washington.”65Now, does the U.S. suppose that it alone can win the "war on terror"? 
Its military power notwithstanding, the limitations of that power and its intelligence 
capabilities have become painfully apparent in recent years in light of 9/11 and the 
situation in Iraq. This reality, then, suggests the need for an international framework of 
legal accountability for these transnational crimes in addition to national ones. If ever 
there was a type of crime deserving the jurisdiction of an international penal tribunal, it is 
that of terrorist crimes.
Finally, the U.S. has argued that it cannot join the ICC because the Rome Statute 
prohibits reservations. There is no legal requirement in international law that a treaty 
must provide for reservations, but the provision is unusual when viewed in light of 
practice. As Sadat and Carden have observed, perhaps a more interesting question is why 
this was done.66 Clearly, the states parties believed that, especially given the delicate 
compromises that had already been made between national jurisdiction, international 
jurisdiction by the Court, and the role of the Security Council, allowing reservations to 
the Rome Statute would have simply rendered the Court stillborn. And they were right,
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in this writer's view. The statute includes a provision whereby a state party to it can 
withdraw - which safeguards the element of freedom of association for any party.
Was the bar to reservations a sufficiently weighty reason to justify U.S. non­
participation? The question is academic, as the U.S. has the sovereign right to choose 
what international institutions it may or may not join. A detailed discussion of 
international law regarding reservations to treaties is beyond the scope of this work. 
Suffice to note that reservations are a complex matter, and the International Court of 
Justice, in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case67, stipulated that 
reservations must be consistent with a treaty purpose. Knowing what is known about the 
U.S. position on the ICC, it would be unrealistic to contemplate a U.S. reservation that 
would have been in conformity with the purpose of the Court.
To conclude this review of the United States and the International Criminal Court, 
the six main reasons why the U.S. wants no part of the ICC, in a sense amount to one: the 
U.S., while espousing the rule of law abroad, does not wish to see its military power and 
strategic scope for manoeuvre fettered by that notion and does not want to suffer the 
“indignity” of seeing its service personnel being tried in an international court. It 
supports ad hoc international criminal justice by special courts and tribunals on an ad hoc 
basis, but is fundamentally opposed to the cosmopolitan aspirations of a standing court 
with global reach. For better or worse, that decision is well within its rights as a 
sovereign state. In the frequently emotional tenor of the ICC debate this fact is frequently 
forgotten.
There are those who wistfully believe that this situation exists because President 
George Bush is widely seen as distrustful of international institutions. But it should not
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be forgotten that America’s positions were staked out at the Rome negotiations during the 
presidency of William Jefferson Clinton who had earlier lent his voice at the UN General 
Assembly in 1997 in the hope that the world would one day have a permanent 
International Criminal Court. Even as his government signed the Rome treaty just before 
he left office, it appeared as if the signature was appended more to justify years of efforts 
expended by the U.S. negotiating team, led by the dedicated David Scheffer, than for any 
other reason. Even had the signature not been subsequently "unsigned” by President 
Bush, the treaty would have been one of several others that the U.S. had signed without 
ratifying. The chances that any U.S. government will join the ICC are bleak. The story 
demonstrates once again the strength of the international society approach towards 
international criminal justice. That approach looks at how states actually behave, not 
only at what they say or how we wish them to act.
Going a bit further along what states actually do, a clear majority within the 
society of states decided to establish the ICC in its current form over U.S. objections. 
That is also a significant development in international relations. It demonstrated that, 
subject to the protection of their sovereignty through the complementarity principle, those 
states share a value of international cooperation for international justice through a 
mechanism that the U.S. did not. It is indicative of the tendency, seen as well during UN 
Security Council debates and negotiations over the use of force in Iraq in 2003, where 
some states are increasingly able to stand up to the United States. What this suggests is 
that the extent of U.S. power may be overrated.
The key to the defeat of the U.S. position in Rome was the united front of the 
European states, several of whom have positioned themselves in world politics as
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champions of human rights and liberal justice and have greater experience with 
supranational human rights oversight. These states project military power in the 
international realm mostly in the context of consensually agreed peacekeeping operations, 
and rarely in a unilateral manner68. This is a reflection of the "soft power" of those states 
compared to the "hard power" of the U.S. Clearly, the U.S. overrated its own power in 
relation to the Court, believing during the Rome negotiations that a Court without U.S. 
participation in terms of political muscle and financing was doomed to failure. There is 
no evidence that this will be the case — that the Court will go the way of the League of 
Nations. Should the ICC fail, it will more probably be attributable more to a failure by its 
states parties to live up to their obligations in the area of judicial cooperation with the 
Court than to America's absence from the Court.
Conclusion
The International Criminal Court, then, is as much a political as a legal institution. 
The process of its creation was one in which politics and law played a role. It was an 
exercise in plenipotentiary treaty-making by the political and diplomatic representatives 
of states, and, as we have seen, all parties were fully aware that their decisions and 
negotiating positions had political implications. It is precisely because of those 
implications that the United States and some other states have opted not to join the Court. 
But the delegates also argued their positions on the basis of international law, 
demonstrating the impact of international norms on international politics69. On balance, 
though, politics clearly prevailed. This should surprise no one, for virtually all law is
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indeed political insofar as it is comes into being through political acts aimed at ordering 
national or international society.
From the outset the ICC has become as much a political symbol as a legal one. It 
is the symbol, even before Iraq, of the rift in the transatlantic relationship between Europe 
and the United States that occurred at the beginning of the 21st century. Perhaps that rift 
can be healed, perhaps not. But insofar as the U.S. will not join the Court in the 
foreseeable future, it is indicative of a deeply divergent view of world politics — and its 
legalization — between Europe, on the one hand, and America, China and other non-ICC 
states on the other. It is the most profound demonstration of the rise of Europe’s soft 
power in world politics.
The Court’s universalist aspirations, though, will not be realized, stymied as it 
will be by the international society’s anarchical nature. The fact that the U.S. and a 
number of states in war zones — Iraq , for instance — are not members of the ICC has 
important implications for the Court’s potential reach. One of those is that national or 
mixed national-international tribunals, and even on the odd occasion the pure Yugoslavia 
or Rwanda -  type tribunals directly created by the U.N. Security Council, could be used 
in future in such places.
And, despite the arguments for such a court in the international society’s 
architecture, it’s centralization in the Hague will deny it of an important component of 
legitimacy -- psychological proximity and impact on the societies its work hopes to affect 
-- as seen from the experience of the U.N. ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
That a number of states have passed domestic legislation to place their laws in line with 
the Rome statute is not the same as internalizing human rights norms. The latter outcome
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has much to do with the socialization of norms outside legal circles, such as in domestic 
politics, and is best achieved in the context of physical interaction, and even more so by 
domestic, rather than international jurisdiction. At the very least the ICC should have 
some form of regional branches in Africa, Asia and Latin America, with a preponderance 
of judges from those regions sitting on each regional court, and with the Hague as its 
European headquarters or a type of appellate chamber. It is often forgotten that 
Nuremberg, hallowed as it is in the minds of many human rights activists, achieved 
political impact in Germany largely because it sat in that country amidst the ruins of war, 
and even then its impact was not immediate but took a generation to ossify.
The ICC is also hegemonic to the extent it will affect the internal sovereign 
choices of political communities, despite complementarity70. Whether this is good or bad 
I cannot be certain. It is perhaps too early to say which way that principle will turn out. 
Madeline Morris is on strong ground when she observes: “Because of the array of 
overlapping but also divergent interests at stake, the meaning of the ICC’s 
complementarity with national courts is neither obvious nor inconsequential”71. The 
weak states for which the ICC will have hegemonic outcomes have allowed those 
outcomes by their inability to put their house in order, and so, of course, an outside 
influence will necessarily step into the breach, with consequences that are not automatic 
one way or another.
In conclusion, while the ICC fills a certain gap that would have been better 
plugged by domestic societies, it is important not to have expectations of the institution 
that would be unrealistic, such as that it will wipe out man’s inhumanity to man. It will
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investigate, prosecute and punish some warlords, which would be a function common to 
all criminal law. But it will not end wars or evil.
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Correction to Chapter 9: New Introductory Paragraphs 
Introduction
There are three ways in which this thesis has sought to demonstrate the tension 
between political and legal responses to violations of international humanitarian law, and 
all three merge into the politics of the International Criminal Court. The first is the 
frequent tension between justice and order, which I treated mostly in Chapters 4 and 5. I 
have sought to demonstrate that, although justice is constitutive of order, the two 
concepts are frequently in tension. This is the case frequently in transitional justice, 
where trade-offs between justice and order often occur. South Africa’s transition from 
apartheid to majority rule and the non-prosecution of Hirohito are the most prominent 
examples. Just as demonstrative is the doctrine of universal jurisdiction discussed in 
Chapter 5, which is one of the reasons why the United States, a great power which sees 
itself as a guardian of international order, is opposed to attempts to make the jurisdiction 
of the ICC universally applicable to states not parties to the treaty establishing the Court.
This first challenge, the order-justice conundrum, inevitably leads to the second -  
the selectivity of legal responses as a way of maintaining the balance of the international 
society. This has been empirically demonstrated, I believe, by the practical inability of 
the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to indict members 
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front that now governs Rwanda for war crimes committed 
during the civil war in 1994. That inability is not accidental. It is a reflection of strategic 
calculations in influential parts of the international society -  calculations that are order- 
based in relation to the Great Lakes region of Africa and appear to have trumped the 
quest for impartial justice for Rwanda. In relation to the ICC, selectivity is demonstrated
445
by the exemption of United States personnel from possible prosecution by the ICC in 
Resolution 1593 (2005) of the United Nations Security Council resolution referring the 
crimes in Darfur, Sudan to the Court. This selectivity is based on the role of power in 
world politics.
Third, I have posited that the international criminal tribunals are a political fig leaf 
-  a convenient resort from the failure to take muscular action to prevent violations of 
international humanitarian law on a massive scale. The inaction over the crimes in 
Darfur, and the possibility of subsequent prosecutions in the ICC will serve this function.
From these perspectives, the hopes placed in the ICC as a potential ‘final solution’ 
to mass atrocities are misplaced. The politics of the ICC, however, while demonstrating 
these anarchical characteristics, also point to a more advanced international society. The 
chief indicator of this shift is that ethical concerns have become a greater force in 
international society than they once were. This is why a permanent international war 
crimes tribunal was established, overriding the objections of the United States.
It is against this background that we can now examine the politics of the 
establishment and jurisdiction of the ICC.
